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  iv 
Turkey’s bid to join the European Union is fraught with political tension and questions of identity, 
values and norms. In some ways, it is seen as on the central battlefield of Huntington’s clash of 
civilizations. It is also a matter of security and economic politics, with great geopolitical implications. 
This research explores why member states support or oppose Turkish membership in the EU. 
 This research investigates the Turkish membership policies of 15 EU member states from 
1997 to 2006 and tests 32 hypotheses drawn from international relations theories and approaches. 
These include variables related to security, power, and wealth; identities, norms and values.  In doing 
so it comes to some interesting conclusions and policy implications. 
 Contrary to common perception, it is not about security, economics or power politics 
between states, nor is it primarily about Turkey’s ability to meet the Copenhagen criteria of EU 
membership. By and large, the politics of Turkey’s bid to join the EU are not about Turkey at all. 
Instead, it is about the domestic politics of immigration in some member states and other member 
states’ own respect for human rights norms. The exception is Greece, which has a peculiar bilateral 
political dynamic with Turkey. Furthermore, this research finds that many more member states 
support Turkey than oppose its bid for membership. 
 In finding a parsimonious model of predicting member states’ policies, it develops policy 
options for Turkey to guide its difficult path for membership.  Rather than attempting to be a 
security asset and valuable trading partner, Turkey needs to muck it up in member states’ domestic 
politics, where the real challenges lie. Of course, it needs to meet the criteria for membership, but at 
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PREFACE 
This dissertation found its origin in a question about what the Netherlands’ policy was on Turkey’s 
candidacy for EU membership in 2004, when it held the EU’s rotating presidency. I sought an 
answer to this question because I was about to perform the role of the Dutch Presidency before a 
group of High School students, each of whom were also playing the roles of EU member-state 
leaders. This was in a Model EU simulation hosted by the European Union Center of Excellence at 
the University of Pittsburgh in 2006, when I was just embarking on my doctoral studies at the 
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. 
 For the next few years, I was the guy who was talking and writing about the 
Netherlands, the EU and/or Turkey, in nearly all my papers and projects. I received a generous 
research fellowship grant from the same EU Center to interview Dutch decision- and opinion-
makers, all in preparation for this grand single-case study that I was preparing. I lost count of the 
number of times I was asked: ‘Why on earth are you studying the Netherlands?’ or ‘Why does the 
Dutch case matter?’ Finally, in my proposal defense, I was strongly advised by my dissertation 
committee to broaden it out, include more countries – bigger countries – countries that really matter 
for EU decision-making. Despite being a little ruffled, because I wanted to believe that the 
Netherlands does matter, I took their advice.  
I ended up taking a very big bite – fifteen countries at five different episodes – and, to my 
surprise, that bite took two years to chew on and another to digest. The product of this ingestion is 
the present dissertation, the core of which are chapters 5 – 9, which develop, in meticulously cited 
and obsessive detail, the dataset upon which the subsequent analyses rest. With equal compulsive 
zeal, I developed the thirty-two hypotheses that the dataset is used to test. This I did without my 
committee’s knowledge, else they would have wisely advised me to test many fewer hypotheses. The 
responsibility for this fanaticism rests on my shoulders alone, and my committee deserves no blame 
for my excesses.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“If Turkey joins the EU… the victory at the Battle of Vienna will have been in vain.”  
~ Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, Leiden 2004. 
 
This, according to sound-byte reporting, is what European Commissioner Bolkestein said in a 
speech in September 2004, as the EU prepared to decide whether or not to begin accession 
negotiations with Turkey. The sentiment, often thrown at Bolkestein’s feet as part of anti-
Turkish/anti-Islamic fearmongering, is not entirely fair. He said that a union of many nations was 
not stable and that, like the Austro-Hungarian Empire, this instability would lead to the breakup of 
the Union. Furthermore, he said that continued spread of Islam in Europe would mean that the 
victory at Vienna would have been in vain.  
The misquote and the actual statement, however, both suggest that Turkey could do with 
accession what the Ottomans failed to do by force. The misquote leaves out the supposed method 
and the supposed purpose. Bolkenstein suggests that Turkey could destabilize the EU and migrating 
millions of Muslims into European countries would mean the destruction of European civilization 
through the spreading of the Muslim faith. By painting this picture of a clash between a conquesting 
Islam and a civilized multi-national Europe, he fed a dramatic narrative with invaders and defenders, 
between Western civilization and the barbarians at the gates. 
This implied narrative is, however, absurd. Accession is not conquest, nor is Europe under 
threat of becoming subject to an Islamic caliphate with a policy to change the religious beliefs of the 
Europeans. The “Islamization” of Europe presently does not amount to ten percent of the 
population anywhere in Western Europe. As absurd as the narrative is, its absurdity has not meant 
that it has been wanting for adherents. The drama of it has been its winning feature, even if it has 
been lacking in plausibility. As such, the narrative has been an effective vote-getter.  
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While Bolkestein’s Netherlands was not – at that particular time – preparing for elections, 
his political party, the right-wing liberal VVD, was in the midst of an internal struggle over Turkey 
and its bid for membership. This was also during the Netherlands’ tenure in the rotating Presidency 
of the EU, and Turkey topped the European Council’s agenda. The VVD’s foreign policy 
spokesman in Parliament, Geert Wilders, was at vehement odds with the party leadership on the 
question of opening accession negotiations with Ankara. The VVD had, in the general elections of 
2002, been crushed by the flamboyant Pim Fortuyn who campaigned on limiting immigration and 
criticizing Muslim culture. Fortuyn’s assassination left a vacuum in a new political market, one in 
which it was possible to win votes by agitating against Muslim immigration. By splitting with the 
VVD in the early fall of 2004, Geert Wilders successfully began to fill that vacuum and would, in 
time, gain immense electoral success. 
Geert Wilders’ success has not been alone in Europe. The Danish People’s Party is a 
forerunner. The Front National in France, the Northern League in Italy, the Freedom Party in 
Austria, Vlaams Blok/Belang in Belgium, the Sweden Democrats, and, more recently, the True 
Finns in Finland are also part of this phenomenon. All want stronger policies on immigration, 
especially immigration from Muslim countries. Opposition to Turkish membership in the EU is 
essentially a part of their overall narrative of defending their ‘civilized’ European countries against 
Muslim invasion.  
Lest it be thought that this is only an attack on the supposedly misguided politics of the 
political right, the political left has also used biased political narratives. The left has embraced the 
idea of spreading Western liberal values, defeating the Clash of Civilizations, and thwarting racism 
and bigotry by embracing Turkey, regardless of Turkey’s own merits. At several turns, governments 
of the political left have taken the pose of a benevolent tutor. Yet, these tutors’ grading was based 
on their own narrative-driven aspirations rather than the student’s performance, while at the same 
time making the crux of their argument about accusing their domestic political counterparts of 
discrimination and prejudice. As such, it cannot be said that the domestic political process has been 
the means by which member states have decided their rational interests. The political discussion has 
not been materially rational– on either side of the argument. The debate has been ideational and 
instrumentally contrived. 
This research is not, however, about political narrative; it is about the politics of Turkey 
joining the EU. The reason that the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ narrative leads off this introduction is 
because the findings point to the importance of that narrative in a particular set of member states. 
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Another finding is that this narrative is not a given. Public opinions and public policies in the 
member states have varied tremendously over short periods of time. As such, the narratives that 
drive public opinion are both factor and function in the domestic politics of these member states, 
and those domestic politics have ruled these member states’ policies regarding Turkey. They are the 
reason for Turkey’s troubled accession process.  
In all, the political debates about Turkey have had little to do with Turkey. Turkey’s own 
progress, or occasional lack thereof, has not led the member states to be more or less supportive of 
its candidacy. The enlargement regime has not been the same for Turkey as it has been for other 
member states, despite the protestations of those who would (sometimes rightly) hold Turkey to 
account for its failings. The Copenhagen criteria of membership are not the only criteria by which 
Turkey has been judged, nor have the Copenhagen political criteria been fully required for Turkey’s 
advancement. Furthermore, in order to become a member, Turkey will – beyond doubt – have to 
make political concessions that are outside of the Copenhagen criteria for membership, on Cyprus, 
on the free movement of persons, and probably on its historical understanding of the mass killings 
of 1915. 
In the broader terms of analyzing foreign policy, these domestic-political curiosities – minor 
parties who agitate against foreigners and their foreign ways – are left out of polite discussion about 
international relations. The dominant paradigm of international relations – rationalism – insists that 
foreign policies are decided on ‘hard’ rational grounds, not on xenophobic sentiment. Interests are 
supposed to be based on material things; not the functions of political narratives designed to 
obfuscate reality for political benefit. This rationale, furthermore, is based on what is good for the 
‘self’, and that self is assumed to be the state as a unitary actor. If foreign policy, on the other hand, 
is the result of domestic politics – which are decided more on domestic policy than foreign policy – 
then it can, in no way, be said that foreign policy is the result of a unitary actor acting for rational 
purposes. At best, it is the result of an actor with a multiple-personality disorder acting in favor of 
the interests of the personality du jour.   
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PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research has been to determine the factors that govern member-state policies 
regarding Turkish candidacy for membership. Like any such research it has the dual purpose of 
learning more about the case at hand and testing the theories that describe the social dynamics of 
the case. In terms of member-state behavior, much of this research has involved discovering how 
each member state’s policy toward Turkey’s candidacy has evolved over the course of a decade. 
Against this empirical record, a variety of plausible factors have been tested to determine what 
metatheoretical paradigm best explains the observed behavior. 
Because it is a case where, to a large extent, policies on the same question are made at very 
similar intervals, on a high-stakes political question of foreign policy, the question of Turkey’s 
candidacy to join the EU is one that is both fruitful and rich for foreign policy analysis. There are 
fifteen member-state cases, analyzed at five episodes, at 2-to-3-year intervals. That yields 75 data 
points and the rare possibility for quantitatively assessing foreign policies on a relatively simple-to-
categorize policy outcome. With this dataset, a large number of independent variables can be 
unleashed to determine if they are explanatory of the policies that the member states have expressed. 
This dissertation can, essentially, be divided into three main sections. The first part consists 
of the first three chapters, which pose the analytical precepts – the ontologies and epistemologies – 
that drive this research. The first chapter poses the broad ontological understandings of what 
motivates states and nations. In doing so it presents the two competing metatheories of international 
relations: Rationalism and Constructivism.  
In brief terms, rationalism is a metatheory drawn from the discipline of economics that 
combines the broad traditions of realism and liberalism as one paradigm in which states are unitary 
actors and act in pursuit of their material interests. These material interests are posed as being 
security, power and wealth. constructivism is a paradigm drawn from the discipline of sociology that 
takes culture as the driving force of human events. Broadly speaking, constructivism argues that 
identity, norms, and values are what guide behavior.  
What this chapter argues is that the current contest between these two metatheories has 
been analytically fruitless. Rationalism, in its ‘thin-theory’ form, is so expansive as to, essentially, not 
allow for any predictive power of interest definition. Its ‘thick-theory’ form is more rigorous, but it 
is still not conclusive about what, ontologically, constitutes a ‘material’ interest. This is particularly 
highlighted by constructivist critics of rationalism, who argue that security, power and wealth are 
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‘ideas all the way down’. Constructivists, in their turn, are also ‘fuzzy’ on what the boundaries of 
their theories are. Identities, norms and values can be taken as being expansive without limit, and 
cannot, therefore, rule out any forms of behavior. 
The second chapter takes these metatheories and the six components – security, power and 
wealth for Rationalism and identity, norms and values for Constructivism – and derives 32 testable 
hypotheses from these overarching metatheories. For security, security from regional instability, 
terrorism, and crime is taken into account. For power, power at the global, regional and domestic 
levels are considered, and for wealth, wealth in terms of agriculture, trade, investment and 
employment is analyzed. In terms of identities, religion and religiosity as well as nationalism and 
cultural differences are tested for. For norms, the institutions of the enlargement regime and 
socialization are considered, and in terms of values member states are gauged by their own respect 
for civil and human rights as well as their own levels of corruption. 
Chapter three describes the methodologies that are used to test these hypotheses. 
Independent variables such as military participation, terrorist incidents, degrees of external trade, 
population size, public opinion, the relative number of immigrants, trade surpluses, religion, anti-
Muslim sentiment, and a corruption perception index, are used to test the hypotheses posed in the 
second chapter. With a few exceptions, quantitative measures of correlation (Pearson’s R) and 
proportional reduction of error (gamma) are used to test the mostly ratio-level variables, both in 
static terms (in average across time) and time-sensitive terms (taking change over time into account).  
The second part presents the broad history of EU enlargement in chapter four, and the 
narrative histories of five separate episodes in which Turkey was on the agenda of the European 
Council. These five episodes are each contained in chapters five through nine. Chapter five 
considers the events leading up to the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997. At that 
time Turkey was treated differently from other applicant countries, but nevertheless invited to attend 
a conference for all countries “aspiring to accede to” the EU. Chapter six considers the 
developments leading to the Helsinki European Council in 1999 when Turkey was confirmed as a 
candidate for membership. Chapter seven considers the Copenhagen European Council of 2002, 
when on the sidelines of the signing of the ratification treaties that would enlarge the EU by ten 
countries, Turkey was denied for starting accession negotiations. Chapter eight describes how the 
Council came to a different decision in 2004 when, under the Dutch presidency, the member states 
agreed to start accession negotiations with Turkey starting in October 2005. In 2006, described in 
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chapter nine, however, the member states decided to freeze several chapters of negotiations in order 
to compel Turkey to open its harbors and airports to (Greek) Cypriot ships and airplanes. 
What these chapters demonstrate is that the member states had varying policies toward 
Turkey’s candidacy for membership. Some, such as Italy and the United Kingdom, have been steady 
supporters, whereas others, such as Austria and Denmark have been fairly steady opponents. Most 
countries, however, changed their policies over the course of the five episodes. Countries such as 
the Netherlands, Finland, Germany, Greece, and Luxembourg have opposed and supported Turkey, 
changing their policies with some frequency. The purpose of this empirical record has been to 
determine what the policies of the member states were in each of these episodes and provide the 
research with a dependent variable. 
The third part is the analytical part of this research. The first of these chapters, chapter ten, 
summarizes the dependent variable as this was set in the preceding five chapters. It then tests the 
Rationalist hypotheses posed in chapter two. It tests twenty-one of the thirty-two hypotheses put 
forward in that chapter. It finds that there is significant support for the hypotheses related to 
domestic politics, and that the relationship between domestic politics of the countries with relatively 
large Turkish communities and the expressed policies is particularly significant. By comparison, the 
variables related to security, power at the global and regional levels, and wealth are less significant. 
Chapter eleven, in turn, tests the eleven Constructivist hypotheses. It finds that perceptions 
of cultural differences significantly explain trends in member-state policies, but less so when 
measured across time. In this regard, it provides a less powerful explanation than the domestic 
politics of immigration do, and suggests that perceptions of cultural differences are a function of the 
domestic politics, rather than a leading factor in forming them. It also finds that human-rights and 
rule-of-law values have relatively significant predictive powers.  
Notably, this chapter finds that religiosity is counterintuitive in its predictive value. Countries 
that have greater church attendance are more likely to be supportive of Turkey than countries with 
less church attendance do. As such, it is clearly not the case that the churches are convincing public 
opinion to oppose Turkey. Nor is it the pope, despite his opaque statements about Turkey. In that 
sense, the Christians are not the ones keeping Turkey out of the ‘Christian club’. That said, Catholic 
countries (Austria and Luxembourg notwithstanding) are more likely to be supportive of Turkey 
than Protestant countries are (the United Kingdom notwithstanding), yet with such striking 
exceptions to the rule that the rule is not a very good one. Further, it is also not evident that 
countries with higher levels of intolerance toward Muslims are more likely to oppose Turkey than 
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more tolerant countries are. As such, the common understanding of what has kept Turkey from 
having an easier road to membership is not demonstrably true. 
Chapter twelve takes tally of the findings of the previous two chapters. It takes the domestic 
politics explanation – where those countries with relatively large Turkish communities – and 
analyzes what other variables are explanatory in the context of the domestic politics of these 
member states. In other words: what explains the other member states? What is found is that among 
the remaining member states, the countries with higher human rights standards are more likely to 
oppose Turkey than countries with lower human rights standards are. A partial exception is Greece, 
which – unsurprisingly – has a peculiar relationship with Turkey.  
In this context, the chapter proposes a typology of member states with three categories: the 
politically-motivated countries, the habitual drivers, and the human-rights sticklers. Again, it treats 
Greece as an outlier from the typology because of its peculiar relationship with Turkey. The 
politically-motivated countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands) 
are the countries with relatively large Turkish communities living within their borders. In these 
countries it is the changes of government, between left and right, which generally explain the 
changes of policy. By-and-large, right-wing governments oppose Turkey whereas left-wing 
governments support Turkey.   
The habitual drivers (Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom) generally 
support Turkey, though some of them do not always get off the sidelines to make their views on 
Turkish membership heard. They are characterized by lower human rights standards than other 
member states. It is also noteworthy that public opinion in these countries is less informed about, or 
less interested in, Turkey’s candidacy, as more Eurobarometer respondents respond with ‘don’t 
know’ when asked about their preferences for future Turkish membership in the EU.  
The human rights sticklers (Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden) are countries with high 
human rights standards that have a greater tendency to oppose Turkey than the other countries 
have, but are also more likely to be supportive when Turkey’s own human rights standards are 
improved. These countries were uniformly opposed to opening accession negotiations in 2002 and 
were uniformly supportive in 2004, after Turkey had made significant advances in human and civil 
rights standards. 
Based on this typology and a country-by-country assessment of the driving factors of policy, 
the chapter finishes with a set of recommendations for Turkey to adopt in order to navigate its 
remaining road to membership. It does not pretend that accession will be easy for Turkey to achieve, 
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or even certain – regardless of Turkey’s efforts. Turkey should improve its human rights standards 
and complete the necessary reforms in adopting the acquis communautaire – the body of EU laws. 
Once these are implemented, it shall have to make certain painful concessions in order to win the 
ratifications of the accession treaties. It must come to an arrangement with Cyprus about the future 
of that divided island, one that ensures mutual recognition between these two countries. This will 
also, likely, involve an arrangement with Greece. Turkey should also negotiate some level of 
recognition about the events of 1915, generally called the Armenian Genocide. Without doing so, it 
will be very difficult to bring French socialists on board. The French socialists will doubtlessly have 
to be in power for France to ratify an accession treaty with Turkey, and the Armenian community 
has influence in that political party.  
Finally, Turkey will, more than likely, have to offer the concession of permanent safeguards 
on the free movement of persons. This will probably be the only way in which the political right in 
the politically-motivated countries does not veto an accession treaty. With immigration being the 
well-spring of the anti-Turkish narrative, the prospect – realistic or not – of a flood of immigrant 
Turks will have to be taken off the table. While both unfair and humiliating, it is something that will 
be more likely to be overturned at a later point in time than it seems possible to ratify an accession 
treaty with all member states with the free movement of persons intact.  
  9 
1.0  METATHEORY 
International relations is a very broad field of study. Essentially, it studies how foreign policies are 
decided, and how all the different foreign policies affect the world, and how the interactions of 
those foreign policies create new factors in foreign policy-making. As the world becomes 
increasingly internationalized, foreign policies take more and more issues into consideration. Theory 
is necessary in order to make sense of everything. Because of the increasingly broader scope of 
foreign politics, it is also necessary to disentangle particular questions from the broader world of 
international relations and attempt to understand what dynamics are more relevant to any particular 
question, and what dynamics can be ignored. 
As a social science, international relations, as a sub-set of political science, is mindful of the 
broader schools of thought in social science theory. The purpose of this chapter is to explore what 
has been written about the overarching approaches that international relations scholars have devised 
to support their theories about why states behave the way that they do. Social science, from its 
different disciplines, has developed certain frameworks of thinking about social phenomena. At the 
present juncture, the great debate among the social sciences, as they are manifested in international 
relations theory, is between the rationalist approaches coming out of the discipline of economics, 
and the constructivist approaches coming out of the discipline of sociology. This chapter first 
explores these approaches, from which the second chapter can propose theories and hypotheses to 
test the theoretical propositions.  
 Because any project such as this one cannot explore the whole broad scope of 
international relations theory, and because any one researcher or reader does not have infinite 
interests it is necessary to narrow in on particular questions. The particular question in this research 
– the case that shall be explored for its own sake as well as for what it teaches about foreign policy-
making – is why states decide their policies regarding Turkey’s ambitions to join the European 
Union. This question fits into EU enlargement studies, which is a subset of EU studies and 
European politics. These, in turn, are part of foreign policy studies in general, which are subsets of 
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international relations and political science. All these disciplines, sub-disciplines, and sub-sub-
disciplines have their existing bodies of work, with much overlapping and cross-fertilization. Just as 
it is beyond the scope of this project to encompass even a fraction of the totality of understanding, it 
is also impossible to review all that has been written on the matter. Below, however, is a quick 
outline of the state of EU-enlargement studies that will help place this research on the broader 
research map. 
1.1 EU ENLARGEMENT STUDIES 
In assessing the state of EU enlargement studies, Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier 
(2005, p. 6) divided the different aspects thereof into four categories: the politics of applicant 
countries, the politics of member states, EU-level politics, and the impacts of enlargement. This 
particular project fits into the second category: the politics of member-states. The central question of 
this category is: what motivates member states to have certain positions on enlargement and not 
other positions? It is, however, understood that the third category, EU-level politics, is structured by 
the different alignments of the member-states, but that these also create the context in which 
member-states decide their policies. Decisions are a function of different arrangements of power, 
and power is inherently a relational concept. Furthermore, to the degree that member-states are 
governed by a rationalist logic of consequences, the fourth body of work is relevant for the decisions 
that member states make. 
In Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s table (ibid., p. 7) that lists what sort of work had already 
been done, much of which was in their edited volume, they identify a void in two forms of analyses 
of member-state politics: cross-sectional comparisons between states, and longitudinal comparisons, 
looking at the behavior of states over time. This project seeks to diminish that void. While it is 
limited to looking at one particular candidate country, it is a country of significance and peculiarity, 
whose candidacy has captured many fears and imaginations in Europe.  
That is not to say that there is a void in the above-mentioned literature as to why states make 
the decisions that they do. That body of work is so voluminous that there is no point in cataloging it 
here. What will be done, however, is an assessment in the metatheoretical foundations of theories on 
foreign-policy making.  
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As such, this chapter outlines the theoretical and philosophical grounding of the different 
hypotheses being tested in the present research. It broadly engages the theoretical and the 
metatheoretical understandings in order to provide this research with an intellectual scaffolding from 
which to draw hypotheses. In so doing it differentiates ‘mid-level theories’ from metatheories, also 
known as paradigms. The section below describes what is meant by metatheories, after which the 
pursuant sections will describe the the two dominant metatheories, before the next chapter explores 
different derived theories of foreign-policy making in the organizational context of the European 
Union.  
1.2 METATHEORIES 
Theories are ideas about why phenomena happen, attempting to explain them from one concept to 
the next. Metatheories are ideas about what sorts of concepts should be addressed by theories and 
why. Also, they identify the relevant actors of analysis and to what sort of stimuli these respond. 
There are two metatheories that have gained particular salience in political science, and especially so 
in the study of international relations. These are rationalism and constructivism. 
1.2.1 Rationalism and Constructivism: an Overview 
Rationalism is an overarching paradigm for the realist and liberal theories, which have been the 
theoretical/philosophical battle lines of many decades past. Both of these theories drew inspiration 
from economic theory and ontology, which emphasized scientific approaches and frameworks for 
analysis. Having adopted these approaches and frameworks, realism became neorealism and 
liberalism became neoliberalism, essentially jettisoning any room for culture and ideology. Both 
suggest that they are highly materialist and have a utilitarian and individualistic ontology at their core, 
with some variations depending on which scholar one reads. Central to the differences between 
them was a zero- or constant-sum logic vs. a positive-sum logic.  
Where rationalism was inspired by economics, constructivism entered the political science 
debate out of sociology, calling everything that had been said neorealists and neoliberals into 
question. In doing so, constructivists undermined the notion that the materialist utilities or 
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rationalists were, in fact, material at all. They questioned if such material-sounding concepts as 
security, power and wealth were really materialistic, in the sense of pertaining to physical objects, or 
if they were functions of different mental maps. 
Constructivism has claimed that materialist imperatives – security, power and wealth – are 
‘ideas all the way down’, while rationalism explains behavior that is seemingly ideational or cultural 
as being a cover for ulterior materialist motives, i.e. politically acceptable behavior necessary for the 
pursuit of power. Ultimately, then, both rationalism and constructivism can explain the exact same 
observations. The difference is what sort of motivations lie unobserved within policy makers’ heads. 
Yet, this is analytically fruitless. If both theories can explain everything, they cannot teach anything.  
Enter scholars trying to get back to making sense of why political leaders do what they do 
and these scholars are presented with unfathomable ontological and epistemological scaffoldings on 
which to hang their observations and ‘mid-level’ theories. Most of them embrace the paradigm they 
like and dismiss any protestations from other schools of thought without engaging the critiques. The 
best minds attempting to solve this conundrum give the struggling researchers the advice: don’t 
worry about the metatheories. They also advise the researchers avoid the route of the 
anthropologist, stamping around barefoot in the mud until the mud starts to make sense1. Do not 
get too abstract; do not get too grounded. Think about what you’re doing, but not too much. Do 
not break your head on Habermas or poke your toes on twigs lodged in the muck.  
The problem with the mid-level theories is that they come from different schools of thought 
and it is important to not finagle one theory to its detriment and so support another theory more 
generously conceived of. Another problem is the choice of how and what to analyze, as some 
paradigms, theories and metatheories, lend themselves more to explaining than others do.  
1.2.2 So What? 
If both paradigms are, then, too amorphous to make sense of, what is their utility and how does that 
pertain to this research? Their utility is in their primary orientations. They help guide the researcher 
in forming initial hypotheses: e.g. if one presumes the state as actor, and its interests as security from 
violent instability, what would be the state’s interest regarding Turkey and its prospect for 
membership. How might the force of that interest compare with that of a neighboring state? From 
                                                
1 Many thanks to Joseph Jupille for this metaphor. 
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the other side, e.g. if the people of state are more religious than that state, how might their 
identification with Turkey differ? 
Conducting this broad exercise allows the researcher to focus in on the set of variables that, 
in a multivariate model, seem to best explain the behavior of the actors in question. Once that is 
done, further research within the context of those can help come to further insight in the social 
dynamics of the case and, hopefully, insight into broader realms of political activity. Along the way, 
the researcher is exposed to the raw data – politicians’ statements, their individual behavior, the 
relationship between political maneuvering and policy outcomes – that greater understanding can 
take place in order to guide that further research. 
This research cannot go all the way to the end of this investigative road. It shall not discover 
the Higgs boson of human and political decision-making. As the following chapters will explain, its 
purpose is to find a limited set of variables that most helpfully explain the observed behavior in the 
case of Turkey and its bid for membership in the European Union. The findings of this research can 
then help guide future research toward, at least, a better explanation of the interaction between self-
interested action and other-interested impulse.  
To this end, this chapter reaches up to the ethereal plane of metatheory in order to outline 
where specific hypotheses that can explain the decisions that political leaders make can be drawn 
from. In the sections below those metatheories are outlined, whereby rationalism assumes that 
actors have interests, probably materialistic, which they pursue for their own gain and utility, and 
constructivism posits actors as having identities, norms and values, which they express and live by. 
Each section looks at five different elements: identification of actors; interests; cognitive 
limitations/maps; internal divisions; and room for dialogues and distinctions. Following these 
treatments of the metatheories, the chapter will consider where these metatheories overlap and 
where they differ from one another in order to suggest contrasting expectations. Once that is done, 
the pursuant chapter will deal with taking the expectations and identifying discrete hypotheses from 
them. 
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1.3 RATIONALISM 
Rationalism is the school of thought that emerged from the discipline of economics and has been 
particularly dominant in international relations theory. It deals with rationality from the economics 
perspective – the rational actor model – which is materialistic, objective and individualistic. 
Rationalism’s general presumption is that actors have material self-interests, which center on 
security, power and wealth, which are pursued by means according to effectiveness and efficiency. 
Rationalism dismisses normative arguments as being explanatory in themselves. These are nothing 
more than the rhetoric that provides a cover for the real – material – motives of actors. In 
rationalism, norms are not internalized, values are strictly related to material gain, security and 
power, and identities are treated as given – only useful in the way actors are distinguished from one 
another.  
The following paragraphs discuss rationalism’s precepts on individualism and interests 
(security, power, and wealth). They further treat the concept of bounded rationality and the internal 
divisions within the rationalist paradigm. Finally, it discusses on what fronts rationalism must be 
distinct from constructivism in order to be meaningful, and on what fronts there is conceptual 
overlap, creating a possibility for theoretical synthesis. 
1.3.1 Actor Definition: Individualism 
The rationalist approach requires a specified choice of the level and the unit of analysis. By 
definition, rationalism is about self-regard in a materialistic sense. The more narrowly the ‘self’ is 
defined, the purer and more true the degree to which the rational actor model is ontologically 
precise. The purest approach (barring an exploration into divided psychologies) is to define the actor 
as an individual human being. In the realm of politics, the narrow reading of individualism points 
toward analysis of individual politicians and their narrowly egoistic interests.  
In the field of international relations, the individual actor, however, tends to refer to states. 
Because of the dense structure of political organization at the state level, individual politicians are 
placed into a dizzying array of fiduciary responsibilities. Because of this Byzantine maelstrom of 
interests, it is taken as far more parsimonious to assume the state as being a rational actor, with 
egoistic material interests, which are objectively identifiable.  
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Yet, it is worthwhile to, for a moment, contemplate the intra-state level of analysis of an 
individual political actor within the state system. A Foreign Minister, for example, represents his/her 
colleague ministers from the cabinet toward the Parliament, the nation toward other countries, 
his/her political party within a coalition government, particular constituencies within the political 
party, and any organized interests which have given him/her support for certain purposes. A 
Foreign Minister also has to represent the international level to the national level of politics. The 
politician’s art is to juggle all these fiduciary relationships between those principals/constituencies, 
for which he/she is the agent, and reap the surplus rewards for doing so. Rationalism would dictate 
that such actors align those interests and selectively (mis)represent them in order to wield a 
maximum of individual power within the political system. 
In cases where the international level of politics is one of vitally high stakes – where mistakes 
can have fundamentally dangerous consequences of life, death and the destruction or usurpation of 
a political order – then there is little question that individual politicians must ‘hang together’, else 
they shall surely ‘hang separately’. This is the precept of the realist theory of international relations.  
However, political decisions at the international level actually very rarely have those sorts of 
consequences in the estimable future. They concern trade treaties, the language in the charters of 
international organizations, or the invasion of some country that has previously been rendered 
harmless. This reality – that the overwhelming bulk of decisions made at the international level of 
analysis are not of vital importance to the continuation of the state or to the lives and limbs of its 
valuable citizens – means that it is less imperative for individual politicians to cooperate seamlessly. 
They may have significant interest in winning domestic conflicts, such that they might leverage the 
international political environment toward domestic political goals. This is the lesson of Robert 
Putnam’s logic of two-level games (1988). 
One purpose of this research is to see if there is room to consider the domestic level of 
analysis to have greater explanatory power than the international level of analysis. If there is, then 
rationalism is not necessarily falsified. Yet, the central presumption of mainstream rationalist 
theorizing in international relations – that the state is the unitary rational actor – becomes 
questionable. It becomes more questionable when it can be shown that the domestic level of analysis 
proves to be more explanatory than the international level of analysis in questions that are high-
stakes, even if they are not vital stakes.  
This, not incidentally, is the purpose of the case study, beyond its other interesting qualities. 
The question of Turkey joining the European Union is a very serious question with tremendous 
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consequences. Should Turkey join the EU, it would mean a firmer relationship with very powerful 
ally in a very strategic location. Its sheer population size would unquestionably shift the balance of 
power in the EU’s institutions, and its relative poverty (in GDP/capita) and massive agricultural 
sector, would upset the economic balance of power and wealth in the Single Market. If, in the 
context of this question, member states nevertheless succumb to the press of their domestic politics, 
then international relations theory has some serious explaining to do.  
Because theory is, by definition, an abstract understanding of a complex reality, allowances 
must be made against a demand for total reductionism to the individual human being or politician. 
Abstract aggregations to the political party, the government department, or to the state are more 
reasonable. Nevertheless, rational choice theory must be careful with this holism. Narrow self-regard 
is axiomatic within the paradigm, and therefore the self-definition is crucial. At the very least, the 
self-definition must be static, in that the actor definition, be it the individual, the state, or the 
organization – and, therefore, the unit of analysis – does not change over time, within the same 
research. More specifically, the rational actor model assumes that the unit of analysis treats itself as 
the unit of analysis with regard to its utilitarian calculus. 
This research will generally follow the approach of assuming the state as the rational actor. It 
will certainly take the state as the unit of comparative analysis, looking at the behavior and the 
characteristics of 15 member states of the EU. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence suggests that it 
is useful to unpack the state, given that domestic politics frequently determine the policies, rather 
than the objective interests of the state as a whole.  
1.3.2 Interests: Security, Power, and Wealth 
The hallmark of the rationalist approach is its concern for those things considered material, i.e. ‘real’ 
and ‘tangible’. The criticism from constructivism is that those things that are said to be material 
interests are, in fact, just as much ideas as shared identity, norms and values are. Perhaps that ‘real’-
ness that rationalism hopes to get at is better defined by discussing ideas that are more imperative 
and of a higher order of importance than others are. Also, that the ideas are so broadly shared that 
they are – with few exceptions – universally accepted by all those in political power and with 
sufficient understanding of the world to make roughly accurate analyses.  
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This is closely related to the ontological/epistemological necessity for the interests being 
objective; interests cannot be subject to peculiar individual preferences. The real crux of the 
rationalist paradigm is, thus, not the material-ness of interests in terms of pertaining to control over 
physical things, but the broad purchase in being recognized as being imperative. This is where 
rationalism and constructivism must differentiate from one another: the degree to which recognition 
of the central imperatives of behavior is common to all actors within a social system. The more they 
are commonly recognized, the more interests are objective, and the more likely that rationalism can 
explain them. The less objective they are – the more interests are constructed by particular groups of 
people – the more constructivism will be necessary to explain behavior.  
First among the objective interests of rationalism is the interest for continued survival of the 
actor in question. Nothing matters to one who has ceased to exist. Therefore, maintaining one’s 
existence has the highest order of importance. For the human being, death is a very real prospect. 
This is as true for the head of government as it is for the beggar in the street. Prevention of death 
and bodily harm is the foremost imperative of human beings, as is protecting one’s ability to make 
choices that protect one’s vital imperatives. For the state, the concept of ‘death’ is a greater 
abstraction, but territorial integrity, maintenance of the monopoly of the use of legitimate force2, and 
freedom of action are conventional analytical proxies to human death, harm and freedom. All of this 
falls under the concept generally called ‘security’. 
The ability to make choices that influence one’s environment, and other actors within that 
environment, is the overall object of political science, and is generally called ‘power’. Power, is, 
however, one of the most fluid and indefinable concepts. It depends heavily on context – the 
conditions of the environment and the relationships with other actors in that environment. 
Traditionally, in the realist paradigm (examined further below) of international relations, power has 
been examined through the lens of the ability to threaten the security of others and so coerce them 
to do one’s bidding. In the liberal paradigm, other forms of influence – by manipulating the rules of 
regimes or by the transfer of agreed-upon tokens of wealth – are also taken into account. Regardless 
of the precise details from these somewhat conflicting paradigms, this is the concept of power. 
A particular form of power, acknowledged by all schools of political science, is the ability to 
build coalitions of support for mutual interests. In the study of international relations, this is 
                                                
2 This phrase is drawn from Weber (1922), as is much of the conceptualization of this section. 
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generally covered in studies on alliance formation. When ‘power’ is discussed below, it will refer to 
this ability to wield influence over others by forming such coalitions. 
The form of influence resulting from the mastery of wealth is a highly abstracted form of 
power. It is also one that is highly quantifiable and intricate methods of tracking the flows and 
means of this type of influence have been developed, generally, by the study of economics and 
political economy. It results from counting the agreed-upon tokens of wealth, which are generally 
acceptable and highly fungible. Wealth is also measured in levels of economic activity. The growth 
of gross domestic product (GDP) generates more fungible influence for states (fiscal revenue), and 
since it is measured in the same units as revenues are, it is also a measure of well-being of states (the 
inadequacies of such measures for doing so notwithstanding). 
Because of the widespread recognition of the imperative utilities of security, power and 
wealth, these are generally considered as more ‘real’ interests than other concepts that exist between 
the ears of people. In the alien language of constructivism, they may be intersubjective ideas ‘all the 
way down’, but they are exceptionally broadly recognized ideas, which gives them a force of a 
completely different order than other ideas, such as culture, religion, ‘soft power’ or other ‘fuzzy’ 
concepts based on conjecture. What is particularly salient here is that these imperative interests are 
functions of the structure. They are not functions of individual choice; any other actor, placed in the 
same situation, would behave in the same way. 
1.3.3 Bounded Rationality 
Bounded rationality – a concept introduced by Herbert Simon (1982) – accounts for humans’ 
imperfect capacities for calculating the different utilities of competing options. Homo Sapiens’ inability 
to be Homo Economicus has sometimes been used as a foil for the rational actor model. A related field 
of study is that of biased (as opposed to balanced) misperceptions, most notably done by Robert 
Jervis (1976). However, neither the theory of bounded rationality nor the concept of misperception 
undermines the idea that behavior results from individual actors consciously choosing to pursue 
their perceived self-interest  (Gardner, 1985). 
What these theories point out is that there are limitations on the ability of researchers to 
reverse-engineer what the reasons of decision-makers must have been. A researcher cannot always 
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know what misperceptions a political leader may have been subject to3. Because rationalism requires 
objectivity – the notion, mentioned above, that any actor in a similar situation with the same 
information would make the same decision – it is very difficult to reproduce the exact same set of 
misperceptions. Some would say that it also makes the rational actor model less falsifiable, which is 
convenient both for those who want to cling to it and for those who want to dismiss it.  
What is critical, here, is that the biases of bounded rationality and misperception are 
relatively constant and consistent with the interests of the rational actor model and not the functions 
of concepts alien to the imperatives of the paradigm. Misperceptions such as the overestimation of 
the nefariousness of one’s enemy simply heightens the already-present concern for security, whereas 
conception of a particular actor as an enemy due to a contrasting characteristic of identity (such as a 
difference of religion or ideology) is one that skews the conception. So too, the bias of risk aversion 
tends to shifts interests away from other interests back toward security, and from long-term interest 
to short-term interests.  Risk aversion is a degree of preference for a less optimal outcome than for 
an uncertain outcome. It implies the costs one is willing to bear in order to have a higher level of 
certainty about what those outcomes will be.  
Another form of rational hedging is the cognitive map – an actor’s conceptual orientation of 
the world (Monroe, 1991). Originating in psychological experiments on rats running around mazes, 
the idea of a cognitive map is a mental depiction of the social and physical environment, with a 
complex of routes, paths and relationships between concepts that translates information into 
decisions and actions (Tolman, 1948). Homo economicus has a comprehensive and accurate map; Homo 
sapiens does not. Because Homo sapiens, like Rattus norvegicus, has an imperfect cognitive map and has 
learned some general solutions to some general problems, he regularly applies some general 
solutions to all problems, whereas Homo economicus would calculate the perfect solution to any 
problem. The willingness to live with the suboptimal outcomes because the cost of calculating every 
single solution to every single problem is simply too high is called satisficing. The cognitive map 
suggests a set of solutions that tend to work for a set of problems. The limitations in scope and 
specificity of one’s cognitive map, coupled with the lack of willingness to find a particular solution 
to a particular problem, essentially defines the degree to which one is a satisficer.  
If cognitive maps are such that they are functions of different worldviews (e.g. religion, 
ideology, and culture), and the effects of those maps significantly bias decisions in certain ways, then 
                                                
3 So too, a researcher will frequently not have the all the information that a political leader may have had. So it may be 
the researcher who is subject to misperceptions. 
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the rational actor model runs into problems. To a very considerable degree, the rational actor’s 
interests need to be objectively understandable and neutral with respect to culture or worldview. 
When push comes to shove, the actor will flee rather than drink the hemlock, even if his culture, his 
laws, and his own political philosophy tell him that drinking the hemlock is the appropriate thing to 
do.  
The obscure boundary of the paradigm comes when power is derived from behaving 
appropriately in a cultural context, where influence is derived from managing and manipulating one’s 
environment by demonstrating culturally appropriate behavior. If rationalism is true, the actor does 
not internalize the norms and values of a culture and these do not take the place of his objective 
interests. However, because the actor has every reason to maintain the illusion that he is driven by 
norms and values, in order to maintain trust, he has every interest to obscure his objective self-
interests.  
The other question is the environment. To what degree is culture the common cognitive 
map of a group of people, which reduces transaction costs and provides the solution to coordination 
games? And, to what degree is culture the function of identities, norms and values that do not have 
their origin in solutions to social cooperation problems. If rationalism is true, the former degree 
must heavily outweigh the latter. Again, the problem is one of measurement, as these things are 
largely unobservable. 
1.3.4 Internal Divisions 
Like any such broad approach, there are different schools of thought within rationalism. A major 
divide has been (neo)realism vis-à-vis (neo)liberalism, wherein the former posits a conceptual world 
of relative-gains logic, and the latter an absolute-gains logic. The difference is one easily explained 
with the old joke (origin unknown) of two campers encountering a bear. According to the absolute-
gains logic, the two cooperate to drive off the bear, while according to the relative-gains logic, each 
camper attempts to escape the bear faster than his companion is able to. The result of this is that in 
the positive-gains rationality of the neoliberals, cooperation is both possible and likely, whereas in 
the relative-gains rationality of the neorealists, cooperation is rare and fleeting. In realism alliances 
hold only so long as it is useful for all members of the alliance in the face of a greater external threat, 
and conditions of continual distrust put continual strains on the ability of actors to act in concert. 
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A critical difference between liberalism and neoliberalism, which is critical for this research, 
is that the former considered internal characteristics of the state as factors in their behavior. The 
mainstay theory of liberalism was the democratic peace theory; that democracies do not choose to 
go to war with other democracies. As such, it used an internal characteristic of states as explanatory 
for their behavior toward one another, even if only to explain one particular form of behavior (going 
to war or not).  
Neoliberalism, on the other hand, adopted what neorealism had also embraced: the idea that 
the imperatives of the international structure were far more important factors of behavior than 
internal characteristics were. By holding that internal characteristics made certain actors behave 
differently, opened liberalism to the charge that it was not a rationalist theory. Rationalism requires 
objectivism. Because rationalism holds that any given actor, with any given set of capabilities, placed 
in any given situation will have the same response as any other actor in that same situation, the 
internal characteristics of the actor cannot matter in a rationalist analysis.   
While the differences between realism and neoliberalism have been the subject of many long 
debates, this project assumes that the neoliberals have won the internal debate of rationalism. This is 
so especially in the context of the European Union, where cooperation is manifestly possible and 
durable, and where there is a distinct lack of security tension between the powers of Europe. These 
two realizations put realism in a particularly unfavorable light. That is, however, not to say that, even 
within the European Union, actors are not concerned with the gains of others in comparison to 
their own. Those disparities, however, lead to continued bargaining and compromise, rather than a 
breakdown in bargaining in compromise.  
The implication of this assumption of the absence of zero-sum logic is that this research 
does not pose hypotheses derived from theories of competition between states – only each state’s 
desire to improve itself without measurement against the degree to which other states improve 
themselves. That said, the analyses done are put in a comparative framework in the sense that those 
states who stand to gain less will be less likely to support Turkey for membership, even if they do 
stand to benefit some. In that regard, zero-sum logics can be inferred, even if they are not the 
theoretical origins of the analyses.  
The neoliberal conception of regime theory, which theorizes about cooperative institutions, 
is one where there is comparable understanding and even overlapping terminology with 
constructivism and institutionalism. In this sense, neoliberalism is a rational choice theory that 
incorporates the idea that norms are factors in behavior. Norms are regularized modes of behavior, 
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intended to signal to others that one’s behavior will continue to be predictable, and agreements 
previously made will continue to be observed. Regimes are intervening variables between 
preferences and behavior/outcomes (Krasner 1983, p. 8). As such, neoliberalism is already a form of 
metatheoretical dialogue, which incorporates institutionalist elements within an overarching 
rationalist framework and ontological approach.  
Another debate between rationalisms is the difference between thick- and thin-theory 
rationalism. Thick-theory rationalism is that which posits interests as specifically given – materialistic 
(or highly imperative and/or objective) – and also pursued effectively and efficiently. Thin-theory 
rationalism does not assume what the preferences may be, taking preference-formation as 
exogenous to the model, but concerns itself, instead, with the effective and efficient pursuit of those 
interest preferences. As such, thin-theory rationalists allow for non-rationalist interests, while 
maintaining the implications of the theory for the mechanics of conflict and cooperation, such as 
exemplified by game theory.  
Table 1.1, grids the four combinations possible between these four divisions in the 
paradigm. All quadrants except the neoliberal-thick-theory rationalism box are shaded, as they will 
not be considered by this project.  Thin-theory is dismissed as the purpose of this research is to 
understand the motives, not the strategies, of member states. Neo-realist thick theory is dismissed 
because its predictions are not-on-keeping with the fact of the perpetuation of the European Union4.  
                                                
4 That is not to say that Realism is irrelevant in the study of, for example, South Asian politics, but the zero-sum logic no 
longer seems to be in evidence in Europe. 
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Table 1.1 Four Types of Rationalism According to Two Divisions in the Paradigm. 




Interests are materialistic and 
subject to a positive-sum logic. 





Interests are materialistic and 
subject to a zero-sum logic. 
Interests are exogenous and subject to a 
zero-sum logic. 
 
1.3.5 Distinctions and Possibilities for Synthesis 
It is useful to conceive of the reasonable boundaries of rational choice theory. In order to be an 
explanatory framework, it must have self-imposed limits, otherwise it excludes nothing and becomes 
non-falsifiable and useless. As mentioned above, the constructivist critique of ‘materialism’, 
including the social constructions of security, power, and wealth, is an inauthentic attack on 
rationalism. These concepts, while sometimes frayed at the edges (currencies gaining and losing 
value based on confidence, the ‘idea of state’ as a focus for security concerns, and the idea of ‘soft 
power’), nevertheless have sufficient common purchase – they are so thoroughly intersubjectively 
recognized – that they can be considered facts, even if they are socially constructed.  
However, they do require some definition in order to be analytically useful. Wealth refers to 
the greater control over economic goods and services. Power refers to the influence one actor can 
have over the actions of other actors, and security refers to the protection an actor has against being 
(coercively) influenced by other actors. Barry Buzan (1991) highlights how one of these three, 
security, can be a slippery concept as it can include the idea of the state, held by both the inhabitants 
of the state and foreign actors, which can include character definitions of what kind of a state the 
state is. Rationalism can legitimately consider the cohesiveness of that state idea as a security 
concern, but the cultural or ideological makeup of the state is beyond the pale as a security concern 
under rationalism, insofar as these ideas do not diminish the state’s relevant freedom of action.  
The existence of these concepts of wealth, power, and security as social facts, however, 
creates a need for definition and theoretical allotment in order to distinguish material rationalism 
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from constructivism, but at the same time it demonstrates that the two approaches do have some 
overlap, and that possibilities for theoretical dialogue are not non-existent, even at the ontological 
level.  
Two particular fronts on which rationalism can have dialogue with constructivism are on the 
fields of norms and world-perception. Both of these arise from the fact of bounded rationality; the 
notion that human, state, and organizational actors have only limited ability to comprehend their 
environment and as a result of this they rely on forms of cognitive shorthand. One such form of 
cognitive shorthand is the reliance on norms of behavior, which is discussed by neoliberal regime 
theory, under the heading of institutionalism. Another is the factor of regular misperceptions 
creating regularly skewed perceptions of the world, as a subjective ‘life-world’ that is at variance with 
the objective world as it really is. What rationalism will, in both cases, require, however, is that 
adherence to norms and skewed perceptions of the world be common to any type actor in the same 
(or very similar) position.  
1.4 CONSTRUCTIVISM  
Constructivism calls all of the above tenets of rationalism into question. According to this paradigm, 
politics (and, for that matter, the rest of social life) is largely made up of shared ideas, rather than 
physical material (Wendt, 1999). The reason for action in constructivism follows a sociological 
understanding of rationality. Political action by political actors depends greatly on their worldviews, 
or ‘life-world’ (Habermas 1981/1984). Actors act according to what seems both rational and 
appropriate to them in their biased perceptions of the social environment and their self-definitions, 
as they perceive themselves in relation to their environment. 
The bumper-sticker difference between rationalism and constructivism is that the former 
operates according to the logic of consequences in objective world while the latter operates according to 
the logic of appropriateness in subjective worlds. This is not an especially novel distinction coming out 
of the wave of constructivism of the 1980s and 1990s. The Max Weber drew these distinctions as 
being zweckrational and wertrational, respectively (Weber, [1922]1968, p. 24-25)5 many decades prior. 
                                                
5 Weber also added logics of emotion and tradition. 
  25 
Another bumpersticker statement is Alexander Wendt’s general notion that international politics is 
“…what states make of it” – not so much subject to imperatives as they are subject to cultures 
(Wendt 1992).  
Yet, these bumper-sticker encapsulations of constructivism are insufficient. They incline the 
cursory reader to believe that constructivists posit the world of international politics subject to 
infinitely variable factors, adrift without anchors. Yet, while political cultures may be inconstant, they 
are not instantly and infinitely variable either. The normative frameworks of regimes can be more 
durable than the distributions of power or the organizational stipulations of the regimes out of 
which the normative frameworks developed (Ruggie 1982). 
Life-worlds and their expressions in norms, values and identities, develop slowly over time 
(though great upheavals can also have dramatic and rapid life-world-altering effects). If 
constructivism posited that shared ideas were infinitely and instantly mutable, and, indeed subject to 
rapid change, then it would probably be impossible to build theories around them, because it would 
be impossible to make meaningful general statements about the state of political affairs. Positing 
cultural and sociological factors as (generally) slowly evolving is what makes them scientifically 
testable. If this were not so, one would be better off reading the newspaper than any academic tract 
in order to understand the political world. Conversely, if shared ideas were constants and shared by 
all significant actors in the political system, the understanding of the shared ideas would almost be 
irrelevant. A constant variable (which, then, would not be a variable) would not explain the 
developments in world politics. In order to be interesting, social variables have to be variable – 
across time and/or place/actor – but not infinitely and instantly so.  
 Unlike rationalism, constructivism has been less thoroughly examined and specified 
in studies of international relations. In order to compare and contrast constructivism with 
rationalism, it is useful to posit categories of comparison at the ontological level. First, the 
individualist aspect of rationalism is specified. In constructivism, identities and definitions of ‘self’ 
and ‘other(s)’ are not taken for granted. Second, rationalism takes interests as defined by the pursuit 
of imperative motivations. In constructivism, interests are functions of and, possibly, factors in, 
identities. Thirdly, notwithstanding the limitations of bounded rationality and misperceptions, 
rationalism also posits that cognitive maps are uncomplicated by biases of cultural mental maps, 
while in constructivism, worldviews and cultures are taken as exceptionally explanatory. Biases in 
perceptions do not simply reinforce objectives and/or material interests. Instead, they create peculiar 
motivations that give particular actors different motivations than other actors.  
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Unlike rationalism, which has been the subject of at least a century of internal divisions, the 
internal divisions of constructivism have not been sufficiently belabored so as to discern distinct 
schools of thought that have been at analytic war with one another to the degree that identifiable 
positions have emerged. The debate, rather, has been against rationalism and internecine struggles 
have mostly been at the level of individual scholars or aimed at the utility of positivist scientific 
approaches.  
That said, in clear division within the broader school is methodological. Many constructivists 
oppose the positivist imposition of the scientific method (Kratochwil & Ruggie, 1986). Yet, that is a 
position that is at odds with the purpose of this research, and will, therefore, not be considered here 
to any reasonable extent. Many constructivists (e.g. Jepperson, Katzenstein, Wendt, Schimmelfennig) 
happily embrace the conventional epistemology of positing hypotheses and allowing empirical 
evidence to reject or fail to reject such hypotheses, and thus come to an increasingly more informed 
understanding of the mechanics of social interaction.  
1.4.1 Actor Definition and Identities 
Above, the actor definition of rationalism – the individual – was taken as given by the research 
agenda. If one is studying the behavior of states, then the individual state is generally the unit of 
analysis and therefore the actor. That actor takes itself as the point of reference, and the interests of 
other actors are not taken into account, except insofar as the interests of others are useful for the 
self. Additionally, identities are essentially treated as constants in rationalism, wherein the level of 
analysis of the particular theory defines the identity of the actor. Once so defined, the identity is 
constant and self-serving.  
In constructivism, on the other hand, identities are variable. They are complex in that the 
actor being studied may have a different self-definition than the analyst’s definition of the unit of 
analysis. Actors may conceive of their identity as shared with other actors, and therefore act in 
solidarity with actors sharing that identity. This aspect of constructivism is particularly interesting in 
cases of irredentism and separatism, where the concepts of ‘the nation’ and ‘the state’ do not 
overlap, and people of overlapping identities of one sort may clash (sometimes violently) with 
members of the same identity, because their identity of another sort conflicts. It is also interesting in 
cases of concentric identities, where different levels of identity are present – Bavarian, German, 
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European – or they may be overlapping: simultaneously Dane and Christian; Italian and Christian; 
Italian and Muslim; Dane and Muslim. Understanding the politics of identity as a factor of behavior 
involves understanding what type of identity is most salient at a particular time in a particular 
context.  
In terms of analytic specification, any selection of a unit of analysis is acceptable as long as 
the associated actor makes decisions, and as long as it is understood that the actor may have a 
different definition of identity than strictly as itself. The unit of analysis may feel solidarity with, or 
hostility toward, particular other units. The researcher, however, has to make useful decisions as to 
what actors to study, and what identity and solidarity/hostility definitions to assume, if those 
patterns of identity and self/other definitions are not the subjects or objects of empirical study. 
1.4.2 Identities, Values and Norms as Interests 
Because of a major focus of constructivism in international relations theory has been in agitation 
against the rationalist paradigm, much that has been written about identities, norms, and values has 
been in terms of attempting to prove that they matter, rather than specifying what, exactly, they are, 
and how they are, at least conceptually, distinct from one another. An overview of identities has 
already been offered above.  
Norms come in different types and are recognized both in neoliberalism and constructivism. 
In neoliberalism, norms are strictly interpreted as patterns of, or constraints on, behavior. In thick-
theory rationalism, only materialistic interests (security, power, and wealth) are valued because of 
their clearly utilitarian nature. Norms are thereby limited to being standards of behavior, the 
deviation from which will unsettle other actors in the system, possibly causing them to retaliate in 
ways that will bring costs to the norm-deviating actor.  
In constructivism, norms are internalized and they become integral to the construction of 
preferences. Non-imperative social concerns (such as spreading democracy, human rights or 
maintaining the religious identity of a people) factor into the preferences of actors. Norms, in the 
sociologically standard use of the term, are collective expectations about the proper behavior for a 
given identity, rather than the expected behavior of actors. Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 
(1996) argue that norms can be “regulative”, which is the minimal way in which the rationalists use 
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them. However, they also argue that norms can be “constitutive” of identities, making it clear whom 
the actors in the political system are, and implying what they want. 
Wendt (1999, p. 250) differentiates between norms/rules that are followed because of force, 
price and legitimacy: the first, essentially in his Hobbesian (realist) world, the second in his Lockean 
(neoliberalism), and the third in his Kantian (constructivist) world. While his constructivism covers 
all of these – as each dominant logic is the function of the culture of the epoch – it is necessary to 
separate out the Kantian norms, because the rationalist theories already have a claim on the other 
epochal cultures, and the point of this exercise is to draw distinctions.  
When norms operate below the radar of consciousness, and they are not contested, they may 
simply be treated as solutions to cooperation problems that are so taken for granted that no one is 
thinking about them. They are, then, essentially objective. However, when norms are challenged – 
for example when they are contested because two cultures of norms clash, or because an ideology 
calls these norms into question – then they become analytically interesting.   
In a constructivist paradigm, distinct from rationalism, contested norms are supported not 
because they are convenient or because they are negotiated or imposed, but because of their 
relationship with values. Frequently, they are connected to unspoken traditional values with norms 
dictating the way things are done because they have ‘always’ been done that way. When those norms 
are challenged, so are the culture and its values. However, sometimes the values – and even the 
alleged traditions – are recent constructions in which people rare led to believe. One such example is 
the notion of America’s culture of self-reliance, when the actual originating culture of American 
colonialism and expansion is one of cooperation in the face of a challenging environment.  
Values, on the other hand, are abstract notions that are held dear, and their disregard is 
eschewed, for their own sake. They are what give constructivist norms their legitimacy – because 
norms are closely related to values. Traditional or nationalistic norms and values are, in turn, 
inextricably related to identity6 and are valued because the identity is valued. The protection, or, 
indeed, the spread, of the values calls for action – not because the norms are so taken for granted 
that they operate under the cognitive radar, but because they are contested. 
                                                
6 The argument can be made that all norms and values are connected to identity, not just traditional and nationalistic 
ones. 
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1.4.3 Cognitive/Mental Maps 
If culture is a significant factor in behavior, then different cultures will produce different cognitive 
maps and similar cultures will produce similar cognitive maps. By contrast, rational actor models 
operating under situations of bounded rationality, will not behave differently from one another. Any 
variation in behavior will be a function of the different environments or particular niches in the 
environment. In constructivism, then, the different cognitive maps as the functions of different 
cultures, create significantly different perceptions of the world, and – therefore – different 
understandings of what is rational and appropriate. These different understandings create different 
world views.  
Habermas (1984) calls these ‘lifeworlds’, and constructivism posits that these mental maps 
have more than the logic of consequences built into them. It is not about rats finding food in an 
efficient manner, but a whole host of incentives that give an individual or state their meaning. If 
constructivism analytically useful, political cultures coalesce around different lifeworlds/mental 
maps: ideas about how the world works, broadly shared by members of the culture.  
To a very great extent, the liberal paradigm – descended from the Enlightenment movement 
of the 18th Century – has been the dominant paradigm in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, and became more broadly shared in Europe and elsewhere after the Second World War, 
with the military defeat of a somewhat different paradigm, nationalism7.  
The basic philosophies of the liberal paradigm have been materialism, individualism and 
rationalism. It is not coincidental that these are also the tenets of the rationalist paradigm described 
above. They are, after all, the product of Anglo-American social science.  Likewise, the western 
scientific method of learning has marched shoulder-to-shoulder with rationalism into the far-flung 
reaches of the globe, where the West has attempted to inspire (or impose on) non-Western people 
the adoption of Western ways. 
Where rationalism and constructivism must part ways with this history, however, is where 
the question of ‘why?’ arises. If rationalism is true, then the West imposed all of this as an efficient 
means of extracting resources, exporting intra-European wars, and keeping the Western world safe 
from an invasion of outside threats. If constructivism is true, then the road to hell was paved, at 
least partly, with good intentions. The Western missionaries came to save the souls of the heathens 
                                                
7 This is not to suggest that the Enlightenment was absent in continental Europe, but there were very significant lapses 
in the embrace thereof. 
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because the heathens would be better off with their souls saved, not because saving another’s soul 
saved one’s own.  
1.4.4 Internal Divisions: Epistemology 
In constructivism, the main divide among constructivists is epistemological in that a significant 
faction views any embrace of what is called positivistic social science as an anathema to their way of 
learning about the social world. From their perspective, it is a surrender of their central finding, that 
the scientific method is part of the rejected false paradigm. Mainstream constructivists, however, 
accept the scientific method as an acceptable scientific practice. In any case, it is the way in which 
Western intellectuals in Western culture conduct their inquiries. As that is the case, then there 
should be nothing wrong with continuing to do so; doing in Rome as the Romans do. Especially as 
this is a research agenda that looks at Western culture, this research also adopts the Western 
scientific method.  
More seriously, however: much of constructivism, in the purest sense, seems to neglect the 
Popperian revolution of science with Karl Popper’s 20th century appeal to see falsifiability as the 
criterion to validate science. This method of inquiry does not conclude that what ‘science’ finds 
must be true, without regard to other points of view. It suggests that those things found to be 
empirically false should be discarded from consideration. The truth can still depend on one’s point 
of view, but an honest scientist cannot make up his/her own facts where those facts are 
demonstrably false.  
This may not lead toward the same level of understanding about the social world that 
physical sciences have attained in the physical world, because human beings, interacting in social 
environments, frequently behave differently from one individual to the next and can alter their 
behavior from one time period to the next. Humans have the ability to strategically adapt to their 
environment and create cognitive mental maps that help them understand that environment in the 
ways that the subjects of the natural sciences do not. Science is one of the means of doing so (even 
if many if not most policy makers ignore the lessons of science). Nevertheless, it is still very useful 
for at least defenestrating those ideas about the social world, as it has existed, which patently do not 
hold up to empirical reality. Doing so is still an advancement of learning, which increases the general 
knowledge of the social and political world. The use of the scientific method remains a very useful 
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tool in increasing general knowledge alongside more freestyle inquiries such as the other 
constructivists use, and those who embrace the humanities approaches. 
1.4.5 Limits and Opportunities for Dialogue 
As with rationalism, constructivism has within it the danger of swallowing up everything on order to 
explain anything. Doing so runs the risk of uselessness and there are even greater dangers for this 
with constructivism than there are for rationalism, because of the seemingly infinite malleability of 
its explanatory factors. Because constructivism allows itself to be so malleable – as culture can 
change and any individual can be assigned multiple labels of identity, each with their own behavioral 
implications – culture can easily be assigned to any form of behavior after-the-fact. 
As such, constructivism is in dire need for specificity and predictions that exclude certain 
forms of behavior. This research is an attempt to do so, with several approaches stemming from the 
three supposed motives for behavior: identities, norms and values. Several frames of identity, as 
these seem to relate to the subject matter – religion, nationalism, and perceptions of cultural 
difference – are tested against the dependent variable. So too, norms take the form of regime rules 
and levels of socialization. Values are framed as embrace of human and civil rights and levels of 
corruption (ie. rule of law).  
In doing so, it must also clearly distinguish itself from rationalism. If rationalism is adopted 
as a discourse that has great purchase and which most people use, then we might as well simply use 
rationalism and discard constructivism and the notion of discourses. That does not mean that there 
should not be opportunities for inter-paradigmatic dialogue. These are treated more fully below, but 
one particular avenue for such dialogue would be to think about how certain discourses are created 
instrumentally for the purpose of generating power: making people believe what one wants them to 
believe and making them believe they always believed it.  
This is advanced as the idea of instrumental narratives that politicians and opinion leaders 
use to explain policy challenges to their audiences. These narratives are created in such a way that 
the audience will prefer to believe these politicians and opinion leaders over other politicians and 
opinion leaders, and so power shifts from one faction to another. The narratives do not necessarily 
win because of their adherence to verifiable reality, but due to their believability. Believability is 
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suggested to be more of a function of drama than of accuracy, though there are some limits on the 
degree to which politicians and opinion leaders can skew the truth to their advantage.  
This is, however, not the aim of the present research. This research attempts to discover 
what realm of politics best explains state behavior in the case at hand. The metatheories of 
rationalism and constructivism are used to inspire hypotheses that will help discover the most 
parsimonious explanation for that behavior. 
1.5 METATHEORETICAL DIALOGUE 
At the present juncture, the great debate in international relations theory is a contradiction between 
these two metatheories. While much work has been done to attempt to demonstrate the superiority 
of one approach over the other – or the inadequacy of the other in favor of the one – many scholars 
are attempting to bridge the divide between the two schools. One aspect of the debate, however, 
that has proven to be highly problematic for completing the dialogue exists at the ontological level. 
The purists on each side usually put this ontological argument forward. Some closer toward the 
center argue that the ontologies of rationalism and constructivism may simply be irreconcilable, and 
that the best approach is to simply move ahead with the “mid-level” theory and empirical 
observation without getting hung up on the foundations of the theories (Fearon & Wendt 2002; 
Jupille et al. 2003). 
However, the purists on both sides have valid critiques of one another. Observing scientist 
plod along empirically or at the mid-level, as if the contradictions do not matter, makes one wonder 
if the human-rat analogies drawn by the above-mentioned murine psychologists are more poignant 
than one should hope for8. Yet, a problem in the combining of, or establishing a dialogue between, 
rationalism and constructivism is that they are, at their core, fundamentally contrasting approaches 
to understanding the world, as well as contradictory approaches to learning about the world. 
Drawing on the points made above, there are four main areas of distinction: actor definition and 
identity, positing interests, cognitive imperfection and contrasting epistemologies. Any dialogue 
between the theories would have to address these core differences.  
                                                
8 That is not to say that this research goes beyond that recommendation. It is an exercise in deductively positing 
hypotheses in order to arrive at an inductively-based understanding of what motivations, together, best explain the case, 
regardless of their paradigmatic origins. 
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A guide by Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel (ibid.) offers a suggestion of four means by which 
scholars can move forward: competitively testing the metatheories, separating them by domains of 
applicability, using them in sequential orders, or by one of the metatheories incorporating the other. 
To a large degree, their suggestions have long been taken up by scholarship. Competitive testing has 
been the mainstay of the debate, and the domain of application is, really, a non-starter. Who decides 
what turf belongs to whom? Are high-stakes conflicts, such as those concerning security really more 
subject to the realpolitik of realism than they are to constructivism? How far down the ladder must 
one go in order to shift from one explanatory paradigm to another? 
More interesting are their suggestions of sequencing and incorporation, but these are already 
commonplace approaches. Sequencing is either thin-theory rationalism (constructivist preference 
ordering, and rationalist goal-seeking), or institutionalism (the solution to rational bargain at t1 
becomes the institutional, and normative, context of the rational bargain at t2). Incorporation of 
norms and rules into an overarching Rationalist paradigm is what neoliberalism is all about, while 
constructivism, as it has been written, already argues that rationalism is one of many possible 
discourses.  
The way forward chosen by this research is to not care that the ontologies of different 
explanatory frameworks differ. The findings suggest that a combination of factors drawn from both 
paradigms work best to explain the case. It works in practice, even if it fails in (meta)theory. The 
solution must be to re-conceive of the metatheory if the metatheoretical distinctions fail to work, 
not the other way around. 
1.6 METATHEORY AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This research finds that the best explanatory framework for understanding the member-states’ 
policies regarding Turkey’s prospect for EU membership is a combination of domestic political 
factors coupled with levels of immigration and adherence to human rights standards. Where the 
member states had many Turkish immigrants, the decision to embrace or reject Turkey was based 
on the outcomes of domestic elections. In these countries, right-wing parties opposed Turkey and 
left-wing parties embraced Turkey. Where there were no such concerns over immigration, domestic 
political developments did not matter. Instead, it is the remaining member states’ own adherence to 
  34 
human rights standards that best helps predict the policies toward Turkey they would embrace. It 
helps to consider Turkey’s own progress toward meeting the human rights standards of the 
Copenhagen criteria, but doing so has marginal added explanatory value. 
Immigration politics is a factor that is deduced from the rationalist approach while relaxing 
the stipulation that the state is the unitary actor. Political parties desire power and campaigning 
against Turkish membership has proven to be a winning issue for right-wing parties. Once in power, 
these political parties have attempted to block, slow down and derail Turkey’s accession process. 
The same is not true of right-wing political parties in countries without large Turkish immigrant 
communities. 
The more ‘hard-core’ rationalist imperatives – security, wealth and power at the regional and 
global levels – have marginal explanatory value, if any value whatsoever. From the constructivist 
side, the usual explanations – religious bigotry and/or the requirement that Turkey first adhere to 
European norms and values – prove not to have significant explanatory value. Instead, it is the 
member states’ own regard for human rights that is more explanatory, in the absence of domestic 
political motivations.  
As the central hypotheses of the competing metatheories have proven to be inadequate to 
the task of explaining the case, it is necessary to scratch one’s head and consider what went wrong. 
Surely the many decades of metatheory-building have not been in vain, even if there has been no 
lack of mutual denouncement. What does this case suggest about a method for inter-paradigmatic 
dialogue?  
The first recourse is to look closely at the case at hand and see what the evidence suggests. 
In the process of ‘soaking and poking’ into the material, what is very striking are the arguments used 
by the policy-makers. It does not take a consummate cynic to think that the politicians and opinion 
leaders use arguments selectively to pursue power. As such, it is quite rational for them to design 
their political rhetoric around the messages that will appeal to their audiences and propel them 
toward victorious elections. Doubtlessly, some of them believe, or come to believe, their own 
messages, and those messages frequently have arguments not based in material or objective interests. 
The array of arguments aligned against Turkey: that Turkey is not a European country; that 
Turkey’s dominant religion makes it unsuitable as an EU member; that the cultural differences 
and/or historical memories are just too great, or that Turkey’s behavior with respect to Cyprus and 
human rights are commonplace in the rhetoric of Turkey’s opponents, yet none have their basis in 
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rationalism. Why would these arguments appeal to Europe’s electorates if the electorates were 
rational? Why should politicians be presumed to be rational if their electorates are not? 
The answer, most likely, lies in bounded rationality or, more blatantly, ignorance. Members 
of the electorate are frequently uninformed about many of the basics of the case. Politicians and 
opinion leaders, who – themselves – are not always the most informed, seek to give them enough 
information to satisfice a need to feel sufficiently informed to have an opinion. This information, 
embedded in an explicit or implicit dramatic narrative, motivates audiences to arrive at opinions. If 
the politicians and opinion leaders are successful, the audience is swayed by the overall argument 
and this results in changes in public opinion and, thus, political fortunes. 
This research cannot say which of Jupille et al’s four categories of metatheoretical dialogue 
best provide a most useful framework for understanding. The answer is clearly not either rationalism 
or constructivism in a competitive testing model. The narratives and the emotions which they appeal 
to are not mere deviations from the overall model, nor are the politicians and opinion leaders slaves 
to their own discourses – they are their authors and they are instrumentally designed for the 
accumulation of power. This is simply one case, and cannot say that it represents one sequence or 
another, though the formation of narratives may be rationalist as an instrumental means to power, 
while their subsequent appeal might be a more cultural phenomenon, and thus constructivist. 
The finding that member states’ high-stakes foreign policies are functions of their domestic 
politics (or their embrace of human rights) calls any domain of application separation between 
rationalism and constructivism into question. If the one domain of politics is leveraged (or 
mortgaged) in favor of the other, then it is difficult to say that one paradigm belongs in one domain 
and another belongs in the other.  
Finally, subsumption is little more than a friendlier (or pedantic) version of either/or 
competitive testing. That said, subsumption of either type – rationalism within an overarching 
constructivist framework or vice versa – is probably the most useful way to proceed. What matters is 
that they provide useful hypotheses, and allowing a fruitful interaction of deductive and inductive 
research to take place so that the science is guided by the real world, rather than paradigmatic 
preferences. 
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2.0  THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES 
The Metatheories described in the previous chapter, without elaboration, are poor predictors of the 
actual patterns of behavior of actors. They provide for competing frameworks of thinking, and the 
underlying ‘physics’, as it were, for building theories, but they do not directly provide a concrete 
understanding of what particular motives explain what particular types of actions. Furthermore, it is 
necessary to place the motivations and impulses into context in order to apply them toward 
understanding behavior. In order to use the physics of metatheory to understand the behavior of 
actors in international relations, it is necessary to introduce engineering to the physics, and 
understand how the motives and impulses of metatheory are applied in real-world settings. 
This chapter uses the metatheoretical approaches discussed in the previous chapter to 
further explore the theoretical implications within the context of European Union politics 
concerning possible Turkish membership in the EU. It operationalizes the different theoretical 
approaches into testable hypotheses. Following the Popperian methodology described in the 
previous chapter, it is necessary to dismiss a host of plausible notions about why certain EU 
members might support Turkey and others might not.  
It is, of course, impossible to hypothesize and test every possible variable that could 
conceivably explain why states behave the way that they do, nor is it likely that any single variable, 
even if derived from a plausible theory, could explain the entire range of behavior that states exhibit. 
Nevertheless, it is desirable to test as many as possible within reasonable margins. In order to bring 
structure to the inquiries to be made, this chapter takes the motivations and impulses, identified in 
the previous chapter, and derives theories that explain state behavior. The first half of the chapter 
looks at theories and hypotheses derived from Rationalism and the second half looks at theories and 
hypotheses derived from Constructivism. 
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2.1 RATIONALIST THEORIES  
Rationalism posits security, power, and wealth, as the reasons that states do what they do, because 
these concepts capture facets of life that are considered to have a greater imperative for human 
action than notional identities, norms of behavior, or abstract values do. In order to apply these 
concepts to generalized motivations of state behavior, however, they must be conceptualized in 
more detail. In order to stay true to the metatheory of Rationalism, these conceptualizations must 
also be distinguished from non-Rationalist conceptions of security, power and wealth. Doing so is 
the purpose of this section of the chapter. 
2.1.1 Security  
For a long time, scholars of international relations theory have treated security as the overwhelming 
imperative in the anarchic world of self-helping actors. The precarious struggle for survival has been 
taken as eclipsing any secondary considerations, such as domestic politics, ideology or religion. 
Further, economics are only a useful lens to the degree that the economic structure helps fuel states’ 
means of conducting war. As such, the study of international relations has been dominated by 
attempts to understand why states go to war against one another, and how security from being 
conquered or coerced must be the foremost concern of statesmen and override all other national 
interests. What use is getting a leg up in an international treaty or possessing the exclusive rights to 
some other country’s exports, when a militarily stronger neighbor is going to take it all away?  
2.1.1.1  Security from Coercion 
Security from coercion is thus the classic frame of reference for understanding power in an anarchic 
system. Famously drawn from Thucydides’ Melian dialogue, the strong do as they can and the weak 
suffer what they must in order to survive. States use threats or actual violence to force their 
neighbors to behave as they are directed to. This traditional conception of security relations is 
derived from the writings of Kenneth Waltz (in particular 1979), for whom the international balance 
of power was determinative, and Stephen Walt (1987), for whom the balance of threat is 
determinative. The difference between the two is a subtle one, where the essential theory of the 
former considers concentrations of global power to invite balancing – countries seeking to enhance 
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their freedom from coercion by opposing the domination of the dominant global power through 
alliances with the lesser powers. Walt’s permutation on this idea is that countries balance against 
particular threats to their individual autonomy without regard to the global distribution of power.  
While Waltz’ balance of power theory may explain the behavior of great powers, it is a 
difficult theory to apply to smaller countries, because if its central tenet were true, all countries 
would balance against the dominant global power, assuming they had the decision-making capacity 
to do so. In that regard, the balance of threat is more workable in the context of Europe. According 
to Walt’s Realist theory, states would balance against those other states that are most likely to 
dominate them because of a particular state’s aggregate abilities, proximity, offensive capabilities, or 
expressed aggressive intentions.  
While Walt’s theory may well hold true in continents like Asia and in the Middle East, it is 
difficult to make the case for present-day Europe, where the development of offensive capabilities is 
lackluster and where expressed aggressive intentions toward one another is completely absent. 
Perhaps it is due to the United States’ maintenance of NATO and its continued military presence in 
Europe that has prevented John Mearsheimer’s (1990) predictions of a return to 19th and early 20th 
Century coercive European politics from coming true.  
Regardless of why, it is taken as assumed that coercive politics are absent in Europe, aside 
from some prevention of humanitarian disasters and instability in the Balkans. One exception is 
Greece. In 1996 there was a very real specter of war with Turkey over two rocks in the Aegean Sea 
inhabited by goats. While it is certainly not inconceivable that Greece’s behavior on Turkey’s 
membership was strongly influenced by its stochastically hostile relationship with Turkey, it is 
inconceivable that Turkey forced Greece to support its membership on pain of invasion. As such, 
without prejudice for security from coercion being a real factor in foreign policy behavior, it is not 
treated as being explanatory of politics in the EU. 
Assumed that direct coercion is obsolete in the West as it currently exists, and that 
colonialism is a political system of the past, the objective of security policy is maintaining a stable 
environment in which the threat of violence remains remote and resources have few troubles in 
flowing to European shores. As such, European countries have concerns for both regional and 
global stability. Threats to regional stability have come in the shape of civil wars in the Balkans, the 
(supposed) development of weapons of mass destruction in Iran and Iraq, and the support of 
massive terrorist operations out of Afghanistan. In addition to regional instability and terrorism, 
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another security concern is transnational crime, which undermines each state’s ability to monopolize 
the use of force within their borders and protect their citizens from harm.  
Many have argued that tying Turkey closer to Europe is a security interest, because Turkey is 
an Islamic country. The reasoning is that a Turkey that is both Islamic and democratic, tied closely 
to Europe, provides a powerful symbol and creates an avenue for civilizational dialogue. Such a 
dialogue would, supposedly, diminish Islamist terrorism aimed at European countries and provide 
inspiration for other Middle Eastern countries to democratize. That may very well be the case, but 
that is an understanding of security that is wholly alien to security in the ‘material’ sense. In the 
material sense, Turkey would be a stabilizing factor in its sphere of influence, straddling the Balkans 
and the Northern Middle East. From the materialist security perspective, the argument would be 
that Turkey could leverage its troops, its counter-terrorism and law-enforcement capabilities, and its 
diplomats in order to help the member states enforce or negotiate solutions to, or prevention of, 
armed conflicts, terrorism, and/or transnational crime. 
It is assumed that politically and administratively integrating Turkey into the EU makes 
Turkey more stable and predictable for European countries and more aligned with their general 
security interests. Furthermore, because Turkey has expressed its strong interest in joining the EU, 
European countries can extract security gains from Turkey, with its strong military, which is already 
integrated into NATO structures.  
This understanding creates a general interest for European countries, but not, necessarily, 
one that creates an interest that distinguishes between the member states. Given that the member 
states are not unanimously supportive, the critical question is analyzing why certain member states 
would have a greater interest than other member states, from a cooperative security perspective. 
Why would the United Kingdom or Ireland have a greater interest in Turkey contributing to 
collective European security than, say, Denmark or Austria? 
That is where three different security dimensions, separate from security from coercion, 
come in. These are security from regional instability, security from terrorism, and security from 
transnational crime. The following three sections will consider each dimension in turn, present an 
operational understanding of each dimension, and propose testable hypotheses. 
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2.1.1.2  Security from Instability 
The first of these security threats usually results from certain states being unable to maintain control 
over their territories and/or engaging in such behavior that will threaten their respective regions 
with instability, either by way of refugees, irredentism, or the pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction. In these instances, the surrounding states and states with a global scope collaborate to 
stabilize the instable area. Examples are the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia. The Balkans 
has been subject to security missions because this area is geographically close to countries with the 
organizational wherewithal to mount an active cooperative mission (provided they are led by the 
United States). The Middle East invites involvement because it is where the oil comes from, and 
Central Asia has become a place where Western countries have intervened because it became a 
haven for terrorists with the intent to strike globally9.  
The mechanism for (re-)imposing order is usually by way of coercive diplomacy or  
cooperative military intervention. These are used to coerce the ‘rogue nation’ into adjusting its 
aberrant behavior or to impose security directly by putting security forces on the ground. For most 
countries, contributing to these missions is costly and each has an incentive to free-ride on the 
burden sharing, or, at least, to contribute less than their share. Conversely, the threat of instability 
impacts each of the countries in the security community to a different degree, giving them each a 
different cost and benefit balance to calculate. From rationalist assumptions, each country will 
contribute enough to allow the mission to be successful, given a certain expectation of how many 
forces will be necessary to achieve that goal, but not more than necessary to achieve that goal. As a 
part of this, there is a strategic calculus looking at the contributions of other countries, and 
attempting to induce them to incur more of the cost of deploying peace-keeping/enforcing forces.  
In terms of numbers of soldiers, Turkey has the largest military in Europe aside from Russia. 
Furthermore, Turkey’s military is integrated into NATO and is thus already a part of the Euro-
Atlantic security framework. Assuming that Turkey could chart its independent geopolitical 
orientation away from Europe, if it chose to do so, European countries have an incentive to 
persuade Turkey to keep its security orientation aligned with theirs. EU-membership is a way to 
offer Turkey something that it has expressed an interest in and simultaneously anchor it into a 
European orientation.  
                                                
9 These terrorists could, and have in the past, set up their activities in any country with limited internal monopolies on 
the use of force. As such, there is nothing special about Central Asia in this respect, aside from the customs of protective 
hospitality practiced by its inhabitants and their dominant religion. 
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The challenge in analyzing this theoretical motivation for member states in enlarging the EU 
with Turkey lies in identifying a proxy variable that captures the member states’ relative interests in 
maintaining collective security. One approach is simply looking at participants in the existing 
regional security framework – NATO – and seeing if NATO members are more likely to be 
supportive of Turkey than non-NATO members are. The problem with this hypothesis, is that 
NATO membership does not change much over time, with the same volatility as member states’ 
positions on Turkey change. It is, however, possible to look at the underlying likelihood of NATO 
members being more likely to support their fellow NATO member at any given instance than non-
NATO members. The formal hypothesis is: 
Hs1: NATO members are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than 
non-NATO members are. 
Another approach is looking at variable levels of contribution to military missions in support of 
regional stability. Maintaining troops in instable places is costly in terms of lives and money. The 
more other countries share the burden of maintaining a secure regional environment, the less each 
member state has to provide in maintaining that secure environment. Turkey, as a significant military 
power integrated into NATO, has great potential to share those burdens. Assuming that Turkey is 
more likely to share those burdens if integrated into the EU, those who contribute more to 
multilateral security missions are more likely to have their costs of doing so diminished by Turkey 
taking on some of the burdens of maintaining that security, than those who contribute less to these 
missions.  The hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
Hs2: Those member states who contribute more to the missions that Turkey also 
contributes to are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those 
who contribute less. 
A valid critique of this proxy is that free-riders on multilateral security issues can still benefit from 
more Turkish participation in multilateral security missions and geopolitical alignment with Europe. 
However, those who abstain from such missions will not see a direct reduction in the share that they 
need to contribute to make the mission successful, as they probably have no intention of 
participating with or without Turkey’s participation. Another aspect to this is that co-participation in 
the field creates a greater mutual interest, as well as a greater immediate need for mutual reliance. 
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Because Turkey is not indifferent to each country’s level of support for its membership ambitions, 
countries that are co-participating in the field with Turkey can expect a variable degree of 
cooperation from Turkey depending on their position on Turkish membership in the European 
Council.  
2.1.1.3  Security from Terrorism 
In the time since the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, the threat of terrorist movements has 
become a much greater part of security studies. Terrorists kill people, destroy property, and attempt 
to force states to adopt different policies than they would otherwise do. As with the security from 
regional instability dimension, states’ responses to the threats are characterized by cooperation with 
other states that suffer from the same or similar terrorist threats. In addressing terrorist threats, 
states share intelligence information in order to locate, apprehend, or otherwise put a stop to 
terrorists as they plan or carry out their activities. Organizational integration is one mechanism for 
enhancing capabilities by reducing transaction costs in sharing intelligence and cooperating in 
counter-terror operations. 
Terrorism is also a security threat to European countries. Quite aside from the idea that the 
symbolism of Turkish membership would diminish the threat from Islamist terrorists, Turkey is a 
state with significant counter-terrorism capabilities. Being a country that deals with terrorists of 
many stripes, it has developed intelligence-gathering capabilities that are likely to be unique among 
European countries. Political integration into the EU by way of membership is likely to foster 
greater alignment between Europe’s counter-terror needs and Turkey’s counter-terror capabilities, 
offering a real security incentive for European countries to enlarge the EU with Turkey’s 
membership. 
The challenge, again, is identifying those countries that will have a greater incentive for 
enhancing their ability to prevent terrorist activities against their citizens and interests. Assuming 
that the past is prologue, those countries that have experienced more terrorist strikes in the past are 
more likely to have an incentive to want their counter-terror capabilities enhanced by enhancing 
cooperation with Turkey’s capabilities, than those who have suffered less from terrorism.  The 
hypothesis can, therefore, be stated as follows: 
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Hs3: Those member states that have suffered from terrorism in the past more are 
more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have suffered 
less. 
2.1.1.4  Security from Transnational Crime 
Another security aspect is the threat of transnational crime. Though not a purposeful attempt to 
coerce changes in state policies, transnational organized crime groups undermine states’ monopolies 
on the use of force within their borders. Their activities also harm citizens and the legitimate 
economy and tend to generate corruption. Like terrorists, transnational crime syndicates cause 
damage to citizens’ lives and property. Because these are covert non-state actors, such syndicates 
invite similar policy responses as terrorism does, by having states cooperate in sharing intelligence 
information in order to locate and apprehend criminals and intercept their contraband. 
Turkish and Kurdish crime rings are a problem for many European countries. In Western 
Europe, such groups mainly make their money from drug smuggling – especially heroin – from Asia, 
through Turkey, to Europe, where the drugs are distributed (Cengiz, 2010, p. 72). Deaths induced by 
heroin use alone amount to ten times the amount of people killed annually in Europe over those 
killed due to terrorist strikes.  
Integrating Turkey into the EU implies greater integration of Turkey into Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA) structures, which would plausibly create greater capabilities to fight that sort of crime. 
Because Turkish organized crime groups (TOCs) traffic between Turkey and the Western European 
countries, it is very plausible that Turkish law enforcement capabilities, integrated through EU JHA 
structures, can be a considerable resource to European law enforcement. This resource would exist 
on both sides of the equation: assistance from Turkish law enforcement intelligence and capabilities 
for use in European countries, and assistance from European law enforcement in Turkey, stifling 
the flow of contraband into Europe through Turkey’s jurisdiction. 
The added value to law enforcement against Turkish organized crime groups is not among 
the reasons mentioned publically by European leaders. That stands to reason from a political 
rhetoric point of view. Mentioning the existence of TOCs is not likely to endear public opinion 
among European voters to the idea of Turkish membership in the EU. So, while probably being a 
good reason for supporting Turkish membership, it is probably not a good political argument for doing 
so. The aim here, however, is not to gauge the effectiveness of pro/con arguments, but to gauge 
what actual motivations are plausibly behind member-state policies.  
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Once again, the challenge is differentiating the levels of threat from TOCs to EU member 
states. The threat from heroin is estimated by the end-result: heroin-induced deaths. In this context 
it is noteworthy that the number of drug-induced deaths related to heroin does not correlate with 
the relative sizes of the Turkish populations in those countries. That means that while it is 
undoubtedly true that TOCs do operate within the Turkish immigrant communities, and these 
groups are responsible for trafficking the overwhelming majority of heroin into Western Europe, the 
greater presence of those communities does not increase the number of people dying from heroin 
overdose or behavior related to the consumption of that drug. As such, these measures are not 
proxies for measuring Turkish immigration or the presence of Turkish immigrant communities. The 
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Hs4: Those member states that suffer from more insecurity from the heroin trade 
are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have 
suffered less insecurity from the heroin trade. 
2.1.2 Power   
Power refers to the ability to bring about desired effects that would otherwise not happen. Power is 
the seminal concept of political science, but it is an amorphous and contested concept. In the 
absence of the tools of coercion related to security policy, power becomes influence. In a rationalist 
framework – one that dismisses the idea that rational actors might be convinced, normatively 
persuaded, or subconsciously manipulated – influence comes from different sources. Aside from 
military and economic resources, which are dealt with separately, power comes in the form of being 
able to leverage allies and supporters against rivals and other opponents. This is the form of power 
that is discussed under this heading of rational interest.  
A separate form of power would be mastery of a particular regime’s rules and resources, but 
that presupposes that different countries have different levels of institutional control or that the 
rules have the ability to influence a state’s decisions. Institutional controls are certainly avenues 
worthy of investigation in cases where outcomes, rather than preferences, are being investigated. In 
terms of rules – or norms – influencing a state’s preference ordering, the question departs from the 
materialist and unitary actor assumptions of rationalism. In terms of the costs and benefits of 
adhering to rules, these are the result of expectations of retaliation or acquiescence by other actors in 
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the system. Those other actors will react according to their own interests, rather than the normative 
value of the rules themselves.  
In the context of enlarging international organizations – deciding whether or not to admit 
new member-states – power is enhanced or diminished by having new member states that agree on 
policy issues, rather than disagree on them. While the EU is a consensus regime, the consensus 
usually does reflect the will of the majority of member states, with reasonable accommodations for 
the minority of member states. Bringing in a new member state alters the existing balance if the new 
member state has policy preferences that are different from the pre-enlargement status quo. 
The policy fields in which this concept of power can be analyzed offers three levels of 
analysis: influence in the world, influence in the organization, and influence in the domestic arena. 
The global level of analysis refers to EU-level policies that relate to the rest of the world, such as 
foreign and trade policy. The organizational level of analysis refers to EU-level policies that affect 
developments within the EU, such as institutional development, the budget, agriculture, and regional 
development.  
In terms of framework of analysis, the global and organizational level are separated from one 
another only for ease of reference. The domestic level of analysis, on the other hand, is different in 
the sense that it unpacks the assumption of the state as a unitary actor, and, instead, takes the party 
or parties in power as the actor, and assumes that continuing to control the government is its 
dominant rational interest. Each of these levels of analysis will be considered separately, below. 
2.1.2.1  Power at the Global Level 
All states are constituents of the world as a whole and the world’s dynamics structure state interests. 
Those global dynamics are, however, very unwieldy to influence and can, realistically, only be 
attempted by great powers such as the United States, China, and other first-rank nations. While 
dynamics at the regional level are the only ones within the realistic reach of small- and medium-sized 
powers like the European countries, together, they can possibly wield influence as the whole EU, 
given that the EU represents the largest single market in the world.  
For the EU and the member states, the global level of analysis considers the influence gained 
or lost in the world, with respect to the member states’ preferences for developments in the widest 
arena and attempts to use the EU as a conduit for those national preferences. In the question of 
Turkey joining the EU, the addition of Turkey would doubtlessly give the EU more weight in its 
potential to influence the world, and, as such, there is little reason to doubt that any member-state 
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would oppose a more powerful EU, provided the organization maintained the capacity to efficiently 
make decisions.  
While there are doubtlessly nuances, all members are assumed to have an interest in a 
stronger EU that has greater weight in the world in order to pursue their collective interests. The 
suspicion that exists about the United Kingdom’s reluctance for a more powerful EU is exhibited in 
its frequent opposition toward deeper integration. This reluctance for a more powerful EU has, 
however, not been in evidence in terms of the United Kingdom’s policies on enlargement. In fact, if 
anything, it is accused of supporting enlargement in order to create a weaker European Union. The 
UK’s interest in maintaining a strong Western alliance by using the EU as an anchor for countries 
on Europe’s periphery would be a more charitable interpretation of the UK’s enlargement 
motivations.  
Because this would, in theory, be an equal motivation for all the members equally, it is 
necessary to put this level of analysis into the perspective of relative interests, in a similar way to the 
different security perspectives previously considered. As such, the question is not one of size, but of 
orientation. How would an EU, with Turkey as a member, orient its policies differently than an EU 
without Turkey as a member would? Antagonists to Turkey’s membership have, for example, argued 
that Turkey would be a Trojan Horse for American interests, echoing similar debates in the late 
1960s and early 1970s when the United Kingdom was in the process of becoming a member state.  
2.1.2.2  Atlanticism vs. Continentalism 
One theory, then, is that an EU enlarged by Turkey would have a more Atlanticist foreign and 
security policy than an EU without Turkey as a member. Though it is, here, categorized as a power-
variable, the question of Atlanticism or Continentalism is one that is intimately connected to the 
question of security: Essentially, it is a question of where will the decisions about European security 
be made: Washington with Brussels’ (SHAPE – NATO headquarters) assistance or in Paris and 
Berlin with Brussels’ (EU/ESDP-headquarters) assistance. 
It is, nevertheless, categorized as a power-variable, rather than a security variable because the 
question is one of geopolitical balancing. It decides who wields the power to determine Europe’s 
security rather than necessarily how effective that security is. As a question of balancing, it is, for 
France and Germany, a question of concentrating more power toward themselves, and for the other 
European countries a question of spreading their dependence among different centers of power.  
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For the United States, Turkish membership in the EU – for which it has in all instances 
advocated – is overwhelmingly a question of security. European antagonists of Turkish accession 
argue that Turkey would be an American Trojan Horse. It, therefore, stands to reason that countries 
that, themselves, embrace a more Atlanticist foreign policy would be more supportive of Turkish 
membership than those with a more continental or neutral foreign policy. The hypothesis derived 
from this theory is stated as follows: 
Hp1: Those member states that exhibit a more Atlanticist foreign policy are more 
likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have a more 
continental or neutral foreign policy. 
2.1.2.3  External Trade Policy 
Another framework of considering the global level of analysis comes from the conception of the 
EU, not as a player in global geopolitics (foreign policy decisions are, after all, more likely to be 
determined by each member state individually, rather than in Brussels), but as a player in the global 
economy. In global economic fora, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the 
World Trade Organization, and the trade rounds sponsored by that organization, the EU has a far 
more powerful single voice than in discussions of foreign or security policy.  
In previous enlargement rounds, enlargement has had profound effects upon the EEC/EU’s 
trade policy, in that the addition of member states with liberal trade policies have shifted the 
EEC/EU’s trade policy toward support for a more liberal world trading regime and the accession of 
more protectionist has made the EU, as a whole, more protectionist (Woolcock, 2005, p. 390). 
Following this train of thought, it should be expected that member states that have trade 
policy preferences similar to Turkey’s are likely to have an interest in having Turkey on board as an 
ally in deciding the EU’s trade policy toward the world, than those countries with trade policies 
expected to be dissimilar to Turkey’s. If Turkey’s trade policy toward other countries is expected to 
be protectionist, then the protectionist member states ought to be in favor of Turkey joining, as 
having a populous member state on one’s side in the trade debate. Likewise, if it is to be expected if 
Turkey’s trade policy will be more liberal, then the liberal member states should be expected to be 
more in favor of Turkey’s membership than the protectionist member states. The global trade 
hypothesis is, therefore: 
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Hp2: Those member states that exhibit a trade policy similar to Turkey’s expected 
trade policy are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those 
who have a trade policy at odds with Turkey’s expected trade policy. 
2.1.2.4  Regional or Organizational Level 
The second level, influence within the region, is different because it is one where small- and 
medium-sized states have a stake but can also have some level of influence. In the context of 
Europe, that influence is institutionalized within the European Union. In this respect, influence in 
the region is mostly absorbed by influence within the regional organization.   
In the sense of being a question about organizational enlargement, the potential accession of 
Turkey poses several aspects of consideration: the dilution of power of each member state, the 
ability of the organization to make decisions, and the sort of decisions arrived at. Enlarging an 
organization is always a dilution of any given state’s own share of power within the organization. 
This supposition makes the question analytically stale, because it is not conceptually variable over 
time or variable between countries. All existing member-states will have their share of power diluted 
by the accession of a new member. It is therefore treated as irrelevant for this research.   
2.1.2.5  Enlargement Policy 
That does not mean that different countries do not have blanket preferences over enlargement. 
Some countries have a vision of the future wherein the EU is a larger entity, whereas others prefer a 
(supposedly) more manageable EU. That may or may not be related to that country’s preference 
toward the ability of the European Union to enact significant policies. Those with blanket 
preferences in favor of enlargement may not be particularly concerned over the nature or 
characteristics of any particular candidate. If countries are generally in favor of enlargement, 
regardless of the candidate, then it ought to be measurable when compared to the member-states’ 
past stance on enlargement toward Easter Europe. Because it is not discernable if the states that 
demonstrated reluctance with respect to enlargement opposed enlargement per se or simply 
preferred a slower schedule, the element of swiftness of enlargement will be added to the 
hypothesis. The hypothesis reads: 
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Hp3: Those member states that have exhibited preferences for swift enlargement to 
Eastern Europe are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those 
who have opposed swift enlargement. 
2.1.2.6  Euroscepticism 
Another angle is the organization’s decision-making capacity as a whole. Several countries, but 
predominantly the United Kingdom, have been labeled as Eurosceptic and having an interest in 
gumming up the works in Brussels. If it is the case that enlargement would complicate further 
integration or decision-making in Brussels – a commonly-held notion that has not always proved to 
be accurate – then countries that are more Eurosceptic would be expected to have a policy in favor 
of Turkey’s accession than those who are less Eurosceptic. The hypothesis related to this 
expectation reads: 
Hp4: More Eurosceptic member states are more likely to be supportive of Turkish 
membership than less Eurosceptic member states. 
If it is true that Euroscepticism drives enlargement policy, there is no reason to suspect that the 
nature and character of the particular candidate should matter. It is therefore also expected that 
Euroscepticism should correlate with the earlier preferences on enlargement; in other words that the 
variables identified for hypothesis Hp4 should covary with the variable identified for hypothesis 
Hp3.   
2.1.2.7  Large vs. Small 
The EU is a group of countries with very disparate member-state sizes. At present, Germany 
remains the largest member state with over 80 million inhabitants. By contrast, prior to the 
enlargement of 2004, Luxembourg was the smallest with around 0.4 million inhabitants. While the 
ratio of size to influence in the EU has always been modulated in favor of the smaller countries, in 
terms of voting strength in the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, that 
ratio has changed modestly over time as the institutions developed and different treaties made 
different arrangements.  
As such, with respect for the future development of the European Union, it is conceivable 
that larger countries would have an interest in the bolstering of their (already considerable) weight in 
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the EU’s different institutions. More convincingly, the smaller countries might have a fear that the 
addition of yet another very large country would dilute their influence even further. An added large 
ally might help move the organization’s power toward the larger states and erode what influence the 
smaller countries, collectively, have. This theory is, however, problematic because the influence of 
each large member-state would also be eroded. 
Another explanation for this hypothetical relationship is that larger states may have interests 
on a wider scope than smaller states do. The addition of Turkey would be a benefit at the global 
level where the larger powers have more concerns than the smaller powers do, because the larger 
countries have ambitions at that level that the smaller countries could never have. In other words, 
the large countries may believe that they gain global influence by having another medium-size power 
in the European Union, whereas smaller states, unable to influence broader events, may be resigned 
to more parochial interests that might suffer at the hands of Turkey as a member state. 
Contrariwise, the relationship may be the reverse, in that the large countries would prefer to 
not have another large country to rival their own power, whereas the smaller countries would have 
more choice of which large country to follow. If this idea were more salient to the member states, 
the relationship of size to support would be negative. The large vs. small state hypothesis is: 
Hp5: Larger member states are more likely to be supportive of Turkish 
membership than smaller member states. 
2.1.2.8  The EU Budget 
Another important division is that which exists between those who pay more into the EU budget 
than they receive and those who receive more money than they pay in. The calculation of the 
comparative fiscal interests in enlargement is one that is complicated, because it necessarily involves 
speculations about how policies and fiscal balances will develop in the future.  
These speculations also need to involve strategic perspectives, because one thing is certain: 
there will be a policy changes in agricultural and structural policies prior to enlargement. If there is 
not a long-run strategic perspective, but only a short-term calculation on the costs and benefits of a 
large poor country joining the European Union, that calculus would advise both net-donors and net-
recipients to attempt to prevent enlargement. After all, a large poor country is not likely to 
contribute much to the EU’s coffers under the current structure of that regime. Net-donors would 
have to provide more and net-recipients would receive less if Turkey were to join the current 
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redistributive regime. Because Turkish accession is not only supported by some but by most countries, 
it is already known that the short-term fiscal logic is not determinative of enlargement preferences. 
The fact of the 2004 enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe (also poor agricultural countries, if 
not all large ones) is also an indicator that, in the end, countries will allow such enlargements to take 
place, even if the short-term fiscal calculus indicates that they should not allow the enlargement.  
In order to salvage a fiscal theory of enlargement, it is, therefore, necessary to conceive of a 
longer-term fiscal perspective that expects winners as well as losers. Having both generates variation 
in the independent variable that spans incentives and disincentives for allowing enlargement, rather 
than just different degrees of disincentive. Those longer-term perspectives are as follows. 
On the one hand, there are the net-donors who will certainly look at the prospect of Turkey, 
a very large and poor country, with a measure of fiscal apprehension. Leaving the agricultural and 
structural policies of the late 1990s and early-to-mid 2000s unchanged, a country with very 
underdeveloped and agricultural regions, would be a major drain on EU resources. However, that 
prospect, as it did with the enlargement of the Central and Eastern European countries, also offers 
the political pressure to reform those policies so that they are less fiscally burdensome. That would 
be an incentive for net-donors to be in favor of enlargement.  
However, provided that the net-recipients are able to prevent the frameworks of the 
redistributive policies from being dismantled altogether, the prospects grow less positive for the net-
donors. With a large country like Turkey in the EU’s councils and the European Parliament, the 
beneficiaries of the EU’s redistributive policies are strengthened with a powerful ally. A larger voting 
bloc in favor of more redistribution from the net-donors to the net-recipients means that further 
into the future, the volume of redistribution could grow at the expense of the net-donors.  
From the recipients’ perspective, the tables are nearly reversed. As mentioned, in the short 
term, the net-recipients are also likely to have to face cuts in the funds from which they have 
benefited. Furthermore, in the negotiations that will determine the financial perspectives after 
enlargement, they will face a great deal of pressure from the net-donors to change the policies in 
order to keep the fiscal damage within certain bounds, and, perhaps, even to change the policies 
from which the net-recipients have benefited for so long altogether. In the long term, however, the 
net recipients face prospects that are the mirror image of what the net-donors face. The net-
recipients can expect to gain a large, and, therefore, powerful ally in the European councils and the 
European Parliament who will be able to assist them in expanding the volume of redistributed 
resources.   
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Assuming that the net-recipients are able to stave off fundamental changes to the 
redistributive policies, the trade-off, for the net-donors, is one of an immediate future in which they 
will be able to make more predictable gains against a future in which the losses are less predictable. 
Because the immediate future is more knowable, and because all the member states must agree on 
the package deal that reforms the redistributive policies before enlargement, it is assumed that 
member states have much more certainty about the near-future amendments to the redistribution 
regime, than they have about how deals will progress in the pursuant financial perspective after 
enlargement, and the financial perspectives thereafter. Contrariwise, the net-recipients face an 
immediate future in which they face more predictable losses against a future with less predictable 
gains.  
If the tendencies, expected by bounded rationality, hold that certain costs with uncertain 
gains are to be preferred over certain gains with uncertain losses (not dissimilar to the concept of 
buying an insurance policy), then net-donors are expected to be less enthusiastic about enlargement 
toward a large poor country than net-recipients are. Unfortunately for this theory, however, the 
experience of the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe demonstrated otherwise. 
Nevertheless, the hypothesis is as follows: 
Hp6: net-recipient states are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership 
than net-donor states are. 
If this were research about a candidate that was not both poor and agricultural, it would be useful to 
separate out the member states by how much they received from the agricultural policy versus the 
structural policy. If the candidate was relatively agricultural, but not poor, it would be expected that 
a similar country, like Denmark, would be supportive of the candidate. In contrast, if the candidate 
were poor but not agricultural, it would be useful to see if those countries that benefit much more 
from the structural policy than the agricultural policy, like Portugal, were more favorable towards 
enlargement. Given that Turkey has significantly underdeveloped regions and has a very large share 
of the population engaged in agriculture, doing separate analyses on each of the two redistributive 
policies is not a worthwhile avenue of investigation. 
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2.1.2.9  Power at the Domestic Level 
The third level under consideration is the domestic realm. The principle behind this frame of 
reference is that those who are in power have an interest in remaining in power. Because the 
question of Turkish EU membership has become a very heated political issue in many European 
countries, some political parties have incorporated their position on Turkey as campaign rhetoric. A 
way to determine if domestic politics have played a crucial part in the decisions of member states 
regarding Turkey will be to establish if changes in their policies towards Turkey coincided with 
changes in their governments and/or public opinion. 
This frame of analysis is fundamentally different from the previous analyses in three ways. 
First, while some may declare that the domestic political process is the process by which states arrive 
at their allegedly rational foreign policy decisions, there is clearly a distinction between the two. The 
notion that political actors make international- and European-level decisions in order to win 
domestic debates fundamentally undermines one of the key tenets of Rationalism in post-1950s 
International Relations theory; namely that the domestic characteristics of a state – other than its 
capabilities in relation to the capabilities of other states – do not determine a state’s behavior. 
Decisions must be objective in that they are functions of the imperatives of the structures, rather 
than functions characteristics of the agent.  
Second, because of the above, this frame of analysis fudges on the actor definition imposed 
by Rationalism. Rather than taking the state as the unit of analysis, the actor becomes the party or 
parties in power. This actor, then, is engaged in one of Robert Putnam’s (1988, p. 434) two-level 
games, where the strength at one of two levels, foreign or domestic, is used to shore up weakness at 
the other level.  
The third way in which the domestic level of analysis is problematic is if the political rhetoric 
is very non-rationalist (i.e. ideational). In such a case – as if frequently observed in regard to the 
politics of EU enlargement to Turkey – the whole premise of rational calculation based on 
imperatives is called into question. If political actors, speaking to domestic audiences, appeal to 
cultural differences, historical memories, or abstract ideals, rather than to the state’s objective 
material interests, then it implies that – at the very least – those political actors do not believe their 
audiences are materially rational. If the decision-makers are rational, and they fit their rhetoric to 
maximize their goal, then it must be assumed that the non-materialist rhetoric is effective. If that is 
so, then the audiences are less than materially rational. However, to the degree that the politicians 
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are swept up in their own narratives, and the audiences respond positively to that message, neither 
can be assumed to be rational according to the materialist assumptions of thick-theory Rationalism. 
These three reservations notwithstanding, the maintenance of political power is a rational 
thing to do for political actors, and it is quite manifest that in the political debates between political 
parties, the issue of Turkey possibly becoming an EU member is a very contentious issue. Domestic 
politics as a factor in deciding policy also has the analytical virtue of being quite variable over time 
frames similar to the variation in the dependent variable. 
The analysis of the domestic level is done using four frames: public opinion, political party 
ideology, political opportunism, and immigration politics. In order to thoroughly investigate the 
domestic realm, these four frames follow increasing degrees of analytical complexity. Where the 
frame of public opinion simply assumes that policy-makers do what their publics want them to do, 
the frame of political ideology assumes that political parties behave as they are expected to behave. 
This is more complex because it is understood that political parties have somewhat fixed 
constituencies and there is a reputational cost to nakedly pursuing the polls. Political opportunism 
suggests that politicians only appeal to the issue when it is clear that there is a political market for 
doing so. The frame of immigration politics understands that enlargement to Turkey is not an issue 
for all countries because for most European countries, Turkey is not seen predominantly as a source 
for undesirable immigrants. Only a handful of member states are destinations for many Turkish 
immigrants. 
2.1.2.10  Public Opinion 
European countries are democracies in which leaders are supposed to reflect the dominant desires 
of their constituents in the policies upon which they decide. The straightforward analysis, then, is 
whether or not public opinion simply influences policy directly. Do the countries where Turkish 
membership is the most unpopular oppose Turkish membership, while those countries where 
Turkish membership is the least unpopular support Turkish membership? Also, are changes in 
public opinion reflected in changes in government policy? The hypothesis encapsulating this idea is: 
Hp7: Member states with public opinion more predominantly against Turkish 
membership are less likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member 
states with public opinion less predominantly against Turkish membership. 
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2.1.2.11  Political Party Ideology 
Rudimentary knowledge of the interaction between public opinion and state policy, however, 
indicates that the matter is rarely so simple. Political parties frequently have particular constituencies 
and different coalitions mean different trade-offs can be made. Politics frequently follows a right-
wing/centrist/left-wing spectrum, with coalitions also broadly following that pattern. The next-to-
simplest way to frame the possible influence of domestic politics is to ask if mostly right-wing 
governments are more likely to be opposed to Turkey while mostly left-wing governments are more 
likely to be supportive of Turkey’s membership ambitions.  
The reason for this direction is, mostly, the implicit connection to the immigration issue. 
Right-wing politics are frequently tougher on immigrants, whereas left wing politics frequently draws 
on naturalized and second-generation immigrant votes. In the same vein, right-wing parties 
frequently draw on nativism or anti-Islamic sentiment, whereas left-wing parties gladly accuse their 
opponents of bigotry. Furthermore, Turkey being a (rapidly) developing country would more likely 
be the recipient of the EU’s redistributive policies, something that is more of an anathema to the 
right than it is to the left. The hypothesis for this question is as follows: 
Hp8: Left-wing governments are more likely to be supportive of Turkish 
membership than right-wing governments are. 
2.1.2.12 Political Opportunism 
Another frame to use is to focus on the political struggle between a government and its domestic 
opposition. While seeming similar, this is a frame that is quite different from the ideology of the 
parties in and out of power. According to the ideological left-right frame, parties of different 
orientations have different assessments of social problems and policies that address those problems. 
The political struggle of ideology is about advancing the policies preferred by the ideology. 
According to the frame of political opportunism, parties are not necessarily wedded to an ideology 
(beyond rhetoric), but seek for opportunities to be in power. Enacting popular policies helps 
governments stay in power, and unpopular policies create opportunities for opposition parties to 
defeat sitting governments in elections. Given the heatedness of opinion on the matter of Turkey 
and the prospect of its membership in the EU, and the degree to which that prospect is generally 
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unpopular, it is worthwhile to investigate if the domestic political struggle, itself, explains member 
states’ policies, and their changes of policy.  
The supposition is that in order to draw favorable distinctions between themselves and the 
parties in power, the main opposition parties criticize whatever unpopular policy the ruling party or 
coalition has adopted, in hopes of electoral advantage. When election results change governments, 
the existing policy is changed for the opposite position in order to stay true to the political rhetoric 
of the previous campaign.  
This is labeled political opportunism because it reflects that policy is not necessarily made on 
the objective wisdom of the policy in question from the perspective of the state, but based on the 
ability for opposition parties to gain power by engaging in popular rhetoric, and implementing that 
rhetoric into policy in order to prevent defeat in the subsequent election. The hypothesis reads: 
Hp9: When existing government policy is at odds with public opinion, significant 
changes in government pursuant to elections are more likely to result in policy 
changes than when existing policy is not at odds with public opinion. 
2.1.2.13 Immigration Politics 
It is a political fact of life that immigration is a political hot potato. Not a few European politicians 
have proven themselves capable of harnessing political power out of the immigration issue, either by 
agitating fears against immigrants or appealing to immigrants (naturalized immigrants and those of 
second the generation of immigrants) for votes. Further, many have labeled opponents of 
immigration as racist, xenophobic or Islamophobic. In contrast to this, others have used the 
immigration issue in order to stand up for women’s and homosexuals’ rights against what they argue 
is an oppressive Islam practiced by the immigrants from the Middle East, South Asia and Northern 
Africa. 
The politics of the prospect of Turkish membership in the EU, and the belief that such 
membership would bring a new wave of migration from Turkey to current EU members, has been 
attached to the immigration debate in many EU member states. Presuming that the previous three 
hypotheses do not offer an easier explanation of why and when member states decide to support or 
oppose Turkey, it is useful to test for relationships between the policies regarding Turkey and 
various constructions of immigration politics. 
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It is manifest10, however, that the debate over Turkey is not attached to all immigration 
debates in all member states in equal measure. For many European countries, the Turks are not the 
dominant immigrant group. The immigration debates in Spain and the United Kingdom, for 
example, have very little to do with Turks, because the Turks are only a small part of the immigrant 
communities into those countries. In Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, on the other hand, the 
Turks are the most numerous immigrant group.  
Related to this is the identification of the Turks as Muslims, and therefore as a part of the 
debate on the supposed Islamification of Europe. In some countries with many Muslim immigrants 
(native Muslims notwithstanding), the Turks may be seen as another Muslim group, regardless of 
their distinct identity and prevalence in the immigrant community of that country. It is, therefore, 
useful to expand the analysis by also looking for effect of the number of Muslims in the population 
as having an effect on member-state policies on Turkey.  
Yet, not all countries have the same concerns over immigration. In Portugal, Greece, and 
Finland, for example, few people consider immigration to be one of the major political concerns, 
whereas in Spain, the United Kingdom, and Denmark, many people believe that immigration is a top 
political concern facing their country. In countries where immigration is not a topic of heated 
political debate, the risk of more Turkish immigrants might not be a salient topic by which 
politicians can win votes. 
Rationally, then, there would be a connection between policy and electoral politics in those 
countries where there are many Turks or Muslims, but also where immigration is seen as a problem 
requiring a policy response. Seeing immigration as a problem may be a function of the agenda-
setting of political entrepreneurs, but if it is not seen as a problem, agitating against Turkish 
membership would not be effective either. The next chapter shall outline the precise methodology 
by which these variables will be taken into account. The hypotheses are as follows: 
Hp10: Member states with larger immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations, relative 
to total population, are more likely to oppose Turkish membership than member 
states with smaller immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations relative to total 
population, are. 
                                                
10 This will be demonstrated in chapter 10. 
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Hp11: Member states with larger immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations, relative 
to total population, are more likely to change their policies on Turkish membership 
more frequently than member states with smaller Muslim/Turkish populations 
relative to total population, are. 
Hp12: Member states with larger immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations, relative 
to total population, are more likely to see a relationship between changes of 
government and policies on Turkish membership. 
2.1.3 Wealth 
The lens of wealth is an especially poignant frame for this analysis because the European Union is, 
at its core, still, a political-economic organization. The analysis, however, runs into an empirical 
brick wall. In weighing the benefits for member-state economies, national policy-makers are reliant 
on predictive analyses of what Turkish accession would mean for their economies. However, those 
predictions generally conclude that while the benefits to the Turkish economy would be 
considerable, the benefits to the European economies, while not non-existent, are still very small 
(e.g. Flam, 2005; Lejour & de Mooij, 2005). 
Nevertheless, perhaps small percentages of change in GDP, one way or another, may be 
enough to convince policy-makers to support or oppose Turkish membership. This section outlines 
the avenues for investigating the gains and losses that European countries can expect relative to one 
another. The four different economic impacts investigated are trade in agriculture, trade overall, 
investment overall, and labor migration. 
2.1.3.1  Agriculture 
A large part of the economic question is subject to the fact that Turkey is already in a customs union 
with the EU, and Turkey’s trade is already oriented toward the Western Europe with a significant 
trade deficit. Incorporating Turkey into the EU would, however, allow for more trade in agricultural 
goods, because that sector of the economy is not covered by the customs union. Given that Turkey 
would then also be covered by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), whatever shape that policy 
might take at the time, European farmers would cease to have the CAP-advantage over Turkish 
  59 
farmers, which would, presumably move the balance of trade in agricultural products in Turkey’s 
favor.  
Not all agricultural products are the same, however. Turkey is a country with specific 
comparative advantages in agricultural output, as are each of the member states. Turkey is likely to 
be a competitor to some member states, but a good market and provider of necessary goods for 
others. The degree to which Turkey’s agricultural output is competitive vs. complementary with 
those of the member states will determine how attractive its addition to the single market in 
agricultural produce it is likely to be for member states. Countries, whose dominant agricultural 
imports match Turkey’s dominant agricultural exports and vice versa can be expected to benefit 
from Turkey entering the agricultural single market, whereas those who will compete with Turkey 
can be expected to suffer from competing with Turkey on an equal footing. The hypothesis that 
captures this question is: 
Hw1: Member states with a complementary agricultural sector with Turkey are 
more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with a 
competitive agricultural sector with Turkey. 
2.1.3.2  Trade and Investment 
Because non-agricultural goods are already traded freely between Turkey and the member states of 
the EU (Cyprus notwithstanding), and investment is also free from constraint, determining the 
relative benefits (or costs) of trade and investment between member states and Turkey must follow a 
different form of analysis. Lejour and de Mooij (2005, p. 109) calculate that any trade diversion of 
member-state products in competition with Turkish products will mostly impact the new member 
states that joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007. As their policies toward Turkey are not 
being investigated by this research, this research will hold trade-diversion as a negligible effect.  
Assuming that trade diversion from Western European countries will not be significant, the 
presumption is that existing bilateral relationships are likely to become more valuable. Trade and 
investment are two angles of inquiry and rely on the following rationale: countries with more 
voluminous bilateral trade relationships will benefit from lowered NTBs more than those with 
minimal trade with Turkey, and those with direct investment into Turkey will see their returns on 
investment increase. The hypotheses are as follows: 
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Hw2: Member states with greater volumes of trade with Turkey are more likely to 
be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with smaller volumes of 
trade with Turkey. 
Hw3: Member states with greater volumes of investment between that member 
state and Turkey are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than 
member states with smaller volumes of investment in Turkey. 
Frequently, however, national accounts give preference toward exports (which benefit producers) 
than imports (which benefit consumers), because imports decrease the trade surplus (or increase the 
trade deficit). Because producers have more direct influence in the political system (they are more 
concentrated, have more effective lobbies, and have narrower interests) than consumers do, their 
interests are likely to be more influential in policy-making than consumer-interests are. 
A similar argument cannot really be made in regard to net investment flows and positions. 
Inward investments from Turkey to member states are a boon to member states, because it increases 
the opportunities for domestic entrepreneurs and workers. If that produces a longer-term outward 
flow to Turkey, it is because those investments are paying off, and they would generally only pay off 
if economic activity had increased as a result of those investments. Because of this, it seems 
worthwhile to look at the trade surplus/deficit with Turkey, but not the balance of investment flows 
that member states have with Turkey. The related hypothesis reads as follows:  
Hw4: Member states with a trade surplus with Turkey are more likely to be 
supportive of Turkish membership than member states with a trade deficit with 
Turkey. 
2.1.3.3  Migration and Employment 
A third angle is labor migration coupled with the need for workers. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
countries with rapidly growing economies actively sought out Turkish (and other) migrants in order 
to provide the extra labor needed to keep those economies growing. Considering the expected 
relationship between EU membership and the free movement of workers, it is not unnatural that 
many expect that Turkey’s membership might bring more Turkish immigrants to the member states. 
Full membership in the EU, should it ever happen, is expected to (eventually) bring the freedom of 
movement for labor to Turkish citizens in the same way as it has for other members. Though some 
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have argued on the establishment of permanent safeguards on that freedom of movement, these 
efforts seem unlikely to succeed. Though an argument can be made that economic development in 
Turkey will strongly diminish the flow of migration, and perhaps even create a return migration at 
some point, policy-makers assume that the desire of Turkish people to migrate from Turkey to 
Western Europe will continue for the foreseeable future. Membership in the EU is assumed to make 
that migration easier than it has been, and therefore the flow migration is likely to increase following 
membership. 
From the rationalist angle, enhancing the economic strength of one’s country means creating 
a balance between rates of (un)employment and economic growth. For growing economies with low 
rates of unemployment, the prospect of migrants should be a benefit, whereas for countries with 
higher rates of unemployment or low rates of economic growth, the prospects of immigrants 
increasing the unemployment rate and possibly receiving public benefits should be considered a 
cost. 
While rates of unemployment fluctuate year-by-year due to the regular business cycle, 
Turkish membership in the EU, and the migration that is generally expected to follow, is not 
something that is expected to be a short-term prospect. Therefore, year-by-year changes in the 
unemployment rate should not be expected to change the long-term interests. These countries will 
further benefit from increasing levels of education in Turkey as Turkey develops. This factors that 
Lejour and de Mooij identify as being relatively significant in calculating the benefits of Turkish 
membership for European countries).  
For countries with high levels of unemployment, on the other hand, their immigrant 
communities are likely to be a disadvantage to the country. Unemployed immigrants are likely to be 
a burden on the welfare programs of the member states, and countries with higher unemployment 
can expect to receive fewer Turks with higher levels of education. Furthermore, assuming that 
economic and social conditions in the member states in question remain preferable to those in 
Turkey, those unemployed immigrants are likely to return to their homeland, especially after they 
have established roots in the countries where they live.  The hypothesis that relates to this question 
is: 
Hw5: Member states with low levels of unemployment are more likely to be 
supportive of Turkish membership than member states with high levels of 
unemployment. 
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2.2 CONSTRUCTIVISM 
The following section of the chapter concerns Constructivist theories of state behavior and what 
sort of motivations and impulses may, hypothetically, explain member-state policies regarding 
Turkey and potential Turkish membership. The first subsection describes the conceptual changes 
from the previous section, outlining the differences between Rationalism and Constructivism. The 
pursuant subsections detail each motivations and impulses arising from identity concepts, norms and 
values.  
2.2.1 Transitioning from Rationalism to Constructivism 
In the preceding paragraphs, the approach of identity has been limited to the assumption of the 
individual self as the object of reference for utility calculations. In all but the domestic politics frame, 
this ‘self’ has been defined as ‘the state’. The assumption of ‘the self’ as the individual, and therefore 
an egoistic concern for utility is the sine qua non of Rationalism. Without this assumption any theory 
of preference formation cannot be considered Rationalism in a meaningful sense.  
In all of the Rationalist propositions, there have been two other relevant characteristics of 
the actor. The first of these concerns the assumed interests of the actor, which are for security, 
power and wealth, as detailed in the first half of this chapter. Security was considered first, because it 
is the prime imperative of the actor remaining an actor. The second was the actor’s ability to make 
independent decisions and control the actions of others, and the third was, essentially, in order to 
exist and thrive economically. Because these three concepts have such widespread purchase – they 
are intersubjectively recognized so broadly and so firmly that they are considered to be ‘material’, 
when, in fact, they are what Wendt (1999) calls ‘social things’. Security, power and wealth are not 
physically ‘real’ – they are reified; they are real only insofar as they can be counted upon to be steady 
reasons for actor behavior.  
The third characteristic that was discussed was bounded rationality – the inability of the 
actor to know and evaluate all that the actor would need to know and evaluate in order to make 
perfect decisions in pursuit of its interests. The only aspect of bounded rationality that was discussed 
in the context of Rationalism was risk aversion, and the assumption that different cultural cognitive 
maps will not produce strikingly different outcomes in similar situations, preserving the objectivity 
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of Rationalism. According to Constructivism, bounded rationality is more than risk aversion. 
Cognitive maps are a function of culture. Different cognitive maps can also highlight imperatives 
other than those built around survival, power and wealth.  
Even in the Western world, which is supposedly the home ground for Rationalism, the 
cognitive maps highlight the Western values of liberal democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and 
non-discrimination. The missionary zeal with which the West frequently attempts to export these 
values goes beyond the rationalized benefit to the West. While the spreading of such values is 
broadly considered good for the Western world, it is debatable if the policies that promote those 
values are actually worth their cost in a strictly cost/benefit (to the individual actor-self) calculus. 
The following sections consider the Constructivist aspects that shape interests and possibly explain 
the foreign policy decisions that have been made regarding Turkey and possible EU membership.  
The challenge, then, of this section is to identify how identities, norms and values (other 
than the supposed materialistic ones) illuminate the politics of Turkish accession. Some, such as 
those connected to identity – i.e. religion and culture – are not difficult to identify, because their 
relevance leaps off the newspaper page as being why many in Europe reject Turkey. Norms are 
relevant in terms of how member states are expected to behave when deciding matters of 
enlargement vis-à-vis Turkey. In creating a regime that involves membership criteria, that candidate 
countries must meet, member states are agreeing that they will not upset the process for reasons 
other than those regarding the membership criteria. Values are relevant in terms of how enlargement 
supports the abstract values that member states value in and of themselves, such as democracy, 
human rights, and the rule of law. Because the enlargement regime involves candidate countries 
having to accept these values for themselves, these values are directly connected to the enlargement 
debate. The following sections will look at each of these angles in turn and posit hypotheses that can 
be tested against the empirical record.   
2.2.2 Identity 
In the context of Turkey joining the EU, identity is considered to be one of the dominant 
explanatory frames of why member states are hesitant about admitting Turkey. A large part of that 
may come from political leaders constructing Turkey as ‘the other’ and, therefore, being a bad fit for 
Europe. When they use the supposedly geographical definition, saying that Turkey cannot be a 
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member of the European Union because it is not a European country, it is highly doubtful that they 
are horribly concerned over continental contiguousness (especially in light of Cyprus not having 
been subject to the same reservation).  
When others argue that Turkey is a bad fit because they did not experience the Renaissance, 
the Reformation and the Enlightenment, they are making an argument of cultural or historical 
identity. Curiously, this is also an argument that did not prevent countries, such as Greece, Romania 
and Bulgaria, becoming members. As these countries were subject to the Ottoman Empire at the 
time of these historical/cultural movements of the early Modern Era in (Western) Europe, they 
could not have, supposedly, benefitted from the historical/cultural any more than the Turks have.  
Yet, identity questions are frequently subject to mythmaking. This does not make the 
narrative any less potent, however. Public opinion polls clearly demonstrate that Turkey is in a 
category of its own when it comes to public support for membership among the peoples of the 
member states. An analytical problem, is how to distinguish between the member states in order to 
discern cultural variations among the member states which can explain their different policies 
regarding Turkey. The first section, below, will explain why historical memories are an inadequate 
frame of reference, even if some bring them up as being explanatory. The pursuant sections detail 
more fecund identity-related approaches. These approaches fall under the headings of religion, 
nationalism, and cultural differences.   
2.2.2.1  Historical Memory 
Historical memories consist of particular highlights in a nation’s history that frame a particular 
relationship between one nation and another. Frequently, these follow particular atrocities and brutal 
wars. For others, such as Greece, which has made EU accession (as well as other memberships in 
international organizations difficult) for Macedonia, the memory hearkens back to Alexander the 
Great and Philip of Macedon of the fourth century BCE. In this case, it is about an intellectual 
property-right dispute over latter country’s name. More generously speaking, names can imply 
territorial rights and foment irredentism, which are not unrealistic issues in the Balkans.  
It is frequently cited that for Austria it is particularly difficult to support Turkey because of 
the historical memory of the Ottoman Seige of Vienna in the early Sixteenth Century. This two-
week long seige, which ended in a victory for the defenders seems to have been more historically 
traumatizing than the four months-long Seige of Vienna in the late Fifteenth Century, by the 
Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus. This earlier seige resulted in a Hungarian victory and a five-year 
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subjection to the Hungarian throne. Yet, Austria is not deemed to have been opposed to Hungarian 
membership. Likewise, the Greeks suffered centuries of subjection to the Ottomans, and more 
recent wars and atrocities involving forced population swaps and an ongoing ethnic dispute over 
Cyprus. However, as the empirical record of chapters six, seven, and eight will demonstrate, Greece 
has been more supportive of Turkish membership than several other member states have been, its 
more recent and dramatic historical memory notwithstanding.  
Given that historical memories of the Ottomans cannot account for the other member 
states, this is an impossible frame to impose on the question. The Turks did not beseige 
Copenhagen, nor did the Janissary Corps ever sack the Ducal Palace in Luxembourg. Nevertheless, 
Denmark and Luxembourg have been at least as adamant against Turkey’s membership as Austria 
has been. That is not to say that historical memories are irrelevant, but they are impossible to 
quantify and unlikely to explain most of the member states’ behavior, given the lack of such 
historical backgrounds. Therefore, no hypothesis will be posed or tested for this Constructivist 
concept. 
2.2.2.2  Religion 
The Muslim nature of Turkey’s population is frequently cited as a reason why many Europeans 
oppose Turkey’s bid for membership in the EU. However, proponents argue cite this same fact as a 
strong reason why Turkey should be included in the EU – because doing so would have symbolic 
value for the broader Muslim world that the West is not opposed to Islam or Muslims. They further 
accuse opponents of religious bigotry for their opposition to Turkey.  
Both sides of the argument, then, contend that religious identity matters. However, can that 
explain why one member state supports Turkey while the other opposes Turkey? The fact that 
Turkey is a country with many Muslims cannot be denied, but that fact in itself is not a variable that 
can explain different and changing behavior among the member states. What remains is attempting 
to identify different identities among the member states which would make them more, or less, 
supportive of Turkey in order to assess the importance of religious differences. Unfortunately, 
similarities between religions are not quantifiable. It cannot be said that Catholics are twice as similar 
to Muslims as Protestants are. However, it may be that there is still something about Catholics that 
make them more or less likely to be supportive of Turkey than Protestants are. The Pope, certainly, 
has played a varying and opaque role in the politics of Turkish accession. This may have influenced 
the way Catholics push their political leaders to set their policies on Turkish membership. 
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Beyond thinking in terms of religious differences, there are certain beliefs and cultural values 
that are associated with the different dominant Christian religions. Max Weber (1930) used this 
divide as an overarching label for broader cultural concepts to explain historic economic 
performance. In that regard, the economizing puritan spirit of capitalism, which Weber identified as 
unique to Protestantism, would not be shared by Catholics or (Muslim) Turks. Catholics and Turks 
would be more alike to one another than to Protestants, meaning that Catholics would be less likely 
to define the Turks as ‘the other’ than Protestants would be. The hypothesis would then be as 
follows: 
Hi1: Member states that are predominantly Catholic are more likely to be 
supportive of Turkish membership than member states that are predominantly 
Protestant. 
Should the reverse be the case, then, perhaps, there is something about Catholicism that makes it 
inhospitable toward allowing Turkey to gain membership in that organization. 
Another way of looking at religious origins of member-state policies is to measure the degree 
of religiosity. In terms of similarity of identity, it can be said that Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims 
are all more religious than atheists and agnostics are. Therefore, religiosity is one way to address 
religious differences. As such, the hypothetical statement is: 
Hi2: Member states with a high level of religiosity are more likely to be supportive 
of Turkish membership than member states with a low level of religiosity are. 
This hypothesis is counter-intuitive. The immediate idea is that religion, and therefore religious 
differences, should matter more to people with high levels of religiosity, whereas peoples with low 
levels of religiosity ought not to care as much. However, by the same token, religious people are 
more likely to have similar frameworks of thought to one another than non-religious people are to 
have with religious people. Given that Turkey is highly religious, albeit Muslim, religious Christians 
are more likely to have more in common, philosophically with Muslims than they are with atheists, 
agnostics and the religiously apathetic. 
Finally, the question may not be about self-identification or support in recognition of a 
shared identity, but rather one about a negative identification of others. Anti-muslim sentiment may 
drive member states to oppose Turkish membership. If that idea is true, then it is quite possible that 
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Turkey’s exclusion is, indeed, due to a ‘Christian club’ not wanting to include non-Christian 
members. The hypothesis that encapsulates this idea is as follows: 
Hi3: member states with lower levels of anti-Muslim sentiment are more likely to be 
supportive of Turkish membership than member states with high levels of anti-
Muslim sentiment. 
2.2.2.3  Nationalism 
A second form of identity is a nationalist one. In its most basic form, nationalism is frequently 
interpreted as being the love of one’s nation. It also implies a differentiation between members of a 
nation and non-members of a nation. While a nation is not the same as ‘country’ or ‘state’, these are, 
however, frequently associated with one another, especially in Europe where the nation-state has its, 
albeit imperfect, paradigmatic origins. The core if the idea is one that poses national differences 
between given groups of people, and that members of the nation belong together. In an exclusionist 
way, it also implies that non-members do not belong. The political implications, further, are that 
members of one’s nation should be self-governing and not governed, even partially, by members of 
another nation. The hypotheses is as follows: 
Hi4: Countries with low levels of nationalism are more likely to be supportive of 
Turkish membership than member states with high levels of nationalism. 
2.2.2.4 Cultural Differences 
In the context of the enlargement of a multi-national European Union, the question arises why 
Turkish membership should be considered particularly salient, while the accession of, for example, 
Bulgaria and Romania should not. One answer is the differences in scale, as Turkey is a vastly larger 
country than Romania and Bulgaria are. Furthermore, Turkey was, per capita, a little poorer than 
either of these two new member states were.11 Another answer is Turkey’s greater perceived cultural 
difference from Romania and Bulgaria.  
                                                
11 At first blush, however, the relative sizes between Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria have not changed and per-capita 
incomes of Turks have been catching up to those of Romanians and Bulgarians, while member-state public opinions 
increasingly differentiated between their support/opposition to Turkey and toward the 2007 entrants. 
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Another identity-related frame, then, is one that is frequently applied to analyses of Turkey’s 
bid to join the EU is that Turkey is too different, in broad cultural terms, to join the EU. This is one 
that distinguishes Turkey from other candidates that are considered to be more culturally compatible 
with the EU. In contrast to the nationalist frame, wherein the identity of the self is the critical factor, 
in this frame it is the identity of the ‘specific other’. Given that the question of Turkey joining the 
EU has offered a much more heated debate than the accessions of Bulgaria and Romania did, it is 
plausible that the Turkish identity, as perceived by others, is an identity that carries a more particular 
‘other’-ness than the Bulgarian and Romanian identities do, when they are perceived by member-
state Europeans.  
Gürer (2008) has done extensive work on the causes of public opinion regarding Turkey’s 
candidacy to join the European Union. His findings point out that perceptions of cultural difference 
between the EU and Turkey explain hostile public opinion toward the prospect of Turkish 
membership. The relationship between public opinion and member-state policies are explored 
elsewhere in this research. The purpose here is to determine if stronger identification of Turkey’s 
‘otherness’ leads to lower levels of support for Turkey’s membership.  
There is also the question of the degree to which the saliency of cultural differences is itself 
variable over time. While the actual differences of cultures is not something that change much over 
time, the appreciation of those cultural differences may do so considerably. In addition to a 
consideration of cultural differences, it is necessary to test the saliency of those differences. As will 
be further explored in the following chapter, this is done by comparing the levels of difference in 
public support and opposition to other candidate countries as opposed to Turkey’s candidacy. If 
Turkey’s cultural differences with European countries is a structurally prohibitive characteristic for 
membership, because of deep popular opposition, then that should not be an ephemeral factor. The 
hypotheses that investigate these aspects of cultural differences between the EU member states and 
Turkey are the following: 
Hi5: Countries whose populations identify cultural differences as being the reason 
Turkey should not be allowed to join by greater degrees are more likely to oppose 
Turkey for EU membership than those who do so to lesser degrees are.  
Hi6: Countries whose populations consistently differentiate Turkey from other 
candidate countries less are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership 
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than countries whose populations differentiate Turkey from other candidate 
countries more. 
2.2.3 Norms 
Regime theory is the idea that in order to make outcomes more predictable and differences of 
interests less likely to escalate into hostilities, states create institutions and regimes in order to 
coordinate interests and lower transaction costs (Keohane, 1984). Some literature on institutionalism 
and organizations (e.g. March & Olsen, 1989; 1998; Ostrom, 2005) suggests that the rules of 
organizations corral the preferences of actors in the institutional structure in such a way that the 
preferences are as much functions of the institutional rules as they are constrained by the rules. 
Though they may initially create coordination and lower transaction costs, eventually they create 
endogenous preferences. 
In that regard, they start out, ostensibly, as the answer to a collective action problem among 
rational actors, but then they proceed to shape actor interests over time. The regimes alter original 
structures and therefore redefine actors and actor preferences. One preference that tends to be in 
the mix is regime maintenance, or rule-adherence for the sake of the rules and the more predictive 
environment those rules maintain. However, in order to make the influence of regimes 
distinguishable from the internalized interests, it is necessary to identify rule-following as being 
distinct from the pursuit of interests. Below are two theories and related hypotheses of how norms 
and norm-following influence member-state behavior regarding Turkey. The first addresses the 
content of the enlargement regime and the norms that constitute that regime, and the second 
addresses the idea of socialization into the broad normative framework of the EU.  
2.2.3.1  The Copenhagen enlargement regime 
At the June 1993 European Council meeting in Copenhagen, the leaders of the rebranded European 
Union established a set of criteria which applicant states had to meet before they would be permitted 
to join the EU. By doing so, member states essentially agreed that the candidate countries’ ability to 
meet the criteria would govern their accessions, rather than the political whims of the member 
states. The brief statement in the Presidency Conclusions, cited below, outlined what would be 
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transformed into an elaborate screening mechanism mostly under the control of the European 
Commission. The statement read as follows: 
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes 
the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the 
aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
(European Council, 1993, art. 7 sec. A par. iii) 
This statement has been commonly divided into three categories: the political, economic and 
administrative criteria of membership. The political criteria were constituted by the need for the 
candidate country to have established democratic institutions, the rule of law, and protections for 
minorities. The economic criteria were constituted by the need for a market economy that would not 
significantly suffer if it became a part of the single market. Finally, the administrative criteria have 
essentially been translated as adopting the different chapters of the acquis communautaire – the entirety 
of the EU’s body of laws. Frequently forgotten, however, was the next clause, which some have 
cited as a reason for delaying enlargement. This was called the ‘fourth criterion’, being: 
The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of 
European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the 
Union and the candidate countries. 
(ibid.) 
This did not constitute a reform that the candidate country had to make, but, rather, a reform that 
the member states had to enact in order to prevent enlargement from making the EU’s institutions 
unwieldy and ineffective. Like the three earlier criteria, however, it did not constitute a lever 
intended to prevent enlargement, but an obligation for reforms to enable enlargement without 
compromising the integrity of the overall organization.  
This regime, particularly the political criteria, enshrined liberal democratic values (see below), 
but also implied rules by which the member states were required to live. Because the regime required 
massive reforms on the part of the membership candidates, it implicitly promised membership at the 
end of the process. By doing so, it implicitly prohibits individual member states from preventing the 
accession of candidates that have met the criteria, provided that the Union has reformed itself in 
order to accept new members. Given that there is no mechanism by which the organization can 
enforce negotiating behavior within the European Council, other than pressure from other members 
of the Council, this rule is enforced by peer pressure alone. 
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This does not mean that the regime has been unchequered. Greece, for example, threatened 
to scuttle the whole effort of the Eastern enlargement if its demands regarding Cyprus were not met, 
and the Netherlands did the same in 2002 regarding the percentage by which the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund would adjust to inflation. In the end, however, the rule 
has been maintained, though some would argue that Romania and Bulgaria were admitted before 
they had actually met the rule-of-law criterion. 
Frank Schimmelfennig (2005a; 2009) has argued that these rules have forced member states 
that were essentially opposed to enlargement for their own reasons to relent and permit the 
accession of countries that had demonstrated their merits under the Copenhagen regime. This 
process, which he calls ‘rhetorical entrapment’ indicates that member states who had acknowledged 
the Copenhagen regime by having previously appealed to the Copenhagen criteria as reasons why 
candidates could not (yet) become members, could no longer resist enlargement when those 
candidates had sufficiently reformed themselves. Doing so, Schimmelfennig argues, would expose 
those member states as hypocrites in the face of the regime and their own prior statements.  
Testing the strength of this regime – and the norms associated with it – means assessing if 
member states are more likely to approve of Turkey’s advancement through the next stage of the 
accession process when it makes strong progress on the required reforms than when it makes slower 
progress on those reforms. The hypothesis is as follows: 
Hn1: Member states are more likely to be supportive of Turkey’s membership after 
Turkey has demonstrated more progress toward meeting the political Copenhagen 
criteria than when Turkey has demonstrated less progress. 
2.2.3.2  Socialization 
Socialization is the process by which actors internalize norms of behavior and consider those norms 
of behavior appropriate. Because socialization is a process, it is considered to be related to time in 
the sense that longer exposure to a regime and its norms implies a higher likelihood that actors will 
behave according to the norms of the regime, and, as such, have their preferences converge.  
In a regime without socialization – i.e. a regime as interpreted by Neoliberal theories – there 
need not be preference convergence. Institutions do not prevent differences of opinion; they 
prevent escalation of those differences into hostilities or other sub-optimal outcomes. Neoliberal 
theories highlight how regimes assist in arriving at outcomes that are Pareto efficient and reduce 
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transaction costs. However, sociological – or Constructivist – theories of institutionalism predict 
that the institutions themselves reform interests and even actors. 
The variation in socialization is provided by the length of time within which the actor has 
inhabited the regime. Presumably, those actors who have been within the regime longer will behave 
more according to the norms of the regime and more alike to members who have been in the regime 
for a similar amount of time. This provides two separate hypotheses.  
Hn2: Member states that have been members of the EU for similar amounts of time 
will exhibit behavior that is more similar to one another than to member states that 
have been members for significantly different lengths of time.  
Hn3: Member states that have been member of the EU longer are more likely to 
have their support or opposition governed by Turkey’s level of progress toward 
meeting the Copenhagen criteria than member states that have been members for 
shorter periods of time. 
 
2.2.4 Values 
European leaders frequently state that the European Union is a community of values. These values 
connect to the ‘European’ identity, in that European countries are supposed to adhere to liberal 
democratic values, human rights, the rule of law, et cetera. At the same time, these European 
countries, and their political leaders, have also been advocates (some stronger than others) for 
spreading those values beyond Europe’s borders. As such, they are treated as universal values and 
not necessarily indicative of particular identities. 
The influence of the degrees of Turkey’s progress towards adoption of the liberal democratic 
values on state policies is tested by Hypothesis Hn1, above. Here, the frame is different in that the 
different degrees of member states’ full embrace of those values are tested. Not all European 
countries live up to the liberal democratic values themselves. Given that, these countries may not be 
as bothered by Turkey’s insufficient embrace of them than those who embrace the values more fully.    
  73 
2.2.4.1  Shared Political Values 
The ostensible political values – democracy, respect for the rule of law, human rights and the 
protection of minorities – are integral in the Copenhagen criteria of membership, cited above. 
Testament to the import of these values, the European Council in 1997 ruled that the political 
Copenhagen criteria needed to be met before candidate countries could begin the critical stage of 
the accession process: accession negotiations. This resulted in several of the candidate countries at 
the time not being invited to join the accession negotiations. Foremost among them were Turkey 
and Slovakia. 
However at every instance, the member states differed with one another about the EU’s 
enlargement policy. Some favored a more open policy, whereas others embraced a stricter one. The 
degree to which the conditionality of the Copenhagen criteria has governed the member-state 
policies regarding Turkey is measured elsewhere. The hypothesis below tests to see if member states 
who were, themselves, less than ideal practitioners of the values articulated by the Copenhagen 
criteria, were more likely to give Turkey a pass. The idea is that those countries that are more alike to 
Turkey in their own adherence to the liberal democratic values will have a greater degree of 
tolerance for Turkey. The hypotheses that reflect this theory is stated as: 
Hv1: Member states with lower levels of adherence to the values of liberal 
democracy are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member 
states with higher levels of adherence to the values of liberal democracy are. 
Another particular type of this pertains to rule-of-law issues, or the degree to which the political 
system is able to maintain it. Corruption is considered the force that erodes the rule of law. The 
theoretical assumption is that countries with less corruption will have less tolerance for a country 
with a high level of corruption like Turkey, as opposed to countries which also have higher levels of 
corruption. The hypotheses associated with this corruption frame of values is: 
Hv2: Member states with lower levels of corruption are less likely to be supportive 
of Turkish membership than member states with higher levels of corruption are. 
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2.3 SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT 
The sections above outline a broad set of testable hypotheses. If theories are thoroughly considered 
and broadly tested general understandings of how social processes – in this case, foreign policy 
decision – work, then this chapter does not present theories, so much as it presents a ‘wealth of 
notions’. Yet, that is the state of research in the field of EU enlargement. In the context of EU 
enlargement studies, Frank Schimmelfennig’s research is an exception. His theory of rhetorical 
entrapment assumes preferences and explains how norms shape outcomes in collective decision-
making, in the context of EU enlargement. However, he does not dig into what the preferences are 
and how they come about. Like so many rationalist studies, he takes them as given. 
A roughly similar gap exists in the broader field of foreign policy-making. The most eminent 
political scientists discuss material interests, international normative regimes, and political cultures, 
but those very general approaches offer very little insight into what particular policies states will 
choose under complex circumstances. What particular costs and benefits are salient and which are 
not? How rule-bound are states in semi-anarchic systems? Are norms more than rhetoric? 
The 32 separate hypotheses presented above represent a stab at a broad swath of the reasons 
that proponents, antagonists and analysts mention in regard to Turkey and European enlargement. 
Many of the hypotheses will be able to be discarded after testing against the empirical record. Some, 
hypotheses, however, cannot be falsified. None explain the whole range of phenomena.  
Most imply unique variables, such as Atlanticist vs. continental or neutralist foreign policies, 
or amounts of heroin deaths. Others, such as progress on the political Copenhagen criteria or 
migration take different approaches to the different variables. Further, some variables imply 
different angles of variation. Some, like the domestic political change, terrorism, public opinion and 
the rule of law, offer much variation over time and across the different member states. Others offer 
significant variation across the member states, such as NATO-membership, external trade policy, 
religion, culture and migration, while they have little variation over time. A third group of variables 
vary over time, but not across the member states, such as turkey’s progress toward meeting the 
Copenhagen criteria. 
The methods used to analyze these variables are presented in the next chapter. Furthermore, 
it will separate out the structural aspects – those phenomena, represented by the variables that are 
essentially fixed over time – and the ephemeral aspects – those phenomena that change frequently 
but are more likely to be explanatory of episode-by-episode changes of policy. It will also lay out 
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how these separate frames can be combined in order to have a more complete understanding of the 
political dynamics of the promise, or threat, of Turkish membership in the European Union. 
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3.0  METHODOLOGY 
The previous chapter posed 32 hypotheses to explain why member states of the EU might support 
or oppose Turkey for EU membership. This chapter describes the methodologies by which these 
hypotheses are tested. The first section describes the way in which the dependent variable is 
determined. The second section describes the different types of independent variables that are 
implied by the hypotheses and why there need to be different approaches toward measuring them. 
The third section outlines the methods used for measuring each of the independent variables and 
how they will be tested against the dependent variable. Finally, the fourth section will outline the 
method for bringing together the different explanatory variables into a more complete 
understanding of the politics surrounding the question of Turkish membership in the EU.  
3.1 THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The dependent variable in this research is an EU member state’s negotiating position regarding 
Turkey’s bid for EU membership. The cases chosen are the 15 member-states that were members 
before the 2004 enlargement. The positions of each of these member states are analyzed at five 
separate points in time. These points in time represent episodes when crucial decisions regarding 
Turkey were on the European Council’s agenda. 
The negotiating positions are not necessarily straightforward. The particular outcomes of 
European Council decisions are not, in themselves, dichotomous – they are not yes/no outcomes to 
discrete questions. The member states, both supporters and antagonists of Turkish membership, 
haggle over formulations in a document – the Presidency conclusions of European Council 
meetings – that all the member states can (more or less) live with. There is no ‘up-or-down’ vote, 
nor are the members’ positions officially recorded. The positions, therefore, are teased out by 
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analyzing statements to the press, and the assessments of journalists and analysts reporting on the 
political developments at each episode. 
Despite not being discrete yes/no roll call votes, the member-state positions are still ones 
that are more versus less favorable toward Turkey’s stated interest. They are positions that promote 
or delay Turkey’s progress through the enlargement regime even as that regime adapts to Turkey’s 
candidacy. The sections below explain the classification system used in recording these negotiating 
positions, and the means by which the researcher has decided upon classifying a state as being in one 
category or another.  
3.1.1 Categorizing 
This research uses three categories: drivers, passengers, and brakeman. The first and last terms are 
taken from Schimmelfennig (2005a, p. 144), where drivers promote the advancement of the 
applicant/candidate state through the accession process, and brakemen attempt to slow down, stall 
or derail the process. This research has added ‘passengers’ to Schimmelfennig’s dichotomy in order 
to account for states that took a middle ground, appeared indifferent, or chose not to express their 
preferences publicly or in such a way as reporters or political sleuths could detect. 
This set does not take intensity into account. Intensity is omitted because it is impossible to 
measure. Some countries may argue more vociferously than others, or for goals that are at greater 
odds with the mean position. Some countries know that their rank in the European pecking order is 
such that louder argument pays off, whereas others know that it is better to lie low over what their 
preferences are, and work diligently behind the scenes. There are also nuances related to the 
different facets of the enlargement debate which do not necessarily directly pertain to the speed at 
which the candidate is propelled or stalled through the regime, but with the future shape of its 
membership, the membership of other parties, or the shape of the European Union’s other 
institutions.  
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3.1.2 Case selection 
The research has chosen to look at the 15 states that were members of the EU before the 2004 
enlargement. As such, an analytical decision has been made to exclude the member states that joined 
in May 2004 from the analysis. It is, of course, not the case that their positions are less interesting, 
but preference is given to having a complete range over the five episodes. Regrettably also, these 
countries were not covered in the press to the same degree as the 15 member states of ’95-’04 (the 
“EU-15”) were covered.  
Another analytical choice has been to look at five instances when important decisions 
concerning Turkey’s progress through the enlargement regime had to be made. These were in 1997, 
1999, 2002, 2004 and 2006. They were not expressly chosen for being at two-year intervals (as the 
reader will note that the interval from 1999 to 2002 was three years), but the fact that they (mostly) 
are, has methodological advantages. As chapters five through nine will establish, there was 
considerable variation in the member-state preferences over time, demonstrating that significant 
changes of policy can occur over relatively short intervals.     
3.1.3 Collecting data 
The primary source materials for discerning the positions of the member states are news articles 
located in the Lexis-Nexis (Academic) database. These were mostly searched for among the articles 
published three months prior to the summit in question, because that was usually when member 
states articulated their positions. In some cases it was necessary to draw on articles from before 
those three months when there was scant news to be had on a particular member-state, or if the 
later articles referenced earlier statements that seemed to be relevant.  
The researcher elected to gain more material at the expense of clinical rigorousness in 
gathering the articles. Some member states were simply easier to find material on than others, and 
some member states demonstrated a more complex story than others did. Some episodes also 
offered more detail than other episodes did. In all, the researcher trawled through several thousands 
of newspaper articles, analyses, and official documents in order to find the more than one thousand 
sources cited at the end of the five empirical chapters.   
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Another highly valuable resource for the chapters for 2002, 2004, and 2006 has been the 
work of Peter Ludlow, who has captured assessments of what happened at the European Council 
meetings and the events leading up to the decisions at those meetings. He did this with extensive 
interviews from insiders and drew on a wide assortment of journalistic accounts to generate his 
accounts.  
A third source was from interviews done in the Netherlands with persons involved or closely 
associated with the Dutch decision in 2004, which was the exploratory case for this research. This 
gave tremendous insight into the Netherlands at that time, but has been of limited value for 
understanding the other member states at other times. It was nevertheless very helpful for 
understanding some of the complexities involved and the way in which a member state deals with 
the internal debates as well as the debates with other countries.   
3.1.4 Classifying 
Translating from news articles into a three-way variable is not a straightforward process. Frequently 
news articles make the categorization in their own texts by signifying certain countries as being on 
Turkey’s side and others as being against. Sometimes, the news articles are at odds with what a 
broader reading of the story supplies, and sometimes they are at odds with one another.  
In order to get a complete picture, the material available in the news articles and in the 
Ludlow accounts has been turned into five episodic narratives with narrative accounts of each 
member state’s positions. In order to determine those positions, the narratives drew on public 
statements and accounts of how those states negotiated behind closed doors with respect to the 
draft Presidency Conclusions of the respective European Council meetings. 
This required figuring out what the critical questions of the episode were and deriving 
member-states’ positions on those questions. Sometimes this also involved separating the explicit 
substance of a text from a broader debate, as in some instances these were not the same. Each 
empirical chapter will detail the critical question being decided at each summit. In shorthand, these 
are the questions below: 
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Luxembourg 1997: Can Turkey be treated the same as other applicants?  
Helsinki 1999: Will Turkey be a ‘candidate’ for EU membership? 
Copenhagen 2002: When can Turkey start accession negotiations? 
Brussels 2004: Should an alternative to membership be made explicit? 
Brussels 2006: How many negotiations chapters should be frozen if Turkey does not 
                   open its harbors and airports to Cypriot ships and airplanes? 
 
Chapters five through nine fully explore these nuances and explain how and why each member state 
at each episode was classified.  
The classification occurs by positive or negative answers to these questions. This is an 
analytical choice not without its ramifications. As made clearer later on, these questions were not 
necessarily the ones that were ‘supposed’ to have been asked. At the Luxembourg summit in 1997, 
the question that was being haggled over was whether or not Turkey could attend a conference for 
members and applicant countries. That question was answered positively. However, Turkey was still 
treated differently from the other applicant countries – even from Slovakia whose progress toward 
meeting the political Copenhagen criteria was also considered wanting. Further, the Presidency’s 
open criticism of Turkey as a country where torture occurs, and the offence the Turks’ took from 
being treated differently, has caused the Luxembourg summit to be cast in a negative light in terms 
of Turkey’s progress toward membership. 
The Brussels summit of 2004 is another example where the supposed question and the 
essential question diverged. The question was supposedly about whether or not Turkey could start 
accession negotiations. Rather than fighting a rearguard action by arguing against the start of 
accession (which only Austria really attempted), the brakemen, instead, inserted language that made 
it clear that there were alternatives to full membership. Some attempted to put the phrase of 
‘privileged partnership’ into the Presidency Conclusions. 
These refinements are necessary in order to preserve the intent of the research by not 
becoming sidetracked by diplomatic nuance. The concept that this research is seeking to measure is 
the degree to which member states promoted or struggled against Turkey’s membership bid. Both 
the drivers and the brakemen were inventive in finding means to circumvent their opponents’ 
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advancement or stalling tactics. By not taking those into account, the essence of what is being 
measured would be lost.  
This is not without a cost, however. It is quite probable that if it were not the particular 
question of Cyprus that proved to be the bone of contention in 2006, Greece, which had a specific 
interest in the Cypriot question, may have remained supportive of Turkey’s progress through the 
accession negotiations. However, because it was about Cyprus, and Greece was strongly opposed to 
Turkey being let off the hook on that count, it is impossible to know for certain. Therefore, Greece 
was categorized as a brakeman, when it was not Turkey’s candidacy for full membership that Greece 
declared was the sticking point for them. 
3.2 GENERAL MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGIES 
The methodologies used to test the hypotheses identified in the previous chapter must fit the nature 
of the variables inherent in them. With 32 separate hypotheses, there are many different types of 
variable to test. These variables differ in the ways in which they vary and in their level of 
measurement (nominal, ordinal, interval, or ratio – see below). This section will account for the 
different types of variables, in what time frames they are measured and what methods are used to 
test them.  
3.2.1 Type of variation 
The ways in which they vary is actually defined by the way in which they do not vary. Some of them 
vary both over time and over case. These are the time-sensitive variables, and include co-deployment 
of military forces, terrorist strikes, threat of drugs, public opinion, and domestic politics. These not 
only vary across the time, but – importantly – also across the member states. There are also variables 
that vary across the member states, but are not particularly variable over time. These are time-fixed 
variables. They include NATO membership, foreign policy orientations, external trade policy 
preferences, population sizes, religion, culture, or the share of the population that is Turkish and/or 
practices the Muslim faith.  
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Finally, one of the variables varies over time, but not over the member states. This is 
Turkey’s progress toward meeting the political Copenhagen criteria. Ostensibly, this is what is 
governs Turkey’s progress through the enlargement regime, and what states are supposed to be 
judging when they debate how to move forward. Essentially, this is a case-fixed variable. The table, 
below, presents these three categories. The pursuant subsections discuss the different types and 
what their analytical implications are. 
Table 3.1: The nature of variation of the different variables. 
Time-sensitive variables Time-fixed variables Case-fixed variables 
 Participation in multilateral 
military missions 
 Terrorism 
 Heroin deaths 
 Public opinion 
 Domestic Politics 
- left/center/right 
- change of power 
- change and migration 
 Agricultural trade 
 Trade 
-     volume 
-     balance 
 Investment volume 




 Foreign policy alignment 
 External trade policy 
 Enlargement policy 
 Euroscepticism 
 Population Size 
 EU budget  




-     Catholics & Protestants 
-     religiosity 
-     anti-Islamic sentiment 
 Nationalism 
 Cultural differences 
 Immigrant population 
 Muslim Population 
 Turkish population 
 Degrees of socialization 
 Member-state values 
 Corruption 
 Turkey’s progress toward 
meeting the political 
Copenhagen criteria 
 
3.2.1.1  Time-sensitive variables 
As chapters five through nine will demonstrate, many member states held different policies on 
Turkey at different times. Within the span of a decade, some countries held contrary positions, from 
  83 
one episode to the next, with some changing their policy from forceful support to forceful 
opposition and back again, or vice versa. While these policies have been extremely variable for some 
countries, only a few of the independent variables inherent in the hypotheses demonstrate such 
variation over the span of a decade and over the fifteen member states. These are the time-sensitive 
independent variables. 
These variables, then, have the most prima facie likelihood of explaining member-state 
policies regarding Turkish membership because they tend to exhibit the same level of variation as 
the dependent variable does. That said, they offer very little prospect for understanding the longer-
term political structure due to their ephemeral nature. For example, finding that changes in 
government are the most likely predictor for policy changes does not offer a prediction of how any 
particular country is likely to behave in the coming decade, given that it is difficult to predict changes 
in the future prospect of the political parties of each member state. It does, however, suggest where 
to look.   
3.2.1.2  Time-fixed variables 
As the table, above, demonstrates, the majority of the independent variables are of a nature that 
does not vary significantly over time. Given that lack of variation, these variables cannot explain why 
states change their positions over time. That does not necessarily mean that these variables are 
insignificant. It is clear that some countries have a much greater tendency to support Turkey and 
others have a much greater tendency to oppose the prospect of Turkish membership in the EU. The 
time-sensitive variables may not explain those tendencies; where the time-fixed variables possibly 
can. It does mean that the time-fixed variables must rely on either the time-sensitive variables or the 
case-fixed variable to explain the particular changes of position.  
3.2.1.3  Case-fixed variables 
Turkey’s progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria, which is the most-often reason for 
setting policy by the member-state leaders, does not vary among the member states, as it relates to 
just Turkey. Because it does not vary between the member states, it cannot explain why Germany 
may be supportive at the same time that France is not (or vice versa). It can only possibly explain 
why more member states were supportive in one episode than another.  
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3.2.2 Frames and Models of measurement 
Due to the different natures of the time-sensitive and time-fixed variables, it is necessary to adopt 
two time-frames of measurement: the short run and the long run. The short-run refers to each 
member state’s expressed preferences at each of the five episodes. The long run takes the average of 
these short-run policies, establishing more of a trend that generates more degrees of variation than 
the short-run can.  
3.2.2.1  The short run 
The time-sensitive variables can be measured against the dependent variable in its original form – 
fifteen cases over five episodes. Because the coding for the dependent variable is a simple three-way 
variable – driver, passenger, brakeman – this limits the quantitative analytical methods to those 
which are designed to measure ordinal-level variables. The method chosen to assess the strength of 
the individual time-sensitive variables against the dependent variable is the ordinal proportional 
reduction of error measure, gamma. Gamma (γ) measures the degree to which knowing the 
independent variable helps the analyst predict the outcome of the dependent variable. The measure 
reflects the percentage by which errors are proportionally reduced over knowledge of the overall 
distributions in the independent and dependent variables. 
Gamma (γ) measures ordinal-level variables against other ordinal-level variables. In this case, 
then, the independent variables must also be of an ordinal level. Because most of the independent 
variables are ratio-level variables in their original form, the method used to categorize them into 
ordinal categories will be to divide the 75 individual values from the 75 cases (15 countries x 5 
episodes) into three categories by ranking. The lowest 25 values will be assigned to the lower 
category, the middle 25 into the medium category, and the top 25 values into the higher category. 
The Gamma scores have a potential range of –1 to 1, with 0 being no relationship, -1 being perfectly 
negative, and 1 being perfectly positive. Negative refers to an inverse relationship. 
In addition to Gamma, the report will make use of time-series graphs in which changes over 
time in the dependent variable for each country is depicted alongside changes over time in the 
independent variables. Doing so helps the reader and researcher interpret the comparative changes 
over time.  
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3.2.2.2  The long run 
Those independent variables, which do not change much over time but demonstrate significant 
variation between the member states, need to be assessed against the dependent variable in a way 
that removes time from the equation. This means transforming the dependent variable from 
expressed support at each episode to the mean level of support over the decade. The mean policy 
over the five different episodes is measured by coding every time that a country is a brakeman as 0, a 
passenger as 0.5, and driver as 1. Averaging these scores over the five episodes offers a ratio-level 
variable potentially between 0 and 1 (or 0% and 100%). This estimates the probability that each 
country is in support of Turkey’s membership bid at any given time. 
Producing a ratio-level dependent variable allows tests to be done against the ratio-level 
independent variables. One straight-forward measure is Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r), which is 
a measure that reflects the same scale and general interpretation as Gamma. Along with measuring 
the correlation coefficient, it is possible to draw scatterplots and regression lines to depict the 
variation graphically. Doing so provides a single-glance appreciation of the variation and the 
relationship between the two variables.  
3.2.2.3  Exceptions 
The ‘case-fixed’ variable is in an analytical classification of its own, because it does not compare the 
member states to one another. Instead, it sums up their policy-changes over time to compare those 
changes against Turkey’s progress toward putting the liberal democratic values of the political 
Copenhagen criteria into policy and enactment. Likewise, the tests of socialization look at the 
changes over time of different categories of member states. This is done to determine if member 
states behave similarly to one another because they may have similar degrees of socialization into the 
EU regime. All these hypotheses are tested by interpreting time-series graphs. 
The third exception is the test of political opportunism. The impact of political opportunism 
– where opposition parties successfully challenge a party or coalition in power  that has embraced an 
unpopular policy regarding Turkey and subsequently changes the policy. This hypothesis is tested by 
dividing the cases into different scenarios and counting which scenarios are the most prevalent. 
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3.2.3 Levels of measurement 
The levels of measurement of the dependent and independent variables govern the sorts of analyses 
that can be used to assess the degree to which there is a potential relationship. As already mentioned, 
the assessments in the long run can use a ratio-level dependent variable. In the short run, however, 
the dependent variable is of an ordinal level. The independent variables come in levels that are 
necessitated by their natures. Some of the variables may also have different facets that allow for 
different types of measurement levels to be drawn from them. The attempt, however, is to use ratio-
level variables where possible in order to use the greatest amount of variation possible to draw 
distinctions. Table 3.2, on the next page, presents the independent variables according to the two 
different levels of measurement. 
These different levels of measurement in the independent variable also implies different 
types of measurement. Most analyses involve a ratio- or interval-level independent variable. Where 
the dependent variable is ordinal, as it is in the short-run model, then the independent variable is re-
coded into an ordinal-level variable. In a few cases, the dependent variable is of a ratio-level and the 
independent variable is of a nominal level. In those cases, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
will suffice to measure its relationship with the long-run dependent variable.  
3.3 THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The independent variables are inherent to the hypotheses from which they are drawn. As such, this 
section will follow the same format as the previous chapter. Therefore, it is broken up into the six 
main categories of explanation drawn from the metatheories: security, power, wealth, identity, norms 
and values. Each subsection will take its hypotheses, derive the associated variables, and detail how 
each is measured and tested. 
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3.3.1 Security 
This first set of hypotheses relate to the national security interests of the member states. They relate 
to each member’s integration into the trans-Atlantic security regime, participation in multilateral 
military missions, and threats of terrorism and transnational organized crime.  
Table 3.2: The levels of measurement of the independent variables. 
Ratio or interval level Nominal or ordinal level 
 Long-run dependent variable  Short-run dependent variable 
 Co-deployment of military forces 
 Terrorism 
 Heroin trade/deaths 
 Population size 
 EU budget 
 Public opinion 
 Domestic politics 
- political ideology 
- immigration politics 
 Agricultural trade 
 Trade (volume/balance) 
 Investment (volume) 
 Migration and unemployment 
 Religion (Catholics vs. Protestants) 
 Religiosity 
 Anti-Muslim sentiment 
 Nationalism 
 Cultural differences 
 Number of immigrants, Muslims and 
Turks 





 Atlanticism vs. continentalism 
 External trade policy 
 Enlargement policy 
 Euroscepticism 
 Domestic Politics 
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3.3.1.1  NATO-Membership 
Hs1: NATO members are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than non-
NATO members are. 
The variable that is derived from this hypothesis is fairly straightforward and does not require 
intricate measurement and calculation. It differentiates NATO-members from non-NATO 
members. The one complication is France, which is a member of NATO, but not integrated into the 
military command. As such, it is treated as a ‘half-in’, creating three categories: Members, France, 
and non-members, in an ordinal level variable. As an ordinal-level variable, in a long-run model, it is 
tested with a one-way ANOVA test. It is also considered by looking at a cross tabulation of the 
NATO members against France and the non-NATO members, ordered according to levels of long-
run support for Turkish membership. 
3.3.1.2  Multilateral Military Missions  
Hs2: Those member states who contribute more to the missions that Turkey also 
contributes to are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those 
who contribute less. 
EU member states engaged in several major military missions during the episodes being analyzed. 
With the second-largest military (in terms of numbers of troops) in NATO after the United States, 
Turkey has had significant capabilities to put into the field. As such, Turkey has a great deal to offer 
to EU-member states in terms of burden sharing. Three of the missions occurred in cooperation 
with Turkish forces, and one (the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq) did not. At the time 
of the Copenhagen summit in 2002 it was, however, not yet known if Turkey would assist in the 
invasion or occupation. Indeed, there was much hope on the part of those supporting the United 
States that they would open a northern front through which the invasion could take place. The 
paragraphs below detail the time-frame and method of measurement, the implications of the level of 
measurement, and the means used to analyze this independent variable against the empirical record 
of member-state policies regarding Turkey.   
Given the prospective understanding of the underlying theory – that member states support 
Turkey in the hopes of military burden-sharing benefits in the near future – the aim of this test is to 
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identify grounds for interest. The logic of the hypothesis is that those countries who expected to be 
engaged in the near future (the year following each summit) alongside Turkey had an interest in 
keeping friends with Turkey by supporting Ankara’s ambitions at the summit. That expectation is 
modeled by actual participation in missions together with Turkey in the year following each episode. 
The exception is 2002, when Turkish participation was hoped for but not, in the end, received. This 
makes the prospect of Turkish participation and/or assistance with Iraq relevant in 2002, but not in 
2004 and 2006. The Iraq invasion will, therefore, be considered separately. 
The measurement challenge is the construction of a testable variable that reflects the interest 
in Turkey’s participation, using member-state participation rates. That interest has to be measured 
relative to member-states’ capabilities and relative to other participants’ contributions. This implies a 
multifaceted computation of the independent variable based on particular a framing of capabilities 
and the contributions of other participating countries. 
 Different member states have different capabilities. Not only is there a vast difference 
between the military capabilities of Germany and Luxembourg, because of their different 
populations, but the degrees of militarization also differ. For example, Belgium and Greece are very 
comparable in population size, but in 1998 Greece had four times the amount of soldiers under 
arms. Belgium, on the other hand, has a very modern military while Greece made extensive use of 
conscript soldiers. 
Because the multilateral missions, on which Turkey has cooperated with the EU member 
states, have been infantry-intensive affairs (as opposed to aerial and naval missions – Operation 
Active Endeavour notwithstanding), the simplest measure is based on numbers of soldiers assigned to 
a military mission. The numbers exclude soldiers stationed in countries far away from the theatre of 
operation, such as the German forces participating in the ISAF mission from remote Djibouti. 
Troops stationed in neighboring countries in support (such as troops in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in 
support of ISAF) are, however, included in the numbers. 
Because of the widely different capabilities between the countries, it is necessary to measure 
troops in a proportion to a country’s capabilities. Those capabilities are also framed in terms of 
armies: the number of soldiers in a member-states’ army (as opposed to air forces, navies or strategic 
units). These numbers are taken from The Military Balance for each year after a decision episode, i.e. 
1998, 2000, 2003, 2005, and 2007.  
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Each member state’s number of deployed troops to missions in which Turkey also 
participated (or where it was hoped they would do so, in reference to Iraq 2003) divided by the size 
of their army, only tells part of the story. 
Multilateral missions make each contribution 
a part of a larger multinational force. The rate 
of deployment (tdrc = troops deployed, tdc 
divided by the size of a country’s army, Ac) 
must be considered against other countries’ 
deployment rates. Therefore, the troop 
deployment rates of each country participating 
in each multilateral mission in which Turkey is 
also participating is added together. This 
figure will provide the denominator, with the country in question’s troop deployment rate as the 
nominator, for the figure that offers each member state’s proportional troop deployment rate (αtdrc). 
This figure is the number used in the independent variable that will test the hypothesis against the 
dependent variable. Because the independent variable is of a ratio level, and it is time-sensitive, the 
test is conducted by means of an ordinal reduction of error measurement, as per the method 
described above.  
In order to not pre-judge the outcome of this test, the outliers (Greece and Luxembourg) 
have been removed from the dataset. In the case of Greece, this is for two reasons. First, it is 
understood that Greece has a unique military relationship with Turkey (antagonism) that is not 
shared by the other member states. Greece should not be expected to have similar military concerns 
as other member states do vis-à-vis Turkey. The second reason is the nature of Greece’s military, 
which remains a conscript-based military. This sort of military underrates the proportional troop 
deployment rate because any troops deployed are divided by the total amount of soldiers in that 
military’s army. Luxembourg has been removed for the opposite reason. Because of its extremely 
small army size, even in proportion to its citizen base (which is significantly smaller than its 
population size), the proportional troop deployment rate derived from the 26-59 troops it had in the 




Troop deployments divided by the total number 
of soldiers in that country’s army offers the 
troop deployment rate. The troop deployment 
rate divided by all of the troop deployment rates 
of all the countries in all the concurrent 
multilateral missions being assessed offers the 
proportional troop deployment rate for that 
country. 
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3.3.1.3  Terrorism 
Hs3: Those member states that have suffered from terrorism in the past more are 
more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have suffered 
less. 
The terrorism hypothesis implies a number of possible variables that can be framed in different 
ways. The simplest test involves looking at the massive terrorist incidents that took place during the 
period in question: the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
Madrid train bombings of March 11, 2004, and the London Underground bombings of July 7, 2005. 
The former would not imply variation among the member states, given that they struck in the 
United States, while the latter two attacks struck Spain and the United Kingdom.  
If the great catastrophic attacks were explanatory, there should have been a significant 
different between member-state behavior before and after these strikes. This is, however, not the 
case. The average level of support for Turkish membership among the member states before and 
after 2001 is negligible (0.60 vs. 0.62). So too, the Spanish and British policies, prior to the Madrid 
and London attacks respectively, were already supportive. It is conceivable that the attacks 
strengthened their determination, but they did not change their policies from one category to 
another. 
In order to not summarily dismiss the hypothesis, it is necessary to frame the independent 
variables in ways that go beyond these three major attacks. Doing so presents certain methodological 
problems, but also some advantages. The first problem is one of operationalization: choosing what 
data to use to signify a level of threat. ‘Threat’, after all, is a subjective feeling that cannot be 
measured by available data. It is, therefore, necessary to choose a dataset that measures an objective 
proxy to the threat level. The proxy is ‘past terrorist incidents’, for which there are open-source 
databases available. 
The chosen database is the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by the National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), based at the University of 
Maryland. This database is purported to be the most comprehensive dataset, which allows particular 
queries to be downloaded in spreadsheet format, allowing for easy data manipulation. The available 
data includes dates, countries, perpetrator, number of fatalities, and number of injuries. This data 
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presents the researcher with an array of possibilities, but also some limitations. The possibilities 
include the ability to adjust the time frame and the severity of the incident. It is also possible to 
measure the incidents in terms relative to population. Because there is little analytic cost in looking 
at several scenarios, adjusting for different levels of severity, different time frames, and either in 
absolute numbers or relative to population, thirty-two of these scenario analyses conducted. 
The main limitation comes in the form of the inability of selecting by category of perpetrator 
or by purpose of action. The dataset includes (suspected) perpetrators, but not categories of such 
perpetrators or those perpetrators’ motives for action. Terrorists active in the EU-15 member states 
are extremely numerous and varied. At the one end the perpetrators include the Abu Hafs al-Masri 
Brigades, which is alleged to have carried out the Madrid train and London underground attacks. At 
the other end of the spectrum the perpetrators of terrorism include the Arsonists for Social 
Cohesion. This group set alight a Ferrari and a Fiat in Athens one day in July 1998, in what may 
have been a rage against Italian automobiles. While there is a likelihood that the ‘Al-Qaeda 
Organization for Jihad in Sweden’ has more in common with the al-Masri Brigades, than it does 
with the Arsonists for Social Cohesion, in terms of motive, the Al-Qaeda Organization for Jihad in 
Sweden’s method and target of attack had much more in common with the Arsonists for Social 
Cohesion than with the attacks of the al-Masri Brigades.  
Imputing motive from perpetrator is tricky and not included in the dataset. It is, therefore, 
not possible to separate Islamist terrorism from separatist terrorism from automotive terrorism. This 
makes it impossible to discern member-state motives for diminishing terrorism by supporting 
Turkey for EU membership. In terms of the symbolic nature of Turkey as a mostly Muslim country, 
while it might be possible to select every terrorist organization with an Arab-sounding name, it is not 
the case that every such organization is motivated by the Clash of Civilizations, anger at Western 
support for dictatorial regimes, or participation in the occupation of Iraq.  
Even if it were possible to identify such motives, it is not clear that doing so would be 
theoretically desirable. Selecting for an Islamist motive presumes that it is the symbolism of 
enlarging to a mostly Muslim country through which most incidents of terrorism would be 
diminished. Again, using symbolism as the analytical frame assumes an ideational metatheoretical 
scaffolding, which does not suit the Rationalist imperative of focusing on a security motive of 
action.  
From the Rationalist perspective, the integration of Turkey’s counter-terror assets is what 
offers the EU member states the added value in terms of diminishing the terrorist threats to their 
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security. Turkish counter-terror assets are aimed more at separatist threats, and more specifically at 
Kurdish separatist threats, than at Islamist threats. Al-Qaeda and al-Masri Brigades, together, 
account for 12 incidents in the member states (ten of which, together, make up the Madrid train and 
London underground bombings), whereas Kurdish groups account for 112 incidents inside the 15 
member states in the period being assessed. Therefore, it is not useful to take an ‘Islamist motive’, 
whatever that may mean, as the most useful frame for analysis. Because of the above, separating out 
terrorism by motive does not seem useful. Instead, all motives of terrorism will be counted in the 
measurement of this variable, provided they meet three criteria, referenced below. 
The methodological advantages offered by the terrorism dataset are in measuring severity 
and time specificity. In terms of severity, counting ‘incidents of terrorism’ is one way to measure the 
level of threat. This may be useful, but a garden-variety terrorist incident frequently involves a 
Molotov cocktail thrown at an ATM machine in a mid-size town somewhere in the country’s 
hinterland in which nobody is hurt or killed. The purpose of terrorism is usually to terrorize or to 
make a symbolic statement and not necessarily to kill or maim. Nevertheless, national governments 
are theoretically more likely to adjust their foreign policies in response to incidents that involve 
fatalities and injuries than those that impede someone’s ability to withdraw ahead of a visit the 
village grocer. Therefore, four levels of severity are assessed – incidents, fatal and/or injurious 
incidents, fatalities, and a weighed fatal and injurious composite.  
The most encompassing of these, ‘incidents’, counts all incidents of terror included in the 
GTD database that meet three criteria of terrorism: 
 The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. 
 There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other 
message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. 
 The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, i.e. the act must 
be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the 
admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants). 
This produces a total count of 1568 incidents between 1994 and 2006, ranging from the Molotov 
cocktails aimed at ATM machines to the Madrid and London bombings. The second level counts 
incidents that produced casualties of injury and/or death that also meet the three criteria of 
terrorism above. This produces a total count of 348 such incidents between the same years. The 
third level counts the fatalities in the above-mentioned incidents. This produces 409 people killed 
over the twelve-year time frame. 
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The fourth level of severity is drawn from a weighed composite of fatalities and injuries. 
Simply adding fatalities and injuries together would weigh the severity of the attacks severely in the 
directions of the injuries, given that injuries outnumber deaths by more than ten-to-one (4336 to 
409). Assuming that a death is considered to be of a greater severity than an injury, the researcher 
has chosen to weigh the composite in a 1:10 scale, mirroring the frequency ratio, making ten injuries 
count as severely as one death. It is understood that this weighing is somewhat arbitrary, but it 
provides a standard for measuring the injured as well, and not ignoring them completely, except in 
incident counts.  
The other methodological advantage from this dataset is that it includes dates and countries, 
allowing for both cross-national and cross-period analyses, which is also the format of the 
dependent variable. Because terrorist strikes are incidents in time, this introduces the ability to do 
time-series analyses, but also the challenge of selecting time frames. If terrorism explains behavior, 
then member-state governments should be expected to support Turkish membership more after an 
increase in incidents, or after particularly catastrophic ones. By the same token, that support would 
diminish as the threat has diminished. 
The ability to do a time-series analysis, however, offers the challenge of choosing what sort 
of time frame to choose. Presumably, levels of threat diminish over time after an incident, if no 
other incidents occur. But how quickly does that happen? It is possible to introduce a cumulative 
time lag - counting incidents, deaths or casualties during a certain span of time prior to the time of 
comparison. For example, when France had to make a decision on Turkey in 1997, it had suffered 
23 terrorist incidents that year, two of which produced a total of three injuries but no deaths. The 
previous year, however, it suffered 41 incidents, eight of which produced a total of seven deaths and 
97 injuries.  A cumulative time-lag of one year therefore puts the number at 64 incidents, ten of 
which produced with seven deaths and 100 injuries.  
The analysis will take four time-lag frames into account. The first will look at only the year in 
question (1997, 1999, 2002, 2004 and 2006). The one-year cumulative time lag will look at that year 
and the year prior, as in the example above. The same is done for two-year and three-year 
cumulative time lags which will add the year in question and the two or three years prior, 
respectively. Because the two- and three-year time lags create measurements with overlapping years, 
it is understood that in these scenarios the variation over time will diminish as the years overlap. The 
four different levels of threat and the four degrees of time lag offer sixteen different scenarios to 
measure the level of threat in each country at each episode.  
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It is also necessary to mention levels of terrorism in terms relative to population. Larger 
countries attract more terrorism than smaller countries do. The largest five countries - Germany, 
France, the UK, Italy and Spain each suffered, on average, 19 incidents per year (between 1994 and 
2006), while the smaller countries each suffered 2.7 incidents per year on average. Given that the 
population ratios between the largest five and the smallest ten is a factor of about 7.6 (the 
population of the average big country as opposed to the average small country), and that that ratio 
multiplied by the average amount of incidents in the small countries is in the ball-park of that of the 
small countries (2.7 x 7.5 = 20.52, in comparison to the large country’s 19 average incidents per 
year), there is an argument for proportionality.  
Because large countries attract more terrorist attacks than small countries do, small countries 
are likely to ‘feel’ attacks more heavily than large countries are. The Al-Qaeda Organization for Jihad 
in Sweden throwing a Molotov cocktail at the Iraqi embassy is more likely to catch the attention of 
Stockholm than a Corsican separatist, throwing a Molotov cocktail at an ATM machine, is going to 
catch Paris’ attention. On the other hand, German people and leaders are not likely to consider the 
value of one person injured or killed as only one-tenth as shocking than the Swedish people and 
leaders are, simply because that is the respective proportions of their populations. Therefore, the 
analyses are conducted both in terms of absolute numbers as well as in terms relative to population.  
Table 3.3: Thirty-two frames of analysis: (4 x 4 x 2) 
Levels of severity Time-lags Absolute/relative 
 All incidents 
 Incidents with casualties 
 Deaths 
 Deaths + injuries/10 
 Same-year 
 Same + previous year 
 Same + previous two years 
 Same + previous three years 
 Absolute amounts 
 Divided by population 
 
 
Each of the sixteen scenarios, arising from the four different levels of severity and four different 
time frames, are carried out twice (for absolute and relative numbers) for a total of 32 sets of figures 
to test against the dependent variable. These methods all produce ratio-level variables, which are 
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tested against the dependent variable in the short run. Suiting testing mode to variables, the tests are 
done by calculating proportional reductions in error for ordinal variables, Gamma (γ).  
3.3.1.4  Security from Transnational Crime  
Hs4: Those member states that suffer more from the heroin trade are more likely to 
be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have suffered less from the 
heroin trade. 
Transnational Crime related to Turkey, as a concept, is a far more complicated concept to measure 
than terrorism is. Where terrorism is highly explicit, in the sense that it is attempting to attract 
attention, transnational crime is highly covert. The (in)security impact of transnational crime also has 
(even) more varied concepts of measurement: Transnational organized crime (TOC) groups are 
involved in an array of different criminal trades: drugs, human trafficking, cigarette and arms 
smuggling, extortion and racketeering, and the trade in nuclear materials. The challenge, therefore, is 
finding a reasonable proxy. As the hypothesis suggests, heroin-induced deaths is taken as that proxy. 
Of the above-mentioned activities in European countries, drugs are the TOC groups’ bread 
and butter, accounting for the overwhelming lion’s share of Turkish TOC activities. Heroin is also 
the main narcotic trafficked by these groups (Cengiz, 2010, p. 253). By measuring the threat of 
TOCs by counting the number of deaths related to heroin, this research assumes that the safety of 
citizens is the focus of the security concern and the number of deaths of those citizens measures of 
the level of threat from the drugs. The data used for this analysis is from the European Monitoring 
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). Their measure, drug-induced deaths 
(EMCDDA standard definition, ‘Selection B’) is a subset of drug-related deaths, that counts the 
deaths resulting from direct poisoning and resulting from mental and behavioral disorders due to 
psychoactive substance use of narcotics.  
Selection B is chosen in favor of ‘Selection D’ because this latter selection narrows the 
definition and does not include data from Belgium, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom. Selection B, on the other hand, does not include data from Greece. The Greek 
data can, however, be estimated. Other missing values in Selection B are estimated by using linear 
trends from Selection B as well as comparison to available numbers in Selection D in order to arrive 
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at numbers to be used in the analysis. The statistical appendix (B) explains the means of estimating 
missing data.   
Among the drug-induced deaths, the involvement of opiates (i.e. heroin and other opium-
related drugs, such as Methadone and Buprenorphine) is particularly high. Regrettably, the data on 
the toxicology of the drug-induced deaths is very incomplete over the range of member states and 
years in question. In many cases, the toxicology of drug-induced deaths is simply unknown. 
Furthermore, in the toxicology reports, EU members use different definitions, leading to weaknesses 
in the comparability of data.  
Thankfully, among the known cases, the ratio of drug-induced deaths related to opiates over 
all deaths with a known toxicology being related to opiates amounts to a fairly constant 88%. Given 
a low level of deviation from this average, with only one marked exception12, the share of drug-
induced deaths resulting from opiates is assumed to be constant among the member states. 
Removing the outlier from the set results in the increase of the average percentage of drug-induced 
deaths, with known toxicology, to 90%.  Taking the toxicology as constant, the drug-induced deaths 
numbers (Selection B, multiplied by 0.9) is taken as the independent variable for this analysis.  
Because the number of drug-induced deaths is a variable that varies over the course of a 
decade as well as between cases, it is possible to test the possible effect of this independent variable 
against the dependent variable in the short term. Because of the availability of year-by-year data, it 
can also be tested with time lags. In the case of this variable, it is desirable to introduce the time-lags, 
because there is doubtlessly a certain passage of time before changes in a policy problem finds an 
indirect solution such as incorporation of Turkey into the EU. 
While it is possible to test both absolute numbers as well as numbers relative to 
population, this makes less sense than doing so does with terrorism. Drug deaths are not 
broadcast with the same shock as terrorist attacks are. It is not the case that each death is met by 
the whole population of a country with an equal amount of horror. This is partially a function of 
the nature of drug deaths, but also a function of the higher numbers of people dying from drugs 
than from terrorism. Furthermore, there is likely a bad stigma associated with the victims. 
Therefore, taking absolute numbers of persons dying from heroin becomes, essentially, a proxy 
for population size, which is already tested by a different hypothesis. 
                                                
12 Belgium in 2004, where there was an unusual drop in the percentage of drug-induced deaths resulting from the use of 
opiates, down to 55%. These toxicology figure are from the 2009 DRD-1partii table from the European Monitoring 
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). 
  98 
The means of measurement is going to be similar to that for terrorism; drawing a gamma-
ratio of the proportion of dependent-variable variation explained by the independent variable. The 
independent variable is computed into a three-category ordinal variable that take the lowest third, 
the medium third and the highest third as the categories, tested against the brakemen, passengers 
and drivers of each episode. This is also done with a two-year and three-year cumulative time lag. 
Doing so results in three gamma-ratios that will measure the proportional reduction in error that the 
independent variable provides.  
3.3.2 Power 
The following sections explain how the hypotheses that measure the possible explanatory effects of 
power-related variables. The first two, foreign policy orientation and external trade policy, explore 
the international level of analysis. The following four, being enlargement policy, stance on further 
integration, population size, and the EU’s redistributional policies, analyze the EU-level of politics. 
The final four consider domestic political variables. 
3.3.2.1  Atlanticism vs. Continentalism 
Hp1: Those member states that exhibit a more Atlanticist foreign policy are more 
likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have a more 
continental or neutral foreign policy. 
The foreign policy tendencies of the EU member states – the degree to which they tilt toward 
agreement with the United States, or for a more independent European orientation – is one that is 
much qualitatively described in the literature. France and Germany are, by definition, numbered 
among the continental powers. The United Kingdom is manifestly Atlanticist.  
Because Atlanticism or continentalism, as a concept, is closely aligned with security policy, 
there is a danger of a covariance with the NATO and multilateral missions variables. In practice, this 
is, however, not the case. For example, Finland and Sweden are neutral countries are not NATO 
members. Yet they have a strong preference for a European security arrangement that is led by the 
United States, rather than Brussels or the continental axis (Herolf & Huldt, 2002, p 77). So too, 
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Germany is a full-fledged member of NATO, but that does not mean that it is not a continental 
power.  
The variable will be treated as a three-way ordinal variable. This means that it is considered a 
range with Atlanticism at one end and continentalism on the other, with an intermediate category 
between them for those countries that are not quite Atlanticist, but not continentals either. In order 
to determine where the countries are on the spectrum, a brief survey of the literature, especially on 
those cases that are not so widely understood, is assessed. Following the determination of categories, 
the methods of analysis are a one-way ANOVA test and a cross tabulation. 
3.3.2.2  External Trade Policy  
Hp2: Those member states that exhibit a trade policy similar to Turkey’s expected 
trade policy are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those 
who have a trade policy at odds with Turkey’s expected trade policy. 
Consideration of member states’ positions on global trade and the European Union’s external trade 
policy follows a similar method and analysis to the preceding hypothesis. However, because trade 
policy is more clear-cut than foreign and security policy, this hypothesis is not only tested against a 
categorization based in the literature, it is also tested against measures of volume and balance 
external trade for each member state.  
Because it is beyond the analytical scope of this research to project what Turkey’s policy may 
be upon accession (should that ever happen), this assessment will look at degrees of preferred trade 
liberalism. Countries that support more liberal trade policies are assumed to have a similar stand on 
Turkey, one that is different from member states that oppose Turkish membership, provided that 
external trade policy is on members’ minds when they make their enlargement policy decisions. The 
purpose of the empirical test is to demonstrate a relationship, positive or negative, between external 
trade preferences and Turkish membership preferences.  
The assessment of the support for a more protectionist or more liberal external trade policy 
is done in two ways. First, there is the assessment in Woolcock (2005), in which he categorizes the 
member states according to observed behavior in the EU’s councils. Like the assessments on 
NATO and Atlanticism vs. continentalism, above, this creates a three-way categorization between 
liberals, protectionists and member states that provide the swing-votes on particular questions. This 
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division of member states among the three categories is tested against the exhibited long-run policy 
on Turkey by means of a one-way ANOVA test and an appreciation of a table showing the different 
categories along both variables. 
The second way is to measure against actual ratios of external over total trade. This is based 
on the presumption that a preference for more liberal external trade follows from a greater actual 
ratio of external trade. Those countries that do more of their trading with third countries (outside of 
the European Economic Area) are presumed to prefer a more liberal external trade policy. 
Calculating these ratios also involves calculating the same for Turkey. Turkey’s own side of the 
spectrum would suggest where its own preferences might lie.  
3.3.2.3  Enlargement Policy  
Hp3: Those member states that have exhibited preferences for swift enlargement to 
Eastern Europe are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those 
who have opposed swift enlargement. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, countries have a history of having a certain position on 
enlarging the EU that may not be applicant/candidate-specific. They may support Turkish 
membership because they generally prefer a European Union with more member states. Their 
policies on supporting Turkey for membership may not have anything to do with Turkey’s particular 
characteristics.  
Measuring a member-state’s overall preferences for enlargement is done by comparing their 
record of supportiveness in the round of enlargement that brought in the Eastern European 
countries, Malta and Cyprus. Rather than going through an assessment process as detailed as the 
following chapters is beyond the pale of this research, and, instead the categorization provided by 
Schimmelfennig (2005a) is used.  
Schimmelfennig provides a variable, like the one being used here, to differentiate between 
those in favor and opposed to enlargement. The difference is that Schimmelfennig uses two 
categories (drivers and brakemen), rather than three. He further differentiates based upon each 
member state’s stance on limited or inclusive enlargement, referring to either enlarging only to those 
candidates that had progressed more speedily toward meeting the criteria and were geographically 
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closer to most of the member states. The analysis here will ignore this second dimension, taking only 
the driver/brakeman dichotomy into account. 
The lineup of drivers and brakemen is measured against the long-run policy preferences by 
way of a one-way ANOVA test, as well as an optical assessment of a cross tabulation.   
3.3.2.4  Euroscepticism 
Hp4: More Eurosceptic member states are more likely to be supportive of Turkish 
membership than less Eurosceptic member states. 
It is frequently argued that those member states in favor of enlargement – and especially the 
enlargement to Turkey – have an agenda that seeks to erode the EU as an effective organization by 
making it too broad and unwieldy. This idea argues that enlargement preferences are fuelled by 
Euroscepticism from the member-state governments’ perspectives. Soetendorp (1997) offers an 
assessment of what countries are generally in favor of deeper integration in the EU, and which are 
more hesitant or opposed to further integration. The relationship between Soetendorp’s 
categorization and the policy on Turkey will be tested with a one-way ANOVA F-test and an 
assessment of a cross tabulation. 
It is worthwhile to consider that the measure above does not measure popular attitudes 
toward European integration. It is a commonplace understanding that government policy and 
popular opinion do not frequently align on the point of integration. For example, Soetendorp finds 
that “Portugal takes a more cautious attitude” than Spain when it comes to tighter European 
integration, while its public opinion is among the most enthusiastic for a more rapidly integrating 
EU (ibid, p. 43; Eurobarometer). A similar situation is true for Greece. The reverse is true of 
Finland and, to a lesser extent, Germany. 
3.3.2.5  Large vs. Small 
Hp5: Larger member states are more likely to be supportive of Turkish 
membership than smaller member states. 
This hypothesis is based off the idea that larger states will be more likely to support Turkey because 
Turkey, as a member, would have more similar interests to other large states in crafting the future of 
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the European Union. Because size in population is a ratio-level variable, and it is not one that offers 
much variation over time, it is possible to do a regression analysis and draw a scatterplot to see if 
there is any potential relationship between population size and policy.   
3.3.2.6  The EU Budget 
Hp6: net-recipient states are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership 
than net-donor states are. 
This hypothesis suggests that member states that are net-recipients of the EU’s redistribution 
policies (the CAP and the Structural/Regional Policy) may have more favorable policies toward 
Turkish membership than net-donors. The logic is that Turkey, as a powerful member, due to its 
size, would help lock in those policies and prevent the net-donors from diminishing those policies in 
the future. The net-donors would have an interest in keeping Turkey out for exactly the same 
reason. 
The data collected are the receipts from the EAGGF (European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund) and the Regional Policy, minus total expenditures. This figure is divided by each 
member state’s GDP so as to measure the redistribution as a share of a member state’s annual 
economy. Data is collected for each year between 1995 and 2006. With the exception of Ireland, that 
share of GDP did not change drastically over time. This means that, like population size, a member-
state’s net-status on the budget is a ratio-level variable that does not change by significant degrees 
over time, and should therefore be measured against a the long-run policy on Turkey. A scatterplot 
and regression analysis can give insight into the potential relationship between these two variables. 
3.3.2.7  Public Opinion 
Hp7: Member states with public opinion more predominantly against Turkish 
membership are less likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member 
states with public opinion less predominantly against Turkish membership. 
Public opinion is a variable that can change significantly over the course of a decade. Therefore, it is 
useful to measure it against the short-run policy. It is also a ratio-level variable. The influence of 
public opinion is measured by an ordinal-level proportional reduction of error measure (gamma) and 
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by comparing graphs. The data is taken from Eurobarometer. While there have been numerous 
public opinion polls about Turkey, there are many complications in the data. Only Eurobarometer 
has systematically assessed public opinion among all the EU member states. They have also done so 
with the same question for several years. 
Table 3.4 (below) shows in what years, and months, the question: “For each of the following 
countries, [incl. Turkey] are you in favour or not of it becoming part of the European Union in the future?” was 
asked. The best method is to set the nearest preceding date before each episode’s decision moment 
to measure the level of public support for Turkish membership. This is not desirable for the 2004 
decision, however, as the nearest preceding survey question on Turkey was asked in November 
2002, two years earlier. For 2004 it is necessary to use the June 2005 survey as the proxy for public 
opinion in late 2004. 
Table 3.4: Months of Eurobarometer surveys featuring the same question on Turkey. 
Public opinion on Turkey was asked 
in several Eurobarometer surveys 
1996 January  
1997 April  
1999 April November 
2000 June  
2001 January November 
2005 June October 
2006  September 
2008 April  
 
 
Because the answers to the survey questions allow three answers: ‘For’, ‘Against’, and ‘Don’t Know’, 
it is necessary to recalculate the variable in order to provide one number that measures the level of 
public support for Turkish membership. That measure will be the percentage ‘For’ minus the 
percentage ‘Against’. Doing this recalculation, and taking the lowest third, middle third, and highest 
third of the ‘For’ levels for each of the member states at each of the episodes, allows for conducting 
an ordinal proportional reduction of error test as has been done for several other variables. 
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To compute the gamma-measure, it is necessary to turn the ratio-level variable into an 
ordinal level variable. As has been done with other variables, such as terrorism and crime, this is 
done by taking the highest-third, middle-third, and lowest-third values for each of the data points 
and thus dividing them into three ordinal categories. 
Because public opinion is a much-considered variable when thinking about Turkey, it is 
useful to look at changes over time, regardless of the outcome of the gamma-ratio. This is done by 
graphing the changes in public opinion against graphs of the member-state policies on Turkey. 
Doing so also has the benefit of getting a sense of public opinion in a descriptive sense. This allows 
the reader and the researcher to see if public opinion leads policy, or if the relationship is, in fact, the 
reverse; in other words, that the political rhetoric possibly moves public opinion, rather than the 
presumed direction of causality. 
3.3.2.8  Political party ideology 
Hp8: Left-wing governments are more likely to be supportive of Turkish 
membership than Right-wing governments are. 
The challenge for testing this hypothesis is to offer a definition of what governments are right-wing, 
centrist, or left-wing governments. This implies a working definition of these terms and a measure 
that is valid across time and case. That working definition is drawn from Laver & Budge (1992), and 
the data is compiled by Volkens et al. (2010) in the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) database. 
This data offers a scale between –100 (left) and +100 (right) for each political party in many 
states (including all the member states), and draws on political party manifestos ahead of each 
election. The data takes into account policy proposals/statements regarding: military policy, freedom 
and human rights, constitutionalism, political authority, free market economic policy, level of 
protectionism, economic orthodoxy, the welfare state, promotion of a national(ist) culture, 
traditional morality, law and order, promotion of peace, internationalism, democracy, anti-
imperialism, market regulation, economic planning, education policy and stance on organized labor. 
As such, it is a very broad measure and not focused on a small set of criteria. 
Drawing on this data, the ideology of governments is defined by the right-left scores of the 
ruling parties using the data for the most recent election prior to the decision in each episode. 
Coalitions are calculated by summing and averaging the scores of the constituent political parties, 
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using a weight depending on what share of the coalition is represented in the lower house of the 
national parliament. This precise calculation, its rationale, along with the determinations of how 
missing data is handled, is detailed in Statistical Appendix C. 
In addition to the CMP data, which is not always complete, another analysis is drawn using 
the ParlGov data of Döring and Manow (2011). This data encompasses more political parties, 
including minor ones that have joined coalition governments as very junior member parties. The 
scoring of the left/right dimension is along an 11-point scale, from 0 to 10. Its score for political 
parties is, however, static across time, assuming that political parties do not shift their ideology or 
policy proposals.  
The fit of these independent variable data with the dependent variable are first tested using 
the ordinal proportional reduction of error test used previously. That measure of government 
ideology that best the dependent variable is then tested by comparing its graphs to those of the 
dependent variable.  
3.3.2.9  Political opportunism  
Hp9: When existing government policy is at odds with public opinion, significant 
changes in government pursuant to elections are more likely to result in policy 
changes than when existing policy is not at odds with public opinion.  
Because this is essentially a bivariate analysis, testing this hypothesis requires making two sets of 
distinctions: levels of public opinion and changes of government. Further, in contrast to the 
previous tests, this test considers changes of government and changes of policy. That means that the 
observations are no longer attributes of the cases at certain episodes, but rather attributes of cases 
between episodes, or intervals. Because it is also framed in a conditional sense – where the requisite 
condition for the hypothesis operating is that policy must be at odds with public opinion – a test of 
this hypothesis must be done while looking at only those cases where the condition is true. 
This subset is where public opinion is at odds with the policy in the previous episode. 
Because the balance of public opinion is heavily toward the negative – there are only a handful of 
cases where the balance of public opinion is in Turkey’s favor and the policy is not that of a driver – 
that there is little point in looking too heavily at those cases where a favorable public opinion was at 
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odd with government policy.13 The analysis will, therefore, look at the cases where public opinion 
was negative and the government had embraced a driver policy.  
Using this subset, each case is looked at to see what the fallout was from the contrast 
between policy and opinion. There are three developments that logically can fall within the domestic 
politics as an explanatory frame: 1) the driver government was replaced by government with a 
passenger or brakeman policy, 2) the sitting government changed its policy, and 3) the government 
managed to change public opinion (or public opinion changed for other reasons). Other possible 
developments are 4) that the sitting government stuck to its policy and weathered the political 
discontent with its policy, and 5) that the replacement government maintained the driver policy.  
The test is seeing what the distribution of outcomes is. If outcomes 1, 2, and 3 are prevalent 
then it is possible that political opportunism explains some of the changes in policy. If, however, 4 
or 5 are the prevalent outcomes, then there is little evidence that political opportunism played a role. 
Under scenario 4, where governments maintain their policies, it means that governments are either 
so secure in their positions that the chance of being removed is considered remote, or that they 
consider the benefit of the policy worth the risk of being replaced. In these cases, it is interesting to 
assess the degree to which a government could feel secure. In the last scenario, the opposition either 
did not make Turkey an election issue despite the chance that it would have been worthwhile 
campaign rhetoric. In that case, it is interesting to learn by what margins the election was won. If the 
margins were close, the benefits of the driver policy must be considered sufficiently worthwhile that 
the opposition would risk not winning the elections, or they would risk losing the elections for not 
having kept their word. 
3.3.2.10 Immigration Politics 
Hp10: Member states with larger immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations, relative 
to total population, are more likely to oppose Turkish membership than member 
states with smaller immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations relative to total 
population, are. 
                                                
13 Incidentally, there are five cases where the balance of public opinion was in favor of Turkish membership and the 
government held a passenger policy, and one case (Sweden in 1997) where the government held a brakeman position 
despite a positive balance in public opinion. 
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Hp11: Member states with larger immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations, relative 
to total population, are more likely to change their policies on Turkish membership 
more frequently than member states with smaller Muslim/Turkish populations 
relative to total population, are. 
Hp12: Member states with larger immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations, relative 
to total population, are more likely to see a relationship between changes of 
government and policies on Turkish membership. 
Because immigration politics are frequently cited as reasons why states set their policies on Turkey, it 
is useful to test these related hypotheses with increasing complexity. The first, being the simplest, 
looks to see if the presence of large immigrant, Muslim or Turkish minorities tends to move policies 
toward one end of the spectrum, rather than the other. The idea is that the more such persons are 
present, the more the dominant/native population will want to prevent the large-scale immigration 
that the free movement of persons associated with EU membership might bring. 
Because the relative numbers of immigrants, Muslims or Turks in the population is not 
something that changes dramatically over the course of a decade, this is tested against the long-run 
policy tendency. It will be tested by drawing a Pearson correlation between the share of Muslims or 
Turks in the population and depicted with a scatterplot and least-squares regression line. If the 
presence of large immigrant, Muslim or Turkish communities makes it more likely that a member-
state will oppose Turkish membership, there ought to be a significant negative relationship. 
Failing that, the next thing that is measured is if the presence of large immigrant, Muslim or 
Turkish populations makes a policy more volatile, as the policy becomes the subject of political 
gamesmanship. Rather than the long-run policy being the dependent variable, the policy volatility 
will stand in for the dependent variable. This volatility is be measured by counting the number of 
times that the policy changed, where a policy shift from brakeman to driver (or vice versa) is 
counted as 2 and a shift to or from passenger from a different policy counts as a shift of 1. If the 
presence of large immigrant, Muslim, or Turkish communities makes the politics more volatile, there 
ought to be a significant positive relationship.  
The third of these tests requires a different approach, one that takes the short-run policies 
into account by re-introducing the evolution of policies over time. Rather than calculating the 
proportional reduction of error over time, however, a correlation is drawn between the policy 
change and political change over time for each member state. The test consists of seeing if these 
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correlations, per member state, change depending on the percentage of immigrants, Turks or 
Muslims in the member-state populations. If the hypothesis holds, there ought to be stronger 
correlations among those countries with large populations of Turks or Muslims and weaker (and/or 
counterintuitive) ones among those with smaller populations of Turks or Muslims.  
The political change measured in the correlations is calculated by taking difference between 
an episode and the previous episode, according to the ParlGov measure of political ideology. The 
differences are measured with the ideological direction as well as made neutral, calculating the degree 
of change without the direction of political change. Doing both allows for the measurement of the 
importance of political ideology in predicting the policies. 
The tests of these hypotheses each involve three categories of minority population: 
immigrants, Muslims and Turks. The percentage of immigrants in the population, for the statistical 
tests, is counted by taking the number of foreign citizens in each member state, divided by the whole 
population for all the years in which data is available and taking the average percentage for all those 
years. In that way, the number is not skewed by having it approximate either the beginning of the 
periods, or the end, and not being subject to particular cases of missing data. Because Luxembourg 
is such an outlier from this dataset, owing to a very small share of Luxembourg citizens in the 
population, Luxembourg will be omitted from the test with immigrants.  
Muslims, who are not necessarily immigrants, but are frequently framed as ‘the’ immigrant 
population of many Western European countries, are not generally counted in census data. Instead, 
the tests here will use the stock by Kettani (2009). 
The numbers of Turks in the member-state populations are estimated using the methods 
described in Statistical Appendix C. This method accounts for both the first and second generation 
of Turks. It has been important to also account for the second generation, given that the beginning 
of Turkish immigration began in the 1960s, and those who came at that time have had their children 
in their new homes. Many of these children have citizenships in the country of their birth, but are 
considered a part of the Turkish community. Because data on Greece is not compiled, Greece must 
be omitted from this analysis. 
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3.3.3 Wealth 
The following sections describe the methodologies used to understand the influence, if any, purely 
economic factors had on the member states’ policies. The first of these relates to agriculture, the 
sector on which enlargement would likely have the greatest impact. Following agriculture, measures 
of trade and investment are considered, followed by the prospect of member states’ greater access to 
workers. 
3.3.3.1  Agriculture 
Hw1: Member states with a complementary agricultural sector with Turkey are 
more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with a 
competitive agricultural sector with Turkey. 
Agriculture is considered a special wealth-related subject in the context of Turkey joining the EU, 
because it is the main set of traded commodities that is not subject to the EU-Turkey Customs 
Union. In other words, bringing Turkey into the EU would all but certainly drop the trade barriers 
against agricultural commodities and allow tremendous growth in trade in these goods. The same is 
not true of other commodities, because the Customs Union already allows for free trade in those 
goods. 
Rather than measuring an existing trade relationship, it is necessary to estimate the potential 
trade relationship, but also the potential for trade diversion. The method here is to look at 
agricultural imports and exports for Turkey and the EU-15 member states, and see to what degree 
these are complementary or competitive with one another. Doing so involves drawing data on the 
top-20 (by value in 2000 US$) import and export commodities drawn from the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) for Turkey and each of the member states. The challenge is to 
convert the import and export values of the top-20 commodities into a single measure of agricultural 
complement. 
The idea behind this measurement is that the degree to which the export and import profiles 
of the European member states are complementary with Turkey, the more they will have to gain 
from Turkey joining the EU. Conversely, the more their export and import profiles are in 
competition with Turkey, the more they will stand to lose if Turkey joins the EU, because their 
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exports will have compete with Turkish exports without the protection of the present trade barriers. 
Additionally, their demand for such agricultural imports will also have to compete with Turkish 
demand on an equal footing.  
In order to create a single quantitative measure of agricultural complement, the following 
method is employed. Turkey’s top 20 agricultural commodity exports and top 20 agricultural 
commodity imports are compared with the top 20 such exports and imports of each of the member 
states. This is done in four ways, imports vs. imports, imports vs. exports, exports vs. imports and 
exports vs. exports. For every commodity classification that appears in both lists in each of these 
four match-ups, the corresponding values are summed with one another. All these summed values 
from each of the four lists are added together, the complements (imports vs. exports and exports vs. 
imports) positively and the competitors (exports vs. exports and imports vs. imports) negatively. 
Those sums are then divided by the GDPs of the member states.  
The resulting values represent the degree to which the agricultural profiles of each of the 
member states is in competition or is complementary to that of Turkey, in proportion to each of the 
member-state economies. As such, these numbers reflect how much the member-states’ agricultural 
economies (both in terms of producers and consumers of agricultural products) would benefit from 
(or be harmed by) Turkey joining. If the politics of agricultural economics matter in the debate on 
Turkish membership, then those countries with strong positive values should tend to be supportive 
of Turkey joining the EU and those with strong negative values should tend to oppose Turkey 
joining the EU. 
The numbers that result from these calculations are surprisingly variable over time. The 
trade in agricultural commodities is not a placid pastoral affair, but demonstrates significant hustle 
and bustle. In terms of explaining the dependent variable, this is promising, because of the variation 
over time in the dependent variable. Of course, it ought not to be expected that a government’s 
enlargement policy will be driven like a weathervane by the gales of its agricultural economics, even 
if its agricultural economics would be on its mind. For this reason, the analysis introduces the time-
lags as have been done before. The different γ-rates are calculated for four different cumulative 
time-lag scenarios (0-, 1-, 2-, and 3-year cumulative time-lags).  
An unfortunate Achilles heel in this analysis is that it does not account for domestic 
agricultural economies and the degree to which Turkish producers may out-compete domestic 
producers in the member states where they had previously been able to out-compete other foreign 
producers. Given the degree to which the agricultural economy in Europe is ‘Europeanized’ in that 
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products freely cross borders and a country can export the same category products that it exports to 
others, this problem is considered negligible. Unfortunately also, prior to 2000 the FAO combined 
the agricultural exports of Belgium and Luxembourg in their accounting. Because their post-2000 
agricultural export/import profiles are significantly different from one another, and because of the 
variability in the profiles over time, it is impossible to extrapolate values for the years prior to 2000, 
and estimate the respective values. For this reason, Belgium and Luxembourg must be left out of the 
analysis. 
 
3.3.3.2  Trade and investment 
Hw2: Member states with greater volumes of trade with Turkey are more likely to 
be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with smaller volumes of 
trade with Turkey. 
Hw3: Member states with greater volumes of investment between that member 
state and Turkey are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than 
member states with smaller volumes of investment in Turkey. 
Hw4: Member states with a trade surplus with Turkey are more likely to be 
supportive of Turkish membership than member states with a trade deficit with 
Turkey. 
The next hypotheses that consider the motive for wealth as explanatory for policy deal with trade 
and investment. There are three hypotheses connected to these two concepts and because they have 
many similar methodological aspects, they are treated together. Those common aspects are that they 
are both ratio-level variables and are fairly variable in the short term. This means that they are 
subject to similar means of assessment: ordinal proportional reduction of error, gamma, as used in 
many of the preceding analyses. 
The trade variable is taken from the Correlates of War bilateral trade dataset (Barbieri, Keshk 
& Pollins, 2008), which includes import and export figures to and from each country in the world 
(with some small exceptions). For each member state, the total volume of trade (imports plus 
exports) is taken to and from Turkey. This figure is divided by GDP to put the numbers into a 
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relative framework. For the trade balance, the imports are subtracted from the exports and, again, 
divided by GDP.  
The GDPs used to calculate the shares of the economies are from the OECD database, and 
are collected in base year (2000) US$ at constant exchange rates. The data from the Correlates of 
War dataset are at ‘current’ US$, with the data compiled in 2007. The 2007 GDP figures are 
calculated using deflator figures from the OECD, in order to match US$ of the GDP to the US$ of 
the Correlates of War data.  
For investment, the data is drawn from the OECD database of foreign direct investment 
statistics. The two statistics used are the inward and outward flows of investment. The flows 
measure the increased amount invested during a year, whereas the positions measure the stock of 
extant investments. While and the inward and outward positions of investment are available after 
2001, they are not available in the years prior to 2000. They cannot, therefore, be used to assess the 
policies of 1997 or 1999. Regrettably, the annual returns on investment flowing back into a country 
are not reported to the OECD’s database. Because of these limitations, only the annual flows of 
investments are tested against the policies.  
The theoretical assumption is that countries with more of their investors’ money being 
invested in Turkey (represented by the inward flows investments, as the ‘inward’ represents inward 
to Turkey), will have a greater stake in Turkey joining the European Union than countries with less 
of such investment. The same works in reverse in that the more Turkey invests in European 
countries, the more those who have Turkey investing in them, will have to gain by facilitating 
Turkish membership in that this will presumably mean more investment in the future as the 
economies become further intertwined with similar regulatory regimes. It should be noted that the 
outward flows are small compared to the inward flows of investment, demonstrating that member-
state investors are significantly more invested in Turkey than Turkish investors are in the member 
states, when judging capital in absolute amounts.  
Because the numbers of trade with and investment in Turkey for each member state 
fluctuate significantly from year to year, trade is a variable that is best looked at in the short run, 
rather than the long run. Further, because multiple years can be taken into account, it is useful to use 
a model of analysis similar to what was used for analyzing the threat of terrorism – one that makes 
use of time lags in order to find a model that best fits the hypothesis.  
Over the course of the decade being analyzed, trade with Turkey has grown tremendously, 
outpacing the macroeconomic (GDP) growth of the member states. For the average member state, 
  113 
the volume of trade with Turkey in 2006 was comfortably more than twice that in 1997. Given this, 
one might expect member-states’ appreciation of the prospect of Turkism membership to have 
grown as well. A rudimentary knowledge of the history of the diplomacy teaches one that it was not 
the case that member states were twice as supportive of Turkish membership in 2006 than they were 
in 1997. Because the negotiating positions were determined in a strategic sense (in terms relative to 
their fellow EU members), it is also necessary to reassess the trade numbers in terms relative to the 
other member states for each episode.  
Therefore, when categorizing the trade volumes and investment flows into the three ordinal 
categories used in the gamma tests, it is best to measure the categories by greatest third, smallest 
third, and middle third for each episode (and lagged years), rather than for the decade overall. This 
corrects for the across-the-board increases or broad fluctuations in the volumes and flows of trade 
and investments. 
3.3.3.3 Migration and employment 
Hw5: Member states with low levels of unemployment are more likely to be 
supportive of Turkish membership than member states with high levels of 
unemployment. 
The idea of this test is to capture the notion that countries with high rates of employment have an 
interest in attracting more workers in order to work in their economies. The converse probably 
paints a clearer picture that aligns closer with a common understanding of the problem: that 
countries with high rates of unemployment have an interest in keeping migrants from competing 
with the domestic unemployed for scarce jobs.  
Because having Turkey join the EU would allow for more migrants from Turkey to EU 
member states under the freedom of movement for workers, having Turkey join the EU would 
likely promise an increase in migration until such time as Turkey’s own (presumed) economic 
growth would begin to pull Turkish migrants back to their home country.  
Therefore, the expectation is that low rates of unemployment would predict more support 
(or less opposition) to Turkish membership. While this implies a simple test of a ratio-level variable 
(unemployment) that fluctuates over time against the short-run policies of the member states, there 
is the complication that the time-horizon for Turkish membership, and thus the promise (or threat) 
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of increased migration can be seen as something that should not necessarily be compared to the 
immediate employment situation, but the situation of employment over a longer previous period. 
For this reason, it is useful to allow for long time-lags to measure the ordinal proportional reduction 
of error rate, but also to average the level of unemployment over a long time against the long-run 
policy average in a regression model to see if levels of unemployment can help explain the policy 
tendency in the long run.   
Another concept that is brought into the analysis is the idea that not all rates of 
unemployment are equal for all countries. Many policy makers and economists embrace the idea of a 
natural rate of unemployment, or, a level of unemployment that is still considered full employment 
because of certain structural tendencies in the workforce. The measure frequently applied is called 
the ‘non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment’ (NAIRU), above which inflation does not 
tend to occur despite expansionary fiscal or monetary policies. In addition to a test against the 
simple unemployment rate, an additional test against the NAIRU minus the unemployment rate is 
tested.  
The idea here is that the degree to which unemployment rate is below the NAIRU is the 
degree to which more workers are needed to keep the economy running at full capacity. The greater 
the difference between the unemployment rate and the NAIRU, where the NAIRU is greater than 
the unemployment rate (so that NAIRU minus the unemployment rate is a positive number), the 
greater will be an economy’s demand for workers. On the other hand, where this number turns 
negative, where the unemployment rate is greater than the NAIRU, the less an economy will 
demand more workers and the more migrants will be competing with the domestic unemployed for 
those scarce jobs. 
Subtracting from the NAIRU introduces a variable between the member states, in that not 
all economies have the same level of structural unemployment. The average NAIRU for Belgium 
over the 1996-2005 period, for example, was nearly twice that for Austria. Belgium may have, 
therefore, had a greater demand for workers than Austria, despite a higher rate of unemployment. 
The NAIRU is drawn from the OECD, where the average 1996-2005 will be used to 
calculate all values. Because the OECD does not report the NAIRU for Luxembourg, Luxembourg 
is, regrettably, omitted from the analyses using this measure. The annual unemployment rates are 
taken from Eurostat. 
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3.3.4 Identity 
This and the following headings focus on the constructivist hypotheses and the methods used to test 
them. The politics of identity are frequently cited as being influential determinants of member state 
policies. The following sections describe the methods used for testing the hypotheses related to this 
approach. The first of these, religion, looks at the different degrees of support from Catholic vs. 
Protestant countries, if religiosity and/or church attendance play a role, or if it is due to distaste for 
Islam. Secondly, the methods measuring the influence of rationalism are explained, followed by the 
influence of cultural differences. 
3.3.4.1 Religion 
Hi1: Member states that are predominantly Catholic are more likely to be 
supportive of Turkish membership than member states that are predominantly 
Protestant. 
Hi2: Member states with a high level of religiosity are more likely to be supportive 
of Turkish membership than member states with a low level of religiosity are 
Hi3: member states with lower levels of anti-Muslim sentiment are more likely to be 
supportive of Turkish membership than member states with high levels of anti-
Muslim sentiment. 
Test of religion are, by their long-run nature, potentially only explanatory of member-states’ long-
run policies. The religious make-up of a state’s population generally does not change much from one 
year to the next, and religiosity only marginally so, especially in relative terms. Therefore, religion 
and religiosity are tested against the long-run policy tendencies of the member states. Because 
religion and religiosity are ratio-level variables, this allows for the tests to be done by way of simple 
linear regressions.  
The World Values Survey (WVS) has done several waves of surveys throughout the past 
decades on a range of issues relating to people’s values. With respect to the EU-15 member states, 
nearly all states were covered in the 1999 survey, with the exception of Finland, which was surveyed 
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in 2000. These survey results are used to test these hypotheses related to religion, as well as many of 
the variables in the other Constructivist hypotheses.  
The first hypothesis tests denominations against member-state policies. In the WVS question 
on religious denomination, the survey allowed for 86 different responses for all the surveyed 
countries of the world. For the EU-15 countries, this resulted in 12 reported denominations 
(including ‘other’). Because of the range of Protestant denominations, columns adding into 
‘Protestant’ are ‘Free church/Non denominational church’, ‘Protestant’, and ‘Church of Sweden’).  
In terms of proportions, all but Greece and the Netherlands had Protestants and Catholics, 
together, adding up to more than 92%. Greeks are 97.7% Orthodox, and the Dutch have a relatively 
high degree of Muslims (2.3%) and others (9.5%), but Protestants and Catholics, together, still make 
up 88.2% of the population. For this reason the religious denomination variable is calculated by 
subtracting the percentage of Protestants from the percentage of Catholics. This creates a variable 
that produces a positive relationship if the findings are in line with the hypothesis. This measure 
creates a relatively bifurcated population, as most European countries are either predominantly one 
or the other, with only Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom having large minorities 
of Protestants or Catholics. 
Religiosity is measured in two ways. The first is by counting the percentage of people in each 
member state that self-identify as a ‘religious person’, and the second is by measuring church 
attendance. The question on church attendance is: “Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about 
how often do you attend religious services these days?” The variable measures the percentage of those persons 
who answered ‘more than once a week’, ‘once a week’ and ‘once a month’.  
Because the hypothesis predicts a shared identity with Turks, who also strongly identifying 
themselves as religious people, it predicts a positive relationship. Contrariwise, there is the idea that 
people of a particular level of faith would be more inclined to identify members of a different faith 
as being more different from themselves. This idea expects the reverse – that the higher the level the 
religiosity, the less likely a country would be supportive of a predominantly Muslim country like 
Turkey should join the EU.  
In terms of anti-Muslim sentiment, this concept is measured by the World Values Survey 
(WVS) question about the desirability of Muslims as neighbors. The measure used is the percentage 
of persons answering that question in the negative: Muslims were mentioned as a group that the 
respondent would not like to have as a neighbor. If the hypothesis holds true, then there ought to be 
a negative relationship between this independent variable and the long-run member-state policies.   
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3.3.4.2 Nationalism 
Hi4: Countries with low levels of nationalism are more likely to be supportive of 
Turkish membership than member states with high levels of nationalism. 
This hypothesis requires measures of in-group identification. It supposes that the more members of 
a nation/country embrace their own identity, the less inclined they will be to admit others to the 
group of which they are a part, regardless of the nature of that group. That means that one indicator 
of nationalism is the degree to which they are proud of their identity as members of the nation. The 
opposite side of this is the fear of the loss of the national identity. In this frame of nationalism, the 
formation of a large multi-national Europe with (even) Turkey as a member, the national identity 
will essentially dissolve. 
While ‘country’ and ‘nation’ are not the same concept, in popular discourse they are 
frequently taken as interchangeable. In the 1999 World Values Survey, respondents were asked to 
answer to what degree they were proud to be of their country. The first measure of in-group 
identification is the percentage of respondents in each member state who answered ‘Very Proud’. 
This answer was the highest degree in four categories (the others being ‘quite proud’, ‘not very 
proud’, and ‘not at all proud’). The hypothetical supposition is that the stronger the in-group 
identification of the constituents of the member-state, the more likely they will reject outsiders, like 
the Turks, into the European Union. 
The second indicator for in-group identification is the defensive one – the degree to which 
the respondent feels that the identity of his nation is being eroded. The question, from the 
Eurobarometer surveys of 1997 and 2001, are as follows: “Regarding the building of Europe, …are you 
currently afraid of … (our country) not really existing anymore?” The percentage of persons answering that 
they were afraid of losing their nation’s identity in the EU is taken as the independent variable 
representing the fear over the loss of national identity as a result of European unification. Because 
the question was asked in two separate Eurobarometer surveys, the average of the two percentages 
answering the question in the positive will represent the independent variable. 
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3.3.4.3 Cultural Differences 
Hi5: Countries whose populations identify cultural differences as being the reason 
Turkey should not be allowed to join by greater degrees are more likely to oppose 
Turkey for EU membership than those who do so by lesser degrees are.  
Hi6: Countries whose populations consistently differentiate Turkey from other 
candidate countries less are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership 
than countries whose populations differentiate Turkey from other candidate 
countries more. 
These hypotheses require more intricate thinking in terms of measurement. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Gürer (2008) identified perceptions of cultural differences as highly explanatory of 
public opinion regarding the desirability of Turkey becoming a member of the EU. The statistic used 
in his research was drawn from the Fall 2005 Eurobarometer survey. The question asked about 
agreement or disagreement with the statement “The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU member 
states are too significant to allow for this accession.” A simple correlation test between the answers to this 
question and the question from the same survey about the desirablity of Turkey joining the EU in 
the future, at the member-state level of analysis results in a nearly perfect correlation (r = -0.96).  
However, the influence of public opinion on member-state policies is tested for elsewhere in 
this research. The question here is if the survey results of the cultural differences question can 
improve upon the predictive value of member-state policies over the simple public approval of 
seeing Turkey join the EU at some point in the future. This is done by comparing the correlation 
coefficients between approval and the cultural differences against the public policy dependent 
variable. If the cultural differences question performs better than the standard question in the same 
survey, it might be a stronger frame of understanding than ephemeral public opinion is. If, however, 
it performs less adequately, then it may be an antecedent variable through public opinion, but not a 
more helpful frame of understanding. 
The second hypothesis is trickier to assess, because comparing against other candidate 
countries runs the risk of missing variable biases. Among the other candidate countries, Bulgaria and 
Romania were generally the least favored candidates for EU membership. They are, however, 
generally seen as fully European countries, rather than countries with tenuous perceptions as such, 
like Turkey. Of course, Bulgaria and Romania are also smaller and less populous than Turkey is.  
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However, these size-related characteristics – as well as cultural differences – are not 
characteristics that change much, if at all, over time. If the differences in public opinion change a 
great deal over time, then those cannot be primarily caused by these static characteristics, but must 
be the function of time-variable characteristics. 
The purpose of the test is to determine if there is a structural difference in public support 
between Turkey, on the one hand, and Bulgaria and Romania on the other. This is to see if the 
differences in public appreciation are constant or variable over time. If the differences are highly 
variable, then variables that are non-constant over time are the most likely to be explanatory. 
Because this may differ per member state (perhaps the differences are constant for Denmark and 
variable for Portugal, for example, because the structural factors are more important for Denmark 
than they are for Portugal), the analyses will be run per member state in time-series graphs. If the 
graphs show dramatically varying differences in public opinion, then they demonstrate fundamental 
limitations on the idea that cultural differences between Turkey and the member states are 
prohibitive of Turkish membership in the long run.  
Measurement is done by subtracting each of the opposition percentages from the 
Eurobarometer survey data to both Bulgaria and Romania’s candidacy in public opinion from the 
percentages for Turkey. These differences are then graphed over time. The surveys overlap in the 
Eurobarometer surveys of January 1996, April 1997, April and November 1999, June 2000, January 
and November 2001, June and October 2005, and September 2006. That offers enough datapoints 
to establish trends in the comparative movement of public opinion on Turkey, Romania and 
Bulgaria to determine the variability of that public opinion and to assess if the differences are 
structural or ephemeral. These graphs are plotted against the member-state policies in order to 
determine if they help predict the dependent variable. 
3.3.5 Norms 
The following sections describe how the influences of norms are measured. The first of these frames 
is that of the political Copenhagen criteria, which enshrine the Western values of liberal democracy, 
meaning human and civil rights. The other normative frame is that of socialization, where the length 
of involvement in a regime is assumed to produce a convergence of behavior. 
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3.3.5.1 The political Copenhagen criteria 
Hn1: Member states are more likely to be supportive of Turkey’s membership after 
Turkey has demonstrated more progress toward meeting the political Copenhagen 
criteria than when Turkey has demonstrated less progress. 
The purpose in this analysis concerns Turkey’s speed of reforms. Unlike other analyses, it does not 
differentiate among the member states in terms of any of their attributes. This idea is derived from 
the overarching principle that the EU is a community with a liberal democratic character, and that 
only countries that share this character can join the EU. It also implies that Turkey’s membership 
prospects are fundamentally driven by its own ability to meet the membership criteria, rather than 
the particular interests of the member states deciding its fate.  
The first thing is to assess is if there is significant variation in the sum of the dependent 
variable over time. That is, to determine if all the member-state policies, taken together at each 
episode, provide meaningful variation over the episodes. If they do not, and all the member states’ 
policies change are based on the particular calculations of each, then either Turkey has not made any 
progress that the member states might appreciate, or Turkey’s progress is irrelevant to them. 
Therefore, the first test is to see if the sum of policies follows a particular pattern. That pattern is the 
dependent variable for the subsequent tests determining if the pattern fits the changes in Turkey’s 
quantitatively demonstrable progress toward the Copenhagen criteria.  
With sufficient variation in the dependent variable of all the EU-15 member states summed 
together, it is possible to test two published quantitative variables that measure the concepts that are 
encompassed by the Copenhagen criteria. In the short sentence in the Presidency Conclusions of the 
1993 Copenhagen European Council, the stated political criteria were: the “stability of institutions 
guaranteeing: 
 democracy, 
 the rule of law, 
 human rights and 
 respect for and protection of minorities, ...” (European Council, 1993). 
Beginning in 1998, when the Commission was tasked to report on candidates’ progress toward 
meeting the Copenhagen criteria, the Commission has had to report on the developments of 
different concepts that fall under these broad headings. In the reports on Turkey, the broader range 
of concepts have included military influence in politics, torture, treatment of prisoners, missing 
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persons, capital punishment, the effectiveness of the judiciary, corruption, freedom of the media, 
political stability, freedom of association (political parties and labor unions), freedom of assembly 
and speech (particularly in terms of the Kurdish language), political enfranchisement (in terms of 
Kurdish parties and the high electoral threshold), and freedom of religion.  
A complication is that there are, essentially, two ways to conceive of the conditionality 
inherent in the accession process. One can be called the ‘minimal standards’ approach, and the other 
is the ‘encouragement’ approach. The former, which is more restrictive, will only permit Turkey to 
progress through the enlargement regime if it meets the minimal standards necessary to progress to 
the next stage. The latter, which is more permissive, permits Turkey to progress through the stages 
of enlargement regime when it demonstrates sufficient progress since the previous time, assuming 
that all the criteria will be completely met by the time that membership actually occurs.  
In terms of the political criteria, the ‘minimal standards’ model demands that accession 
negotiations, which gauge progress according to the administrative criteria (aligning the candidate’s 
laws and regulations with all the chapters of the acquis communautaire), cannot begin before all the 
political criteria are fully met. The ‘encouragement’ model wants to see sufficient progress so that it 
can be assumed that the political criteria will be fully met at some point during the accession 
negotiations. While these different positions can, certainly, be articulated instrumentally by 
brakemen (minimal standards) and drivers (encouragement), without which either actually believe in 
their rhetoric, the liberal community hypothesis supposes that they do believe in the values. 
The minimal standards model and the encouragement models require different frames of 
analysis. The latter requires the gauging of change, whereas the former needs to determine what the 
standards are and gauge if the candidate has met them. In terms of the minimal standards model, it 
is fortunate that the preceding set of enlargements give some precedents to compare Turkey’s 
progress to. In 1997, the European Council differentiated between the six front-runners in the race 
for membership and the candidates who were not yet deemed ready to start the accession 
negotiations. In 1999, these others were permitted to start the negotiations. Ostensibly, this was 
because these candidates were then also ready for the negotiations. The case of Slovakia is 
particularly instructive because in 1997 it was deemed not ready because of its lack of progress on 
the political front.  
There are two broadly recognized quantitative measures of political and civil rights. These 
are the measures of political rights and civil liberties by Freedom House and the physical integrity 
and empowerment rights indices by the CIRI project (Cingranelli & Richards, 2010). Both generally 
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measure the broad set of concepts that are encompassed by the political Copenhagen criteria. The 
European Commission also closely gauges candidates’ progress toward meeting the criteria, and the 
annual Commission reports are cited by member-state leaders framing their rhetoric on the issue of 
the candidates’ progress toward meeting the criteria. However, the Commission’s reports are 
descriptive and qualitative in nature, rather than quantitative. That means that the Commission’s 
reports cannot directly be used to quantitatively test the hypotheses, but they can be used to assess 
the validity of the other measures.   
The Freedom House indices measure political rights and civil liberties of all countries. Both 
are on 1-to-7 scales where a rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest 
level of freedom. These ratings are calculated based on the methodological process described on the 
Freedom House website14. Because political rights and civil liberties are both parts of the 
Copenhagen criteria, both will be summed to take a cumulative measure of Turkey’s progress 
toward the criteria in the encouragement model. This creates a potential range between 14 and 2. 
Because a higher score means a lower level of freedom, the measure is inverted to compare against 
the balance of member-state policies. The Freedom House data is generally in agreement with the 
findings of the Commission’s annual progress reports.  
In terms of measuring the necessary level of progress to warrant accession negotiations, for 
the minimal standards model, Slovakia was deemed not to have met the minimal requirements when 
its Civil Liberties index was at 4 in 1997, but was approved when it had improved its Civil Liberties 
score to 2 by 1999. As such, a score of 3 is considered the minimum necessary score for the Civil 
Liberties index to warrant accession negotiations. Because the Civil Liberties index and the Political 
Rights index are in the same scale, the analytical assumption is made that a score of 3 is also the 
minimum requirement for the Political Rights index. No country engaged in accession negotiations 
had a worse score than 3 on either of the indices. Bulgaria maintained a Civil Liberties score of 3 
from 1996 until 2001, well into its term negotiating the acquis, suggesting that it is not required to 
strengthen civil liberties institutions to the degree that they reach a score of 2. 
The primary source material for the CIRI data comes from human rights reports from the 
US Department of State, with cross-references with Amnesty International reports in order to 
correct for any US government bias toward its allies. In terms of accuracy, the indicators generally 
accord with other measures of human rights and civil liberties. Among the Physical integrity rights 
                                                
14 http://www.freedomhouse.org, accessed 9-27-2011. 
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index, the measure of disappearances has improved from ‘0’ (frequent occurrences) in 1994 to ‘2’ 
(no occurrences) in 2006, with some starts and stops. In the annual reports by the Commission, 
missing persons or disappearances were not mentioned in the 2005 and 2006 reports. In 2003 and 
2004, on the other hand, (where CIRI gives a score of 2), the Commission mentions that there were 
still reports of disappearances. In terms of torture, the CIRI data maintains a ‘0’ (frequent 
occurrences) throughout. The Commission reports ‘downward trends’ in the number of torture 
cases, but not that torture has been eradicated despite the ‘zero tolerance’ policy from the 
government regarding torture. While there are discrepancies between the Commission and the CIRI 
data, the CIRI data being more pessimistic about Turkey’s progress than the Commission, these are 
not to the degree that they contradict one another beyond a reasonable doubt.  
For measuring progress according to the ‘encouragement’ model, the CIRI data are compiled 
into one score by adding all the component measures together. This provides a range between 0 and 
30. Turkey’s scores range between 9 and 15. In terms of a ‘minimal standards model, it is necessary 
to identify the minimal score held by a negotiating candidate. For Slovakia, the Empowerment 
Rights index improved from 1997 to 1999 from an 11 to a 12, whereas the Physical Integrity index 
held steady at 7. In 2000 and 2003, Slovakia’s physical integrity index slid back to a 6, without its 
negotiations being suspended. For Bulgaria, its Physical Integrity score in 1999 was a 5 while its 
Empowerment index was 9. A year later the former slid down to a 4 and the latter to a 7 without 
negotiations being suspended. In 2005, Romania also had its Empowerment index slide down to a 7 
without negotiations being suspended. For this reason, the Physical Integrity index minimum is 
assumed to be 4 and the Empowerment Rights index 7.  
The graphical tests for the minimal standards approach for both the Freedom House and the 
CIRI Physical Integrity and Empowerment Rights indices measure deviations from the minimum, 
rather than absolute values. Furthermore, because the possible range of the Empowerment Rights 
index is twice that of the Physical Integrity index (as it uses double the indicators) for the CIRI 
measures, the deviation in the former is divided by two, so as to use the same scale. 
Of the four tests, the result from the best of the four is used to test against the individual 
policies of each of the member states. Because the dependent variable is an ordinal level variable, a 
proportional reduction of error (gamma) test determines the degree to which the liberal community 
hypothesis explains member-state policies. 
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3.3.5.2 Socialization 
Hn2: Member states that have been members of the EU for similar amounts of time 
will exhibit behavior that is more similar to one another than to member states that 
have been members for significantly different lengths of time.  
Hn3: Member states that have been member of the EU longer are more likely to 
have their support or opposition governed by Turkey’s level of progress toward 
meeting the Copenhagen criteria than member states that have been members for 
shorter periods of time. 
The simplest test of member states the similarity of policy behavior of the different groups by 
enlargement order is to draw graphs in which each of their policies are depicted together. This gives 
immediate ocular satisfaction of the question. If empirical evidence shows support for the first 
hypothesis, then there is room to compare the policies of the different groups against Turkey’s 
progress toward the Copenhagen criteria by the same method as described above. 
3.3.6 Values 
Finally, the last constructivist frame of analysis is that of values. States with more similar political 
values to Turkey are assumed to have a greater affinity for Turkey joining the EU, rather than the 
idea that Turkey must adjust its values to those of the member states. The section below describes 
the measurement of two types of political values; human rights and corruption. 
3.3.6.1 Shared Political Values 
Hv1: Member states with lower levels of adherence to the values of liberal 
democracy are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member 
states with higher levels of adherence to the values of liberal democracy are. 
Hv2: Member states with lower levels of corruption are less likely to be supportive 
of Turkish membership than member states with higher levels of corruption. 
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In terms of values, the theory is that states that share values will be more open to the membership of 
states with like-minded values. In the case at hand, where the values articulated in the Copenhagen 
criteria – liberal democracy and the rule of law – are ostensibly the stated values of the European 
Union, the degree to which the member-states have enacted the values is a reflection of the degree 
to which the political cultures of the member states embrace those values. 
There are several variables already mentioned which can help measure the political values of 
the member states. These are the same as were tested for in the hypothesis (Hn1) related to Turkey’s 
progress toward the Copenhagen criteria. However, rather than testing the candidate’s embrace of 
the values, this frame tests the member states’ embrace of those values and to test the effect that this 
may have on their policies. The idea is that the countries that are not as strict with themselves on 
these values will be less strict with the candidate in question. The variables used are the Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties measures by Freedom House, and the Physical Integrity and 
Empowerment indices by the CIRI project. In terms of the second hypothesis of this theoretical 
frame is the independent variable is the corruption perception index. The idea, again, is that 
countries with higher levels of corruption will be less strict on permitting candidates with relatively 
high levels of corruption.  
Because the measures drawn from Freedom House and the CIRI project are, essentially, 
interval-level data and available year-by-year, it is possible to do regression tests against the long-run 
policies as well as an ordinal level proportional reduction of error test against the short-run policies 
at each episode. They can, however, be put into different measures – one that simply measures 
member states’ own scores and another that measures the difference between each of the scores of 
the member states and Turkey’s score at the same time, during each episode.  
To measure corruption, this research uses the widely-publicized Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) by Transparency International and the 2005 Eurobarometer survey question on 
Corruption. Due to Transparency International’s method of not using the same sources year-by-
year, it is not proper to use its year-by-year statistics comparatively with one another. Instead, the 
CPI scores for the period in question (1997-2006) is averaged and measured against the long-run 
policy average of the member states. 
Because corruption in a society is not something that changes dramatically year-by-year, it is 
not something that can be expected to influence a member state’s year-by-year behavior. At best it 
can be an underlying cause for a member-state’s (lack of) sympathy for a country like Turkey and its 
bid for EU membership. 
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4.0  THE HISTORY OF EU ENLARGEMENT 
The enlargement of the European communities has been a developing process for many decades. 
The question of Turkey’s vocation as part of this process has a history nearly as long. This chapter 
outlines the history of the geographic expansion of the European Communities and European 
Union, in addition to the history Turkey’s membership prospects prior to the distinct episodes 
detailed in the next five chapters. The purpose of doing so is to provide an introduction and a 
context for the broad interests and structures have facilitated and hindered enlargement in the past, 
both with respect to Turkey and with respect to other applicant/candidate countries.    
4.1 THE FOUNDING 
With the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, and the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the European 
communities had six founding members – Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands. After these foundations, the European communities expanded gradually in several 
waves. In 1973, after more than a decade of contentious politics, the EEC expanded with three new 
members, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. The second wave in the 1980s brought in 
Greece (1981), followed by Spain and Portugal (1986), when they ceased to be ruled by military 
dictatorships. Eastern Germany was brought into the communities when the Cold War ended and 
Germany reunified in 1990. In 1995 the fourth wave enlarged what had by then become the 
European Union with Austria, Finland and Sweden, while the fifth wave of 2004 brought in Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, 
followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.  
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This short-hand history only marks when each of these countries were given voting rights in 
the European Councils and Parliament. Yet the overall geographical integration of Europe has many 
other layers, in many different forms, policies, and memberships, with the EU as only the most 
prominent level thereof. These other levels include the single currency, virtually introduced in 1999 
and physically introduced in 2002. This monetary integration, at the time of writing, officially 
includes only 17 of the 27 EU members. The Schengen Agreement, establishing an area of no 
border controls originally between Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, 
now also includes non-EU members such as Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, but Ireland nor the 
United Kingdom have joined this open-borders regime. Furthermore, Denmark has unilaterally 
decided to reintroduce its border controls as their measure to combat illegal immigration and 
organized crime, creating yet another exception to the rule. 
With regard to Turkey, it too has already participated in European integration. Since the 
1963 signing of the Ankara Agreement, Turkey has been in an Associate Agreement with the 
EEC/EU, which provided for a regularization of political, trade, and security relationships. In 1995, 
this was expanded with the EU-Turkey Customs Union, which went into force in 1996. The 
Customs Union abolishes quotas and tariffs on manufactures and processed agricultural goods, 
(though not on unprocessed agricultural products), and provides for a framework to diminish non-
tariff barriers to trade. This, along with its NATO membership, which has been the primary form of 
integration of military security policy in Europe, Turkey is already partially integrated into Europe’s 
regime of cooperation on economic and security policies.  
Although the geographic integration in Europe is very complex, with inclusions and 
exceptions across a broad spectrum of policy fields, EU membership involves the most prominent 
and thoroughgoing level of integration. It affords a member state a seat at the tables where most of 
the European decisions are made. The political, legal and administrative process leading to 
membership is also the most arduous process of reform requiring massive internal transformation 
and loss of nominal sovereignty with the greatest amount of scrutiny. In the vernacular: it is not a 
cakewalk, but thus far twenty-one countries have managed to join the six original members, while 
seven more are presently at some stage in the process to follow suit.   
Studies of EEC/EU enlargement have had different frames of interest. Particularly the fifth 
enlargement wave has attracted a lot of academic attention. Due to the monumental size of the 
enlargement to 12 countries, the relative poverty of the new member states and the invasive nature 
of the necessary reforms, the fifth enlargement has been seen as being very different from the 
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previous rounds. Previous studies focused on why non-member states would want to become 
members, whereas studies about the fifth enlargement considered why the member states would 
wish to accept the incorporation of new member states.  
That is not to imply that previous enlargement rounds were void of contention among the 
member states. The first round took more than a decade to complete, mostly because of France’s 
objections to British membership. The second round involved three countries that were much 
poorer than the existing members, with recent legacies of dictatorship and fears of immigration. The 
following round by contrast involved three rich countries, without much contention over their 
suitability to join. The sections below provide an overview of this history. 
4.2 THE SIX AND THE SEVEN 
In the 1950s, the founding members – Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands – created three regimes of integration: one for coal and steel, another for nuclear 
power, and a third for economic and trade relations (the ECSC, Euratom, and the EEC 
respectively). While these plans included only these six countries, the idea of the early European 
federalists aimed at a far wider grouping attempting to attract all of the democracies of Europe 
(Kitzinger, 1960, p. 23).  
The United Kingdom, however, felt that these plans went too far, while the Scandinavian 
countries were only willing to go as far as the British would go. When Charles de Gaulle became 
Prime Minister in 1958 and the President of France in 1959, the French plans altered considerably. 
The EEC became a more exclusive club. Rejecting the British suggestions for a Free Trade Area 
(FTA), de Gaulle pressured the Germans to choose between a French-led plan of deeper integration 
with a smaller group of states or a British-led FTA (Gilbert, 2003, p. 87). The Germans chose the 
former more from a geopolitical than an economic point of view (Moravcsik, 1999, p. 220). 
According to Stephen George (1998, p. 28), this choice was made due to Britain’s willingness to 
negotiate with the Soviets over Berlin, while de Gaulle promised to support West Germany’s 
position, if German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer would give up his predilections for the FTA for a 
deeply integrated Customs Union with the EEC.   
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Meanwhile, both Greece and Turkey, in June and July of 1959, respectively, applied for 
Association Agreements (AA). The idea of an AA had been put into the Treaty of Rome, with the 
United Kingdom in mind, but became a vehicle for third countries to engage in specifically 
negotiated agreements with the EEC. These agreements, aimed at deepening economic integration 
with geopolitical implications, also included eventual membership perspectives for applicants 
(Stathatos, 1979, p. 3).  
As the EEC gathered steam and became an economic success, leaving the United Kingdom 
behind, London had to reconsider its position (George, 1998, p. 5). In response to the new trade 
relationships, the United Kingdom invited any non-EEC members of the Organisation for 
European Economic Co-operation (OEEC - the precursor to the OECD, which included all those 
countries receiving Marshall Plan aid, the United States and Canada) to join in a rival free trade area, 
which would be called the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Ultimately, Austria, Denmark, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland signed onto the British plan. The ‘six’ of the EEC were 
rivaled by the ‘seven’. The EFTA was signed on January 4, 1960 at the Stockholm Convention, 
which chartered the EFTA. Below is a listing of participants with both organizations. 
Table 4.1: The Memberships of the EEC and the EFTA. 
The Six (EEC) The Seven (EFTA) 
Belgium Austria 
France Denmark 
West Germany Norway 
Italy Portugal 
Luxembourg Sweden 
The Netherlands Switzerland 
 The United Kingdom 
The EFTA’s success from a British point of view was, however, short-lived, as the EEC countries 
remained tied to the central economies, in terms of both production and consumers, while the 
EFTA countries were peripheral to this market network. Less than a year after the establishment of 
the EFTA Britain and Denmark attempted to negotiate an entry to the EEC. 
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4.3 THE FIRST WAVE 
DENMARK, IRELAND, (NORWAY) & THE UNITED KINGDOM. 
The first enlargement round began in 1961 with the membership applications of Denmark, the 
United Kingdom and Ireland, with the former two opting to switch sides from the EFTA to the 
EEC. Sweden, Austria and Switzerland soon followed suit, applying for associate status that same 
year, while Norway, after a domestic political delay, submitted its application for membership in 
April 1962. Portugal applied for associate status in June of that year (Tatham, 2009, p. 12). 
Accession negotiations with the membership applicants began in 1962. The United 
Kingdom was willing to accept much of the Treaty of Rome, but also sought exclusion from certain 
features, accommodations for its Commonwealth relations, its agriculture, and arrangements for the 
EFTA countries (Gilbert, 2003, p. 97-98). The six were willing to sit at the negotiating table with the 
British, but they demanded more concessions on the Commonwealth and agriculture than the 
British could live with. These negotiations continued, haggling at detailed levels of minutiae for the 
rest of 1962 until de Gaulle called it quits in January 1963 (Dinan, 1999, p. 51; Gilbert, 2003, p. 99).  
The common interpretation of de Gaulle’s motive thereto was that the British nuclear 
agreement with the United States made Britain dependent on the United States for its security, 
whereas de Gaulle was determined to erect an independent European security regime. In this 
context, the UK was seen as an American Trojan horse (Hoffmann, 1964, p. 11-14), a view that has, 
however, been called into question by Andrew Moravcsik (1999, p. 189). Moravcsik suggests 
economic motives, in particular those of French agriculture as being more salient (see also: Gilbert, 
2003, p. 100). De Gaulle also peppered his remarks with notions of identity and norms, referring to 
Britain’s “very original habits and traditions” implying their incongruity with the norms and 
identities of the continent (Tatham, 2009, p. 13). 
Rejected, the British had no economic choice but to further their cooperation with the 
EFTA countries, who also had little choice but to do likewise. As such, the EFTA was given new 
life, moving ahead with the creation of an industrial free trade area. Ireland also essentially became a 
part of the EFTA when it joined the UK in a bilateral free trade agreement (ibid., p. 14). In the 
meantime the EFTA expanded too. Finland joined as an Associate Member in 1961, while Iceland 
would join in 1970. 
Even so, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Norway reapplied for EEC 
membership in 1967. Sweden also requested that discussions take place in order to determine how it 
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might best link itself to the EEC (ibid., 2009, p. 15). De Gaulle, nevertheless, maintained his original 
position about the United Kingdom, arguing that it would have to reform itself profoundly in order 
to fit in the EEC. He doubted that the British would ultimately be able or willing to do so, and he 
was unwilling to have the Community bend itself around so aberrant a potential member. Regarding 
the accession negotiations, de Gaulle wondered why the UK would want to “negotiate on clauses that 
one would have entirely accepted in advance?” (Nicholson & East, 1987,52-53 – emph. added).  
While Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands fully supported the United 
Kingdom’s application, it continued to be met by de Gaulle’s firm veto, with tacit support from 
Adenauer, putting, at least temporarily, an end to the matter (Schulte, 1997, p. 35). When de Gaulle 
resigned as president in 1969, France’s policy also changed, with his successor Georges Pompidou 
favoring UK membership, as did the new Chancellor in Bonn, Willy Brandt who succeeded 
Adenauer that same year (Tatham, 2009, p. 18). This development demonstrates the effect of 
domestic policy changes for foreign policy outcomes. At Pompidou’s urging, EEC heads of state 
and government met in The Hague in December 1969, where the door was opened for Denmark, 
Ireland, Norway, and the United Kingdom to pursue membership leading to accession negotiations 
with all four in June 1970 (George, 1998, p. 38).  
Meanwhile, the Norwegian membership aspirations floundered on the issue of fishing.  
Despite having negotiated a three-year transition period for entry into the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) and ten years for entry into the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), Norway’s eventual 
requirement to align (and limit) its fishing policies to those of the Union resulted in the rejection of 
the Accession Treaty in a national referendum. Agriculture, fishing, sovereignty and preservation of 
the Norwegian way of life were cited as the main reasons for the treaty’s failure (Tatham, 2009, p. 
22). 
4.4 THE SECOND WAVE  
GREECE 
Greece had already applied for membership in 1959 and signed an Association Agreement in 1961. 
This agreement, like the one that would be signed with Turkey two years later, envisioned a Customs 
Union, but also involved economic development assistance for Greece, and the gradual elimination 
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of restrictions on the free movement of goods (Tatham, 2009, p. 29). Like the Turkish AA, the 
Agreement explicitly stated that: 
As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging 
full acceptance by Greece(/Turkey) of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing 
the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of 
Greece(/Turkey) to the Community.  
(‘Accord,’ 1961, Art. 72; ‘Agreement,’ 1963, Art. 28) 
During the years after the AA’s signing, Greece and the EEC worked toward the harmonization of 
agricultural policies, financial assistance, and a customs union (Stathatos, 1979). The implementation 
of the AA was, however, suspended after the 1967 military coup in Greece.  
Greece, like Turkey after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, experienced recurring 
military coups d’état. Prior to the Second World War, General Ioannis Metaxas had taken power 
after a deadlocked election in 1936. Metaxas died a few months after the Italian invasion, and a few 
months later Greece was occupied by the Germans. After the war and a civil war between cold-war 
proxy forces, the government fell into the elected hands of Field Marshall Alexander Papagos, 
whose death in 1955 resulted in the appointment of Constantine Karamanlis15 as Prime Minister of a 
reinstated civilian government. Outvoted in 1963, Karamanlis left office leading to the rise of 
George Papandreou16 who had served nearly a year as interim Prime Minister during the war. 
Papandreou’s term was, however, cut short by more, albeit bloodless, political turmoil. This turmoil, 
an election, and the alleged threat of a communist takeover, ended in a coup d’état on 21 April 1967 
by a cadre of military officers, commonly known as ‘the Colonels’ (Clogg, 1979, p. 109-110). In 
response, the EEC suspended the Association Agreement, pending a return to democracy.  
Characterized by flirtations with the façade of democracy, the Colonels themselves fell 
victim to an internal coup d’état by their military police commander, Dimitrios Ioannidis, who used 
a brutal crackdown on a student uprising to claim power in 1973. Ioannidis engaged Greece in 
nationalistic saber rattling against Turkey over disputed control of the Aegean continental shelf and 
organized a coup d’état in Cyprus. Mass killings on the island and Turkey’s retaliation to the 
provocations, resulted in the invasion of Cyprus  
Ioannidis’ response was to order a full invasion of the Turkish mainland, but his officers’ 
refusal to carry it out the order resulted in the fall of his dictatorship. His political and military allies 
                                                
15 Uncle to the later Prime Minister Karamanlis of the same political party: New Democracy.  
16 Father of the later Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and grandfather to the recent Prime Minister, also George 
Papandreou. Greek politics are decidedly a family affair.  
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also revolted and demanded a return to a civilian government under the former Prime Minister 
Karamanlis, who returned to Athens from his self-imposed exile on the French President Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing’s personal jet (ibid., p. 112-113).   
After the collapse of the military regime in July 1974, the new Greek government withdrew 
from NATO’s integrated command, and held snap elections by November, keeping Karamanlis in 
power, supported by his New Democracy party. The following year, Karamanlis’ government 
communicated its intention to apply for full EEC membership, formally submitting its application in 
June.  
The change in tone between the member states’ enthusiasm for Greece’s return to 
democracy and the idea of Greek membership in 1974 and 1975, compared to the Commission’s 
tone in 1976, when it offered its recommendation, is an exposé of ideals meeting reality. As William 
Wallace (1979, p. 22) notes, in 1974 Portugal and Spain were still ruled by military dictators, without 
any membership perspective. Yet by 1975 and 1976, they too experienced the fall of their regimes 
and proceeded to submit their membership applications to the EEC. The specter of the Iberian 
membership applications politicized the Greek application, due to the economic implications of the 
weight (ie. threat) of the Spanish and Portuguese agricultural sectors. As such, the Commission was 
hesitant in its response to Greece’s application. Though it did recommend opening accession 
negotiations, it also lodged several reservations.  
Among the reasons for its half-hearted response was its fear that the Community’s 
relationship with Greece would become unbalanced vis-à-vis its relationship with Turkey. It also 
took note of the relatively high share of the Greek workforce engaged in agriculture and anticipated 
that Greece’s low level of economic development would require substantial transfers of funds to 
Greece. It additionally addressed the need for further institutional development of the EEC itself, 
which enlargement only made more acute  (Commission, 1976; Tatham, 2009, p. 30).   
While the member-state governments had been eager to get the process underway, neither 
they nor the Greeks had yet fully accounted for the scope of necessary administrative adjustments 
needed. If governments were slow, domestic lobbies were even more so, especially in France and 
Italy. Since the prospect of Mediterranean agricultural competitors – not so much from Greece, as 
expected from Portugal and Spain – was an acute worry to them. To the members not sharing the 
same waters, Mediterranean competition and security concerns were less prominent. While the 
French and the Italians had material interests to be concerned with, the northern EEC countries had 
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ideological reasons to support the strengthening of democracy in Europe. These were balanced by 
concerns over the institutional coherence of the Community (Wallace, 1979, p. 25).  
The British, meanwhile, were less concerned about the institutions than about commitment 
to democracy and NATO. Germany on the other hand, expected to pay for the lion’s share of the 
enlargement costs. This not only for Greece, but further down the path for Spain and Portugal as 
well. Furthermore, as Germany was already the primary destination of migrants, the Federal 
Republic only feared more to come.  
These concerns, however, were balanced by their security concerns. Being on the Warsaw 
Pact frontier, shoring up NATO’s southern flank was a significant interest to the Germans (ibid., 
p.26). Greece had been a member of NATO since 1952, but had withdrawn itself from the unified 
command after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. London and Bonn were not going to allow Greece 
to have a free ride into the EEC, though they officially denied any connection between the two 
issues. France, which had withdrawn from NATO’s integrated command structure in 1958, had 
been satisfied with the Greek withdrawal and preferred to keep it that way (ibid., p. 27). When 
Greece rejoined the unified command in 1980, their EEC membership followed just a year later. It 
appears that the member-states overcame their other reservations with the security argument of 
maintaining a solid allied front in the Eastern Mediterranean (Tatham, 2009, p. 31).  
To meet mass migration and competition concerns, the Accession Treaty, signed in 1979 
and implemented in 1981, imposed a seven-year transition period on the free movement of workers, 
tomatoes and peaches, along with a general transition period of five years on other policies. In 
Greece’s case, a broad spectrum of factors played a role in the negotiations of the terms of its 
membership. These included security, solidifying democracy, trade, migration, shadows of future 
enlargements, etc. Yet while the member-states differed in their negotiating positions, the idea of 
Greek membership – once Greece had democratized and had reapplied for membership – the fact 
of future membership, never seemed to be in doubt; only the terms of membership were contested.  
4.5 THE OTHER SECOND WAVE  
SPAIN & PORTUGAL 
Like Greece, Portugal and Spain were treated as serious applicants for Community membership after 
they ceased to be dictatorships in the mid-1970s. Portugal had been a founding member of the 
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EFTA, and had applied for EEC membership not long after Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom did. De Gaulle’s rejection of the United Kingdom put Portugal’s application in the same 
drawer, which saved the member states from having to explicitly answer Portugal’s application. 
Though Spain had preferred a solution that would keep it out of both the EEC and the 
EFTA, developments induced it to choose between the Six and the Seven. In 1961 it initially opted 
for the Seven, but when Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, opted for the EEC, it decided 
to follow suit and also applied for an association17 with the EEC in February 1962 (Guirao, 1997, p. 
110-111). The Commission acknowledged its receipt of the application a month later, upon which 
the matter was referred to the Council (Castiella, 1962; Couve de Murville, 1962).  
Among the Permanent Representatives, the French ambassador raised the issue of the 
Spanish application. In his arguments, the Franco regime had expressed its willingness to evolve 
politically in order to make Spain’s future Community membership feasible. The measure was 
criticized by Italy and the Netherlands. The Italians opposed on economic grounds, while the Dutch 
representative argued that if the Spanish wanted economic arrangements, something might be done. 
However, association was a political act and any undertaking that this should ultimately lead to 
membership was in the present situation unthinkable. The Germans, on the other hand, suggested 
that exploratory talks were a possibility (Guirao, 1997, p. 118-119). Accordingly, the Spanish 
ambassador, Carlos de Miranda, was invited to resubmit, as long as ‘Association’ was not explicitly 
mentioned in the text of the application. In response, de Miranda sent a letter suggesting that 
developments in the Community and the implementation of economic reforms in Spain had made 
the time ripe for a conversation (de Miranda, 1964). The Commission replied that it was prepared to 
engage in such a conversation with Spain, in which the economic problems would have to be on the 
agenda (Spaak, 1964). A rejection of Association was thereby implied rather than explicit. The 
‘conversation’, on the other hand, turned out differently and lead to a trade agreement signed in 
1970. 
Though the Estado Novo regime ruling Portugal at the time had been no less autocratic in 
its domestic governance than the Franco regime in Spain, Portugal was more integrated into Europe 
and the West in general than Spain had been. In addition to its EFTA membership, Portugal was a 
founding member of NATO and a recipient of Marshall Plan aid starting in 1950. This brought 
                                                
17 Guirao (1997, p. 105-106) argues that the wording of the application were left vague by not referencing what sort of 
association was being implied – association or accession. The common understanding, however, is that Spain applied for 
an Association Agreement. 
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Portugal into a European framework of economic and monetary cooperation that Spain did not join 
until 1959 (Royo & Manuel, 2003 p. 3). Despite these multilateral relationships, Portugal still 
suffered from a level of international pariah status owing to its brutal colonial wars between 1961 
and 1974 in addition to the dictatorial nature of its regime at the time (ibid., p. 9-10). 
In the mid-1970s, the regimes of both Spain and Portugal – the underlying condition for 
exclusion – changed. Portugal was the first to do so. After years of bloody counterinsurgency 
warfare in Portugal’s African colonies, a cadre of junior officers rose up against their political and 
military superiors, and – with popular support – overthrew the dictatorial regime. The “Revolution 
of the Carnations,” so-called for the flowers put into the guns of the soldiers, brought power to a 
new junta of military officers (the Movement of the Armed Forces - MFA) in April 1974 (Linz & 
Stepan, 1996, p. 118). This junta prepared the country for elections one year after the coup. The 
Socialist Party (PS), led by the junta’s overseas negotiator Mário Soares, marginally won the 1975 
elections. Soares’ government prepared a constitution and set the groundwork for another election 
to be held one year later. That following year, Soares and the PS won an even less decisive plurality, 
but they were able to move the country to support their application for Community membership in 
March 1977. 
With the death of Spain’s dictator, Francisco Franco, in November 1975, Spain reformed 
into a democratic state despite some political violence and unrest. Under the leadership of Franco’s 
appointed successor, Juan Carlos de Borbón (crowned King Juan Carlos I), the reform policy of the 
government, Transición, (1976-1982) instituted a gradual removal of the military from politics. A new 
constitution allowed multiparty elections, including the opportunity for the participation of the 
communist party. The new constitution also instituted a regionalism of nationalities maintained 
under a unitary state (Conversi, 2002). Multiparty elections were held in 1977, 1979 and 1982, and 
democracy survived despite an attempted coup d’état in February 1981. The 1982 elections further 
led to a peaceful transition of power from the party of Francisco Franco’s immediate successors to 
the democratically elected Social-Democratic Party (Spanish Socialist Workers Party – PSOE) (Linz 
& Stepan, 1996). 
Spain followed Portugal in its request for membership, submitting its application in July 
1977. Responding to the Council recommendations, the Commission published its opinion on 
Portugal’s application in May 1978, and on Spain’s in November of that same year. The Commission 
opined that negotiations ought to start as soon as possible for both applicants (Commission, 1978a; 
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1978b). Portugal began its accession negotiations in June of 1978 and negotiations with Spain started 
in February of the following year.  
The accession process was not without controversies, however. In terms of their expected 
impacts on member-state economies, Portugal’s smaller size, both in terms of population and GDP, 
was expected to have less impact on the Community than that of Spain. Both economies, however, 
were much poorer than the average member-state. In 1978, the per capita income of Portugal was 
37% that of the EEC average, while that of Spain was 54% of the Community average (World Bank, 
2011). Yet both economies had been developing rapidly between 1960 and their revolutions in the 
mid-1970s (Guirao, 2006). Nevertheless, the degree to which they would be assets or competitors to 
member states depended on different economic factors. For example, in terms of agricultural 
products, Spain and Portugal were net-importers of meat and wheat, which was attractive for 
Northern European countries. They were, however, competitors in terms of the Mediterranean 
foodstuffs of Southern France and Italy, agitating French and Italian agricultural lobbies, but also 
those of industrial production (Duchêne, 1982, p. 28). Steel producers in the member states were 
worried about EEC development funds being used to help develop steel and textile factories in the 
new EEC members, which would then compete with those in the old member states (Wallace, 1979, 
p.32-33). 
In terms of migrant labor, the Commission (1978a, art. 38; 1978b, art. 44) attempted to allay 
fears of mass migration by pointing out in its opinions that migration was a function of the demand 
for labor. Especially the opinion on Spain highlighted this perspective. The Commission advised 
safeguard measures in order to “avoid erratic movements of labour.” This, despite its opinion that 
Spanish migration was only a small share of overall migration and the economic downturn in the 
member states would provide less demand for workers and therefore less migration.  
Regardless of the Commission’s enthusiasm, the time between application and accession was 
longer for Spain and Portugal than it had been for Greece. Greece had applied two years before the 
Iberians, but joined the EEC five years earlier before than they did. The Greek negotiation process, 
from open to close, took 34 months to complete. The same process took 37 months for Spain and 
45 months for Portugal. The Portuguese delay had been partly due to internal EEC matters to be 
negotiated, which led to Spain catching up with Portugal’s lead (Tatham, 2009, p. 41).  
Fearing Spanish agricultural competition and a decrease in subsidies to French farmers, 
France, under Giscard d’Estaing, delayed accession through obstruction of the negotiations. This 
changed when François Mitterand became president in 1982, and the budgetary question was 
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worked out in 1984 (Gilbert, 2003, p. 167-168). Greece was also quite willing to hold the Iberian 
enlargement hostage in return for certain financial benefits (ibid., p. 168; Tatham, 2009, p.43). 
Furthermore, the Commission identified the recession of the late 1970s as contributing to a hostile 
economic environment for accession, creating a need to update internal EEC decision-making 
structures (ibid., p. 39). Although Spain and Portugal did gain their membership in the end, their full 
integration (in terms of tariffs and free movement of persons) was held up by a seven-year transition 
periods and an additional ten years for Portuguese agricultural products (Gilbert 2003, p. 168).  
4.6 MOROCCO 
Despite having been dissuaded from doing so, King Hassan II of Morocco presented his 
membership application to the Community on July 8, 1987. The Commission reported, “The 
President of the Council [of foreign ministers] replied on 1 October, pointing out that the 
community wished to continue strengthening and extending its cooperation with Morocco, in view 
of the special nature of existing relations and joint interests” (Commission, 1988). This was rejection 
by omission. The member states rejected Morocco for membership for unspecified reasons. In all 
likelihood it was due to its bad human rights record, Morocco not being a democracy or, 
geographically at least, a European country. Any of these would have been sufficient for rejection 
(Tatham, 2009, p. 204).  
4.7 THE OTHER GERMANY AND THE ‘DE FACTO’ ENLARGEMENT 
After the end of the Cold War in 1989, the European Community effectively enlarged by the 
reunification of West and East Germany. The process which brought nearly 17 million citizens into 
the European Community happened in less than a year after the wall was broken in November 
1989. This expansion of the EC essentially happened by German fiat rather than by the preferences 
of the other major member states. Within weeks, the Kohl government in Bonn had presented a 
ten-point plan for a federal unification between the West and the East – a plan which had not been 
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previously discussed with Paris or other European governments (Gilbert, 2003, p. 199; Moravcsik, 
1999, p. 397, 400). 
The weight of member-state opinion was against. Margaret Thatcher had already expressed 
her stance against German reunification to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Just prior to a meeting 
of the heads of state and government on 8-9 December, Mitterand also spoke with Gorbachev, 
attempting to prevent reunification, while the Dutch and the Italians expressed their disapproval at 
other occasions (Wiegrefe, 2010). The Strasbourg European Council in December 1989, 
nevertheless, rhetorically embraced the idea of German reunification, saying: “We seek the 
strengthening of the state of peace in Europe in which the German people will regain its unity 
through free self-determination” (European Council, 1989). But in all the important respects the 
enlargement to East Germany was a unilateral affair of the German Chancellery. While the 
European Council and the Commission found themselves in agreement, at least rhetorically, the 
ensuing enlargement process was not comparable to those for other countries, and thus provides 
few broader lessons for studying EC/EU enlargement. 
4.8 THE OTHER EFTA COUNTRIES 
With the Cold War over, and Moscow no longer needing to be assuaged of the geopolitical 
neutralities of Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland, these four countries were also free to join 
what was by then becoming the European Union. Austria submitted its application in July 1989. 
Cyprus and Malta followed a year later. Sweden applied in June of 1990. In 1992, Finland (in March), 
Switzerland (May) and Norway (November) submitted theirs. Iceland would have applied, but for 
the EEC’s restrictions of the Common Fisheries Policy, Having applied, Switzerland withdrew its 
application after a referendum in December 1992 (Tatham, 2009, p. 62). 
Although the EFTA applicants (Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden) all had technical 
complications that needed to be overcome, there were no political obstacles to contend with, save 
for the official neutrality positions of all but Norway. The Community had, however, learned to live 
with Ireland’s neutrality, and since the geopolitical situation had dramatically changed, the 
Commission judged that the Common Foreign and Security Policy would not be insurmountably 
affected by the addition of the neutrals. As such, the Commission published a positive opinion of all 
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these applicants, suggesting that negotiations could begin. These began in February 1993 (ibid., 62, 
65).  
As Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden, together with the other EFTA countries, Iceland 
and Liechtenstein, had been incorporated into the European Economic Area. As such, they were 
already engaged in economic integration with the Community. Therefore, the transition to 
negotiating for membership in 1993 was an easy one, given that the EFTA applicants had already 
been adopted most aspects of the acquis communautaire (the body of EU legislation – at that time 
numbering 29 chapters) (ibid., 2009, p. 66). 
Unlike the previous enlargement rounds, adopting Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden, 
was not a controversial issue for the member states. These were relatively small and rich countries 
that were already substantially integrated into the EU economy  (Gilbert, 2003, p. 237). For these 
countries, the political question was not one of if the EU-12 (the EEC was renamed as the European 
Union in 1993) wanted them, but if they wanted the EU-12. All four of the applicants held referenda 
on membership in 1994. In Finland and Sweden, these were fairly close races (56.9% and 52% in 
favor, respectively. Austrians voted more positively (66.4%), while in Norway, the referendum on 
EU membership failed (to the tune of 52.5% against), despite substantial concessions by the EU on 
oil, gas and fish exploitation in Norwegian territorial waters. With popular approval, then, Austria, 
Finland and Sweden joined the EU on January 1, 1995 (Granell, 1995; Tatham, 2009, p. 68). 
4.9 MALTA & CYPRUS 
Meanwhile, more applicants lined up to join. Other than Turkey, the first in line were two 
Mediterranean island states with relatively small populations – Cyprus and Malta. Both had long 
been connected to the European Community by way of Association Agreements. Malta had 
associated itself with the EC in 1970 followed by Cyprus a year later – one year before the Greek-
backed coup d’état (partially described above) and the Turkish invasion of the island.  
While the international community, including the EU member states, recognized the Greek 
Republic of Cyprus, they did not recognize the claim of sovereign independence by the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). In order to maintain friendly relations with Turkey, the 
member states initially prevented the development of the Association with Cyprus. In 1977, after 
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seemingly positive contacts between the Cypriot President Makarios and the TRNC leader 
Denktash, the Community allowed the development of an Additional Protocol to the AA, allowing 
greater access of Cypriot products to member-state markets (Tsardanidis, 1984, p. 357-358). The 
Association, however, gradually developed toward a Customs Union in the late 1980s (Commission, 
1993c, Art. 24). 
In its opinion on Cyprus, the Commission first underlined, poetically, Cyprus’ European 
identity by referring to its two-thousand year long station as being “at the very fount of European 
Culture and Civilization” (ibid., Art. 44). It further mentioned that a political settlement would 
“reinforce” Cyprus’ European vocation and that “Cyprus’ integration with the Community implies a 
peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement…”   (ibid., Art. 45; Art. 47 – emph. added). Even though it 
suggested to contribute an “economic, social and political transition of Cyprus toward integration,” 
and wrote in hopeful terms about a settlement, the Commission also acknowledged that the 
possibility of failure existed and that the situation should be reassessed in January 1995 (ibid., Art. 49; 
51). The Commission made no mention of accession negotiations. 
Malta, was explicitly recognized as a European country with a democratic status and 
consistent respect for human rights, but the Commission still identified some economic and 
administrative complications. It also recognized that the two main political parties on the 
archipelago had different orientations toward EU membership, with the Nationalist Party (NP) 
being supportive of integration and the Maltese Labour Party (MLP) largely antagonistic. 
Nevertheless, the Commission recommended starting accession negotiations once Malta reformed 
its economic regulatory system (Commission, 1993b, Art 42-47). Both candidates were assured at 
the European Council meeting in Corfu on 24-25 June, 1994, that they would be included in the 
next enlargement phase (European Council, 1994, s. II B).  
In addition to Malta, Cyprus and Turkey, the countries from Central and Eastern Europe 
had begun to submit their applications for membership. Recognizing that very substantial 
enlargement of the Union was on the horizon, the heads of state and government of the member 
states acknowledged the need for institutional reforms, which would have to be worked out in the 
context of an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1996. Before that, the European Council of 
Cannes (1995) promised that negotiations with Malta and Cyprus could begin six months after the 
ICG, which, as it turned out, would culminate with the Treaty of Amsterdam in June 1997.  
By that time, however, the government in Malta had changed back to the MLP. Within a 
month of being elected, the new government informed the Council of its suspension of the 
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accession process. While it still sought a certain measure of integration, full membership was not on 
its agenda and it preferred a relationship more suited to Malta’s specific needs (Tatham, 2009, p. 
123).  
At the Luxembourg Council in December 1997, the heads of state and government 
announced the start of negotiations which Cyprus would be conducting alongside Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic – called the ‘Luxembourg Six – whereby Cyprus joined 
this enlargement wave on an equal footing with the first-rank of Central and Eastern European 
countries. A fuller account of the Luxembourg episode is presented in the following chapter. 
 Meanwhile 1998 brought another political change to Malta. This time, the MLP ceded 
power the power it had gained only two years earlier back to the NP. This resulted in a renewed 
Maltese bid for membership. At Helsinki in December 1999, the Luxembourg six were joined by 
Malta, as well as Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. The two Mediterranean 
countries, though having applied years sooner, were destined to join the following wave of 
enlargement. 
4.10 THE BIG BANG 
Just as the end of the Cold War offered the opportunity for realignment to East Germany and the 
EFTA countries, the same was true for the former communist and Soviet countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. This development, and the subsequent debate on enlargement, created divisions 
between ‘deepeners’ and ‘wideners’. Starting in 1991 with Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, also 
known as the ‘Visegrád Group’18, the EU made ‘Europe Agreements,’ which were essentially the 
same as the Association Agreements. Two years later, in 1993, the three former Soviet republics on 
the Baltic Sea, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania also signed EAs, as did Bulgaria and Romania. Czech 
Rep., Slovakia, and Slovenia followed suit in 1994.  
This policy option, however, was seen as favoring members who preferred deepening to 
widening, as the Agreements were a way of holding off the tide of applicants, while allowing them to 
be a part of a free trade area for industrial products, a structured political dialogue, and an assistance 
                                                
18 They were so named for a meeting among the three countries in February 1991 in the Hungarian town of Visegrád 
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program (Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 409-410). The Europe Agreements, unlike the Association 
Agreements with Greece and Turkey, did not promise membership in the future. Instead, they 
merely recognized that accession was the goal of the associated state, not necessarily of the EU or 
the member states. Despite this reservation, ratification of the first EAs by member-state 
parliaments, took a long time and were not fully ratified until 1994, at the same time as the later 
applicants, Bulgaria and Romania. According to Tatham (2009, p.77), this was a sign that the 
‘Visegrád group’ would not enjoy a preferred relationship with the EU over the non-Visegrád 
countries. 
The Maastricht treaty, which transformed the European Community into the European 
Union, also began to make explicit criteria of membership beyond being a nominally ‘European 
country’. At the Maastricht European Council, the heads of state and government made it clear that 
only democracies could be members of the EU (European Council, 1991, Art. 1.4). Before the ink 
of Maastricht was dry, the Commission drew up a document on what Maastricht meant for 
enlargement, stating that the European projects of the Single Market and a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy necessitated the demand of more political, economic and administrative conditions 
on applicants before accession could take place. Additionally, the Commission included a human 
rights provision, which had previously been articulated among the principles of EU members, but 
not explicitly as a condition of application (Commission, 1992, art. 8).  
In preparation for the Copenhagen European Council of 1993, the Commission drafted a 
report with suggestions bearing on the expected enlargement to Eastern Europe. Two elements in 
this proposal were of particular importance. The first was the suggestion that “in order to offer 
concrete perspectives which the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe can work 
towards, the European Council should confirm, in a clear political message, its commitment to 
membership of the Union for Europe agreements signatories when they are able to satisfy the 
conditions required” (Commission, 1993a, Art. II1). This indicated an automatism that left accession 
within the ability of the candidate countries to become members, rather than at the pleasure of the 
member states to permit or deny them membership (Mayhew, 1998, p. 27).  
The second important element was the statement of the three required conditions, which 
were political, economic and administrative in nature, with a fourth specified criterion, which 
consisted of the “Community’s capacity to absorb new members while maintaining the momentum 
of European integration” (Commission, 1993a, Art. II1). Both of these elements were adopted by 
the member states at the Copenhagen European Council in June. Since then the requirements for 
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membership have come to be known as the ‘Copenhagen criteria’, which were significant because 
they were essentially a compromise between the wideners and deepeners. Member states with pro-
enlargement preferences accepted the promise of enlargement at the cost of a delay, while the 
members against enlargement, at least in the near term, gained time in which deeper integration 
(such as the single currency) could be implemented. 
After Copenhagen, the membership applications for the CEECs began to come in. Hungary 
and Poland applied in 1994 (March and April, respectively). In 1995, Romania, Slovakia (both in 
June), Latvia (October), Estonia (November), Lithuania and Bulgaria (both in December) did so as 
well, with the Czech Republic and Slovenia as the last of the ten, submitting their applications in 
1996 (January and June respectively). Though they applied at these different dates, they all received 
their Opinions from the Commission on the 15th of July, 1997, just after the the Treaty of the EU 
with the Copenhagen criteria was signed and amended in the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam was a start toward meeting the fourth criterion of preparing the EU’s institutions 
toward being able to accommodate the applicants as members. 
 In contrast to the previous opinions, which had been framed in terms of the applicants’ 
preparedness in the immediate or short term, the post-Copenhagen opinions were framed in terms 
of a five-year perspective derived from the requirements decided at the Copenhagen. In particular, a 
sine qua non for opening accession negotiations was reserved for the political criteria of membership 
(stable democratic institutions, human rights and respect for minorities) (Tatham, 2009, p. 91).  
In this regard, the Commission made an example of Slovakia, which it deemed to have 
insufficiently stable institutions to merit the start of accession negotiations, in spite of the country’s 
greater preparedness in terms of the other criteria (Commission, 1997, p. 130). Slovakia was not the 
only candidate to be rejected for accession negotiations, however. The Commission recommended 
that Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania also needed internal reforms before being permitted to 
start accession negotiations. As mentioned above, the Luxembourg European Council approved 
accession negotiations only for the Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, in addition 
to Cyprus, which had been approved earlier. 
The enlargement model that the Commission and the Council adopted in 1997 was  called 
the ‘stadium’ model, whereby the EU would begin with a subset of countries, followed by the next 
set when they were ready. Two years later, at Helsinki, this decision was revised and negotiations 
were opened with all of the ‘candidates’ (aside from Turkey). This new enlargement model was 
called the ‘regatta’ option, allowing all the candidates to proceed at their own individual pace and 
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‘finish’ (i.e. become members) when they had fulfilled the criteria and completed the negotiations, 
regardless the pace at which other candidates were progressing (Tatham, 2009, p. 249-250).  
The innovation that was adopted to make the regatta model possible was the 
implementation of annual reports monitoring the candidates’ progress. These were framed around 
the Copenhagen criteria, with separate sections for political, economic and administrative 
assessments, with the administrative criteria sectioned into the different chapters of the acquis 
communautaire. Compiling those reports also meant that the Commission had to do in-depth research 
into the candidate states and develop a method of gauging progress that was both accurate and 
applicable to all the candidate countries equally (Tatham, 2006, p. 248).  
The regatta model proved to be an inaccurate description of the process about which the 
EU actually had to settle some internal matters, especially relating to voting weights and the 
Common Agricultural Policy, and how this policy would apply to the new member states. Only 
when these matters were settled, at Nice in 2001 and at Copenhagen in 2002 respectively, could 
Cyprus, the Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
become full members in May 1, 2004. Bulgaria and Romania had to wait for another three years to 
join at the start of 2007, when the EU enlarged to its current number of member states, 27. 
4.11 TURKEY 
The oddest of the membership hopefuls has been Turkey, the subject of this present research. 
Though previous applicants had to sometimes wait many years between application and 
membership, none have had to wait and strive as long as Turkey, nor have any of the others had as 
checkered a history with regard to political stability between their indication of wanting membership 
and the commencement of negotiations. Neither had any of the other candidates had been as 
populous, relatively poor, or as predominantly Islamic at a time when precisely that religious 
descriptor has become of particular political salience to western cultures.  
Turkey’s membership perspective was given legal status at the signing of the Association 
Agreement in 1963, for which it had applied in 1959. Known as the ‘Ankara Agreement’, this treaty 
offered Turkey the same perspective as had been offered to its neighbor (and rival), Greece (see 
above). While the democratic requirement for membership was not yet explicit, Turkey had three 
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years before experienced a military coup which had seen its first democratically elected Prime 
Minister, along with his Foreign and Finance Ministers hanged by a military junta (Zürcher, 1993, p. 
261). 
The return to democracy, albeit with military tutelage, in October 1961, however, was not 
the end of military intervention in Turkey’s political affairs. The military would continue to play a 
role of ‘guaranteeing’ the state from political fragmentation or de-secularization. In addition to being 
a force that would be on the mind of any elected government, the military further intervened by 
dismissing the government by way of a memorandum in 1971 and by a coup d’état in 1980. The 
coup of 1980 further drafted a new constitution which gave the military an official political role 
through the National Security Council, and further limited the freedom of the press, the freedom of 
trade unions and individual rights. While the constitution did recognize individual rights, it also 
stipulated that these could be suspended for an assortment of reasons (ibid., p. 295).  
Another complication to Turkey’s membership suitability, which has already been mentioned 
in the contexts of Greece and Cyprus, was the 1974 invasion of Cyprus, ordered by Turkish Prime 
Minister Bülent Ecevit. The invasion was ostensibly in order to protect Cypriot citizens from mass 
killings being carried out by the Greece-backed militias. During the invasion, Turkey occupied 
around 40% of the geographic area of the island to protect a smaller minority of its citizens. While 
the invasion, essentially, solved the problem of mass killings, the political settlement left much to be 
desired. The broader international community recognized Greek Cyprus as the legitimate 
government, but the presence of Turkish troops, and Turkey’s geopolitical importance made it 
impossible to force a solution to even greater detriment of the Turkish Cypriots. Conversely, 
Greece’s entrenchment in the EU has allowed Greece to leverage other issues (such as the 
enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe) for its vote in order to maintain Greek Cyprus’ 
advantages.  
In 1987, the same year that Morocco applied and was rejected, Turkey applied for 
membership of what was still the European Community. In 1989 the Commission replied with an 
Opinion citing three reasons why accession negotiations should not be in a medium-term 
perspective. The first of these was the state of flux in which the Community found itself with the 
Single Market program underway and the preparations for the organizational reforms that would 
culminate at Maastricht. These the Commission expressed as follows, “…this reason alone is 
sufficient for the Commission to consider that it would be unwise, with regard both to the candidate 
countries and to the Member States, to envisage the Community becoming involved in new 
  147 
accession negotiations before 1993 at the earliest, except in exceptional circumstances” 
(Commission, 1989, Art.4). 
Both of the other two reason for rejection concerned Turkey’s own lacking development 
toward membership suitability. In terms of political development, problems were cited with civil and 
minority rights in addition to the Cyprus situation (ibid., Art. 9). In terms of economic development, 
the third reason, the Commission mentioned structural disparities in industry and agriculture, macro-
economic imbalances, high levels of trade protectionism and a low level of social protection. It 
further mentioned that if Turkey were to join, it would severely strain the Community’s own 
resources (ibid., Art. 8.1-8.2).   
Despite these critiques, the Commission recommended that Turkey and the Community 
move forward with the implementation of a customs union, as had been provided for in the 1963 
Association Agreement (ibid., Art. 13.1). The Council adopted this recommendation in February 
1990. Due to delays in the European Parliament, where members objected to Turkey’s human rights 
record, the promised customs union was only implemented at the last possible moment under the 
pressure of making good on the member states’ promise. The customs union did not go into effect 
until January 31st, 1995 (Tatham, 2009. p. 146).  
The following chapters record, in much closer detail, the developments of Turkey’s progress 
through the accession process. In order to give an overview here, it is helpful to consider the 
highlights of each episode: 
4.11.1 1997 – Luxembourg 
In the early part of the year, Turkey suffered another shock to its political system when the military 
once again sent the elected government a memorandum instructing it to resign. This intervention 
was not considered a de jure coup d’état as it did not put the military in direct control of daily 
governing. It was meant to be a driving force behind a change of government with greater adherence 
to state secularism. Accordingly a new coalition government was formed on June 30 that same year.  
However, in a process wherein the stability of democratic institutions is a critical benchmark, 
it was not an auspicious start of the year for Turkey’s EU membership aspirations. Even though the 
European Commission stated in its recommendations for enlargement that Turkey should be 
allowed to participate in a conference for countries with perspectives on membership, the 
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Commission’s document also clearly put Turkey in a separate category from the other applicant 
countries. The Luxembourg European Council accepted the Commission’s recommendation with 
Turkey’s distinct status, while nevertheless shoring up the contested question of its status as a 
European country that could still, in principle, become a member at some point in the future. This 
was an issue of dispute among the heads of state and government at the beginning of the year, but 
was settled – at least at their level – by year’s end. 
4.11.2 1999 – Helsinki 
The Helsinki decision further separated Turkey from the other candidate countries, while 
rhetorically embracing Turkey. Turkey was left out by not starting accession negotiations with 
Ankara at the same time that it began accession negotiations with all the other candidates. 
Rhetorically, the heads of state and government made the point more emphatically that Turkey was 
a European country. That rhetoric did not, however, start any new enlargement processes.  
Nevertheless, despite being nothing more than rhetoric, the Helsinki decision was seen as a 
positive turning point for Turkey’s membership prospects. It gave the government in Ankara the 
wind in the back to make necessary reforms on the political front which would, ultimately, help start 
accession negotiations in 2005 (Öniş, 2008).  
The real turning point, however, was in Greek and German policy. The embarrassment of 
having been found to be harboring Abdullah Öcalan brought the necessary political change within 
the Greek cabinet to seek rapprochement with Ankara. Two devastating earthquakes brought 
around enough Greek public opinion in order to make that policy not politically suicidal. In 
Germany, with help from the domestic Turkish electorate, Gerhard Schröder came to power in 
Berlin, changing Germany into an advocate as opposed to an antagonist of Turkish membership. 
With Greece and Germany on board, the balance of opinion in the Council was strongly in Turkey’s 
favor. 
4.11.3 2002 – Copenhagen 
The Copenhagen decision postponed Turkey’s advancement through the accession process by 
denying its request to start accession negotiations and introducing an artificial timetable of two years, 
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after which its readiness to start negotiations, in political terms, would be gauged. While in the 
process of strong haggling over the precise details of the 2004 enlargement, and how agricultural 
funds would be distributed in a European Union of 25 member states, Turkey demanded to start the 
accession negotiations that ten of the candidates had just wrapped up. Ultimately, Turkey was left 
waiting with the concession that if Turkey met the political criteria in 2004, Turkey and the EU 
would start accession negotiations ‘without delay’.  
4.11.4 2004 – Brussels 
As had been promised in 2002, the 2004 European Council judged that the political criteria had 
sufficiently been met to warrant accession negotiations. These would, however, not commence until 
October of 2005, and only after Turkey signed the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement.  
The ‘without delay’ clause of 2002 was extended by ten months in order to not scare off voters from 
approving the Constitutional Treaty in referenda The Additional Protocol would mean extending 
the free movement of goods between Turkey and all of the new member states, including (Greek) 
Cyprus.  
4.11.5 2006 - Brussels 
When the negotiations started in 2005, Turkey had signed the Additional Protocol, extending the 
Customs Union to all EU member states. However, it made an exception for (Greek) Cypriot ships 
and air traffic, meaning that these did not have access to Turkish harbors and airports. Their 
rationale was the failure of the EU to open itself to trade from Turkish Cyprus. After the Finnish 
Presidency failed to bring Turkey and Cyprus to an agreement, the dispute within the Council was 
about how to sanction Turkey for its failure to open itself to Greek Cypriot vessels. Finally, the 
agreed-upon formula was to suspend eight chapters of accession negotiations with Turkey and to 
not provisionally close any more chapters until Turkey opened its airports and harbors.  
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4.12 HISTORY’S LESSONS 
This history presents several lessons that are relevant to this research. The first is that history is on 
the side of the applicants. Thus far, only three countries have applied for membership without 
ultimately becoming members. These are Norway, Switzerland, and Morocco. The former two 
countries did not become members due to their own decisions. Morocco was denied for reasons 
that were not made explicit, but were presumably due to at least three factors: not being a European 
country, not being a democracy, and not respecting human rights. These three ideational reasons 
can, however, easily be a shroud for European fears of further opening European doors to 
Morocco’s poor migrants with Islamic identities. As a very poor country, Morocco would no doubt 
also have been considered a heavy net loss to the European budget, while in terms of security and 
power, it had little to offer the EU or its member states in terms of strategic advantage. 
Because history appears to be, with that one exception, on the side of the applicants, ‘no’ is 
not the same as ‘never’. In the first enlargement, the United Kingdom was able to secure entry by 
waiting for Charles de Gaulle to leave the scene. In the second enlargement, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain were able to become members because of long transition periods for French and Italian 
farmers to prepare for increased competition. The same was true of the CEECs, where the 
Common Agricultural Policy was reformed in order to assuage the net-donors to the EU budget that 
their wealth transfers to the new member states would not get out of hand. The threat of mass 
migration, which had been a concern during the second and most recent enlargement wave, did not 
occur, nor did it create permanent limitations on the freedom of movement for the citizens of the 
new member states.  
That lesson, however, is only an interesting side note to the purpose of this research, which 
is to find explanations for member-state behavior. In terms of international security, German 
support for Greek accession was seemingly defined by Germany’s desire to shore up the southern 
European flank of NATO in the containment regime. France’s opposition to British membership 
was to a great extent concerned with maintaining its independence from the United States and 
preserving its dominant role in the Community. The reluctance of the French and Italian farmers did 
not prevent their governments from eventually accepting Spain and Portugal as members, and 
eventually they gained allies in the great agricultural debates of the 1990s and 2000s.  
The questions of identity and related norms and values play into the requirements for 
application and have become important for the opening of accession negotiations. Morocco was, 
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presumably, denied entry for reasons of European identity. Turkey’s identity as a European country 
has been one of the major points of debate regarding that country’s candidacy. In terms of values, 
the accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain was unthinkable while they continued to be 
dictatorships. Once they became democracies, their processes of accession went swiftly, despite the 
haggling over agricultural competition. During the process that led to the ‘Big Bang’ enlargement, 
Slovakia was denied accession negotiations precisely because of its faltering democratic record.  
In the course of the evolving European Community/Union, the values (e.g. democracy, 
human rights, and good neighborly relations) have become increasingly supported by explicit rules.  
These were led by Commission opinions that were formalized by the European Council. These rules 
have become one of the points of disagreement between Turkey’s protagonists and antagonists, with 
the former arguing that Turkey should be treated the same as the states that joined in 2004 and 
2007, with the latter arguing that Turkey has not met the necessary criteria. This is aside from the 
protagonists’ arguments that Turkey would be a valuable member and ally and the antagonists’ 
arguments that Turkey is ill suited as a member for reasons of religion, culture and geography. A 
major element in this research is to discover if those arguments cohere at all with member states’ 
reasoning.  
Lastly, it is worthwhile to note the cases where member states changed their policies. While 
de Gaulle single handedly kept the door shut on the United Kingdom, this was quickly overturned 
when de Gaulle left the scene. Similarly, French opposition to Spain and Portugal evaporated when 
Mitterand replaced Giscard d’Estaing. By and large, however, policy changes due to domestic 
political changes are not in much evidence in this history of enlargement. This can be for one of two 
reasons: first, that domestic politics simply have not ruled enlargement decisions. It is not 
inconceivable that the enlargement processes mentioned above were simply not politically salient 
issues in domestic political contests in the member states. Second, it may be that the traditional 
focus of international relations theory has blinded many of the sources that recount the history of 
European enlargement. 
This research finds that domestic political concerns assuredly played a role in the case of 
Turkey. It is beyond doubt that Turkish membership has become a salient political issue in certain 
member states. Notably, it has done so in states with large Turkish immigrant communities. The 
following chapters address the history of Turkey’s bid for membership in five separate episodes.  
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5.0  LUXEMBOURG, 1997 
The first episode of the Turkish pursuit of candidacy for membership in the European Union 
concerns the events of 1997, culminating in the Luxembourg summit of 11 and 12 December of 
that year. The first section of the following chapter about the politics of 1997 looks at a broad 
chronological sequence of events, describing the major developments thereof. The second section 
looks at some specific issues of debate between the member states. The final section focuses on the 
positions of each of the member states as these were read in the journalistic record. For each of 
these, the positions of the member states are determined as being a driver, being a supported of 
Turkey’s bid for membership, a brakeman, being an opponent of Turkey’s bid for membership, or a 
passenger, a member state whose position was too obscure to determine, as they did not engage in 
the public debate.  
5.1 THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
1997 was a year that started off on the wrong foot for the Turkish pursuit of candidacy for 
membership in the European Union. In January, Denmark brought a case against Turkey before the 
European Commission of Human Rights, citing torture of Kurds of Danish nationality (Rath, 1997). 
On February 28th of that year, the Turkish National Security Council presented the Islamist Prime 
Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, with a 20-point memorandum of warning that “activities of an archaic 
nature [meaning religious] against the regime won't be tolerated” (Couturier 1997). The 
memorandum was preceded by an incident involving the diverting of a “…column of tanks through 
Sincan, an Islamist suburb of Ankara whose mayor demanded, in a speech, the adoption of Islamic 
law (Barham, 1997b; Pope, 1997). The Erbakan government lasted until its resignation at the end of 
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June. At the same time the sitting president, Süleyman Demirel, invited Mesut Yılmaz (the leader of 
the Motherland Party ANAP) to form a new government.  
Concerning the evolution of the member states’ positions, there were four episodes revealing 
sentiments that deserve to be mentioned: The first, a summit of EU and member-state leaders from 
the European People’s Party (EPP - by-and-large Christian Democrats) in early March. The second 
was a Foreign ministers meeting in mid-March. Third, was the publication of the Commission 
opinions on enlargement, and, fourth, the politicking prior to and during the European Council 
meeting in December, under the Luxembourg presidency. There were also particular issues of 
importance that are discussed following the chronological account of the different episodes. These 
are summarized as the persistent dispute over Cyprus, Greek-Turkish territorial conflicts, and the 
nature of the enlargement regime – including particularly the Copenhagen criteria.  
5.1.1 EPP summit 
In the beginning of March, a summit of political leaders from the member states and EU institutions 
from the European People’s Party produced an agreement that Turkey should have closer ties to 
Europe through the European Customs Union, but should not be offered candidacy for 
membership. Attendees included German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Italian Prime Minister Romano 
Prodi, Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar, Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) John Bruton, 
Prime Minister of Luxembourg Jean-Claude Juncker, Austrian Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor 
Wolfgang Schüssel, Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc DeHaene, European Commission President 
Jacques Santer, President of the European Parliament José María Gil-Robles, European Union of 
Christian Democrats president Wim van Welzen, and EPP-President (and former Belgian Prime 
Minister) Wilfried Martens. (Barber, 1997b; “Christdemokratische,” 1997; Klaassen, 1997b; Van 
Lierop 1997; Van der Velden, 1997a).  
At this summit, there had been unanimous agreement that Turkey’s human rights record as 
well as its size were reasons to deny Turkey membership (Barber, 1997b). Chairman Martens, 
speaking on behalf of all, argued that it was “not acceptable” for Turkey to become a member of the 
EU. “We are creating a European Union. This is a European project,” he argued, indicating a closed 
European identity that excludes Turkey (Barber 1997b, emphasis according to Klaassen 1997b; 
Traynor & Nuttall, 1997).  
  154 
Wolfgang Schüssel also cited economic reasons, such as high inflation and unemployment 
rates (“Christdemokratische,” 1997). Van Velzen was more explicit about excluding Turkey based on 
identity, saying: “The cultural, humanist and Christian values of Europe,” are different from those of 
Turkey; “Europe has its borders” (Barber 1997b; Van der Velden, 1997a – trans. mine). The 
Financial Times’ Lionel Barber (1997b) wrote “…they agreed unanimously that Turkey's human 
rights record, its size, and, implicitly, the Islamic strain in its society, made it impossible for the EU 
to contemplate admitting the country into a Union which is preparing to expand to Central and 
Eastern Europe around the year 2002.” 
Furthermore, several participants of the summit cited the diplomatic pressure-tactics, not 
only implemented by Turkey, but also by the United States, as having retrograde effects on their 
inclinations to support Turkey for membership (Traynor & Nuttall, 1997; Van der Velden, 1997a). 
The tactics, on Turkey’s part, included threats to veto NATO enlargement to Eastern European 
countries. 
This unanimous agreement, however, turned out to have a limited lifespan. Prime Minister 
Romano Prodi of Italy distanced himself from the EPP agreement within just a few days of the 
summit (Van Lambalgen 1997). The EPP-position of Bruton was also negated by the Taoiseach’s 
replacement by Bertie Ahern on June 26, following the June 6 elections in Ireland. Spain’s position 
remained somewhat unclear throughout the remainder of the year, sometimes being praised by the 
Turks for its support, and at other times expressing its opposition by citing Turkey’s human rights 
record (“Foreign minister on need,” 1997; Mortimer, 1997b; Sanz, 1997; Smith, 1997). Although 
generally speaking, Madrid seemed more favorable to Ankara’s membership ambitions than 
unfavorable. Luxembourg also recanted its EPP position that Turkey was not a European country, 
yet maintained that its human rights situation was sufficient reason to not invite it to accession 
negotiations (“Der Krieg wird,” 1997). For the remainder of 1997, Belgium failed to make the press 
concerning their stance on Turkey.  
Apart from this, the participants at the EPP summit had not all been able to speak for their 
governments. Wolfgang Schüssel’s declaration of opposition to EU-membership for Turkey was 
contradicted later that year by statements from his chancellor, Viktor Klima, and president, Thomas 
Klestil, in support of Turkish membership to the EU (“Turkey recognizes,” 1997). So too, Helmut 
Kohl’s position was not necessarily the same as that of his coalition partner, Foreign Minister Klaus 
Kinkel of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) (Barber, 1997c; De Graaf, 1997b; LaRoche, 1997; 
“Spanningen,” 1997; Van der Velden, 1997b; “Wijze mannen,” 1997). The German position during 
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the EPP summit had therefore been modified by Kinkel’s stance nearly two weeks later at the EU 
Foreign Ministers meeting in Apeldoorn (Netherlands) (Van der Velden, 1997b). Later in the year, 
Kohl would also express support for “eventual Turkish membership”, in his attempt to improve the 
German-Turkish relations that had soured after the summit (Atkins, 1997).  
5.1.2 Apeldoorn 
During the Dutch presidency in the first half of 1997, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans 
van Mierlo (also the political leader of the center-left liberal D66 party), and his countryman, EU 
Commissioner of External Affairs Hans van den Broek (a former foreign minister and member of 
the Christian-democratic CDA), had to deal with the diplomatic crisis created by the statement of 
the EPP summit. Van Mierlo, having received an earful in Ankara after the EPP-summit, was 
determined that the Apeldoorn meeting of the EU Foreign Ministers would produce “movement” in 
the situation (Van Lambalgen, 1997 – trans. mine).  
The main issue at Apeldoorn, with respect to Turkey’s bid for membership, was to clarify 
(and determine) the Council’s position on Turkey’s eligibility, especially when this had been 
contested at the EPP summit. At Apeldoorn, the foreign ministers decided that Turkey “could be 
reassured that it had a future in the West, saying they were ready to deepen economic and political 
cooperation and were leaving the door open to eventual EU membership” (Beurkle 1997). 
Separately, Malcolm Rifkind and Hervé de Charette, the foreign secretary of the United Kingdom 
and the foreign minister of France, respectively, declared to the press that they ‘insisted that Turkey's 
EU ambitions must be judged on the same objective criteria as Central European states’ (ibid.). De 
Charette added that “Turkey has the calling to become a member of the EU. That calling must be 
forcefully confirmed,” and that “we must judge based on objective criteria, not on religious or ethnic 
grounds” (Pijnappels, 1997 – trans. mine). Abel Matutes, the foreign minister of Spain, asserted that 
'”The EU is not a Christian club” (ibid.).  
According to van Mierlo, “The discussion is far from finished, but we have accepted the 
principle that Turkey must continue to have a perspective on the European Union.”  However,  
there were still a “great many issues” for Turkey to address, and that Ankara had to demonstrate “a 
substantial improvement with regard to human rights. The general feeling exists that it can still take 
quite some time before it comes to a membership” (Coenraadts, et al. 1997 – trans. mine).  
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At Apeldoorn, the ministers also discussed the French proposal of a permanent European 
conference, which would be a forum for EU members (the EU-15), negotiating the EU membership 
perspectives of countries in general. The purpose of this conference was to prevent countries not 
selected for accession negotiations or official candidacy, feeling left out (Wynia 1997). Kinkel 
seemed to embrace this idea, arguing that it “…allows us to give those who aren't in the first wave 
the feeling that they are not being ignored” (Beurkle 1997). “The EU wants Turkey to remain on the 
track to Europe and not to be pushed into a siding,” Mr. Kinkel said. But, he added, “it is clear that 
Turkey does not now fulfill the conditions for membership” (ibid.). Greece maintained its veto on 
the release of the financial assistance package, but did not explicitly reject the idea of including 
Turkey in such a conference (ibid.). 
Commenting on the results of the meeting in Apeldoorn, Turkish foreign minister Tansu 
Çiller said that she was extremely pleased, saying, “A new door has been opened” (Santing, 1997 – 
trans. mine). In this context, ‘Çiller thanked the Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo in 
particular, as well as Italy, Spain, Britain, France, Finland and US President Clinton and Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright for the support they extended to Turkey” (“Foreign minister ‘impressed’,” 
1997). She also congratulated Greece for its position at the Apeldoorn meeting, especially for Greek 
foreign minister’s Pangalos’ statement that “Turkey, of course, belongs in Europe” (ibid., 
Weymouth, 1997). 
A month and a half after Apeldoorn, the consensus between the member states held. It was 
reconfirmed in Luxembourg by the EU/Turkey Association Council, a forum consisting of member 
states and Turkey, which been brought into existence by the 1963 Association Agreement. At 
Luxembourg, the Association Council agrees on “Turkey’s eligibility for EU membership and the 
fact that Turkey will be judged by the same objective standards and criteria as other applicants” 
(Commission, 1997a). Accordingly the foreign ministers agreed on non-discrimination against 
Turkey with respect to the criteria by which it would be judged. However, the devil was in the 
political details. The European Council would still have to decide on the matter, and there were 
complicating issues such as Cyprus to be dealt with. Furthermore, Greece still blocked the financial 
package promised to Turkey on the commencement of the customs union.  
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5.1.3 Agenda 2000 – the Commission ‘s recommendation 
The Madrid European Council (December 15–16, 1995) had determined that accession negotiations 
with candidate countries could begin six months after the conclusion of the Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC), which led to the Treaty of Amsterdam. The purpose of the IGC was to prepare 
the institutions of the EU for the prospect of enlargement. The Treaty of Amsterdam, completed at 
the Amsterdam European Council (June 16-17, 1997), paved the way for the Commission to offer 
its opinions on the applicants’ prospects for accession.19   
On July 15th, in response to Madrid and Apeldoorn, the European Commission published its 
opinions on the applications of the ten Eastern European states that had applied for membership 
between 1994 and 1996. (In 1993, the Commission had already published its opinion on the 
application of Cyprus, which had applied in 1990.20) Within a set of documents collectively titled 
Agenda 2000, the Commission proposed that accession negotiations could begin with Hungary, 
Estonia, Slovenia, Poland, the Czech Republic,  and Cyprus, the so-called ‘Luxembourg Six’. At the 
same time, the opinion confirmed the consensus on the membership perspectives of the remaining 
Eastern European countries – the ‘pre-ins’ – Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, 
stating “that negotiations for accession to the European Union should be opened…as soon as it has 
made sufficient progress in satisfying the conditions of membership defined by the European 
Council in Copenhagen” (Commission, 1997c-g).  
The Commission’s opinion on Turkey in 1989, had not contained such terminology, as it 
had been drafted well before the 1993 Copenhagen European Council (Commission, 1989). 
Nevertheless, the same package that contained the Commission’s opinions on the Eastern European 
countries, did include a statement on Turkey, reaffirming the position held at Apeldoorn, as well as 
the EC/Turkey Association Council decision of April 29, 1997, that “eligibility [for membership] 
and confirmed that Turkey will be judged by the same objective standards and criteria as other 
applicants” (Commission, 1997b). In an additional communication, the Commission recommended 
                                                
19 The Treaty of Amsterdam did not clear all the hurdles for institutional amendment, which were left for the Treaty of 
Nice to sort out. It was, however, decided that the hurdles still to be overcome were not an impediment for beginning 
accession negotiations with the front-running candidates.  
20 Both Malta and Cyprus applied for membership in 1990, with the Commission offering its opinions in 1993. Malta, 
however, froze its application after the Maltese Labour Party took power in 1996. It reapplied in 1998, after the 
Nationalist Party returned to power. 
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to the Council and the European Parliament a 12-point plan for deepening the relationship between 
the EU and Turkey, and assisting the latter on its path toward membership (Commission, 1997a).  
Despite the Commission’s affirmation of equal treatment of Turkey, it did not offer 
prospects for accession negotiations, as had been explicitly included in the agreement on Bulgaria, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia (Commission 1997b-l). It was for this reason that France 
proposed the ‘European Conference’ for all countries with a European perspective. This conference 
present would include the opportunity for a permanent dialogue between the EU and Turkey, in 
addition to the Association Council’s objectives. However, the Commission was still divided on the 
conference issue, with Commissioner Hans van den Broek arguing in favor of such a conference 
including Turkey, and President Jacques Santer raising objections against it (Barber, 1997d). 
The Commission’s texts did not explicitly compare Turkey to the other applicants in terms 
of the degree to which they met the Copenhagen criteria. Each opinion in the Agenda 2000 
documents essentially was a stand-alone opinion that did not regard the other opinions. However, 
the text of each was fairly formulaic, allowing for comparison.   
Table 5.1: Progress toward the Copenhagen criteria by each of the applicant countries.  
Country Political Economic Administrative 
Czech Republic √ √ - 
Estonia - √ - 
Hungary √ √ - 
Poland √ √ - 
Slovenia √ √ - 
Bulgaria - X X 
Latvia - X - 
Lithuania √ X - 
Romania - X X 
Slovakia X √ - 
Turkey X - X 
Sources: Commission, 1997b-l. 
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Table 5.1, above, shows the three different categories of criteria by which applicants were gauged. A 
‘√’-mark indicates the Commission’s confidence in the applicant’s progress toward that criterion. A 
‘–‘ indicates that progress had been made, but more was necessary, and an ‘X’ indicates that the 
applicant fell too far short of meeting the required goals21. 
This table shows that the main difference between the Luxembourg Six and the others is the 
degree to which they meet the economic criteria, without failing the political criteria. Aside from 
Estonia, where protections of for minorities were gauged as inadequate for the Russian-speaking 
non-citizens, all of the countries the Commission suggested for starting accession negotiations with 
met the political criteria. Lithuania was also considered to have met the political criteria, but fell 
short on the economic front. Slovakia was judged to have an economy capable of withstanding the 
pressures of the Single Market, but its political institutions were gauged to be insufficiently 
democratic as the executive had usurped powers delegated to other branches of government and 
there were insufficient protections of opposition parties and minorities.  
The administrative criteria are the chapters of acquis communautaire. These were (and are) the 
subjects of the accession negotiations. The process of negotiations incrementally determines the 
degree to which the applicant have adopted the necessary administrative procedures to operate 
within the body of EU laws.  As such, applicants are expected to modify their administrative 
structures and procedures during the negotiations process and are not expected to meet them at the 
outset of negotiations. However, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey were all judged to not have 
transposed or taken on the essential elements of the acquis, particularly as regarded the internal 
market. As such, they were considered administratively underprepared to start the negotiations 
process. 
By this comparison, Turkey failed the political criterion and readiness to administratively 
begin the negotiations process. It was, however, gauged to have made significant strides in terms of 
its economy. According to the Commission, “the customs union has demonstrated the Turkish 
economy’s ability to cope with the competitive challenge of free trade in manufactured goods… 
However, macroeconomic instability continues to give cause for concern.” (Commission, 1997b).  
The political critieria were particularly sticky for Turkey. This was where Turkey was seen to 
be particularly lacking. On this criterion, the Commission (1997b, Art. IV) wrote:  
                                                
21 With respect to the Eastern European countries who were actively gauged in the Commission opinions, comparison is 
fairly straightforward, as the documents use largely the same wording for each. With respect to Turkey, however, as the 
Commission did not publish an Opinion in the same format, the wording differs somewhat.  
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In political terms Turkey has a government and parliament resulting from multi-party, 
democratic elections and an administration capable of framing and applying legislation 
compatible with the acquis communautaire. Despite political recognition of the need for 
improvement and certain recent legislative changes, Turkey’s record on upholding the 
rights of the individual and freedom of expression falls well short of standards in the EU. In 
combating terrorism in the south east, Turkey needs to exercise restraint, to make greater 
efforts to uphold the rule of law and human rights and to find a civil and not a military 
solution. Persistent cases of torture, disappearances and extra-judicial executions, 
notwithstanding repeated official statements of the government’s commitment to ending 
such practices, put into question the extent to which the authorities are able to monitor and 
control the activities of the security forces. 
Recent developments in the administration and the education system, while intended to 
strengthen secularism, nonetheless underline the particular role of the military in Turkish 
society. The National Security Council has a special role under the Constitution in the 
formulation and implementation of national security policy and the Council of Ministers is 
required to give priority to its decisions. There are ambiguities in the Turkish legal system 
with regard to civilian political control of the military. 
 
In this respect especially  torture had been highlighted by several European member-state officials as 
a reason to find Turkey’s unfit for EU starting the negotiations process. Jean-Claude Juncker, in 
particular, commented vociferously that ‘a country which practised torture could not sit down at the 
EU table’ (Barham, 1997h; see also: James, 1997c; Gillespie, 1997b; Walker 1997b).  
As Chapter 11 will discuss in greater detail, Turkey’s civil and human rights protections were 
much less adequate than those of the other applicant states. In 1997, Turkey still had frequent 
occurrences of torture, disappearances, extrajudicial killings and political prisoners. That is not to 
suggest that the other applicants were faultless, as Juncker suggests that they are. Incidents of torture 
were also systemic in Bulgaria and Romania, and occurred incidentally not only in Cyprus, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia, but also occasionally in Greece, Italy Portugal, Spain, and 
the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, Turkey had many more problems than the others did, especially 
regarding killings, disappearances and political prisoners (Cingranelli & Richards, 2010).  
5.1.4 The road to Luxembourg 
The final word on enlargement, however, rested with the European Council, rather than the 
Commission. Since the Commission had not proposed a framework for Turkey, the real debate 
hinged on whether or not to either explicitly offer Turkey a membership perspective and put it on a 
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similar, if not the same, track as Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. A third option, 
between a perspective or no perspective, was in offering the half-way solution in the form of 
conference participation, whereby the specific mold in which to shape such a conference would no 
doubt be subject to further dispute. 
In the meantime, the Yılmaz government in Ankara had also changed the focus of its efforts. 
Although disagreeing with the Commission’s decision to not invite Turkey to accession negotiations, 
or even equal treatment with the ‘pre-ins’, it seemed to have accepted the Commission’s 
differentiation between front-running and lagging candidates. Instead of making forceful attempts to 
demand acceptance into the negotiations process, it decided to adopt policies making it more 
acceptable to the Copenhagen criteria, such as improving its inflation-ridden economy and its ill-
favored human rights record, as well as furthering its democratic progress (Atkins, 1997; Barham, 
1997d, 1997e). Furthermore, Prime Minister Yılmaz sought rapprochement with Helmut Kohl, 
which seemed to at least soften the German Chancellor’s strong opposition to Turkish membership 
as this had been demonstrated at the EPP summit (Atkins, 1997; LaRoche 1997).  
On October 6th, the EU foreign ministers met in Luxembourg, where France again proposed 
Turkey’s inclusion in a European Conference of countries with membership perspectives. Germany 
remained opposed (Docquiert, 1997a). When the ministers met again in Montdorf-les-Bains (also 
Luxembourg) on October 25th, and enlargement issues were discussed, the United Kingdom, France, 
Italy and the Netherlands supported Turkish participation in the European Conference to be held at 
Buckingham Palace in February of the next year, while Greece threatened with a veto and Germany 
opposed Turkey’s inclusion, though not explicitly with a veto (Bremner, 1997a; Donker, 1997; 
Ferrari, 1997;  James, 1997a; Pijnappels & van Meteren, 1997; Smith, 1997; “Strijd over Turkije,” 
1997; van Meteren, 1997; Walker, 1997a). 
By November, however, Germany gave up its firm position of rejecting Turkish 
participation in the proposed European Conference, provided that EU enlargement would not be 
on the agenda (Berger, 1997a; “Bonn staat EU,” 1997; Buckley, 1997). Greece, on the other hand, 
maintained its opposition. Despite Germany’s relenting, Turkey still required, as far as its presence at 
the European Conference was concerned, a more positive sign from the European Council than 
what it considered to be nothing more than an opportunity for a “family photo”, with little 
significance (Barham 1997f).  
     Another source of discontentment for the Turks were the demands made by the ‘pre-ins’ 
and their allies among the member states (Denmark, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, and Greece) (Barber, 
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1997e, 1997f; “Het zijn geen rechtsstaten,“ 1997; Walker, 1997a). These members had proposed a 
‘regatta’ of enlargement, whereby the candidate countries (except Slovakia and Turkey) could 
progress toward membership, each at its own pace (Smith, 1997). This was contrasted by the model 
being proposed by the Commission, which was a ‘wave model’, wherein several candidates would 
enter at the same time. The regatta model, was intended to benefit those who had not been 
recommended by the Commission for accession negotiations, but did meet the political standards of 
the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey and Slovakia were not considered part of that group, owing to their 
failures on the political criteria. Thus, the proposed regatta model further differentiated Turkey from 
the other candidates by putting it behind even Bulgaria and Romania.  
5.1.5 The Luxembourg European Council 
The Luxembourg European Council on the 12th of December commenced with the following 
options: the Commission’s proposal to begin negotiations with six candidates, the 
German/Scandinavian compromise proposal to “screen” all the candidates (except Turkey, and 
perhaps also excluding Slovakia), while offering them financial assistance, the French proposal of the 
European Conference, and the Greek promise to veto the latter, unless Ankara would meet a list of 
conditions, including concessions over Cyprus and the Aegean territorial dispute.  
The Foreign Ministers’ meeting immediately prior to the European Council had not been 
able to solve these problems, having left them for the heads of state and government. The foreign 
ministers has, however, agreed on offering some reassurances (such as 100mln ECU) to the Eastern 
European countries that would be ‘left behind’ by the accession negotiation process (Barber, 1997g; 
James, 1997b). Meanwhile, Ankara demanded more than a “family photo” conference at 
Buckingham Palace with Queen Elizabeth (Bremner 1997b; Mortimer, 1997b).  
The Council decided against giving Turkey the same status as the ‘pre-ins’, though still 
including Slovakia. Although the latter also had problems meeting the political criteria, the Council 
argued that it had come closer to meeting them than Turkey had done. Council President, Jean-
Claude Juncker articulated the distinction as: “There is no comparison possible between Turkey and 
the 11 other applicant countries. Nobody is tortured in these countries,” adding that “We cannot 
admit to the EU a country which has border disputes with another member state” (Bremner 1997b; 
Walker 1997b).  
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On the Wednesday preceding the summit, the mood between the Luxembourg Presidency 
and Turkey had already been soured over dinner between prime ministers Juncker and Yılmaz. 
Furthermore, during an interview on the first day of the summit, Juncker had expounded on several 
Turkish issues, such as torture, the military occupation of Northern Cyprus, and its provocations 
against Greece (Bogaerts & de Graaf, 1997). Relations between Turkey and the Luxembourg 
Presidency were not off to a good start for Turkish prospects. 
During the summit, a Dutch diplomat complained, that of Turkey’s core allies – France, the 
United Kingdom, Italy and the Netherlands – only the latter had made a forceful argument to 
support Turkey’s inclusion in the process. Blair seemed to have lost his luster after a bruising clash 
between the UK and Germany/France over the former’s asserted right to be part of the Euro-X 
Committee22. France seemed to be internally stymied by disagreements between President Chirac 
and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin (Bogaerts & de Graaf, 1997; de Jong 1997). As such, the Dutch 
diplomat argued, Greece was able to ‘hijack’ the summit, only relenting to Turkey’s inclusion into 
the European Conference if it met certain conditions, which implicitly included concessions over 
Cyprus and the territorial dispute in the Aegean Sea (James, 1997c; de Jong, 1997; Gillespie, 1997b).  
Regardless, the summit ultimately offered Turkey a place at the European Conference, 
though without financial support, neither as a released financial package for the Customs Union, nor 
as a pre-accession assistance package such as participation in the PHARE (Poland and Hungary: 
Assistance for Restructuring their Economies) program, as had been offered to the Eastern 
European countries23. These financial incentives formed part of an ‘enhanced pre-accession strategy’ 
(European Council, 1997, cl.13-16). 
More important than Turkey’s place at the European Conference, had been in the 
Presidency Conclusions’ clauses 11 and 12, describing the ‘process of accession and negotiation’. 
These paragraphs explicitly referred to “the ten Central and East European applicant States and 
Cyprus,” and not Turkey, as part of this process. Although this clause did not include Turkey, the 
conclusions did have the following separate section on Turkey: 
The Council confirms Turkey’s eligibility for accession to the European Union. Turkey will 
be judged on the basis of the same criteria as the other applicant States. While the political 
                                                
22 The Euro-X committee would decide on matters pertaining to the common currency, which Britain, Denmark and, 
for an unspecified time, Sweden would opt out of. 
23 The Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE) program was begun as an 
assistance program for Poland and Hungary, but expanded to include all ten Eastern European countries applying for 
membership.  
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and economic conditions allowing accession negotiations to be envisaged are not satisfied, 
the European Council considers that it is nevertheless important for a strategy to be drawn 
up to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the European Union in every 
field.  
(European Council 1997, cl. 31) 
According to this clause, the criteria for Turkey were to be the same as for the other applicants. This 
established a norm of non-discrimination regarding membership on anything except the 
Copenhagen criteria. This, likely, followed an overall societal norm of non-discrimination  on the 
basis of ethnicity and religion, which is part of the Western political belief system. Therefore, the 
assessment of the political Copenhagen criteria ostensibly became even more important for the 
development of the European Union’s enlargement regime, as other discriminating factors were 
supposedly removed. 
The Council’s conclusions suggest that the difference in treatment between Turkey and the 
‘pre-ins’ – the countries that were not selected to begin accession negotiations with the EU, but were 
a part of the ‘single framework’ for the Central and Eastern European countries – were categorized 
differently on the implicit grounds that Turkey failed to meet the political Copenhagen criteria by a 
greater degree than the other applicants did. From the perspective of the Cingranelli & Richards 
(2010) comparative data on human rights, this was certainly the case, but the Council did not make 
its reasoning explicit, leaving room for doubt, and the belief that Turkey was being treated 
differently because of its religious, cultural and geographic distinctiveness. 
The particular importance of the political criteria was established in clause 25 of the 
conclusions. These criteria were to be met at the start of negotiations, rather than by the time of 
accession. The clause reads: 
Compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria is a prerequisite for the opening of any 
accession negotiations. Economic criteria and the ability to fulfill the obligations arising from 
membership have been and must be assessed in a forward-looking, dynamic way.  
(European Council, 1997, c. 25) 
This, essentially, established the provision that applicant states first needed to get their political 
system in order prior to beginning accession negotiations. The economic and administrative criteria 
would be allowed to develop in due course, as long as these criteria were met at the time of 
accession. This rule was, however, weakened by 2004, when Turkey’s advocates did not argue that 
Turkey fully complied with the political criteria, but that it ought to be judged in the ‘forward-
looking dynamic way’, of assessing if Turkey could meet the political criteria by the time of actual 
accession, rather than the sooner moment of accession negotiations.  
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5.1.6 The Aftermath 
After the summit, Yılmaz rejected the conditional offer of participation in the Conference.  “There 
will not be a political dialogue between Turkey and the European Union,” he said at the end of a 
cabinet meeting in Ankara, also stating that he would end the political dialogue with the European 
Union and integrate Northern Cyprus into Turkey (James, 1997c; de Jong, 1997). Additionally, there 
were threats of boycotting goods from 12 EU countries, excluding France, Italy and the United 
Kingdom, which were excepted owing to what Turkey felt was their more positive stance toward its 
membership application (Barham, 1997h).  
5.2 ISSUES 
During the1997 episode, there were several issues concerning Turkey that had been of particular 
consequence to the Luxembourg decision. The division of Cyprus, itself a candidate for EU 
membership, had been a tricky matter and would remain so during the following episodes. Another 
such issue had been the dispute between Greece and Turkey over territorial waters and two small, 
unpopulated islands in the Aegean Sea between the two countries. The third bone of contention was 
the proposed European Conference, which was taken as an alternative to offering Turkey the same 
status as the ‘pre-ins’ (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia). The following three 
sections will look at these issues in further detail, followed by the expressed positions of each of the 
fifteen member states. 
5.2.1 Cyprus 
EU-Turkey relations during 1997 were complicated by Cyprus’ candidacy for EU-membership along 
with the persistent hostile situation between its internationally-recognized Greek side and the ethnic 
Turkish side, which has only been recognized only by Turkey and a portion of Azerbaijan (the 
Nakhchevan exclave). A large garrison of 30,000-35,000 Turkish military troops has also been based 
there since the Turkish occupation in 1974. In 1995, Turkey had agreed to not block Cyprus joining 
the EU, provided Greece did not veto Turkey’s candidacy for the EU and the coming into force of 
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the EU-Turkey Customs Union. Greece, however, had kept a political card up its sleeve, which it 
had used by vetoing the release of an EU financial aid package for Turkey, while Turkey had 
maintained its support for the hard-line Rauf Denktash in Nicosia. Both then threatened to scupper 
expansion of NATO and the EU if their demands concerning Cyprus were not met (Barber 1997a).  
    1997 had begun in the context of the Greek-Cypriot government having placed an order 
for Russian S-300 ground-to-air missiles to which Turkey had responded with the reservation of the 
right to intervene militarily if the Greek-Cypriot south proceeded with its armament program 
(Barber 1996; Barham, 1997a; “Cabinet approves,” 1996). At the time this development in the 
Cyprus dispute had drawn considerable attention worldwide (Bertens, 1997).  
On February 24th, the EU Foreign ministers, led by Berlin and Paris, indicated that accession 
negotiations between the EU and Cyprus needed to include Turkish-Cypriots. In response, Athens 
vetoed the GAERC (General Affairs and External Relations Council – Council of Ministers 
configuration) text, and threatened to suspend further Council discussion on the matter (Barber, 
1997a). This situation grew worse after the EPP summit in Brussels, when Ankara threatened that a 
denial of its membership application would result in the cancellation of the Customs Union and the 
annexation of Northern Cyprus (Barham, 1997c). This threat was made under the Erbakan 
government and repeated by Deputy-Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit after the change of government 
in Ankara (Weymouth 1997). Though less adamant than the Greeks, the Greek-Cypriots voiced their 
understanding that reconciliation on the island and their own pursuit of membership had to occur 
simultaneously (de Graaf, 1997a; van Hasselt, 1997).  
In September, the Yılmaz government in Ankara signaled its willingness to be more 
energetic with regard to meeting the Copenhagen criteria, and to be more flexible with regard to the 
territorial dispute with Greece, the Customs Union, and German fears concerning the threat of a 
flood of Turkish immigrant workers. Regarding Cyprus, however, a broad Turkish consensus held to 
its threat to not allow the placement of the Russian anti-air missiles on the island (Barham, 1997d).  
During the European Council meeting, Greece gave up on its refusal to allow Turkish 
Cypriots into the Cypriot delegation for the accession negotiations. France, however, made it clear 
that it would not accept a divided island as an EU member (Mortimer 1997b). When Turkey was 
denied official candidacy and only permitted to attend the proposed European Conference, it cut off 
further political dialogue with the EU, and vowed to integrate Northern Cyprus if the EU went 
ahead with its plans to open membership negotiations with the internationally recognized Greek-
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Cypriot government (James, 1997c; Mortimer, 1997a; 1997b; Gillespie, 1997b). By the end of the 
year, the Turkish Cypriots also ended dialogue with Greek Cyprus (“Bonn blijkt felst,” 1997).  
The Greek insistence on Cypriot membership, left the EU with the dilemma of either 
delaying the Eastern enlargement or importing the Cyprus dispute. Ironically, External Relations 
Commissioner Hans van den Broek, who had been named ‘Van den Turk’ by his Greek detractors, 
argued that Turkey could not hold EU membership for Cyprus “hostage.” Berlin and London, 
meanwhile, argued that the EU ought not to a divided island into the EU (van Hasselt, 1997; 
Klaassen 1997a; van Lambalgen, 1997). As such, Turkey’s most powerful advocates, France and the 
UK, and its most powerful antagonist, Kohl’s Germany, agreed about the necessity of uniting 
Cyprus prior to accession. Even though the division among the member states over Turkish 
membership had no direct bearing on their position on Cyprus, it did become fuel for the brakemen 
arguing that Turkey was required to help by providing a solution for Cyprus before it could become 
a member itself. 
5.2.2 The Aegean Sea Territorial Dispute 
The hostilities surrounding Cyprus had also raised the temperature about another simmering Greek-
Turkish dispute, concerning contested sovereignty claims of the territorial waters and airspace in and 
above the Aegean Sea between the two countries. The symbolic centerpiece of this dispute had been 
a set of uninhabited24 islets together called Imia (in Greek) or Kardak (in Turkish), but more 
significantly, it concerned the rights of exploitation of underwater mineral resources. 
In January 1996, just after Costas Simitis succeeded Andreas Papandreou as Prime Minister 
in Greece, several incidents caused uproar. First was a Greek government scheme to offer free 
accommodation on the barren islands to foreign tourists, which offended the Turks (Smith, 1996). 
Second, a Turkish ship ran aground on Imia/Kardak, and refused assistance from the Greek coast 
guard (“Turks and Greeks on alert,” 1996). In response, a Greek priest raised a Greek flag on one of 
the islet (Kalaitzidis, 2009). Making sport of these developments, two teams of Turkish journalists 
from different newspapers held a race to be the first to take down the Greek flag and replace it with 
a Turkish flag (Fakatselis, 1996). Greek soldiers, in turn, occupied the flagged island (taking down 
                                                
24 With the exception of a small herd of goats, who do not claim either nationality. 
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the Turkish flag again, and replacing the Greek flag), followed by Turkish frogmen raising their flag 
on the other island (“Greece, Turkey in fight,” 1996; “Tension between,” 1996).  
All of the above rapidly escalated to a naval standoff, which included a night-time crash of a 
Greek helicopter. Ultimately, the United States brokered a mutual withdrawal of naval forces. 
Multiple news sources argued that a great deal of the nationalistic enthusiasm had been the result of 
weak governments of both Athens and Ankara, playing to their home constituents (Bohlen, 1996; 
“Greece, Turkey,” 1996; Hamilton, 1996; Kalaitzidis, 2009; Smith, 1996). 
A not as widely reported source of tension over the Aegean territories was connected to the 
coming into force of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea – UNCLOS – in November 1994, 
which had formally extended the original 6 miles of territorial waters to 12 miles worldwide. On May 
31st 1995, the Greek Parliament unanimously ratified UNCLOS, asserting its right to extend its 
territorial boundaries in accordance with the new international law. Turkey had not signed the treaty, 
and in response to the Greek ratification declared that any unilateral action on the Greek side would 
constitute a casus belli (Başlar, 2001, p. 9; “Cabinet granted,” 1995, Mann, 2001).  
Following these incidents, the dispute lay dormant until the Greek government blocked the 
release of the financial package for Turkey as part of the Customs Union agreement. At the EU-
Turkey Association Council, at the end of April 1997, Greece and Turkey announced their decision 
to appoint a panel of ‘wise men’ to look for a solution to the Aegean standoff. This was a shift in 
Greek policy, as earlier that month the ‘wise men’ committee suggestion by the Dutch foreign 
minister van Mierlo had been dismissed by the Greek foreign minister Pangalos (Bothof, 1997). 
Greece’s shift to agree with the ‘wise men’ option, rather than solely insist on arbitration by the 
International Court of Justice, had primarily been the result of German pressure (Barber, 1997c). 
The ‘wise men’ were requested to draw up a report with a non-binding recommendation by mid-
June.  
By July, the wise men’s report had been delayed until September. At that stage, Simitis’ 
policy was that no dialogue on the EU financial package could take place until Turkey withdrew its 
claims on Greek territory in the Aegean Sea, or submit them to the World Court (Mortimer & Hope, 
1997). In September, the Yılmaz government signaled that it would have been interested in a 
negotiated settlement for the Aegean dispute, if their hands had not been tied by the Greek 
reluctance to negotiation as well as the Turkish establishment’s militant reluctance for any up-front 
concessions toward Greece (Barham, 1997d; Weymouth, 1997).   
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The possibility for reconciliation had not come any closer with a military standoff in 
October, involving the collision of two warships, one from Greece and the other from Turkey 
(Smith, 1997). However, a meeting of Simitis and Yılmaz on November 5th led to a modest advance. 
The Prime Ministers agreed that their officials should continue to meet in order to discuss the 
matter, and promised to revive NATO ideas for military confidence-building measures in the 
Aegean Sea. Later in November, this led to another modest shift in the Greek position. In order to 
release the financial package, Turkey would have to ‘say’ that it would go to the ICJ. This implied 
that the financial package might be released before the case actually came before the world court 
(Buchan 1997). Greece was supported in this position by the president of the European 
Commission, Jacques Santer (Barber, 1997g).  
Other member states put Greece under pressure to relent on Turkey’s attendance at the 
European Conference, but they also agreed with Greece that a declaration from Turkey seeking 
international arbitration on the Aegean dispute would be helpful (Mortimer 1997b). Some countries, 
with Luxembourg in the lead, argued quite energetically that the EU “cannot admit to the EU a 
country which has border disputes with another member state,” (Walker, 1997b). On the eve of the 
Luxembourg summit, Greece’s future Foreign Minister George Papandreou vowed that he would 
“hold our ground,” on the insistence of international arbitration on the Aegean Sea (Barber, 1997g).  
While the Luxembourg summit was ready to offer Turkey participation in the European 
Conference (see below), Greece continued to block this, until its demand of international arbitration 
found its way into the conditions for such an invitation, as follows: 
[Participants in the Conference must share…] a commitment to the settlement of territorial 
disputes by peaceful means, in particular through the jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice in The Hague. 
(European Council, 1997, c. 5) 
With Turkey’s rejection of the European Conference invite, any prospect for solutions to the 
dispute in the near future were stillborn. The problems would also continue to remain unsolved 
throughout the next four episodes, though Greece’s policy change from being a brakeman to being 
an energetic driver in 1999, 2002 and 2004 would also mean that this issue was put on the back 
burner, while in 2006 the position would hinge on the Cyprus situation. 
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5.2.3 The European Conference proposal 
Toward the end of the year, the particular issue of debate between the member states and Turkey 
concerned the French proposal, presented at the Apeldoorn meeting, by French foreign minister 
Hervé de Charette. This was to hold a European Conference for members and applicant states. The 
dispute was about the purpose of such a conference and who would participate. From the French 
and British perspective, the purpose would be to signal to Turkey that it would still be make it 
explicit that Turkey was involved in the enlargement process. 
The Commission decided to adopt this proposal into its Agenda 2000 document, stating 
“The Member States of the Union and all those European countries aspiring to membership and 
linked to it through an association agreement should be brought together in a single forum,” where 
they “would meet each year at the level of Heads of State or Government and the President of the 
Commission and, where necessary, ministerial level” (Commission, 1997b, p. 79). This formulation 
explicitly included Turkey as an associated country. The topics of discussion in the conference 
would be second and third pillar items, respectively Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).  
This was a very inclusive approach that could be interpreted to not only include all associate 
countries with Europe and Association Agreements (EA & AA), in addition to the eleven Eastern 
European candidates as well as Turkey, but also a large swath of countries such as Algeria (AA-
1976), Malta (AA-1971), Tunisia, which had signed an AA with the EU on March 1, 1998, and even 
the Palestinian Authority as it had signed an interim AA agreement on July 16th of that year (1997).  
During late October, the Luxembourg Presidency suggested that the European Conference 
would include the 11 candidates (Turkey not being one of them), that these would share in a 70 
billion ECU fund between 2000-2006, and that the EU would deal with each candidate separately, 
allowing each to advance toward membership at its own pace (James, 1997a). Turkey would also be 
invited, but in order to make its invitation seem less like a consolation prize without the financial 
assistance offered to them as well, Austria proposed the idea of also inviting Norway and 
Switzerland, neither of which had seemed interested in attending (van der Vaart, 1997).  
By mid-November, Turkish officials signaled that they would welcome an invitation to the 
conference if it included a pre-accession strategy (implying a financial assistance program) to help 
Turkey prepare for entry (Barham, 1997f). The topics of discussion that would be permitted at the 
Conference were also contested by the brakemen, especially Chancellor Kohl, who argued that 
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enlargement policies should not be on the agenda. (“Türkei hat keine,” 1997; “Turkije vormt,” 
1997). To this, Turkish Prime Minister Yılmaz responded that he would not be interested if this 
conference were to be nothing more than a “family photograph”, without a pre-accession financial 
package (the way that the pre-ins, including Slovakia were proposed to receive), relegating Turkey to 
a “third class” applicant, (Binyon, 1997; Mortimer, 1997b).  
Prior to the Luxembourg summit, however, Germany relented this restricted agenda of the 
conference, indicating that all topics should be open for discussion (“Szenario,” 1997). During the 
summit, Greece too finally capitulated on Turkey’s participation in the conference, though in 
exchange it insisted on terms requiring Turkish concessions on the Aegean Sea and Cyprus issues 
that were formulated as follows: 
The members of the Conference must share a common commitment to peace, security and 
good neighbourliness, respect for other countries' sovereignty, the principles upon which 
the European Union is founded, the integrity and inviolability of external borders and the 
principles of international law and a commitment to the settlement of territorial disputes by 
peaceful means, in particular through the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice 
in the Hague. Countries which endorse these principles and respect the right of any 
European country fulfilling the required criteria to accede to the European Union and 
sharing the Union's commitment to building a Europe free of the divisions and difficulties 
of the past will be invited to take part in the Conference.  
(European Council, 1997, c. 5) 
The drivers were convinced by German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel that since this text did not 
implicitly stipulate preconditions for Turkey’s participation, Turkey had been explicitly invited, about 
which Dutch foreign minister Hans van Mierlo admitted that the Presidency conclusions could be 
read in different ways (de Jong, 1997). 
5.3 THE MEMBER-STATE POSITIONS 
Below are the positions of the different member states, coded as ‘drivers’, ‘passengers, and 
‘brakemen’, wherein the drivers attempted to at least include Turkey into the European Conference 
without pushing it into making premature concessions, while the ‘brakemen’ attempted to keep 
Turkey out or make the Conference conditions unpalatable for Turkey. It must be noted here that 
according to various sources more member states balked at the prospect of Turkey joining the 
European Union than they let on, but were content to let Greece exercise its veto so they could 
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maintain the strength of their own bilateral relations with Turkey. Therefore some of the 
‘passengers’ might actually have been ‘brakemen’ had Greece not been so willing to unilaterally 
oppose Turkish participation in the European Conference. 
5.3.1 Austria 
Like other countries, Austria had a coalition government wherein the foreign minister held a 
different opinion than the prime minister. For Austria, this difference of opinion became clear when 
the Austrian Foreign Minister Wolfgang Schüssel (of the Austrian People’s Party – ÖVP) attending 
the EPP summit, argued that an offer of joining the EU to Turkey was at that point completely 
impossible, but that the EU should maintain a special relationship with Turkey 
(“Christdemokratische,” 1997). However, during a meeting in Vienna(,) between the Austrian Prime 
Minister Viktor Klima (of the Social Democratic Party of Austria – SPÖ) and the Turkish Prime 
Minister Mesut Yılmaz, Klima confirmed the earlier statement by the Austrian President, Thomas 
Klestil (ÖVP), that Austria would support Turkey for EU membership (“Turkey recognizes,” 1997). 
For the remainder of the episode, the press reckoned Austria (as a whole) sometimes among 
the proponents and at other times among those nervous about the idea of Turkish membership 
(Barham, 1997g; Berger, 1997; Casanova, 1997; Ferrari, 1997; Mortimer, 1997b; “Szenario,” 1997). 
As such, Austria is considered to have been a ‘passenger’, during the 1997 episode, because of this 
lack of clarity in its overall preferences for Turkey’s membership. It can, however, be read as a case 
where the coalition was simply undecided on the matter and the social-democratic chancellor would 
express one preference and the Christian-democratic foreign minister another. 
5.3.2 Belgium 
The Belgian Prime Minister, Jean-Luc DeHaene had also been one of the attendees EPP-summit 
opposing Turkey membership (Barber, 1997b). For the remainder of the year, the journalistic record 
does not show the Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD&V) – Social Democratic (SP) coalition 
government taking any strong stance on the prospect of Turkish membership, one way or another. 
Given that, and how many of the other governments attending the EPP-summit reversed or 
moderated their opinions later, it cannot be taken for granted that the Belgian government decided 
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on a ‘brakeman’ in accordance with the supposed EPP preference. Therefore, Belgium is also coded 
as a ‘passenger’. 
5.3.3 Denmark 
In early 1997, Denmark brought suit before the European Commission on Human Rights against 
Turkey for torturing one of its citizens. Kemal Koc, an ethnic Kurd, had been visiting Turkey to 
attend his brother’s funeral, and had been arrested and held by the Turkish authorities on suspicion 
of involvement in the PKK.  Danish pressure resulted in the release of Koc after 42 days of 
confinement. Examination by the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims, based in 
Copenhagen, resulted in a determination that Koc had been tortured while in custody. Turkey 
rejected the accusation (Rath, 1997).  
After Koc, another Danish citizen Ferit Suslu had also, allegedly, been tortured in Turkey. 
Referencing these two cases, Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen took Turkey to task over its 
human rights standards. After meeting with Bülent Ecevit in November, he told reporters that “the 
human-rights situation in Turkey is totally unacceptable and progress is needed” (“Denmark 
criticizes,” 1997).  
On the issue of enlargement, Denmark advocated for the ‘Regatta’ model of enlargement, so 
that Latvia and Lithuania would not be left behind in the process when the enlargement would 
occur (Barber, 1997e; James, 1997a; Smith, 1997; Smyth, 1997; Walker, 1997a). This proposal would 
further distance Turkey from the Eastern European Pre-ins, as it would create procedural 
distinctions with all the Eastern European countries in a framework of negotiations, which Turkey 
would have been left out of. A particular aspect of this was Denmark’s advocacy for annually 
reviewing the Eastern Europeans’ progress toward the Copenhagen criteria without which Turkey 
would also be so gauged (Barber, 1997e).  
Regarding the European conference, Pangalos was cited saying that Denmark, along with 
Sweden and his own country, Greece, remained opposed to including Turkey in the conference, 
even after the German change of heart (Martinez de Rituerto, 1997). For this, and the reasons 
above, Denmark is coded as a brakeman. 
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5.3.4 Finland 
Finland’s position vis-à-vis Turkey was one of in-principle support, but serious concern over human 
rights. When Tansu Çiller, Turkey’s foreign minister under the Erbakan government, visited Helsinki 
lobbying for support of Turkey’s candidacy, she met with the Finnish foreign minister, Tarja 
Halonen. After the meeting, Halonen remarked to the press that “We see some obstacles, very very 
serious obstacles in this process; and these are, in my eyes, especially on the question of the human 
rights issue” (Oinonen, 1997). 
The Turkish press, however, neglected to mention Halonen’s cool response to Çiller, 
reporting, instead, that “Halonen said her country approves of Turkey's candidacy as a full member 
of the EU” and that according to Çiller, Halonen had insisted that Turkey would be judged by 
‘identical’ criteria as the other applicants, stressing, “She said not similar but identical criteria” 
(“Foreign minister for "identical" criteria”,” 1997). After the Apeldoorn meeting, Çiller had praised 
several EU member states for their cooperative stance. Finland was among those she mentioned 
(Santing, 1997).  
On the whole, it appears that Finland argued for a ‘strict but fair’ policy – Turkey could be 
welcomed as a member, provided that it could meet the Copenhagen criteria – especially the political 
criteria with an emphasis on human rights. Accordingly, Finland would neither discriminate against 
the membership prospects of Turkey, nor push it forward when the degree to which the republic 
met the Copenhagen criteria was deemed insufficient. In the debate over Turkey in 1997, Finland 
did not appear to be pushing Turkey’s candidacy forward, nor to be making efforts to hold it back 
either. As such, Finland is coded as another ‘passenger’. 
5.3.5 France 
In contrast to all the preceding countries, France was clearly a driver of the Turkish cause. Ankara 
recognized a favorable shift in French foreign policy with the presidency of Jacques Chirac (Baron & 
Bakchine, 1997). Following the EPP-summit, the French Foreign Minister, Hervé de Charette, 
argued that the European Union should make unequivocally clear that Turkey had a right to EU 
membership, with which he made the case for a European Convention for all applicant states, 
especially including Turkey (Favilla, 1997, Pijnappels, 1997; van der Velden, 1997b, Wynia, 1997).  
  175 
In early April, de Charette joined Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo on a trip to 
Ankara to reassure the Turks that the EPP-summit would not determine the policy of the EU (“Van 
Mierlo wil,” 1997). This position was repeated all through October, November and early December, 
when the debates leading up to the Luxembourg summit took place, with France as the original 
proposer and largest advocate of a European Conference to include Turkey (Biedermann, 1997; 
Bremner, 1997a; Buckley, 1997; Docquiert, 1997; Franceschi, 1997; Lamy, 1997; LeMaître, 1997; 
Lorieux, 1997; Pijnappels & van Meteren, 1997; “Strijd over Turkije,” 1997; Vernet, 1997). 
At the Luxembourg summit, the Dutch press reported a tepid degree of French support for 
Turkey, while highlighting the more forceful Dutch argument (Bogaerts & de Graaf, 1997). This was 
blamed on the problems of cohabitation between the Gaullist president and the socialist prime 
minister. The French press, on the other hand, praised President Chirac and Prime Minister Jospin 
for their ability to work together opening the door for enlargement without sacrificing French 
interests (de Bondt, 1997).  
 President Chirac argued that Turkey needed to be anchored in Europe and encouraged to 
succeed in its evolution toward democracy (Bresson, 1997). In the aftermath of the Luxembourg 
summit, the French joined the British in calling the rejection of Turkey’s request for accession a 
diplomatic mistake, while new French foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine, also expressed his 
disappointment to his Turkish counterpart over the Luxembourg decision on the margins of a 
NATO summit (“Turquie + Ankara,” 1997). 
5.3.6 Germany 
Germany was one of the main brakemen during the 1997 episode. Its policy toward Turkey was 
contested between the CDU (Christian Democrats) Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the FDP (Liberal 
Democrat) Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, with the former taking a harder line on Turkey, and the 
latter arguing for more ‘equal treatment’ of Turkey with the other applicants. Still, the crucial 
indicator for this episode of German policy toward Turkey was Germany’s argument concerning the 
European Conference.  
The following paragraphs describe the ebb and flow of Germany’s difficult attempts to 
pursue its preference for holding Turkey at bay without alienating it to the point that it might 
abandon Europe altogether. Given the rocky relationship between Turkey and Germany during this 
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period, as well as Germany’s significant influence on European Council policies, the German case 
merits the extra attention given to it below.  
In November 1996, during a state visit by the Turkish President, Süleyman Demirel, to 
Germany, the Turkish president had been the recipient of an earful on human rights from both 
Helmut Kohl and the Federal German President Roman Herzog, as well as from other German 
political leaders (“Demirel stösst,” 1996; “Menschenrechts-,” 1996). Meanwhile, Klaus Kinkel 
demanded that the European Parliament (and, implicitly, Greece) cease blocking the financial 
package of 350 million ECU promised to Turkey as part of the European Customs Union with 
Turkey signed in 1995 (“Kinkel für,” 1996; “Demirel mit Kohl,” 1996).  
Early in 1997, Kinkel also expressed his concern that Europe’s treatment of Turkey might 
drive Ankara to ‘play the Islamic card’ and orient itself more toward its Middle Eastern neighbors 
rather than toward Europe, which had already been mentioned by the Islamist Prime Minister, 
Erbakan (“Kinkel besorgt,” 1997). 
At a January 1997 EU foreign ministers meeting in Rome, the Turkish Foreign Minister 
Çiller threatened to block NATO expansion if the EU would not grant it full membership. Of all the 
major powers, Germany, represented by Kinkel, argued that the EU would not accept membership 
for applicants having territorial disputes with other member-states, indicating the Aegean Sea dispute 
with Greece (Erzeren, 1997a; “EU sieht noch,” 1997).  
Shortly thereafter, in an early February interview with the German weekly newspaper, ‘Welt 
am Sonntag’, Kinkel argued that the enlargement of both the EU and NATO were “sensitive and 
complementary processes,” that should not be blocked by their respective member states, adding 
that Turkey would be an important ally as well as, “an important bridge,” between Europe and the 
Islamic and Asian world (“Kinkel mahnt,” 1997 – trans. mine; “Ws. Bonn..,” 1997).  It was therefore 
in the interest of Europe to intensify mutual relations with Turkey, release the financial protocol, 
and offer it a reliable EU membership perspective (ibid.). However, his statement did not indicate 
that the German government favored full membership for Turkey in the near future, nor its 
participation in the conference, as had started to be hinted at by France. 
More strident against Turkey’s EU ambitions than his Foreign Minister, Helmut Kohl was 
seen as the prime engineer behind the EPP summit’s rebuff to Turkish hopes, a political maneuver 
that had also taken the German foreign ministry by surprise (Traynor & Nuttall, 1997). One of 
Kohl’s motivations thereto had supposedly been his annoyance with the Turkish threat to block the 
expansion of NATO, if Turkish membership perspective did not improve. Kohl had been quoted 
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saying that, “it is not known to me that Anatolia is a part of Europe,” (Erzeren, 1997d). “Europe 
stops where the Gothic cathedrals end,” he added, suggesting geographical and religious identity 
motives for excluding Turkey  (van der Velden, 2002 – trans. mine).  
At the Apeldoorn meeting, Kinkel maintained that “the EU wants Turkey to stay on track 
for Europe and does not get pushed onto a sidetrack,” and that Turkey’s application would be 
judged according to the same criteria as the other eleven candidates (“EU will Türkei,” 1997; 
Erzeren, 1997b – trans. mine). He also spoke favorably of the French proposal for a European 
Conference, saying that it “allows us to give those who aren’t in the first wave the feeling that they 
are not being ignored.” From his perspective, however, the conference was intended to mollify the 
disappointed Eastern European applicants that had not been selected for immediate accession 
negotiations, not to mollify Turkey. Citing concerns about human rights and Turkey’s handling of its 
Kurdish minority, he said that, “It is clear that Turkey does not now fulfill the conditions for 
membership” (Beurkle, 1997). 
Soon after Apeldoorn, Kinkel traveled to Ankara to patch up the German-Turkish 
relationship (“Kinkel zu Gesprächen,” 1997). Prior to his departure, he offered an interview to Focus 
Magazin, in which he declined to comment on the EPP-summit, but he did mention what would 
become the enduring FDP position: that “Turkey remains on track for Europe. Doubtlessly, it will 
not fulfill the membership criteria of the European Union for the foreseeable future” (Reitz, 1997 – 
trans. mine). In the Turkish news program ‘32. Gün’, he demonstrated greater willingness to express 
his disagreement with the position of the EPP, saying that viewing the EU as a ‘Christian club’ 
would create a dangerous split in a country (Germany) with three million Muslims. However, he also 
repeated his conviction that Turkey could not become a member state in the foreseeable future, 
because of human rights issues, the Kurdish question, Cyprus and the territorial conflict in the 
Aegean Sea (ibid.; Erzeren, 1997c).  
In late September, during a state visit by Mesut Yilmaz to Germany, Kohl voiced support for 
‘eventual’ membership of Turkey in the EU (“Kohl,” 1997). At the time, this did not signal a 
fundamental shift in German policy, which still held off on Turkey’s inclusion in the proposed 
European Conference. At the end of October, Kinkel also still held this position, while Kohl did so 
too at a Franco-German summit in Paris on the 5th of November (de Graaf, 1997b; Vernet, 1997). 
Yet, following the EU foreign ministers meeting shortly afterwards, Kinkel signaled that he would 
be amenable to Turkey’s inclusion into the European Conference if all the other member states 
agreed it would be the right way forward (“EU unterstützt,” 1997; “Kinkel stimmt,” 1997; “Die 
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Türkei,” 1997). This indicated that Germany was coming around to the majority position of the 
member states in favor of inviting Turkey to the conference.  
At the time, Germany could afford to appear warmer toward Turkey as long as the Greeks 
maintained their determination to veto Turkey’s inclusion to the conference (deFouloy, 1997). Also, 
Ankara had already signaled that it would not accept inclusion at the Conference merely to appear in 
the ‘family photograph’. The Turks demanded that their participation would have to be significant 
for its progress toward membership. The Chancellor, meanwhile, continued to insist on barring 
enlargement issues from the agenda of the conference (“Turkije vormt obstakel,” 1997). 
Additionally, Germany floated the idea of a ‘steering committee’ dedicated to guiding the ten east 
European candidates as well as Cyprus toward membership, implying the exclusion of Turkey from 
this selection (van der Vaart, 1997).  
Yet, after the bilateral summit between Kohl and Jacques Chirac, Germany signaled a still 
more positive attitude toward Turkey. After this summit, France agreed to abandon attempts to 
weaken the proposed Growth & Stability Pact and to accept Germany’s candidate Wim Duisenberg 
of the Netherlands for the European Central Bank Presidency (Staunton, 1997). This strongly 
suggests a quid pro quo deal had been struck between the two leaders. 
Just prior to the Luxembourg summit, Germany (represented by Kinkel) also relented on the 
choice of topics for the European Conference. He declared all issues, including enlargement, were 
open for discussion at that forum (“Szenario,” 1997), However, he stipulated that matters would not 
be discussed without a document drawn up four days prior to the summit, indicating that the 
German strategy was to “absolutely avoid the impression that concrete preparations were being 
made to begin accession negotiations” with Turkey (“Bonn blijkt,” 1997; “Bonn hart,” 1997; 
Pörtner, 1997 – trans. mine). A memo leaked to Der Spiegel, further advised that regular reports on 
Turkey’s progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria should be avoided as this would create 
false hope, and consequentially only harm EU-Turkish relations (ibid., 1997). 
After the summit, Kohl and Kinkel both denied the idea that the EU had rejected Turkey. 
Kohl engaged in a fifteen-minute “lecture [to] the Turkish media” on how “he was Turkey’s greatest 
friend”, and if Turkey had only “set its human rights in order”, it would have had better prospects 
(Berger, 1997b – trans. mine). However, he acknowledged that Turkey’s human rights situation was 
not solely responsible for its rejection, when he added that, “a dramatic change in the number of 
Turks in Germany would not be tolerable to German public opinion nor to those in the rest of the 
European Union” (James, 1997c; Mortimer, 1997c). Meanwhile, the SPD spokesman on European 
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affairs, Günter Verheugen, of later fame, asserted that Turkey had spoken “irrationally, but that the 
EU had also made mistakes” (“Harte Reaktion,” 1997 – trans. mine). Despite Kohl and Kinkel’s 
words, Yılmaz was quite sure where to place the blame for Turkey’s failure to gain candidacy status 
(“Yılmaz gibt,” 1997).  
According to Kinkel, Turkey had been made a fair offer, and the door was still “wide open”, 
should Turkey meet the same accession criteria as the other eleven candidates (“EU-Gipfel,” 1997 – 
trans. mine). Reacting to Turkish diplomatic tactics, he added that the EU was “not some kind of 
banana union that can have more and more squeezed out of it” (Barham, 1997g). To contradict the 
idea that Germany had rejected Turkish membership as a matter of principle, Kinkel asserted that, 
“Turkey belongs to Europe. We want them to join” (“Harte Reaktion,” 1997 – trans. mine; Erzeren, 
1997e). 
In the summary analysis of Germany’s policy toward Turkey in 1997, German interests had 
not been defined as being explicitly rejectionist of Turkish membership, as Kohl’s hand in the EPP 
summit might have suggested. Germany’s position, summed up between Kohl and Kinkel, was one 
of keeping Turkey within the European orbit, without having to offer it an immediate perspective 
on membership. The voiced reasons had been the degree to which Turkey had not met the 
Copenhagen criteria, the unresolved conflict over Cyprus and the ongoing territorial dispute 
between Greece and Turkey. While Germany would have preferred to not have offered Turkey 
participation in the European Conference, it had conveniently joined the majority, allowing Greece 
to threaten with a veto if the presidency conclusions were too thin on Turkish concessions that were 
beneficial to Greece. However, Greece, in the end, relented on its veto and it was, mostly, the 
Luxembourger rhetoric that aggravated Turkey to the point of rejection of what the presidency 
conclusions offered. 
5.3.7 Greece 
Of all the member states in 1997, Greece was the most outspoken of the brakemen. Ever since the a 
compensatory financial aid package had been offered to Turkey by the customs union treaty, Greece 
had blocked the release thereof as long as a territorial dispute persisted between these two countries. 
Greece would continue to use its right to veto the release of the financial package, as well as 
Turkey’s participation in the conference, as leverage to get concessions on the Aegean situation as 
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well as that of Cyprus. In spite of this, Greece never argued against the principle of Turkey joining 
the EU.  
Nevertheless, much of the rhetoric of Greece during this period caused considerable 
tensions between Turkey and Greece, even if less than the year before. The height of this occurred 
in late September, when during a statement to the Greek press, on the sidelines of the negotiations 
over Cyprus, Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos argued that it was impossible to negotiate 
with “the bandit, the murderer and the rapist,” and equated Turkey to “Hitler’s Germany.” In a 
retort, Turkey’s minister of foreign affairs İsmail Cem called Pangalos a “psychopath.” The Greek 
Foreign Ministry defended Pangalos’ statement, while the Turkish Foreign Ministry argued that 
“The Greek nation does not deserve such a shame committed on its behalf and on its name” 
(Lippman, 1997; Quinn, 1997; Reid, 1997). 
For the greater part, the Greek position has already been made clear in the preceding 
sections. Greece had no qualms recognizing Turkey as being a European country with a European 
Union perspective. Following both the EPP meeting and a meeting with US Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright, Foreign Minister Pangalos asserted that Turkey should not be rejected by the 
EU, as it had an important part in European history, just as Greece did (“Athene,” 1997; 
“Griekenland,” 1997; Smeenk, 1997). This declaration demonstrates how Greece’s motivations 
differed from those of the Christian Democrats, whose opposition had been based on religious 
identity, while Greece’s opposition would prove to be conditional. Those conditions – cooperation 
on Cyprus, and international arbitration over the Aegean dispute - however, would prove to be 
unpalatable to Turkey in 1997.  
In the aftermath of the Luxembourg summit, the Greek Ambassador in Brussels, Pavlos 
Apostolides, argued that “we have not closed the door on Turkey. But the Turks must understand 
that they must behave differently, both internally as well as externally, if they want to move closer to 
Europe. Internally, they must respect human rights. Externally, they must cooperate on a solution 
for Cyprus and the territorial disputes with Greece, by a peaceful road and not with the threat of 
military violence” (de Graaf, 1997c– trans. mine). Apostolides denied that the decision had been 
made due to unilateral Greek action. “It was a decision of the Fifteen. It’s too crazy for words to 
suggest that a small country like Greece can impose its will on to the others” (ibid. – trans. mine). 
Apostolides further argued that, in the long run, Greece would eventually be a proponent of Turkish 
membership in the EU. Integration into Europe, he argued, is the best guarantee that Turkey will 
  181 
behave less aggressively. The alternative is that Turkey will distance itself from Europe and behave 
more “irrationally” and thus more dangerously for Greece (ibid.). 
5.3.8 Ireland 
The Irish position on Turkey was not particularly outspoken, save for Taoiseach John Bruton’s 
attendance at the EPP summit. While many of the other attendees of that conference were later 
drawn to recant their EPP position, Bruton’s government was turned out of office after the June 
General elections, which brought in Bertie Ahern, who continued to serve during the following four 
episodes of this study. Therefore it is unknown if Bruton would have recanted as the other EPP 
summiteers had done. 
Only a few news articles mention the Irish position. On November 29, the Irish Times 
reported about a lobbying visit to Ireland by the Turkish State Minister for European Affairs, Prof. 
Dr. Sükrü Sina Gürel, who argued against Klaus Kinkel’s position that Turkey might join in the 
‘unforeseeable future’, asserting that Turkey must have prospects in the foreseeable future. The Irish 
Times reported that this was also the position of the Irish government (Gillespie, 1997a). 
At the Luxembourg summit, the Irish Times reported that the Irish government was 
“strongly with the includes” concerning the commitment made to both Turkey and the Eastern 
European Countries not selected for accession negotiations, to keep them in the enlargement 
process (Smyth, 1997). Ireland, however, did embrace the Commission’s distinction made at the 
time between the ‘Luxembourg-six’ countries and the other applicants. 
Nicholas Rees of the International Affairs Committee at the Royal Irish Academy in Dublin 
also failed to highlight the Irish debate on Turkey in his annual account of Irish foreign policy (Rees, 
1998). This indicates that Turkey’s prospects were not high on Ireland’s foreign policy agenda. 
Ireland did vote with the majority in favor of inviting Turkey to the European Conference, but on 
the whole, Ireland is judged to be a ‘passenger’ on the issue. 
5.3.9 Italy 
The Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi was the first EPP leader who recanted the anti-Turkish 
membership position at the March summit in Brussels (van Lambalgen, 1997). Not only was the 
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position recanted, but for the remainder of 1997 Italy was broadly seen as supportive of Turkish 
membership prospects and inclusion in the European Conference (Buckley, 1997; Mortimer, 1997b; 
Pijnappels & van Meteren, 1997; “Strijd,” 1997.)  
At the October meeting of the foreign ministers in Montdorf-les-Bains, Lamberto Dini 
asserted that, “Turkey would become a member of the Union” (James, 1997a). At the Luxembourg 
summit, Italy again debated on Turkey’s behalf, joining the Dutch and French positiona (de Jong, 
1997). After the summit, Dini argued that the summit’s conclusions had been insulting to Turkey 
and said he regretted that the Luxembourg presidency had chosen to side with Greece (“Turquie + 
Ankara,” 1997). In the aftermath Turkey threatened to boycott goods from all member states, save 
Italy, France and the United Kingdom, because they had been supportive of Turkey’s aspirations 
(Barham, 1997g) Thus, Italy is considered a driver of Turkish membership in 1997. 
5.3.10 Luxembourg 
In the second half of 1997, Luxembourg held the rotating presidency. As such, its statements need 
to be read, to a certain degree, from the position of representing all the member states. However, to 
some degree, Luxembourg also put its own stamp on its proposals and its statements, which were at 
odds with the balance of member-state opinions. Given the tone in which Luxembourg’s Prime 
Minister, Jean-Claude Juncker, conducted the face-to-face meetings with his Turkish counterpart, 
Yılmaz, and made his statements to the press (see below), Luxembourg is considered a brakeman.  
Juncker was also present at the EPP summit, where he had been one of the most explicit 
heads of government, who had been cited saying that “Turkey's accession to EU must be viewed 
with significant caution” (“Christdemokratische,” 1997 – trans. mine). Between the March EPP 
summit and the Luxembourg summit in December, not much news was reported about 
Luxembourg’s own position on Turkey. However, in the week prior to the Luxembourg summit, 
Juncker, reportedly, had three difficult meetings with Yılmaz that soured the relationship between 
the two (Bogaerts & de Graaf, 1997; Walker, 1997b).   
At the close of the summit, Juncker made an off-the-cuff remark to the BBC that was widely 
reported and created a rhetorical incident that infuriated Ankara. When asked about Turkey’s 
prospects, Juncker answered that “There is no comparison between Turkey and the 11 other 
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applicant countries. No one is tortured25 in those countries,” (Bremner, 1997b; “ EU-Gipfel,” 1997; 
”EU-Regierungschefs,” 1997). Other post-summit remarks that illustrate Juncker’s position are: 
We cannot admit to the EU a country which has border disputes with another member 
state. 
(Walker, 1997b) 
Europe is saying 'No' to the entrance of Turkey without (Turkey) fulfilling the conditions 
all the applicants have to meet ... Human rights have to be respected everywhere. We are 
not a club of Christians, but we are a club where human rights have to be considered. We 
have our public opinion too, and we are accountable to them. Other applicants have taken 
steps to resolve their border disputes. 
(ibid.). 
Europe is not a Christian club, but one with high standards. 
(Gillespie, 1997b; James, 1997b) 
At the table of the European Union there can be no countries in which people are tortured. 
Human rights are not a sensitive subject for poets. This has to do with real life. I receive 
people in my office, their relatives or they themselves were tortured. This issue has a face 
for me. 
(Berger, 1997b; “Der Krieg,” 1997 – trans. mine; Gillespie, 1997b) 
These remarks, were uncommonly blunt for an EU Presidency, and could hardly be considered 
representative of the other member states’ opinions (Bogaerts & De Graaf, 1997). Paris and 
London, for instance, were not pleased with these remarks, and the Italian Foreign Minister 
Lamberto Dini argued that the Presidency had chosen to favor Greece over Turkey in the debate 
during the summit (Docquiert, 1997b; “Turquie + Ankara,” 1997). 
Previously, during the Presidency’s preparation for the summit, however, Luxembourg’s 
social-democratic foreign minister, Jacques Poos, had sounded optimistic on the prospect of 
reaching a deal, while the other foreign ministers were less sanguine about such an outcome (van 
Meteren, 1997; “Strijd,” 1997)26. The ‘wise man’ committee, proposed and agreed to,  under the 
preceding Dutch presidency, also failed to make any headway during Luxembourg’s presidency. At 
the end of the summit, Poos also declared that Turkey would not be offered any further 
concessions, implying that Turkey had been offered any concessions to begin with (”EU-
Regierungschefs,” 1997). 
                                                
25 According to the CIRI reports, more torture has happened in the member and candidate countries than Juncker is 
suggesting in his remarks contrasting Turkey from the others. 
26 1997, incidentally was Jacques Poos’ third EU Presidency, having previously served in that capacity in 1991 and 1985. 
As such, it cannot be thought of as uninformed optimism on his part. 
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5.3.11 Netherlands 
During 1997, the Netherlands was an outspoken driver of Turkish membership. Throughout its  EU 
presidency during the first six months of the year, Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo, together with 
his fellow countryman Christian Democrat Hans van den Broek of the European Commission, 
continually attempted to reassure Turkey of the EU’s open-minded intentions toward its 
membership prospects.  
After the EPP summit, Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok, declared that he was surprised by 
the EPP statement and that the Netherlands, and therewith the Presidency, did not support the 
exclusion of Turkey from EU membership (Coenraadts, 1997). Van Mierlo called the EPP statement 
“unwise” (van Lambalgen, 1997). Van Mierlo, in the Presidency capacity, was one of the diplomatic 
architects of the Apeldoorn meeting, in which France presented its proposal for a European 
Conference. In late March, van Mierlo also published an op-ed in the International Herald Tribune 
as well as the New York Times, wherein he stated:  
One of the basic principles of the Union is that membership is open to every European 
country which meets the stated criteria. Turkey, for instance, has a long way to go before it 
meets the criteria for full membership. Yet I am firmly convinced that it is in Europe's 
interest to keep the door open and help Turkey overcome its internal problems. 
(Van Mierlo, 1997) 
Van Mierlo further initiated a diplomatic attempt to solve the Aegean problem, in order to remove 
that obstacle from Greek-Turkish relations and therefore EU-Turkish relations (van der Velden, 
1997b). At the Association council, the Dutch Presidency was asked to continue its role as honest 
broker (Barber, 1997c). 
In October, at the Mondorf-les-Bains meeting of the foreign ministers, van Mierlo was one 
of the foreign ministers joining his Italian and French colleagues Lamberto Dini and Hubert Védrine 
in arguing that Turkish participation in the European Conference was “very much desired”, when 
this issue was still the subject of heated debate (“Strijd,” 1997). To a newspaper correspondent he 
said that Europe should “think thrice before sending negative signals to Turkey. This is playing with 
fire”, as Islamic fundamentalism is on the horizon and Turkey’s membership should be valued (de 
Graaf, 1997b; van Meteren, 1997 – trans. mine). When, in November, Germany signaled that it 
would not veto Turkish participation in the conference, Van Mierlo called it “a little bit of profit”, 
but was still worried over Greek intransigence (“Bonn staat,” 1997).  
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As mentioned before, the Netherlands, it seems, was the most outspoken proponent of 
Turkish participation in the conference without the Greek conditions. One Dutch diplomat 
complained that the Greeks had hijacked the Council and that it was futile for the Netherlands to be 
the only member state to speak in favor of Turkey, without strong French and Italian support. He 
complained that the neophyte Blair had been cowed into diminishing his support by his defeat over 
a different issue the previous day (Bogaerts & de Graaf, 1997; de Jong, 1997).  
5.3.12 Portugal 
At the EPP meeting, Portuguese opposition leader Marcelo Reblo de Sousa of the center-right 
Social Democratic Party (PDS) criticized the argument of the drivers that Turkey might veto NATO 
enlargement if it was kept out of the EU, pointing out that the EU should not give in to such 
blackmail (“Turkey accused,” 1997). “Human rights are very far from being respected in Turkey,” he 
added as counter-argument (Kinzer, 1997).  
To show that Turkey’s accession may not have been of particular interest to Portugal, several 
articles (e.g. Berger 1997a; 1997b) mention how both Portugal and Spain lobbied on behalf of their 
allotments under the EU’s redistributive policies (the Regional Policy and the Common Agricultural 
Policy), with their concern that the eastward enlargement might threaten the amounts of money they 
would receive through those policies. By contrast, there is scant evidence of Portugal’s stance 
toward Turkey. It seems likely that the diplomatic effort to maintain the subsidies, as far as Lisbon 
was concerned, overshadowed any position it might have taken on Turkey. 
After the Luxembourg summit, when Turkey expressed its displeasure with the decision and 
threatened to boycott imports from member states, Portugal was not mentioned among the 
exceptions of countries that were considered sympathetic - France, Italy and the United Kingdom 
(Barham, 1997g). Although this is not the clearest indication of Portugal’s ‘unsympathetic’ position, 
given the apparent silence from Portugal, it is assumed that Portugal did not have a public position 
on Turkey and that it was preoccupied with the pecuniary matters. Therefore, Portugal is considered 
a passenger in the debate over Turkey. 
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5.3.13 Spain 
The position of Spain was ambivalent. Prime Minister Aznar was one of the attendees of the EPP 
summit, but Spain was also one of the countries mentioned by the Turkish Prime Minister Tansu 
Çiller as being particularly cooperative after the Apeldoorn meeting (Santing, 1997). It should be 
added here that Greece had also been part of Çiller’s favorites in this regard as Greece did not have 
principled reservations, but conditional ones, and therefore did not intrinsically oppose the prospect 
of Turkey joining. 
Yet, in a November interview in ‘El País’, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Theodor 
Pangalos identified Spain as one of those countries (along with Sweden and Denmark) that were still 
opposed to Turkish participation in the European Conference, even after Germany had relented 
(Martinez de Rituerto, 1997). Yet in an interview with the same newspaper less than two weeks later, 
Turkish Foreign Minister Mesut Yılmaz expressed his pleasant surprise about Aznar being 
cooperative, asserting that Spain had always been an ally in regard to Turkish integration in Europe. 
He further, highlighted Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales’ role during the Spanish EU 
Presidency of (2nd half of) 1995, which had resulted in the EU customs union with Turkey (Sanz, 
1997). 
In spite of the above-mentioned conflicting testimony of Spain’s position, the Spanish 
government was not eager to have Turkey as a EU member, but, along with other countries, it also 
seemed reluctant to send Turkey a negative message and risk a diplomatic fallout on other fronts 
(Mortimer, 1997b). Given this policy of ambivalence and a relative silence in the journalistic records, 
Spain is coded as a ‘passenger’. 
5.3.14 Sweden 
During the European Council at Luxembourg in October, Sweden joined Germany and Greece in 
maintaining that Turkey should be excluded from the European Conference (de Graaf, 1997b). As 
already mentioned under the Denmark heading, Sweden called for the annual review of all ten 
candidate countries, in order to continually assess their eligibility for membership, insisting that the 
enlargement process would be ‘inclusive and non-discriminatory’. This suggested that Turkey’s 
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eligibility for membership would be judged on its own merits, rather than possible prejudice of the 
member states to keep Turkey out, for reasons other than the Copenhagen criteria (Barber, 1997e). 
Sweden’s policy of opposition to Turkey was muted, while its policy attention was focused 
on opting for the ‘regratta’ model of enlargement. This would benefit Latvia and Lithuania, rather 
than have them separated from those eastern European countries that were making greater headway 
in the process, such as Estonia. This regatta model, articulated by Sweden and Denmark, clearly 
envisioned 11 applicants taking part, thus excluding Turkey (but implicitly including Slovakia). In 
spite of its muted opposition, Sweden was cited as being against Turkey’s inclusion both as a 
member of the EU because of human rights concerns, and in the European Conference. However, 
Sweden allowed Germany and Greece do the dirty work of forcing the issue with Turkey (de Graaf, 
1997b; Martinez de Rituerto, 1997; Weymouth, 1997). Therefore Sweden is considered a ‘brakeman’ 
5.3.15 The United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom was one of the principal ‘drivers’ of Turkish participation in the European 
Conference, which was to take place the following year at Buckingham Palace. At every instance 
during the debates, the United Kingdom supported Turkey’s application, both under the Major 
government until May, and the Blair government thereafter. 
In February, the UK joined the Americans in calling for a renewed offer to Turkey of 
participating in the enlargement process, which Germany preferred to forestall (Dale, 1997). After 
the EPP summit, London expressed its view that the Christian-democratic leaders had gone too far 
with their statement rejecting Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership, and that Turkey’s application 
should be “taken seriously” (Clarke, 1997). At Apeldoorn, the UK joined France in its European 
Conference proposal, contradicting Germany’s opposition thereto (“Turkije maakt,” 1997; Wynia, 
1997).  
Britain was, however, insistent that Turkey demonstrate its cooperation in solving the 
Cyprus dispute, with Doug Henderson, Foreign Office Minister for Europe, saying that “if they 
don’t co-operate on other things and don’t put pressure on [Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf] Denktash 
to get meaningfully into negotiations on Cyprus there’ll be a lot of people unhappy, including 
ourselves,” adding, “There has to be a carrot for Turkey to be co-operative on other issues, 
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principally to try and get some progress on Cyprus,” and, “We feel that joining this Europe 
Conference is a plum for them. It opens the way for other plums down the line” (Black, 1997). 
In October, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook attempted to reign in Labour MEPs’ comments 
on human rights in Turkey. Cook had, however, articulated the same critical stance during the 
previous government while serving as shadow foreign secretary in the parliamentary shadow 
government of the Labor party. This caused rebellion among half of Labour’s MEPs. The move was 
intended to release the customs union financial package through the European Parliament (Hencke, 
1997). For the remainder of the year and during the summit, the United Kingdom continued to 
press for Turkish inclusion in the conference, which it hoped would give Turkey “a realistic sense of 
hope that they are not being excluded” (Walker, 1997a – further evidence in Barham, 1997g; Binyon, 
1997; Bremner, 1997a; Buckley, 1997; Mortimer, 1997b).  
5.4 SUMMARY 
Overall, 1997 seemed a bad year for Turkish prospects to participate in European integration, with 
Denmark’s indictment of human rights abuses, the military memorandum of February 28th, and a 
hostile declaration by powerful leaders of the largest political party group in the European 
Parliament. Fortunately for the Turks, many of those leaders later backed away from the EPP 
declaration that had offered the Turks ammunition to accuse Europe of being discriminatory against 
Turkey for its overwhelmingly Muslim population.  
Citing unacceptable degrees in failing to meet the Copenhagen political criteria, as well as 
economic instability27, the Commission had made a distinction between Turkey and the other 
applicants who had not been chosen to begin accession negotiations in 1998. Among them was 
Slovakia, which was also designated as not having met the political criteria. The Luxembourg 
presidency conclusions determined that the political criteria needed to be met before accession 
negotiations could begin, thus establishing a rule for the enlargement regime. Given Estonia’s failure 
to fully provide citizenship rights to Russian speakers, however, suggested that there was 
nevertheless a sliding scale that was subject to political determination. Furthermore, the rhetoric of 
                                                
27 The economic criteria were not critical for the rejection of candidate status or participation in accession negotiations. 
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equal treatment aside, the EU did distinguish between Slovakia and Turkey, bringing Slovakia into a 
pre-accession framework that Turkey was left out of, despite both failing to meet the political 
criteria. 
Among the member states, Greece and Germany (in the ample shape of Helmut Kohl) 
proved to be the dominant brakemen, with other, less prominent, brakemen willing to allow Athens 
and Bonn to take the brunt of Ankara’s diplomatic ire. In the end, Germany relented about Turkish 
participation in the European Conference, while Greece had threatened to veto, unless its demands 
regarding Cyprus and the Aegean territorial dispute were met. In the end, Greece did not veto, but 
the rhetoric – coming mostly from the Luxembourg presidency – sufficiently angered the Turks that 
they rejected the conclusions. 
The rhetoric aside, however, the Luxembourg conclusions did not withold the recognition 
that the Helsinki conclusions offered in the form of official candidacy. The Luxembourg 
conclusions affirmed Turkey’s right to become a member of the EU, provided it meet the 
Copenhagen criteria, a stipulation that was not any less true in any of the conclusions of the 
subsequent episodes.   
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6.0  HELSINKI, 1999 
The following episode concerns the second half of 1999. In October 1998 the Commission had 
begun publishing annual assessments of the applicant states, including Turkey, and their progress 
toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria. In response to these reports, the European Council had 
begun regularly putting enlargement questions on their agenda for the December Council meetings. 
As one of the applicants – an unusually large and attention-grabbing candidate – this also meant that 
the Council could not avoid responding to Turkey’s bid for membership. 
This and the following chapters will lead off with a listing of political changes in the member 
states. Like the previous chapters, it will offer a narrative on the sequence of events, discuss the 
particular issues that were important at some greater length, and then analyze, case-by-case, the 
policies of each of the member states. 
6.1 POLITICAL CHANGES 
The member-state governments in 1999 were not all the same as they had been two years prior. The 
following bullets highlight the changes in the member-state governments: 
 In Turkey, Bulent Ecevit, the Prime Minister who in 1974 had ordered the invasion of 
Cyprus, replaced Mesut Yilmaz as prime minister after the April 1999 elections. İsmail 
Cem remained as Foreign Minister. 
 In late 1998, the German CDU/CSU-FDP government of Helmut Kohl and Klaus 
Kinkel was replaced by the Red-Green (SDP-Grünen) coalition of Gerhard Schröder and 
Joschka Fischer.  
 In Belgium Guy Verhofstad became prime minister after defeating Jean-Luc DeHaene’s 
Christian Democrats, with Louis Michel taking over foreign affairs from Erik Derycke. 
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This constituted a shift from a Christian-democratic government with socialist support to 
one dominated by liberals with socialist and green support. 
 Romano Prodi’s government, which was in power in 1997, had fallen in 1998, leaving 
Massimo D’Alema as the Prime Minister. Lamberto Dini remained Foreign minister. 
 In Greece, Costas Simitis remained in power as Prime Minister. However, Foreign 
Minister Theodoros Pangalos resigned and was replaced by George Papandreou in 
February of 1999, following the capture of Abdullah Öcalan (see below). 
 In Luxembourg, there was a coalition change after the June elections, wherein Lydie 
Dolfer of the Democratic Party took over as Foreign (and Vice-Prime) Minister from 
Jacques Poos. Jean-Claude Juncker remained prime minister. 
 The Dutch government was renewed after the 1998, with the right-liberal Jozias van 
Aartsen taking over from the center-left-liberal Hans van Mierlo as foreign minister. 
 In Sweden, Anna Lindh took over as Foreign Minister in 1998 from Lena Hjelm-Wallén, 
both social democrats. 
 The governments in Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the 
United Kingdom remained essentially unchanged.  
6.2 THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
The crucial events of the latter half of 1999 were several key meetings, a catastrophic earthquake in 
Turkey and another earthquake in Greece. Furthermore, the annual publishing of the Commission’s 
opinion on Turkey’s progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria, and the political 
maneuvering between that publication and the year-end summit, were particularly crucial for the 
expression and evolution of member state policies. 
6.2.1 Cologne 
By the Spring of 1999, the German policy toward Turkey had changed. Rather than following the 
Kohl policy of holding Turkey off from participating in EU enlargement, the Schröder government, 
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in its capacity of the rotating presidency of the EU, proposed restarting the process at the June 3-4 
Cologne European Council. The Presidency’s draft text included two Turkey-related passages: one, a 
renewed invitation to a European Conference for aspiring member states that had not been selected 
for accession negotiations, and another offered Turkey a renewed perspective on membership (van 
Lierop, 1999a; “Euro maakt,” 1999). 
Coinciding with Cologne, Bülent Ecevit, the new prime minister in Ankara, sent a letter to 
Gerhard Schröder, indicating that Turkey understood the need to meet the Copenhagen criteria in 
order to join the European Union. This letter was well received and a majority of the member states 
communicated its intention to acknowledge Turkey as an official candidate at the Helsinki meeting 
of 11-12 December (LeMaître, 1999a). Despite Germany, France, the Netherlands and the UK 
pressing forward movement on the issue, Greece voiced its objection, thus essentially maintaining 
the 1997 stalemate (James, 1999; van Lierop, 1999a; Smythe, 1999a).  
As in the 1997 episode, Greece was again the most outspoken opponent, while, again, 
silently joined by other member states, now also including Italy (“Turkije voorlopig,” 1999). In 
addition to Italy, the Scandinavian countries were also cited as being opponents of immediate 
candidacy, given the death sentence of Abdullah Öcalan (van der Velden, 1999b – the article does 
not name the countries specifically; more on Öcalan, below). Due to this opposition, Germany 
dropped the passages from the proposal and the Cologne Presidency conclusions did not mention 
Turkey or its progress toward membership (European Council, 1999a). 
6.2.2 The İzmit earthquake 
A crucial development for Turkey’s prospects occurred on August 17th at 3:00am, when an 
earthquake struck the city of İzmit near Istanbul. The earthquake, measuring 7.4 on the Richter 
scale, killed around 17,000 people according to official figures, but nearer to 45,000 according to 
other estimates (Ansal, et al, 1999; Barka, 1999; Marza, 2004). Numerous regional countries, 
including Romania, Israel, Azerbaijan, Russia, as well as the United States, assisted the relief effort as 
did some EU member-states such as France, Germany, UK, Austria, Spain, and Italy (Tang, 2000, p. 
259). Most remarkable, however, was the prominent level of Greek aid and Greece’s ability to be on 
the scene rapidly, assisting in Istanbul (Hinrichs, 1999a).  
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Not long after the earthquake, when the horror over the number of dead and wounded had 
sunk in, Spain made the declaration that in the up-coming EU Foreign Ministers meeting in 
Saariselkä, it would suggest granting Turkey candidate status. While this was not an entirely different 
development, given the earlier majority opinion of the majority at Cologne, it was a clear sign that 
Spain’s position toward Turkey would be more forward-leaning that it had previously been (“España 
Quiere,” 1999; van ‘T Klooster, 1999). Italy, while having been critical at Cologne, rapidly followed 
suit (“Aardbeving brengt,” 1999; “Busquin Afgekeurd,” 1999; “Quice Estudian,” 1999; Hinrichs, 
1999a). 
On August 31st, Greece (under pressure from the other member states) agreed to lift its veto 
on the financial package of €150 million plus EIB loans to help Ankara deal with the earthquake 
damage (Paalvast, 1999). This was still short of the €375 million that had been promised as 
compensation for the Customs Union. Yannos Kranidiotis, the Greek deputy foreign minister, 
stipulated that this aid needed to be linked specifically to post-earthquake reconstruction (Buchan, 
1999). He also made it clear that Greece was not prepared to agree to candidacy status for Turkey, 
the way that other member states were prepared to be (Hinrichs, 1999a). On September 1st, Ankara 
signaled that the current attempt at candidacy would also be Turkey’s last. It would not countenance 
another rejection. This, along with the impact of the earthquake added pressure through sympathy 
(Buchan, 1999). Britain immediately reiterated its support to the chorus in favor of Turkey’s 
candidacy (Hinrichs, 1999a).  
6.2.3 Saariselkä 
On 4-5 September, the EU Foreign Ministers met informally in Saariselkä, in Finnish Lappland. The 
venue allowed the foreign ministers to poll one another on their respective positions concerning a 
Turkish candidacy. On September 5th, the Greek government indicated a shift of its policy toward 
supporting an official Turkish candidacy for membership (“Greece supports,” 1999). In doing so, it 
joined Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands (“Grecia 
entreabre,” 1999). Despite this support, Greece maintained that Turkey needed to participate in a 
solution to the conflicts over Cyprus and Imia (Ferrari, 1999a; de Jong, 1999). Sweden, however, 
maintained its position on Turkey, insisting on a road map of conditions that it should meet prior to 
being accepted as a candidate (“Ministers bieden,” 1999; Norman, 1999a; Paalvast, 1999). After the 
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meeting, the Finnish presidency invited İsmail Cem, the Turkish Foreign Minister on behalf of the 
Council to attend a formal meeting in Brussels on September 13th, in order to negotiate the way 
forward (Paalvast, 1999). 
In a peculiar twist of fate, a second earthquake struck Greece two days after the informal 
meeting in Lappland, with the epicenter in the northern Athens district of Achames. The 
earthquake, reading 6.0 on the Richter scale, killed 143 people and left 2000 wounded. A Turkish aid 
team was the first international disaster assistance to arrive on the scene. Furthermore, the Greek 
embassy and its consulates in Turkey were overwhelmed with offers of blood and organ donations. 
The following day, the liberal Turkish newspaper Milliyet headlined with “Perastika Gitona,” (“get 
well, neighbor” – in Greek), thus expressing its sympathy with the victims (Güngör, 1999). The 
press made a great deal of the tragedy of both earthquakes, resulting in the political rapprochement 
between the two countries (Hinrichs, 1999b; Hope, 1999). Behind the scenes, however, the foreign 
ministers, George Papandreou and İsmail Cem, had already begun a bilateral dialogue, thawing their 
animosity prior to the earthquakes (van der Velden, 1999b). That said, the tragedies undoubtedly 
facilitated an improvement of public opinion in both countries towards each other, which gave the 
political leaderships more room to maneuver. 
6.2.4 The Commission’s Opinion 
The Prodi Commission, presided over by the former Italian prime minister Romano Prodi, took 
office on 13 September, with the German Günter Verheugen as Enlargement Commissioner, after a 
brief stint as minister of state in the department of foreign affairs from 1998 to 1999. At his 
inaugural speech to the European Parliament, Prodi spoke of the Commission’s desire to firmly 
reject the ‘Clash of Civilizations’, and instead embrace a “partnership of cultures” (Commission, 
1999). Verheugen was very keen on developing good relations between the EU and Turkey, putting 
the motivation rather bluntly: “Turkey is strategically the most important of the applicant countries. 
It's a top priority for Europe and for the US that Turkey is firmly anchored in the family of western 
democracies.” However, he also warned that Turkey would have to meet the same criteria as other 
accession candidates, with an emphasis on democracy and human rights issues. “There is no rebate 
[concession] for political and strategic importance,” Verheugen pointed out referring to his rejection 
of the cultural/civilizational clash. “I don't see the EU as a Christian club. The criteria are not 
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religious. The criteria are democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and so on” (Wagstyl 
& Norman, 1999). 
During his address to the European Parliament on October 6, Verheugen declared his 
suggestion of candidacy status for Turkey to the European Council, provided Turkey would 
improve its human rights record and annul the execution of the Kurdish militant leader of the PKK 
(Kurish Worker’s Party) Abdullah Öcalan (van Lierop, 1999b). Verheugen’s proposal, however, ran 
into a snag in the European Parliament, where the members of the European Parliament (MEPs) 
voted against the proposal citing Turkey’s “democratic deficit” as the reason for their lack of 
support. The German Hans-Gert Pöttering, leader of the EPP said the time was not ripe yet for 
accession, although he also wanted “a Europe of peace and stability in clear and good partnership 
with Turkey,” adding: “Turkey does have a European vocation. But if we grant Turkey this status 
today what in the future can we say to Russia or the Ukraine if we refuse them the same status?” 
(O’Sullivan, 1999).  
On October 13th, the Commission nevertheless published a composite paper on enlargement 
describing the different situations of the candidates and the steps each of them should take. It stated 
that: “Turkey has expressed the wish to be a candidate country and should be considered as such,” 
and “Turkey should now be considered as a candidate country, although there is no question of 
opening negotiations at this stage.” (Commission, 1999b, p. 11, 40) More broadly, the composite 
paper advised the Council to adopt the ‘Regatta’ model of enlargement for all candidates, wherein 
each of them could progress at their own pace, rather than in groups of negotiating countries and 
non-negotiating countries. One could read this as meaning that Turkey would be subject to the same 
treatment as other countries. This was not the case, however, as the other countries would all begin 
accession negotiations, while the Commission made it clear that Turkey was not yet ready to begin 
such negotiations. There would remain a difference in treatment between Turkey and the others. 
6.2.5 Tampere 
At the meeting of EU leaders in Tampere, Finland on October 15-16, the status of Turkey was 
discussed in preparation for the Helsinki summit in December (“Schröder will in Tampere,” 1999). 
In this meeting the German chancellor aimed at having the European Council reach an agreement to 
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adopt Turkey as an official candidate for EU membership, thus taking the lead in supporting 
Turkey’s candidacy (“Demirel Calls,” 1999; Halisdemir, 1999a). 
With the support of the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, German Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer argued that with Greece giving up its veto, there should be no more significant 
resistance to the proposal to designate Turkey as an official candidate (“Schröder setzt sich,” 1999). 
Greece, however, still desired some concessions, while Sweden and Luxembourg continued to offer 
counter voices (“Asylfrage trennt,” 1999; “EU uneinig,” 1999; Kemmer, 1999; Kools, 1999; Middel, 
1999c). At the conclusion of the meeting the Finnish presidency declared, in speaking to the press, 
that Turkey would be granted the candidacy status that it had been refused two years ago28, but that 
the Council still required “some positive signals from Turkey” (“EU leitet,” 1999 – trans. mine). The 
Tampere Presidency conclusions, themselves, did not mention Turkey, or its progress toward 
membership (European Council, 1999b).  
6.2.6 Before the Helsinki summit 
On the December 1st, Schröder met separately with the French and Spanish leaders Jacques Chirac 
and José Maria Aznar to discuss various issues, including the question of Turkey (Hehn, 1999;  
“Schröder Viaja,” 1999). They agreed on firming up Turkish candidacy, but left the particular 
decisions to the heads of state and government at the upcoming Helsinki summit. Other than a 
statement from the Spanish Foreign Minister Abel Matutes about how Turkish candidacy would 
benefit the stay of execution of Öcalan, the discussion had centered mainly on the Greco-Turkish 
dispute and the situation of Cyprus (“La UE Abrira,” 1999).  
Meanwhile, the European Parliament, like other actors, highlighted the need for political 
reforms, prior to the commencement of negotiations, passing its own resolution concerning Turkey 
as follows: 
[The European Parliament] takes note of Turkey's eligibility to apply for membership of the 
European Union; emphasises, however, that negotiations cannot be opened because 
Turkey is still nowhere near from meeting the political criteria of Copenhagen; insists that, 
as a candidate country, Turkey must make clear and verifiable progress in meeting those 
criteria, especially regarding human rights and the rights of minorities; a clear road map, 
                                                
28 Which it had not, as there had been no such thing as ‘official candidacy’. 
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containing an overview of the measures to be taken by Turkey and the way in which the 
necessary reforms will be achieved, must therefore be developed;…  
(European Parliament, 1999). 
The European Parliament, like other actors, highlighted the need for political reforms, prior to the 
commencement of negotiations. The resolution had been approved by 265 votes in favor to 102 
against. There were 73 abstentions. An amendment calling on Turkey to show “clear signs of 
progress” on human rights was approved by 322 votes with 133 against and 10 abstentions. In 
separate votes, the EU assembly approved economic aid for Turkey worth 150 million euros over 
three years. The parliament rejected an attempt by Danish deputy Pernille Frahm to block the aid 
because of the death sentence handed down to Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan (“EU 
Parliament recognizes,” 1999). Just after the European Parliament vote, Ecevit declared his intention 
to abolish the death penalty in Turkey. “It is clear that the capital punishment cannot go with EU 
membership,” Ecevit said, calling the two a “contradiction.” “God willing, we will over come this 
contradiction soon,” he said (Hacaoğlu, 1999). 
6.2.7 Helsinki 
According to one source from anonymous interviews, the agreement was made within fifteen 
minutes without serious debate, given that the politics had been agreed upon prior to the summit. 
The presidency conclusions of the Helsinki European Council of 11-12 of December declared 
Turkey’s candidate status as official. The headline statement was: 
Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as 
applied to the other candidate States. 
(European Council, 1999c, par. 12) 
However, as always, the devil is in the details. Also in the conclusions was the following paragraph, 
which qualified the conditions of membership: 
The European Council reaffirms the inclusive nature of the accession process, which now 
comprises 13 candidate States within a single framework. The candidate States are 
participating in the accession process on an equal footing. They must share the values and 
objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this respect the European 
Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the 
United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any 
outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a 
reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European 
  198 
Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular 
concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their 
settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. 
Moreover, the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid 
down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession 
negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession 
to the Union. 
(European Council, 1999c, par. 4) 
The inclusion of the ‘peaceful settlement of disputes’ clause has been seen as a natural condition of 
membership, but it was not a part of the specific political Copenhagen criteria. Given that the 
Cyprus and Aegean Sea disputes were an disputes that needed to be settled by Turkey and Greece, 
and that the other candidate countries – with the critical exception of Cyprus – did not have such 
disputes with one another or with member states, this clause essentially erected a barrier for Turkey’s 
membership that did not exist for the other members. Coupled with Greece’s vociferous support for 
Cypriot membership, and its willingness to threaten with its unilateral veto, this clause meant that 
Turkey’s candidacy was not subject to the same rules, even if the stipulation for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes is or seems like a very reasonable one. Furthermore, Cyprus’ acceptance as a 
member in 2004 without which the division of the island was resolved suggests that the rule was not 
equally applied. 
The EU’s leaders, however, were euphoric. The Council’s Secretary General (and foreign 
policy chief) Javier Solana and Commissioner for Enlargement Günter Verheugen directly boarded 
Chirac’s Presidential airplane to bring the good news to Ankara. That news had already been relayed 
to Prime Minister Ecevit by Schröder, and to President Süleyman Demirel by Chirac, while the 
Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen had telephoned the news in to US President Bill Clinton, 
who in turn, had also called Ecevit (Dausend, 1999). The Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok could not 
“envision a better finale to the millennium” than Turkey’s acceptance as a candidate (Kockelmans, 
1999). 
The EUphoria was, however, not shared by the Turks themselves, who had read the fine 
print about the requirements of resolving their problems with Cyprus and their border dispute with 
Greece. If they would fail to reach a negotiated resolution on the latter, they would be required to 
bring the case before the International Court of Justice (“Türkei reagiert zurückhaltend,” 1999). In 
effect, the deal for the Turks was only different from what had been determined at Luxembourg two 
years earlier was that they could now call themselves ‘candidates’ in stead of just a ‘country with a 
European destiny’. The Aegean dispute and the Cyprus situation still had to be solved by the January 
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2005 deadline. Given that Turkey’s position was for a negotiated settlement, and the positions of 
Greece and (Greek) Cyprus were for international arbitration, the additional timetable was only in 
the favor of the latter two.  
From the perspective of relative gains, Turkey became even more distinct from the other 
candidates. The Helsinki European Council had decided that accession negotiations were set to 
begin with all of the Eastern European countries that had been left out by the Luxembourg summit 
in 1997, now joined by Malta, which had unfrozen its candidacy for membership. In that regard, the 
other countries were able to pull ahead faster, and participate in EU financial aid packages, which 
Turkey was not able to. 
The primary difference was in the tone. At Luxembourg, Turkey had been grudgingly and 
provisionally accepted in the text, but publicly been called ‘torturers’ by Luxembourg’s prime 
minister. At Helsinki, Turkey was offered essentially the same deal, only now it was decorated with a 
ribbon that had ‘official candidacy’ written on it. Furthermore, the European leaders, as well as Bill 
Clinton, created an atmosphere of excitement, urging the Turks to consider this a great victory for 
Turkey. Much, if not all, of it was political theater (Peel, 1999). Nevertheless, in the end, Turkey 
accepted Helsinki where they had rejected Luxembourg. Subsequently, when Turkey’s  ‘European-
ness’ has been questioned, either on religious, cultural and/or geographic grounds, Turkey’s 
defenders have pointed to Helsinki and not Luxembourg or any of the EEC/EU’s other statements 
regarding Turkey. 
6.3 ISSUES  
During the 1999 episode, there were several issues that were of particular consequence for the 
Helsinki decision: the Öcalan affair, human rights concerns, and – again – the question of Cyprus 
and the Aegean. These issues are considered in the sections below. 
6.3.1 Abdullah Öcalan & the PKK 
In 1999, the case of the Kurdish militant political leader Abdullah Öcalan, who had been sentenced 
to death in Turkey, presented the EU member states with a conundrum. The question of the Kurds, 
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being the largest linguistic/cultural minority in Turkey, and the conflict with the Kurdish separatist 
movement, spearheaded by the terrorist PKK, was salient, given the protection of minorities as one 
of the political Copenhagen criteria. Öcalan’s case became particularly important with all the 
attention it received in the press with European leader urging Turkey’s disavowal of the death 
penalty in light of the severe crimes he had been convicted of. Many member states asserted that 
candidacy would be difficult, if not impossible, to envision for Turkey, should it execute Öcalan. 
Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the separatist Kurdish guerilla movement PKK (Kurdistan 
Worker’s Party), and his band had been operating out of Syria. After his expulsion from Syria in 
1998, they had moved to Russia, Italy and finally Kenya, where Turkish special forces caught him 
just after leaving the Greek embassy in Nairobi on February 15th 1999. His trial before a military 
court began on May 31st, and he was sentenced to the death penalty by a civilian court a month later. 
Following the trial, the PKK declared a unilateral cease-fire on September 1st (Boulton, 1999). The 
Turkish military also struck a conciliatory tone, arguing that the Kurds demanded cultural rights, 
rather than federalization along with some measure of autonomy from Ankara (ibid.).  
The Öcalan incidents caused a shake-up in the Greek government because its embassy in 
Kenya had harbored him prior to his capture, resulting in the resignation of Foreign Minister 
Pangalos and the interior and justice ministers. It also caused a further souring of stressed relations 
between Turkey and Italy when the latter had refused the former’s request for Öcalan’s extradition 
upon his arrest in Italy in 1989. Further, Germany also disappointed Ankara by giving in to pressure 
from Kurdish protestors, rescinding its arrest-warrant for Öcalan on charges of PKK terrorist 
attacks in Germany (Uwer, 1999). 
On November 25th, just three weeks prior to the Helsinki summit, the Turkish court of 
appeal still upheld the execution order, about which the German ambassador in Ankara commented 
that if Öcalan were executed, “Turkey can forget about Helsinki” (Meixler, 1999 – trans. mine). 
Verheugen’s spokesman said: “We expect that this death penalty is not carried out. We would like to 
remind Turkey as well as other candidate countries that we expect them to withdraw the death 
penalty if they want to become member states” (Morris & Paterson, 1999). 
 At the same time, the Turkish government in Ankara was also under great domestic 
pressure to carry out the execution. In that regard, Öcalan’s lawyers vowing to take their case to the 
European Court of Human Rights gave the government some breathing space at least until after 
Helsinki. Furthermore, the execution – a penalty which Turkey had not carried out since 1984 – 
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required the assent of both the Parliament and the President, which kept the case in political rather 
than judicial hands, following a political timeline rather than a legal one.  
The European governments, meanwhile, took the opportunity to pressure Turkey into not 
carrying out the execution. France, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Spain and Greece in particular took 
pains to urge Ankara not to put Öcalan to death (Bentley, 1999; “La UE Abrira,” 1999). Given the 
European pressure and the human-rights requirements of EU membership, Öcalan’s execution was 
stayed until the death penalty itself was abolished in 2002, when Öcalan’s sentence was commuted 
to life-long aggravated imprisonment on İmralı island in the Sea of Marmara. 
6.3.2 Human Rights Concerns 
On July 8th, The European Court of Human Rights condemned Turkey for 15 serious violations of 
fundamental human rights. Strasbourg’s judgments related to torture, the deaths of Kurds, and the 
violation of freedom of expression of journalists. These were all in connection with the conflict 
between the Turkish government and the Kurdish separatist movement (“Bonn plädiert,” 1999). On 
September 6th, further, the President of the Turkish appeals court declared that the Constitition of 
1980 (which had been written by the military, following the coup d’etat of that year) had “close to 
zero” legitimacy, and it required a major overhaul. While this was not a novel declaration by a 
Turkish judge, the difference this time was that Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit endorsed it 
and pledged reform (Boulton, 1999). This was a sign of prospective reform in accordance with the 
political Copenhagen criteria. 
However, Turkey still had severe shortcomings. The Commission, which had begun its 
annual reports in 1998, still highlighted many human-rights failings. It related the reports of 
widespread existence of torture, disappearances and extra-judicial executions. Most cases of torture 
took place in police custody and the Commission judged the reports to be “so precisely 
documented that there [could be] no doubt about the responsibility of the police authorities” 
(Commission, 1998). It reported that enforcement of anti-torture laws were lax due to the ability 
of the administrative authorities to withhold permission for a trial to go forward and the light 
sentences imposed on officers even when these were found guilty of mistreatment of prisoners. 
In 1999, the Commission reported that this situation had not substantially changed. It did, 
however, highlight some shifts in policy that seemed hopeful. A particular case coming out of the 
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western city of Manisa involving the torture of teenagers was selected for a retrial of police officers 
previously acquitted of torture.29 Further, the Constitutional Court annulled a legal provision 
permitting certain security officers to shoot forewarned fleeing suspects. Also, the Turkish 
parliament adopted a law redefining torture, ill treatment and abuse of power with the prospect of 
stiffer penalties for public officials and medical professionals drafting fake reports (Commission, 
1999c, p. 11).  
In addition to human rights concerns, the Commission also highlighted many civil rights 
concerns, most of which also related to Turkey’s reaction to Kurdish separatism. 1999 saw several of 
instances of civil rights transgressions. In February, the Turkish Constitutional Court had ordered 
the closure of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Mass Party (DKP) on grounds of promotion of 
separatism. In March, the minister of justice issued a communiqué to Governors to be zealous in 
identifying associations, foundations, publications, individuals and organizations that are likely to 
take initiatives in favor of Öcalan.  
Aside from the campaign to thwart Kurdish separatism, or the political development of a 
Kurdish identity, Turkey’s ‘deep state’ establishment (mostly manifested in the top echelons of the 
military and judiciary) also sought to protect Turkish secularism from political Islam. The 1997 
‘post-modern’ coup has already been discussed in the previous chapter. In January 1998 the Islamist 
Refah (Welfare) Party had been banned in name of protecting the secular state. In May 1999, 
proceedings begun to likewise ban the Fazilet (Virtue) Party, also accused of seeking to undermine 
the secular state, which proceeded to court later in the year (Commission, 1999c, p. 8). Fazilet would 
eventually be banned in 2001 in time for the 2002 parliamentary elections.  
6.3.3 Cyprus & the Aegean 
Cyprus was back on the table again in 1999, taking up most of the debate concerning Turkey. The 
question was whether or not Cyprus could become a member of the Union while it remained 
divided between the Greek and Turkish communities. The challenge was to find a formulation that 
                                                
29 The case, stemming from 1995, involved 15 teenagers and their teacher accused of throwing a Molotov cocktail at a 
hairdresser's salon, illicitly putting up political posters, and membership in DHKP/C, a Marxist-Leninist group 
internationally recognized as a terrorist organization. The torture victims were subjected to degrading treatment and 
torture such as being blindfolded, stripped naked, hosed with cold water and given electric shocks (“The Manisa trial,” 
1997). Ultimately, in 2002, the accused officers would be convicted of torture and sentenced to 60-130 months in prison 
(Yıldız & McDermott, 2004). 
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would satisfy Athens without alienating Ankara. The British proposed that the lack of a negotiated 
settlement on the island’s division should not prevent Cyprus from accession to the European 
Union. This solution for Cyprus met Greece’s demand that Cyprus’ accession would not be delayed. 
France and the Netherlands opposed this formulation, considering it too much in Athens’ favor 
(Peel, 1999; de Vries, 1999).  
When the negotiations briefly reached the level of the Heads of State and Government, the 
Dutch prime minister, Wim Kok, insisted that a divided country could never join the Union. 
However, Chirac’s supposed persuasion by Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis meant that “a deal 
could be done for Europe” and a divided Cyprus could join the European Union if the communities 
on the island, and their supporters in Greece and Turkey, failed to resolve the thirty year-old conflict 
(Peel, 1999). What this meant was that Greece and Cyprus would eventually have no incentive to 
compromise on Cyprus, given that the ‘peaceful settlement of disputes’ clause would force Turkey 
would be a precondition of membership for Turkey, but not for Cyprus. Greece, of course, was 
already a member and could threaten its influence over other matters in the Council – notably, the 
broader enlargement process – in order to ease the way in for Cyprus. 
Regarding the Aegean Sea territorial dispute, both Portugal and Sweden supported the Greek 
position in bringing the case before the International Court of Justice (“Les Quinze,” 1999). In 
effect, this attempted to inculcate a time clock for Turkey to make a deal with Greece, otherwise the 
matter would wind up before the court in The Hague. Given that legal arbitration was already the 
Greek preference and Greece could fail to make a deal with Turkey, it meant that Turkey would 
have to calculate what outcome would be less harmful to its interests; conceding to Greek demands 
or allowing the Court to determine the outcome.  
At the time of writing, the dispute remains unsolved, despite accession negotiations having 
begun. Negotiations between Greece and Turkey were halted in 2004 when Greece unilaterally 
pulled out of the talks. This happened following the change of government in Athens, which 
brought Costas Karamanlis of the New Democracy party to power. Since then, however, the Aegean 
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6.4 THE MEMBER-STATE POSITIONS 
The remainder of the chapter again looks at the specific positions of each of the member states. 
Again they are determined as being drivers, who were supporters of Turkey’s bid for membership, 
brakemen, who were antagonistic to progressing that bid for membership, and passengers, whose 
policies were too opaque to discern or indifferent on the matter.  
6.4.1 Austria 
During the early fall of 1999, Austria was in the throes of the parliamentary elections that brought 
Jörg Haider’s anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic FPÖ party to 27% of the vote, at second place after 
Chancellor Klima’s social-democratic SPÖ and ahead of Foreign Minister Schüssel’s ÖVP. The 
results of these elections, held on October 3rd, created an awkward coalition-making environment. 
Viktor Klima had made a commitment not to form a government with the FPÖ, while Wolfgang 
Schüssel had made the promise that if his party would end up in third place (which it did by some 
400 votes), he and his party would not join a coalition government (Müller, 2000). Although the 
FPÖ campaign itself had not placed much emphasis on immigration issues, Jörg Haider’s past 
statements on foreigners and Islam, along with his perceived sympathy for Nazism (or at least Nazi 
labor policies), created an atmosphere of heightened concern.  
Also, Austrian public opinion on the prospect of Turkey joining the EU was among the 
most vehemently opposed (62% against, trailing Greece with 69% and Luxembourg with 
64%)(Eurobarometer; 2000). This made Turkey a tough issue for Chancellor Klima during his 
attempt to forge a coalition with Schüssel’s ÖVP, which he tried to keep out of the headlines 
(Blome, 1999b). This domestic political conundrum explains why very little was heard from Vienna 
about Turkey during the 1999 episode. For this reason Austria is considered a ‘passenger’ in 1999.  
6.4.2 Belgium 
In Belgium, the new Verhofstadt government took a more supportive role in the debates towards 
Turkey than that of his predecessor Jean-Luc DeHaene. At the Saariselkä meeting, Foreign Minister 
Louis Michel argued that Europe should open up to Turkey, but that Turkey also had to make 
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efforts to democratize the army’s role in politics and respect the Copenhagen criteria (“Ik wil niet,” 
1999).  
Both before and after the Helsinki summit, Belgium articulated reasons for its support. Just 
prior to the year-end meeting, Michel argued that Europe would miss a historical chance if it were to 
keep Turkey on the sidelines, and that the bar for its entry should be raised nor lowered for Turkey 
(“EU-staatshoofden,” 1999; “Greece says Finland,” 1999). After the summit, Guy Verhofstadt 
argued that the candidacy of Turkey represented a guarantee against it drifting off into Islamic 
fundamentalism (Bollenbach, 1999; Kockelmans, 1999). Arguing against the opposition to Turkish 
candidacy by European Christian-democrats stressing the loss of cultural identity, Louis Michel 
pointed out that Europe is “already multicultural,” (“Les democrates-chretiens,” 1999 – trans. mine).  
Given the above, Belgium is considered a driver of Turkish membership prospects in 1999. 
6.4.3 Denmark 
During the 1999 episode, Denmark kept itself off the journalistic radar regarding the Turkish 
candidacy. It was sometimes grouped with other Scandinavian member states like Sweden and 
Finland insisting on human rights reforms and the annulment of Abdullah Öcalan’s death sentence 
(Binyon, 1999; van der Velden, 1999b). This in itself is no clear indication, since even Turkey’s own 
most ardent supporters of EU membership frequently referred to their country’s need to reform in 
order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. During the 1999 episode Denmark is therefore considered a 
passenger. 
6.4.4 Finland 
In the role of the Presidency, Finland made the press far more than the other small (and 
Scandinavian) countries. Although it did so in a role of a low-key non-politicized ‘honest broker’, it 
did have its share in maintaining the pro-Turkish momentum that had begun at Cologne and paved 
the way for other countries to overcome the remaining opposition to Turkey’s bid for candidacy. At 
the very least, the Finnish Presidency was very tight-lipped about its pre-summit diplomacy to other 
member-states, in order to prevent multiple diplomatic initiatives possibly interfering with one 
another (de Vries, 1999).  
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As part of maintaining the momentum, Foreign Minister Halonen expressed at the outset of 
the presidency period her confidence that under the Finnish presidency talks with Turkey would 
continue (“Finnland; Jetzt,” 1999). In spite of its neutral position, it did receive criticism during the 
summer by the CDU opposition in the German Bundessrat accusing the Finnish Presidency of 
creating false expectations for Turkey when the candidacy might prove to be fruitless. (“Pflüger 
kritisiert,” 1999).  
However, before, during and after the Saariselkä meeting in September, Finland’s role was 
reported as ambiguous. Finland was seen as part of the Scandinavian bloc that insisted on the 
observance of human rights norms (Middel, 1999a; van der Velden, 1999b). Yet, that perception did 
not make clear at what point in the process the Scandinavians would insisted when the Copenhagen 
criteria would need to be met: as a condition for candidacy status, for the start of accession 
negotiations, or by the time accession could conceivably happen. In this regard, only Sweden seemed 
to have taken the more strident position of compliance at the beginning of the process, while 
Finland was more permissive.  
Finland was, nevertheless, quite clear that Abdullah Öcalan’s fate was directly connected to 
the acceptance of Turkey’s candidacy. Asked on Finnish television whether Mr. Öcalan's execution 
would end Turkey’s hopes of EU membership, the Finnish Prime Minister, Paavo Lipponen replied: 
“I think that the possibility that Turkey could be accepted as a candidate (would be) over for a very 
long time” (Vipotnik, 1999). On the other hand, following the meeting, Halonen expressed the 
unanimity of the Fifteen in wanting to integrate Turkey into the European structures (Docquiert, 
1999).  
In 2004, the Finnish newspaper ‘Helsingin Sanomat’ published a previously undisclosed 
letter that Lipponen had written to Bülent Ecevit in 1999 at the time of the Helsinki summit. In the 
letter, Lipponen guaranteed that there would be no special conditions for Turkey. When asked about 
this letter by the Austrian Die Presse, Lipponen stressed that the Helsinki decision could not be 
reversed and that he had indeed promised to not require special conditions from Turkey. This, the 
Austrian newspaper wrote, would complicate efforts to impose permanent safeguards on 
immigration and agricultural subsidies, which were then being discussed (Leibl, 2004). 
Distinguishing Finland’s policy between a passenger and a driver is empirically difficult. As 
Tiilikainen argues, it was a passenger by being neutral, ie. by exhibiting the neutral disinterests of a 
passenger. Unlike the other passengers, however, Finland was in the role of the presidency, and in 
that role it capably performed the functions of enabling the pro-Turkey position to be expressed in 
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the Presidency Conclusions. The Irish Times’ Paul Gillespie reported that the Finnish presidency 
could take the major credit for the initiative and the delicate wording that phrased conditions of 
Turkey’s candidacy (Gillespie, 1999b).  
Finland’s relatively neutral hosting was certainly in sharp contrast to both Luxembourg’s 
souring of the atmosphere two years prior, and Denmark’s use of its control over the conclusions 
text, three years later. It far more resembles the Dutch presidency, which adopted a ‘strict but fair’ 
policy, while working energetically behind the scenes to facilitate a decision in Turkey’s favor. It also 
resembles its own presidency in 2006, where its position as honest broker helped it to attempt to 
craft a solution to the Cyprus dispute, which would have helped Turkey’s candidacy, if that solution 
could have been realized at the time. This research will therefore respect Tiilikainen’s in-depth 
research in the matter, and designate Finland as a covert driver of Turkey’s candidacy aspirations. 
6.4.5 France 
In 1999, France continued to be a driver of Turkey’s membership prospects. Following the İzmit 
earthquake in August, President Chirac expressed his support for closer relations with Turkey  
(Hinrichs, 1999a). At the Saariselkä meeting in September, Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine 
countered Sweden’s insistence on Turkey meeting a list of preconditions prior to its candidacy, 
which resulted in Anna Lindh backing down from her Stockholm criteria (Paalvast, 1999). France’s 
position on enlargement in general also contrasted with those of other member states, who pressed 
for a concrete enlargement date for the other candidate countries, a move opposed by France as 
“inopportune” (“Bien qu’ils,” 1999; Middel, 1999a – trans. mine). This meant that France opposed 
creating an enlargement timeline that would further distinguish Turkey from the other candidates.  
On the sidelines of the OSCE summit in Istanbul on the 17-19 November, Chirac, together 
with Schröder and Papandreou, expressed his continued support for granting Turkey candidacy 
status at Helsinki (“Diplomatisches Schulterklopfen,” 1999; Meixler). President Chirac and Prime 
Minister Jospin met with Chancellor Schröder again on Tuesday, 30th November about various 
issues, whereby they also reaffirmed the offer of candidacy status to Turkey at Helsinki the following 
month, provided that some conditions were met (Hehn, 1999). After the Helsinki summit, Chirac 
was reported as being “delighted” with the result of Turkey’s full acceptance as a candidate with 
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equal rights and duties as other candidates. He added that, “Turkey, with its history, its geography 
and its ambitions is European” (Bollenbach, 1999 – trans. mine).  
The press reports of France’s support were not unanimous, however. The Irish Times 
reported on October 18th that, according to “diplomatic sources…there were indications that the 
proposal to give Turkey candidate-member status [would] face French opposition at the Helsinki 
summit” (Smythe, 1999b). Given the singularity of this report, and the otherwise overwhelming 
journalistic reports of support from Paris, this article is not considered to accurately represent the 
interest of the French government. That said, once the summit was over, the Helsinki decision was 
met in France with a lot of criticism. Criticism came from the left because of human rights in Turkey 
and from the non-Gaullist right because of a undermining of European identity.  Michelle Ariot-
Marie, of the conservative Gaullist RPR party, on the other hand, defended the decision, arguing 
that the prospect of membership would anchor Turkey in modernity (“En France,” 1999). 
6.4.6 Germany 
With the formation of the Red-Green coalition of SPD-Grünen, the Federal government launched a 
change of orientation in German policy towards Turkey. At his first EU Foreign Ministers meeting 
the new foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, referred to Turkey as a candidate for EU membership, 
indicating this shift in German policy. It was also made a rule at the German Foreign Ministry, that 
“Turkey is an accession candidate” (Gnauck, 1999 – trans. mine).  This, however, did not mean that 
Germany was distancing itself from the Copenhagen criteria.  
At Cologne, Chancellor Schröder proposed two passages that, if adopted by the European 
Council, would have immediately rekindled the accession process for Turkey. With Greece 
opposing, Schröder opted to retract the proposed paragraphs altogether rather than offer a watered-
down text (van Lierop, 1999a). Schröder clarified that the text did not imply an invitation to start 
accession negotiations, which could only begin if and when Turkey had met the political 
Copenhagen criteria (“Turkije voorlopig,” 1999). 
In July, State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Günter Verheugen (soon-to-be Enlargement 
Commissioner of the EU) reiterated the German position that Turkey ought to be named an official 
candidate for enlargement. Nevertheless, he also acknowledged that this was unlikely to happen at 
Helsinki and would not happen if Öcalan were to be executed (“Bonn plädiert,” 1999).  
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In July Joschka Fischer visited Turkey – the first German Foreign Minister’s visit to Ankara 
since his predecessor Klaus Kinkel’s visit two years prior. During his stay, Fischer highlighted the 
necessity for Turkey to meet the (political) Copenhagen criteria for the opening of accession 
negotiations. He particularly underlined the need for progress on human rights, the Kurds and 
Cyprus (“Schatten auf Fischers Besuch,” 1999). In September he argued that, “all interests are clear, 
that it is about a neighbor, whose drifting away can be in no one’s interest – not even Greece’s” 
(Weingärtner, 1999 – trans. mine). 
A vexing matter in the Red-Green coalition was the sale of German Leopard II tanks to 
Ankara, supported by the SPD for its economic benefits, while the Greens opposed it in a matter of 
principle, fearing the tanks would be used against the Kurds (Leersch, 1999). This put the Turkish 
question front-and-center, especially in regards to its human and minority rights situation.  Yet, 
while the Panzer question was a contentious one between the two governing parties (as well as 
between the CDU and CSU, incidentally – “Auch in der Union,” 1999), it did not impair the degree 
to which both desired candidacy status for Turkey at Helsinki. 
Germany took particular care to frame Turkish membership as a process divorced from the 
question of religious identity. “Belonging to the Christian culture is not a condition for accession to 
the EU,” Verheugen said in mid-July (“Schreyer,” 1999). During his Turkey trip, Fischer also made clear 
that the EU was unmistakably a secular community of values in which there was room for atheists, Jews, 
Christians and Muslims. Implicit in his statement was the accusation that Kohl’s government had held the 
reverse opinion (Seidel, 1999a). 
During this period, the political opposition in Germany – CDU, CSU, FDP – expressed 
their opposition to the policy of inviting Turkey to renew its membership bid (“Kritik an Fischers,” 
1999; “Opposition gegen,” 1999; Seidel, 1999b). After Helsinki, the CDU and SCU decried the 
decision to grant Turkey candidacy status, arguing that it gave Turkey false hope, as it would never 
be able to meet the Copenhagen criteria (Blome, 1999c). 
6.4.7 Greece 
While Germany’s policy shifted from being a brakeman to a driver, Greece also shifted from being 
Turkey’s primary antagonist to one of the strongest drivers for its candidacy. The ‘earthquake 
diplomacy’ following the earthquakes in Turkey and Athens, allowed a warming of Greco-Turkish 
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relations due to popular sympathy for one another’s distress, and the mutual aid given in the 
earthquakes’ aftermaths (McLaren & Müftüler-Baç, 2003, p. 216, n. 10).   
However, the desire to see a policy shift (by what countries?) in Turkey’s favor, had already 
been going on prior to the earthquakes (van der Velden, 1999b), whereby Greek-Turkish relations 
had (already) begun to thaw two months before the first earthquake during a meetings between the 
Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem and his Greek counterpart George Papandreou, resulting in 
their military cooperation - to some degree - during the NATO air campaign over Kosovo (Ferrari, 
1999a; Gündoğdu, 2001). For the rest these bilateral discussions had concerned mostly trade, 
environment and cultural issues (Hinrichs, 1999a).  
There had been several triggers to the earlier policy shift, of which the Öcalan debacle had 
been a major one. The diplomatic scandal of the discovery that the Greek had been harboring 
Öcalan, who was sought by Turkey for terrorist acts, had caused the resignation of the Greek 
Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos and two other hard-line cabinet ministers. Pangalos was 
replaced with George Papandreou who, contrary to his father, the late Prime Minister Andreas 
Papandreou, had more conciliatory policy ideas. Also, Greece needed to mend fences with the EU 
member states in order to further its case for joining the common currency (Ayman, 2002, p. 232-
233).  
While Greek relations with Turkey had been thawing before the earthquakes, Athens needed 
domestic support to put its policy shift into practice, which countered considerable opposition. A 
week prior to the İzmit earthquake Papandreou’s predecessor accused Papandreou of betraying 
Greek interests, while others were casting suspicions on Papandreou’s American citizenship 
(Kadritzke, 1999). The outpouring of public sympathy after the earthquake changed the outlook in 
both countries considerably, with the press leading the way. It allowed both Cem and Papandreou to 
claim being simply followers of public opinion, rather than being the initiators of the policy shifts 
(Buchan, 1999; Gündoğdu, 2001).  
However, by early September, Greece made it known that it was not yet willing to retract its 
veto on Turkey’s candidacy status. In order to accept the candidacy, Papandreou demanded 
powerful concessions. Athens maintained that for Turkey to be considered a candidate Ankara 
would have to ensure the involvement of the Turkish Cypriots in the accession negotiations between 
Brussels and Nicosia, and the Aegean dispute would have to be taken to the International Court of 
Justice, of which the latter had been one of the concessions that had been unpalatable to Turkey 
before during the Luxembourg presidency two years earlier (Ferrari, 1999a).  Greece also maintained 
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its veto on the €750 million loan from the EIB to Turkey, but was nevertheless persuaded to allow a 
€200 million financial aid package for disaster relief (Hinrichs, 1999a; Paalvast, 1999).  
At the Saariselskä meeting, Greece signaled its policy reversal by no longer exercising its veto 
on Turkish candidacy, saying, “We are in favor of Turkey becoming a member of the European 
Union” (“Tauwetter zwischen,” 1999; Wielaard, 1999a). The Greek tone changed significantly after 
the Athens earthquake on September 7th, when this no-veto position shifted further to one of active 
support. “Greece not only wants to see Turkey in the EU, it wants to be pulling the cart of a 
European Turkey,” Papandreou said in an interview with the Guardian. “Contrary to popular belief, 
it is in Greece’s interest to see Turkey, at some point, in the EU, rather than having it in continual 
conflict and tension with the bloc and European standards” (Smith, H., 1999). 
During a state visit to Greece by Gerhard Schröder in early October, Greek Prime Minister 
Simitis joined the Chancellor in expressing the desire for Turkey to become a member of the EU 
(“Schröder lobt,” 1999). However, at Tampere (15-16 October), Greece was still hesitant in the 
debate over granting Turkey candidacy status when Papandreou asserted that the discussion was 
about “a real candidacy, not a virtual candidacy,” whereby he also warned that major problems still 
needed to be overcome (“Demirel Calls,” 1999). In an 30 October interview with Die Welt, 
Papandreou expressed his appreciation of the Copenhagen criteria for central European countries, 
but that in the Balkans (implying Turkey as well), a broader set of criteria should be recognized – 
especially concerning relations between countries and respect for mutual borders, UN resolutions 
and the International Court of Justice. He also expressed that since Turkey joining the EU was not a 
question of ‘if’, but ‘when’, Turkey needed to be properly integrated with a clear framework to be set 
out in Helsinki, working toward a solution of problems such as Cyprus and the Aegean (Stausberg, 
1999). 
The shift in the Greek policy toward Turkey was not an easy one for Athens to make. 
Commenting on Greek-Turkish relations, Louis Michel, the Belgian Foreign Minister explained that 
the Greek leadership needed time to sell the policy change to the Greek public (“EU-
staatshoofden,” 1999). Even after the thaw in relations following the earthquakes, 69% of the Greek 
public (down from 80% in 1997) still opposed Turkish membership in the EU, at that time still the 
highest level of public opposition to Turkish membership among EU member states 
(Eurobarometer, 1997; 1999). Again taking an unorthodox avenue for Greek diplomacy, 
Papandreou told EU foreign ministers that “no one supports Turkish EU candidate status as 
strongly as Greece,” but only on certain conditions (“Greece says Finland,” 1999). 
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Determining Greece’s status as a driver, a passenger or a brakeman is not easy to determine 
because of Greece’s particular stance. During the negotiations, Greece still insisted on the settlement 
of territorial disputes as well as the Cyprus issue, the same conditions that Turkey had balked at in 
1997, but only begrudgingly accepted at the Helsinki summit. The difference was in the tone of the 
rhetoric and in the timing of the demanded concessions. According to the Greek reading of the 
Luxembourg conclusions, Turkey would have had to offer concessions prior to participation in the 
European Conference, whereas according to the Helsinki conclusions a settlement, either negotiated 
or arbitrated, would have to occur before 2004. 
The main shift in Greek policy appears to be mostly rhetorical, yet by both Turkish and 
European leaders adopting a more welcoming attitude, this seems to have made a crucial difference 
in the interpretation of the two sets of presidency conclusions. Former Prime Minister Pangalos’ 
characterization of Turkey as ‘thieves, murderers and rapists’ was unacceptable, while Papandreou’s 
more soft-spoken approach, aided by the mutual sympathy after the earthquakes, made what was 
essentially the same deal easier for Turkey to swallow.  
Given this different approach of political rhetoric, as well as the change of bargaining 
strategy that made Turkish membership in the EU an avenue for the pursuit of Greek interest in the 
Aegean as well as for Cyprus rather than a bargaining chip to be withheld, makes Greece definable 
as a driver, rather than a brakeman. 
6.4.8 Ireland 
Ireland was another country that mostly kept itself out of the Turkey debate. After Helsinki, the 
Irish Times reported that, “the Government welcomed the further progress made at the summit 
towards eventual EU membership for Turkey” (Rafter, 1999). Ireland’s Foreign Minister, David 
Andrews, called the Helsinki decision “a major achievement for the Finnish presidency”, and paid 
tribute to Simitis and Papandreou, for their statesmanship in trying to reconcile their country’s 
differences with Turkey (Gillespie, 1999a).  
In the annual assessment of Nicholas Rees (of the International Affairs Committee at the 
Royal Irish Academy in Dublin) on Ireland’s foreign policy, the Turkish question was recognized, 
but nothing was mentioned regarding Ireland’s role in reaching the decision. Rees did report that the 
Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern “warmly welcomed… the decision to include Turkey as a part of this 
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process,” but without mentioning the Irish part in the debates in the Council or in public about 
Turkey’s membership candidacy (Rees, 2000). A country welcoming of a fact after the fact does not 
mean that the country in question was a driver. Ireland failed to make the press prior to Helsinki, 
nor was it mentioned anywhere that it behaved in a fashion that enabled the result in Turkey’s favor. 
Therefore, despite what appears to be Ireland’s post-Summit good will toward Turkey, it 
must be regarded as a passenger for not having contributed on Turkey’s behalf beyond not casting a 
veto in the Council. 
6.4.9 Italy 
At Cologne, Italy joined Greece in opposing the German proposals to re-invite Turkey to a 
European Conference and offer it candidate status (“Turkije voorlopig,” 1999). Earlier that year, a 
row had erupted between Ankara and Rome over the latter’s refusal to extradite Abdullah Öcalan 
after his November 12, 1998 arrest in Rome, and more so after his release to Kenya on January 16, 
1999 (Meiler, 1999). Additionally, there was a statement made by the Italian prime minister Massimo 
D’Alema that boats and ships from Turkey carrying Kurdish illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers 
to the Italian Adriatic coast were not unlike the concurrent situation in Kosovo, where violent 
clashes between Serb forces and Kosovar-Albania separatists had begun a wave of refugees spilling 
across Serbia’s borders into Albania, Macedonia and beyond. The statement compounded the 
bilateral row (Kirişci, 2003, p. 95; Lavenex & Uçarer, 2003, p. 133).  
However, following the İzmit earthquake, Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini was one of the 
EU member-state leaders who expressed his support for granting Turkey official candidacy prior to 
the Saariselkä meeting (“Aardbeving brengt,” 1999; “Busquin Afgekeurd,” 1999; “Quice Estudian,” 
1999; Hinrichs, 1999a).  
Meanwhile, the opposition leader Silvio Berlusconi (the former and later prime minister in 
1994-1995 and 2001-2006), expressed his opposition to Turkey’s candidacy status during a 
December EPP meeting (“Berlusconi Afirma,” 1999). This was a position he would later fail to keep 
when he returned power, just as most of the leaders at the March 1997 EPP meeting detailed in the 
previous episode had done. This rhetoric on Berlusconi’s part did not change the official Italian 
policy, which in 1999 is judged to have been that of a driver, regardless of the earlier brakeman-like 
stance at Cologne and the other bilateral disputes. 
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6.4.10 Luxembourg 
At Tampere (15-16 October), Luxembourg was hesitant in the debate over granting Turkey 
candidacy status. The Premier, Jean-Claude Juncker, expressed to Die Welt his reservations of 
granting Turkey candidacy status. He said that the EU would regret not having a more thorough 
debate on where the borders of Europe should lie (“EU uneinig,” 1999; Ferrari, 1999). During the 
Tampere summit, Die Welt interviewed Juncker. During the interview, he argued that Turkey would 
have to meet the same conditions and requirements as the other candidate states, but that it was not 
at the stage of accession negotiations. He said that he wished that there had been “intensive and 
broad conversations about where exactly the European Borders are. Also to finally have clear 
conditions. We will one day regret that we did not have this exchange of views before the summit in 
Helsinki.” When pressed on his own vote that he expected to cast in Helsinki, Juncker replied, “I 
have nothing against candidacy status for Turkey. But we should not act as if we will have solve all 
problems with it” (Middel, 1999d – trans. mine). 
After the Helsinki summit, Juncker declared that none of the Heads of State and 
Government had been able to “underwrite with both hands that Turkey would become a full 
member” (Middel, 1999e – trans. mine). It appears that Luxembourg was not going to veto Turkish 
candidacy, but it was not enthused about it either, and expressed its reservations about Turkish 
membership openly to the press. As such, Luxembourg is considered a brakeman. 
6.4.11 Netherlands 
During the 1999 episode, the Netherlands was again a driver. At the Cologne summit, the Dutch 
junior minister for European affairs, Dick Benschop, stated that, “if we want to offer Turkey 
something, it has to be of a decent status” (van Lierop, 1999 – trans. mine). At the Saariselkä 
meeting, the Dutch Foreign Minister, Jozias van Aartsen, expressed his satisfaction with the shift in 
the Greek position (“Ministers bieden,” 1999; van der Velden, 1999a).  
Prior to Helsinki, van Aartsen expected a tough discussion over Turkey, but not without 
setting great store on the prospect of Turkish candidacy. He also expressed that he was not in favor 
of the accession of a divided Cyprus, as accession would leave no more pressure on the Greek 
Cypriots to move toward reconciliation (Paalvast & Bergsma, 1999). Van Aartsen did admit to the 
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largely symbolic nature of Turkey’s official candidacy status, nevertheless considering it to be of 
great importance (Schampers, 1999). 
During the summit itself, Prime Minister Wim Kok was the last opponent to allowing a 
divided Cyprus to join the EU. Despite his defeat on that point, he was still ‘lyrical’ over the victory 
of Turkey’s candidacy status saying, “A better end to the millennium is unthinkable.” Humorously 
referring to his own minor case of the flu, he said that, “this was a result to get better from” 
(Kockelmans, 1999 – trans. mine). 
6.4.12 Portugal 
In an interview with the German Focus Magazine, the Portuguese Prime Minister António Guterres 
expressed the safe opinion that Turkey ought to be treated the same as all other candidates, although 
he also expected that, given its ‘democratic deficit’, as well as its need to meet the economic criteria, 
there would be long transition periods (Herzog, 1999). This, in itself, at least indicates that Portugal 
was not a brakeman on cultural grounds – something that had already become a taboo opinion to 
express after 1997.   
As already mentioned, Portugal did support the Greeks at Helsinki to have the Aegean Sea 
dispute brought to the International Court of Justice (“Les Quinze,” 1999). Portugal’s Foreign 
Minister Jaime Gama asserted that no special conditions should be required of Turkey that exceeded 
the EU’s normal standards of respect for human rights and democracy (Wielaard, 1999b). This was 
simply an assertion of the governing enlargement regime rather than a statement of Portugal’s 
support or antagonism toward the prospect of Turkish membership. 
After the Helsinki summit and prior to taking over the rotating EU Presidency in January, 
Guterres mentioned that Portugal was in favor of Turkish membership, so long as it respected 
human and minority rights. As a reason for integrating Turkey into the Union, he cited the 
impediment of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey. As a social democrat himself, he 
also asserted that Portugal’s position was not based on ideological grounds to warrant support from 
either socialist or conservative politicians. He noted that the French and Spanish prime ministers 
Jacques Chirac and José Maria Aznar, both conservatives, were in favor of the candidacy (“UE-
Portugal,” 1999 – trans. mine). Implicit in the remark was that socialists were perceived as being 
more likely to be in favor of Turkey joining the Union, a perception he sought to correct. However, 
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given that he is making this argument after the Helsinki summit and just before Portugal’s 
presidency, this cannot be considered a particularly clear statement of Portuguese support. In the 
role of the presidency, Portugal would be expected to embrace the majority voice of the Council, at 
least during its tenure in the role. 
Meanwhile, at home, Portuguese political opposition voiced by Paulo Portas of the Christian 
Democratic CDS-PP party opposed Turkish candidacy, arguing that Turkey “lacks the same bases of 
civilization as other European countries,” which indicates that it was an issue of political difference 
within Portugal at that time (“Les democrates-chretiens,” 1999 – trans. mine).  
From the limited available material on Portugal’s position in 1999, it is clear that Lisbon was 
not particularly antagonistic toward Turkey’s prospects, nor was it an outspoken supporter. It had 
joined the Greeks and the Swedes on the Aegean question, but otherwise reiterated the need for 
Turkey to adopt the Copenhagen criteria for membership, highlighting that doing so would prevent 
the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. As such, Portugal is considered a Passenger; it accepted 
Turkey’s candidacy as the will of the majority of the member states, but did not actively argue on 
Turkey’s behalf. 
6.4.13 Spain 
During this episode, Spain is considered a driver of Turkish membership. At Cologne in June, Spain 
declared its strong support for Turkish candidacy for European Union membership (“Aznar 
Confia,” 1999). Not long after Cologne, during a state visit to Athens, Ramon de Miguel, the 
Spanish Secretary of state for Foreign and European Affairs, spoke with George Papandreou, 
asserting a position in favor of Turkish membership. To show that he did not do so unconditionally, 
de Miguel added the stipulation that Turkey should “contribute to a reduction in the tensions with 
Greece and allow the Northern Cypriot community to participate in Cyprus’ accession negotiations 
with the EU” (“España Apoya Grecia,” 1999). The Spanish Foreign Minister, Abel Matutes, stated a 
similar position before the foreign affairs committee of the Spanish Congress (“España Confia,” 
1999). During the summer, a broad group of Spanish institutions, governmental and otherwise, 
lobbied Turkey not to execute Öcalan (“Aznar Manifiesta,” 1999; Gobierno y Partidos,” 1999; 
“Movilizacion,” 1999).  
  217 
As mentioned before, following the earthquake, Abel Matutes declared that he would press 
for the adoption of Turkey as an official candidate of the EU at Saariselkä. According to a Spanish 
Foreign Ministry spokesman, official candidacy status would make it easier to release EU financial 
aid of €650 million to Turkey, which could be put to use for the earthquake victims (“España 
Quiere,” 1999; van ‘T Klooster, 1999). Spain also made the case for Turkey by suggesting that with 
its official candidacy and tens of thousands of earthquake victims on its hands, it would be 
increasingly indefensible of Greece to maintain its veto on the financial package. 
In early December, a week prior to Helsinki, during several bilateral and trilateral meetings 
with German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, Spanish 
Prime Minister Aznar agreed with his partners on granting Turkey candidacy status (“Jospin 
Garantiza,” 1999; “Schröder Espera,” 1999; “Schröder Viaja a Madrid,” 1999; “Schröder y Aznar,” 
1999). That same week, the after the foreign ministers’ meeting, Matutes again expressed his support 
for Turkish candidacy by pointing out that it would save Öcalan’s life, since the European Union 
prohibited capital punishment and Turkey would have to spare him in order to become a member  
(“La UE Abrira,” 1999). This indicates a certain reversal of policy. Previously the argument had been 
made that the death sentence had to be undone prior to candidacy, whereas here Matutes saw 
candidacy preceding an official stay of execution.  
At the summit itself, Aznar argued for the candidacy status for Turkey under the same 
criteria set for other candidate countries. When the summit had concluded, and Turkey had been 
recognized as a candate, Aznar declared it a “great step forward” (“Aznar se Falicita,” 1999 – trans. 
mine). In speaking with the press, Matutes recalled Spain’s traditional support of Turkey (which, 
actually, had been muted during the previous episode), but pointed out that Turkey “still has a long 
way to go,” in modernizing their institutions and adopting the acquis, in compliance with the 
Copenhagen criteria (“España Considera,” 1999 – trans. mine). 
Back home, the Aznar government was supported in the Turkish decision by the main 
opposition Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) leader, Joaquin Almunia. However, Aznar caught flack 
from the other opposition party, the United Left (communists, etc.), who characterized the inclusion 
of Turkey, with its human rights problems, as the creation of a political “Frankenstein Monster” 
(“Almunia Avisa,” 1999; “Aznar Niega,” 1999).  
 
  218 
6.4.14 Sweden 
Sweden proved to be the most outspoken brakeman in 1999. Sweden’s proposed policy was that 
Turkey had to get its political house in order before it should be offered candidacy status. Its 
Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh, made her country’s position on Turkey loud and clear when at the 
Saariselkä meeting in September she proposed a road map, which would include a perspective on 
bringing the Turkish legal system into line with EU-norms, ratification of the UN Human Rights 
Convention, abolition of capital punishment, observance of minority rights and a dialogue with the 
Kurds (“Ankara Breaks,” 1999; Hinrichs, 1999c; Middel, 1999b; Paalvast, 1999; “Tauwetter,” 1999). 
These were all in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria. However, Lindh’s road map went further 
to also include an obligation for Ankara to strengthen its dialogues with neighboring countries and 
accept a mission of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to monitor 
Turkey's treatment of its ethnic minorities (“Greece backs,” 1999) At Lindh’s insistence that Turkey 
would have to meet the requirements of her road map prior to being offered candidacy status 
(“Ministers bieden,” 1999).  
Due to Sweden having adopted this tough line on Turkey, the Financial Times dubbed 
Sweden ‘Turkey’s newest foe’ (Norman, 1999a). According to the Financial Times, Sweden’s 
proposed strict road map of conditions “reflected the strong support for human rights in Sweden 
and the Stockholm parliament.” This insistence on reforms prior to candidacy, which would “pose a 
formidable obstacle” to the granting of candidacy by the Helsinki meeting in December, were 
required by Lindh as a “down payment” for further reforms required during the candidacy period.  
A month later, by the time the European Commission had published its recommendation 
and the heads of state and government were meeting in Tampere, Sweden had not yet given up its 
opposition. “Sweden is strictly against granting Turkey candidacy status,” Anna Lindh declared 
(Middel, 1999c – trans. mine). Yet, Sweden was alone as the only vocal opponent of the candidacy 
(“Demirel Calls,” 1999). After the Tampere meeting, with Greece and Germany having become 
proponents of Turkish candidacy, Sweden was left with Luxembourg as its only ally. By then it had 
already been known that Sweden was not going to exercise a unilateral veto on the matter (Blome 
1999a). By December, Sweden had given up its opposition to the candidacy as well as its proposed 
road map of strict conditions (Bouwman, 1999; Norman, 1999b; “Turkije waarschuwt,” 1999). 
Stockholm did, however, support Greece’s arguments at the summit on the question of Cyprus 
(“Les Quinze,” 1999). 
  219 
6.4.15 United Kingdom 
As before, and in the episodes to follow, the United Kingdom was one of Turkey’s most stalwart 
advocates, and drivers of its membership ambitions. The British Foreign Minister, Robin Cook, 
publicly called for Turkey to be designated a candidate prior to the Saariselkä meeting in September 
(“Britain says,” 1999; “EU must treat,” 1999; Hinrichs, 1999a; Smith, J. 1999). The UK was, 
however, careful to stress that its support of Turkey’s candidacy should in no way be interpreted as a 
weakening of the membership criteria (“EU-Aussenminister,” 1999). It was also among the chorus 
of countries urging Turkey not to execute Abdullah Öcalan (Cordon, 1999).  
Prior to Tampere in October, Cook allowed it to circulate, especially in Ankara, that the UK 
stood in support of the EU Commission’s opinion that Turkey should be designated a candidate 
country (“Britain Expresses,” 1999). At the Tampere summit itself, Tony Blair spoke in support, 
affirming that, “there will be an agreement in Helsinki that Turkey should be considered as a 
candidate country” (“Demirel Calls,” 1999; Halisdemir, 1999a). 
After Tampere, meeting with Papandreou in London, Cook declared:  
Speaking for Britain, we believe that it would be right to recognise Turkey as a candidate 
for membership of the European Union… It is right to do so because we would be 
supporting and encouraging the very progressive forces in Turkey who look to Europe for 
their aspirations and their orientation… However, a decision to recognise Turkey as a 
candidate for membership of the European Union is by no means a final decision in that 
process. It will only be the first decision in a long path and it will not be possible to 
progress down that path until Turkey meets the Copenhagen criteria on human rights, 
democracy, recognition of minorities. 
(Hickman, 1999). 
At this same Anglo-Greek meeting, however, Cook also assured Papandreou that the UK would 
support the accession of a still-divided Cyprus, if that situation had not been solved by the time of 
Cyprus’ joining of the EU as a member (“Greece Hails,” 1999).  
Prior to the Helsinki summit, in remarks to the House of Commons, Cook said that Britain 
would prefer Turkey to improve its human rights record and democratic standards - as would be 
expected from any other candidate. Cook also said that the British government would do whatever it 
could to see Turkey included among the candidates, adding that by doing so the EU would give 
encouragement to the democratic institutions in Turkey which, he said, “were working hard to 
achieve improvements in Turkey” (Halisdemir, 1999b). 
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At the Helsinki summit itself, Tony Blair received far more criticism from the media over the 
Anglo-French ‘guerre du bœuf’, an ongoing trade war over British beef exports, than over his policy 
on Turkey’s EU membership (Percival & Blair, 1999). At home too, few articles did more than 
mention the Turkish matter at the bottom of the tabloids, lambasting Blair over the beef and his 
inability to charm the French, indicating that at least according to the media; Turkish membership of 
the EU seemed of little concern in the Kingdom’s domestic opinion.  
6.5 AFTERMATH 
The irony of the ‘candidacy status’ is that it was a label without any concrete benefits for Turkey. 
Nor was there authentically such a thing as an ‘official candidacy status’ prior to the Helsinki 
conclusions. The term candidate does not appear in the Luxembourg Presidency conclusions 
(Council, 1997). In the conclusions of the Cardiff European Council (15-16 June 1998), the word 
‘candidate’ is used four times, all in relation to enlargement. Of these, the most poignant is in 
paragraph 64, which reads: 
The European Council welcomes the Commission’s confirmation that it will submit at the 
end of 1998 its first regular reports on each candidate’s progress towards accession. In the 
case of Turkey, reports will be based on Article 28 of the Association Agreement and the 
conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council. 
(European Council, 1998a) 
In this regard, Turkey is implicitly left out of the category of ‘candidates’. The conclusions of the 
Vienna European Council (11-12 December) also use to word candidate in several instances. It did 
not explicitly exclude Turkey from the category, but certainly not implicitly including Turkey either 
(European Council, 1998b). As such, the language was slowly brought into the conclusions, with, 
probably, much behind-the-scenes haggling, but without there being official categories of candidate 
and applicant beforehand. 
In essence, Turkey had been given a rhetorical emblem in lieu of any concrete concessions 
or admissions on the part of the member states. Prior to Helsinki, Turkey’s ‘right’ to be treated the 
same as other applicant states had already been acknowledged by the European Council on several 
occasions – most notably in the Presidency conclusions of the ill-received Luxembourg summit, two 
years prior, in which Turkey’s ‘European destiny’ – and thus its status as a ‘European country’ – had 
already been unequivocally recognized (Dausend, 1999). As such, the cynical apologist for the 
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language might assert that Turkey was, indeed, being treated the same as other ‘applicants’ with the 
caveat that all the other countries were no longer ‘applicants’, but ‘candidates’ – the category of 
‘applicant’ prior to Helsinki being populated by only one country: Turkey.   
That said, the recognition of Turkey’s then-official candidacy at Helsinki had tremendous 
rhetorical value. In later episodes, where Turkey’s status as a European country would be called into 
question, proponents continually referred back to the Helsinki conclusions. This official-but-only-
rhetorical recognition, as well as the more amiable treatment of Turkey in 1999 in juxtaposition to 
the previous episode, created a political impetus within Turkey itself that enabled its government to 
push through the necessary reforms toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria (Öniş, 2003). 
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7.0  COPENHAGEN, 2002 
The third episode researched here is the second half of 2002. While some actors in 2002 (and since) 
still openly questioned the central fact of the 1999 Helsinki decision, that Turkey had been fully 
accepted as candidate for EU membership, the main issue in 2002 concerned process more than 
substance or goal. It concerned Turkey’s push to start accession negotiations with the EU in 2003. 
The member states, however, decided against the start of immediate negotiations with Turkey, 
opting instead to review the matter two years later. As such, it was not a question of ‘if’ but one of 
‘when’ a decision would have to be made about the start of accession negotiations.   
Within this context, there were different positions and policy formulations for the process 
going forward from 2002. One option, completely unpalatable for the great majority of the member 
states, was that the process be halted altogether and Turkey’s candidacy rescinded. The arguments 
thereto saw Turkey as a bad fit for Europe, partly because it was Muslim, and partly because its 
deplored human rights record that it could never realistically fix.  
A seemingly kinder formulation of this rejection had been to advocate for a ‘privileged 
partnership’ of some sort, whereby Turkey would be offered some unspecified level of integration 
with Europe, without actually allowing it to sit at the decision-making table of the EU. This option 
would mean a reversal of the Helsinki and even Luxembourg decisions in which Turkey’s eligibility 
for full membership of the EU had been established. Also, given Turkey’s participation in the 
customs union, and other forms of cooperation with the EU, it would be difficult to discern how a 
privileged partnership would be different from what was already in effect. 
A second option was for the Council to adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach, that allowed Turkey 
to catch up with the Copenhagen criteria at its own pace, while the Council gauged its progress 
periodicly in order to determine when it had met the criteria and merited negotiations. In that 
respect, it would remain debatable to what degree Turkey would have to meet the criteria in order to 
deserve negotiations. 
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A third option was to set a date at which the Council would decide if Turkey had 
(sufficiently) met the political Copenhagen criteria to begin the negotiations. Variations on this 
option were in the dates when Turkey’s progress would be gauged and when those negotiations 
would begin if Turkey were judged to have sufficiently advanced toward meeting the criteria. 
A fourth option was to begin negotiations as soon as organizationally possible without any 
prior gauging of Turkey’s progress. Turkey, the United States, and their member-state allies 
advocated for such negotiations to begin in 2003, the very next year. This option would essentially 
scrap the political Copenhagen criteria as a requirement for negotiations to start altogether, since the 
Commission and most observers could still easily see problems in Turkey’s progress toward meeting 
the political criteria of human rights and adequate protection of minorities.  
In preparation for Copenhagen, the dispute settled around the Franco-German plan to 
gauge Turkey’s readiness again in December 2004 and, depending on how well Turkey had met the 
political Copenhagen criteria by then, begin negotiations in 2005. Ankara, supported by Washington, 
argued for accession negotiations to begin in 2003, while Madrid and London agreed a date earlier 
than 2005 (Broekhuizen & Van Oostrum, 2002). 
7.1 POLITICAL CHANGES 
In the three years since the explicit acceptance of Turkey’s membership candidacy in 1999, the 
following political changes took place in Turkey and in the member states. 
 In late 2002, Turkey was in the midst of elections, which the moderate Islamist AKP party 
handily won with 34% of the vote. Because of the 10% threshold, only the runners-up – the 
incumbent CHP party – also won representation in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. 
This mechanism gave AKP an absolute majority of 68% over CHP’s 32%. As such, in mid-
November Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit ceded the prime ministership to Abdullah Gül, who 
stood in for AKP’s authentic leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In the Foreign Ministry, İsmael 
Cem resigned in July, leaving the post to Şükrü Sina Gürel. After the elections, Yaşar Yakiş 
was took over as foreign minister until such time as Erdoğan could become Prime Minister 
and Gül became foreign minister. 
  224 
 In Austria, just after the 1999 elections and a difficult coalition-formation process, Wolfgang 
Schüssel formed a coalition government between his own conservative Christian-democrat 
ÖVP and the right-wing FPÖ of Jörg Haider. In the summer and fall of 2002, however, 
political turmoil returned, leading to elections in November. A new government was not 
formed until February. Schlüssel remained Chancellor and Benita Ferrero-Waldner remained 
Foreign Minister throughout this period. 
 In 2001, the Danish Folketing (parliament) elections of 2001 brought a change of 
government from the Social Democrat-led government of Poul Nyrup Rasmussen to the 
Venstre-led coalition of Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Incidentally, Venstre transates as “left”, 
though they are, in fact, a right-wing liberal party. The coalition was joined by the 
Conservative People’s Party and supported in the parliament by the anti-immigration Danish 
People’s Party. 
 In Finland, the government of social democrat Paavo Lipponen did not change save for the 
election of its Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen as President in 2000. She was succeeded by 
Erkki Tuomioja, who assumed office that same year. 
 In France, Jacques Chirac was reelected in May of 2002, upon which his defeated rival Lionel 
Jospin retired from politics. In the June 2002 Legislative elections, Chirac’s center-right 
UMP won the vote decisively, allowing its members to form a cabinet consisting of Jean-
Pierre Raffarin as Prime Minister and Dominique de Villepin taking over as Foreign Minister 
from Hubert Védrine.  
 Germany headed for elections in late September. These elections renewed the govering 
mandate for the red-green coalition of Schröder-Fischer. 
 In Ireland, republican Brian Cowen took over as Foreign Secretary from his fellow party-
member David Andrews. 
 In Italy, the 2001 parliamentary elections brought Silvio Berlusconi’s ‘House of Freedoms’ 
alliance to power and installed him as Prime Minister. In January 2002, Berlusconi also 
appointed himself as Foreign Minister, handing off the portfolio to Franco Frattini in 
November. 
 The Netherlands had a turbulent political year in the run-up to the May 2002 elections, with 
the anti-immigrant political newcomer Pim Fortuyn winning 26 seats (an exceptional result 
in the previously glacial politics of the Netherlands), before he was assassinated on May 6th. 
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The electoral outcome allowed the first Christian Democrat-led cabinet of Jan Peter 
Balkenende to take over from Labor Prime Minister Wim Kok in July 2002 and appoint 
Christian Democrat Jaap de Hoop Scheffer as Foreign Minister. The coalition fell apart 87 
days later with new elections slated for January 2003.    
 In Portugal, the May 2002 elections brought José Manuel Barroso (later President of the 
European Commission), leader of the Social Democratic PSD in as Prime Minister, replacing 
the Socialist (PS) António Guterres. António Martins da Cruz took office as Foreign 
Minister. 
 Under the Aznar government, Minister of Foreign Affairs Abel Matutes was replaced by 
Josep Piqué in 2000, who was replaced by Ana de Palacio (sister of the then-serving EU 
Commissioner for energy and transport, Loyola de Palacio) in July 2002.  
 In the UK, Jack Straw took over as Foreign Secretary from Robin Cook. 
The governments in Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and Sweden remained essentially unchanged. 
7.2 THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
Like in 1999, the diplomacy about enlargement decisions was scheduled for the year-end European 
Council meeting. However, leading into December, a number of occasions prompted European 
leaders to publicly discuss Turkey’s prospects. The first was the mid-year European Council in 
Seville, followed by Turkey enacting a package of reforms aimed at sufficiently meeting the political 
criteria. In early October this package and other developments were gauged by the European 
Commission, which offered the member states its opinion on the process going forward. Pursuant 
to the publication of the Commission’s report, the European Council met in Brussels to haggle over 
political differences regarding the Common Agricultural Policy and how to bring the Eastern 
European countries, Malta and Cyprus into this regime. Turkey was not the headline decision, but it 
was nevertheless a forum at which Turkey was discussed by the heads of state and government. 
Following this, the former French President and sitting President of the European 
Convention on the Future of Europe, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing stirred the pot by pronouncing his 
opinion that Turkey ought not to become a member of the EU because of its geography. This gave 
European leaders cause to object to his public statement. It was also followed by the Turkish 
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elections and a charm offensive by Turkey’s new Islamist leaders, in which they visited European 
capitals, lobbying on Turkey’s behalf.  
As was usually the case prior to European summits, the French and German leaders met in 
order to come to a common position prior to the meeting at which they would, essentially, decide 
what the common European position would be, given their combined weight in the Council. This 
also gave occasion for last minute wrangling and haggling prior to the European Council’s meeting. 
Finally, the European Council meeting in Copenhagen produced the common result which would 
delay a decision on Turkey for another two years, at which point the EU would begin accession 
negotiations ‘without delay’ if Turkey were judged to be ready for doing so in 2004. 
7.2.1 Seville 
During the EU summit of Seville on June 21-22, held under the Spanish presidency, it was decided 
that Turkey would be on the agenda of the Copenhagen summit in December. The conclusions 
thereto read as follows:  
The implementation of the required political and economic reforms will bring forward 
Turkey’s prospects of accession in accordance with the same principles and criteria as are 
applied to the other candidate countries. New decisions could be taken in Copenhagen on 
the next stage of Turkey’s candidature in the light of developments in the situation 
between the Seville and Copenhagen European Councils, on the basis of the regular report 
to be submitted by the Commission in October 2002… 
(European Council, 2002a, par. 25) 
At the close of the Seville summit, Spain’s foreign minister Josep Piqué declared that the EU wished 
for accession negotiations to begin “as soon as possible” (Middel & Ridderbusch, 2002). Irritated, 
Schröder commented that Turkey was not ready for accession negotiations, and that “the chance for 
a binding timetable does not exist” (“EU will gemeinsame,” 2002; “Gipfel lässt,” 2002 – trans. 
mine). 
Turkish President Sezer, on the other hand, joined Spain in saying: “we expect that by the 
end of the year a date for the start of negotiations will be set.” When the negotiations are delayed to 
an uncertain future, “it will create frustration in the [Turkish] people and damage the credibility of 
Europe” (Ridderbusch, 2002a). The soon-to-be President of the Council, Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
declared that “We can set a date for the start of negotiations when Turkey meets the criteria,” which 
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sounded more conciliatory than the German reaction, but was in fact more diplomacy than a 
substantive concession (“Problem-Kandidat,” 2002 – trans. mine).   
7.2.2 Turkish reform package 
The Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit suffered from ill health in the summer of 2002. His 
government, nevertheless, pushed through some of the necessary reforms for meeting the political 
criteria, such as the abolition of the death penalty and allowing the Kurdish language(s) to be used in 
electronic media (Fischer, 2002). In August, the Turkish parliament ratified a reform package. The 
most symbolicly significant reform was the abolition of the peacetime use of the death penalty, while 
it also lifted a ban on education and broadcasting in Kurdish and allowed more freedom of 
expression and assembly for non-Muslim minorities (Jews, Greeks and Armenians). After the 
ratification, Ecevit claimed that “now no one can say anymore that Turkey does not deserve full 
membership” in the EU. “Now Turkey is freer, more democratic and more European” (“Türkisches 
Parlament,” 2002 – trans. mine).  
The German government reacted by indicating that it would support Turkish 
rapprochement with the EU. Denmark called the reform package “good progress” (Gottschlich, 
2002 – trans. mine). The abolition of the death penalty was also welcomed by Greece, Spain and 
Sweden. Belgium preferred to wait for the Commission’s verdict before offering an opinion 
(“Europeos consideran,” 2002). In spite of the apparent approval of most member states, however, 
none of them said anything about inviting Turkey for accession negotiations or setting a date. The 
Commission was also reserved, saying that, “so far the reforms exist only on paper. When people 
actually benefit from it, then we shall believe what we read” (“Türkei; Was die Sterne sagen,” 2002). 
7.2.3 Commission Report and Recommendations  
On October 9, the Commission published its progress report and recommendations on Turkey. 
Although it expressed its approval of the reforms that had been pushed through legislation in 
August, it also noted that these were not enough to meet the political criteria.  
Through constitutional reform and a series of legislative packages Turkey has made 
noticeable progress towards meeting the Copenhagen political criteria, as well as moving 
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forward on the economic criteria and alignment with the acquis. Nonetheless, considerable 
further efforts are needed. 
(Commission, 2002, sec. 6(7)) 
The Commission noted that while the reforms had been passed on paper, it would still require 
verification of actual implementation. Furthermore, it still required more changes, such as lifting the 
states of emergency in two provinces in the Southeast, curbing the power of the military power, 
more far-reaching protections against torture of prisoners and the release of people imprisoned for 
expressing non-violent opinions (Commission, 2002, sec. 5). In order to stimulate the process, the 
Commission recommended enhanced support and resources for pre-accession preparations and 
extending the Customs Union. However, it did not recommend negotiations or a timetable, leaving 
such matters up to the member states to decide.   
In short, the implicit message of the Commission was that Turkey was not yet ready for 
negotiations. Germany, however, put forward the idea of a compromise solution between the 
drivers and the Commission (as well as, implicitly, the brakemen), which was to set a date at which a 
date to start negotiations would be set. Schröder also mentioned setting a date for negotiations to 
begin to Anders Fogh Rasmussen at a meeting in Hannover in late October (“Schröder macht,” 
2002). More likely, however, was the ‘date for a date’ formulation, a proposal that was supported by 
Great Britain and Greece, while Luxembourg, Austria and the Scandinavian countries were more 
skeptical (“Brüssel irritiert,” 2002; “Schröder will Türkei,” 2002).  
7.2.4 Brussels 
The Brussels Summit on 24-25 October, was the scene of rigorous haggling over the text on Turkey. 
Berlusconi and Schröder in particular took up the Turkish cause, warmly endorsed by Greek Prime 
Minister Simitis, while France and the United Kingdom were also clearly in the driver camp at 
Brussels. The Commission, however, was particularly irritated by Berlin’s seemingly new policy, 
given the seeming change-of-heart between Schröder’s pre-election policy and post-election policy 
(see below). At the outset of the summit, Commission President Romano Prodi argued that Turkey 
was still far from meeting the Copenhagen criteria, and therefore was not yet eligible for a date at 
which to start accession negotiations (“Brüssel irritiert,” 2002). He argued (unsuccessfully) for the 
removal of any references to negotiations. Austrian Chancellor Schüssel, Dutch Prime Minister 
Balkenende and Swedish Prime Minister Persson also argued for a slower pace than Turkey’s drivers 
  229 
were urging for, whereby the Netherlands openly argued against any date (de Jong, 2002a; Ludlow, 
2004, p. 194-195). 
Due to the efforts of the Commission and the brakemen, the results of the Brussels summit 
did not set a date for the opening of negotiations (Ridderbusch, 2002d). Enough members saw this 
as a bridge too far, given the Commission’s opinion. Therefore, the issue remained unresolved 
before Copenhagen. Yet by the statement “The Council is invited to prepare in time for the 
Copenhagen European Council the elements for deciding on the next stage of Turkey’s 
candidature,” the option was still left open (European Council, 2002b).  
7.2.5 Giscard d’Estaing  
On November 7th, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the President of the Convention on the Future of 
Europe, had a noteworthy interview with Le Monde, during which he argued against Turkey ever 
becoming a member of the European Union. His assertion was largely based on a geographic 
argument, whereby he emphasized that 95% of Turkey, including the capital, lay outside of Europe. 
He deplored the paucity of the debate about the prospect of EU enlargement to Turkey and had 
decided to broaden the debate beyond the Turkish electorate. He also accused the advocates of 
Turkish accession (primarily the UK) of being motivated by hostility to European integration. 
Instead, he supposed, the advocates preferred a free trade area of continental Europe and the 
Middle East. The consequence of Turkish membership, he said, would be ‘the end of Europe’ 
(Leparmetier & Zecchini, 2002b). 
Giscard d’Estaing’s interview and outspoken statement of opposition based on geography, 
but also on future integration, cultural and religious differences and history, provided European 
leaders with a cause to respond. The Danish Presidency reiterated that Turkey “may become a 
member in the same way as other candidates” and, “when Turkey has fulfilled the political criteria, 
accession negotiations can begin, and when it has satisfied all the criteria, it may become a member” 
(“En lançant,” 2002 – trans. mine; Roustel, 2002; “Turkije kan lid worden,” 2002).  
Jean-Pierre Raffarin, France’s Prime Minister, dismissed Giscard d’Estaing’s opinion as a 
personal one, not reflecting the policy of France or the European countries as a whole (“Raffarin: la 
position,” 2002). Jacques Chirac’s office also let it be known that the President maintained his 
“conviction that Turkey had its place in Europe insofar as it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria” 
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(“Le president,” 2002 – trans. mine). German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer also voiced his 
opposition to this opinion by saying, “I’ll have none of it; blocking the door for Turkey or walling it 
off” (Middel, 2002b – trans. mine). Giscard d’Estaing’s arguments were apparently not picked up by 
any of the EU member governments, even though some had been clearly critical of Turkish 
membership and continued to be actively hesitant taking a next step in the accession process (de 
Barochez, 2002a).  
7.2.6 Turkish Elections and Erdoğan’s Charm Offensive 
On November 3rd, Turkey held its elections for the Grand National Assembly wherein the electorate 
awarded an outright majority of seats to the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Its leader, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan had not been eligible to become Prime Ministership owing to his 1998 prison 
sentence for citing a poem that was not in keeping with Kemalism, the basic secular ideology of the 
Turkish Republic. Instead he nominated his deputy, Abdullah Gül, as prime minister until 2003, 
when a legal change made it possible for Erdoğan to take the post. 
This restriction in 2002, however, did not prevent Erdoğan from acting as the unofficial 
Turkish leader. Toward the end of November, he made a tour to some of the European capitals, 
starting with Rome – Turkey’s ‘best friend in Europe’ (Ludlow, 2004, p. 253). Athens, the second 
port of call, also warmly welcomed the unofficial leader of Turkey. In his mission to feel out the 
members of the Council, he discovered that Italy, Greece, Belgium, the UK, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain were all firm drivers of Turkey’s cause and that Austria, Finland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Sweden were more skeptical, while the Commission was also not very forthcoming 
with support. This left the remaining three member states – Germany, Denmark and France – not 
yet committed to a clear stance as the key ‘swing states’ on the Council (ibid.). 
In Berlin, Erdoğan learned of the German ambivalence toward Turkey’s preference for a 
date to start negotiations (Ludlow, 2004 p. 254). As the national section below will illustrate, 
Germany was walking a tightrope between domestic pre-election politics on one side and its 
authentic preferences for an acceleration of the Turkish accession process coupled with its 
rapprochement with Washington on the other. Schröder ended the deadlock when he expressed 
Germany’s support for a date for the start of negotiations proper as a way for the EU to send 
Turkey a positive signal (“Schröder will ‘Signal’,” 2002). Yet, whether this would get enough support 
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from the other member states was highly doubtful. After meeting with Schröder and Fischer in 
Berlin, Erdoğan expressed his willingness to accept the ‘date for a date’ option (Antonaros, 2002b; 
“Erdoğan signalisiert,” 2002).  
On his final visit, to Paris, Jacques Chirac welcomed him on the steps of the Elysée Palace, a 
gesture normally reserved for heads of state or government (Mamarbachi, 2002). The cordiality with 
which he was received had also been due to his expressed commitment to push for more energetic 
reforms toward the Copenhagen criteria, especially of a ‘zero tolerance’ policy on torture, one of the 
major issues that had plagued Turkey’s membership prospects (Sulser & Biegala, 2002). Chirac, 
personally supportive of Turkey, despite his party’s hostility toward that position, was also keen on 
maintaining France’s position of European consensus-builder together with Germany. Pushing too 
hard for Turkey’s cause would undermine its authority in this respect and also create more political 
problems domestically. In the French domestic debate on Turkey, Chirac invoked the European 
norms and values (read: political Copenhagen criteria) as the community values that could bind 
Turkey to Europe, as opposed to the historical and religious identities that would inevitably separate 
the two. This rhetoric implied that Turkey’s progress toward accession would also have to be 
governed by the pace at which Turkey actually progressed toward meeting the political criteria.  
Denmark, on the other hand, seemed to have had the preferences of a brakeman, which 
were either shrouded in, or authentically concerned with, the Copenhagen criteria. In its role of 
formal consensus-builder due to its half-month tenure in the EU presidency, Denmark worked 
closely with the Commission in holding Turkey to account for its progress toward meeting the 
political criteria by pointing out that it had not met them. As the Danish proposals for Copenhagen 
materialized, Rasmussen found himself at odds with Schröder on Turkey as well as on other issues, 
such as the future funding of the Common Agricultural Policy and what effects the enlargement to 
Central and Eastern Europe would have thereon (Parenthoen, 2002; “Schröder hält EU-
Erweiterungskosten,” 2002). In order to outflank Rasmussen, Schröder decided with Chirac to 
revive the Franco-German axis of European leadership. 
7.2.7 Franco-German Pre-Summit Agreement 
At a December 4 bilateral pre-summit (before Copenhagen) meeting between Germany and France 
in Storkow (Germany), Schröder sought to convince Chirac to support the date for negotiations, or 
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at the least, the ‘date for a date’ option (Parenthoen, 2002). The idea was that if Berlin and Paris 
could have an agreement, supported by London and Rome, Luxembourg and Vienna would relent 
(Blome & Middel, 2002; “Schröder und Chirac,” 2002).  
Prior to the meeting, both had determined that there should be a ‘clear signal’ for Turkey, 
whereby that they had agreed to come to a common position at Copenhagen. (“Berlin und Paris,” 
2002). However, while they aimed at coming to a common position, their preferences differed. 
Chirac, according to a ‘usually well-informed source’ preferred a date for negotiations to begin some 
time in 2008, if any date was to be set at all (Ludlow, 2004, p. 255). Germany preferred to set a date, 
but only when Turkey’s progress was considered adequate (Scally, 2002).  This position also implies 
a date when the Turkey’s progress would have to be gauged. Meanwhile, they also had a financial 
package for the Common Agricultural Policy to come to an agreement on. 
After the bilateral meeting, the two leaders remained cryptic about its outcome, except by 
hinting at consensus, and asserting that Turkey would receive that ‘clear signal’ (“Geteiltes Echo auf 
deutsch-französische,” 2002). However, soon there were mixed messages leaking to the press. Some 
reported that they were intent on a specific date for the start of actual negotiations, set on 1 July 
2005 (Beeston, 2002; Black, 2002b; 2002c; Dempsey & Guha, 2002; “Türkei kann auf,” 2002). 
Others declared that the Franco-German negotiations had failed to arrive at a consensus, and that 
the Germans had prematurely claimed success in the press (Hooper & Traynor, 2002).  
Prior to the Copenhagen summit, Fischer put out to the press that a large majority of 
member states intended to offer Turkey a date for accession negotiations. This was contradictory to 
statements made by the Danish Presidency asserting that Turkey would not be given any dates 
(Boulton, Dempsey & Hoyos, 2002; Lucas, 2002; “Mehrheit der EU-Staaten,” 2002). However, the 
Council would still have to gauge whether or not it had met the political criteria in mid or late 2004 
to determine if it was eligible for such negotiations to begin (“Berlin und Paris wollen Datum,” 
2002; “Chirac bestätigt,” 2002; Parenthoen & Goulliaud, 2002; “Türkei soll bedingtes,” 2002; 
“Verhandlungen,” 2002). This formulation would meet the needs of both Turkey and the brakemen 
by   offering Turkey a firm date and the brakemen the assurance that Turkey would have to meet the 
political criteria fully before the negotiations could begin. 
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7.2.8 Pre-summit wrangling 
Prior to the Copenhagen summit, Turkey, the participants as well as the United States all put 
forward their arguments in the press, over the telephone, and at the pre-summit foreign ministers 
meeting. Ankara rejected the Franco-German proposal, Washington picked up the telephone to 
Berlin insisting on Turkey getting a better deal, while other parties also made their positions known 
to one another and the press. 
In response to the Franco-German position, Erdoğan reversed his earlier acceptance of the 
‘date for a date’ position, publicly arguing that negotiations proper should begin in 2003, rather than 
2005. In his argument to the Turkish press, Erdoğan suggested that Osama bin Laden would be 
pleased with this division between Christians and Muslims (Ankara lehnt,” 2002; “Erdoğan rejette,” 
2002; Middel, 2002e). Gül also made it clear that anything less than a date for accession negotiations 
would be difficult to explain to the Turkish public as anything other than a rejection of Turkey based 
on its faith (“La Turquie réclame,” 2002; “Türkei besteht,” 2002). Furthermore, he indicated that the 
Franco-German proposal was designed to delay Turkey and was an act of bad faith on the part of 
Berlin and Paris. It also made the Turkish press that Ankara considered turning down German and 
French tenders, especially those for military hardware (Curta, 2002). 
During a bilateral summit in Rome between Italy and Greece on December 6, Berlusconi 
and Simitis said that the Franco-German proposal was inadequate, and that negotiations should start 
no later than January of 2004, a formulation which, according to Berlusconi, was also supported by 
Spain and the United Kingdom (“L'Italie et la Grèce,” 2002). Meanwhile, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 
also rejecting the Franco-German formulation, reiterated the Commission’s position that Turkey 
would first have to meet the Copenhagen political criteria before negotiations could commence. 
“There will be no date given at Copenhagen,” he told the German nieuwspaper Welt am Sonntag 
(Kaserer, 2002; “Rasmussen gegen Datum,” 2002). 
7.2.9 The Copenhagen Summit 
One the sidelines of the 12-13 December summit, prior to when decisions had to be made, Gül and 
Erdoğan met with Schröder and Chirac for a last-minute lobby on behalf of the earlier negotiation 
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date. In this effort they explicitly put Cyprus on the table (“La Turquie veut,” 2002). This, however, 
did not shift the Franco-German consensus. 
Rasmussen had the initiative in drafting the presidency conclusions. In his draft, which he 
communicated orally to the heads of state and government during the working dinner on the 12th, 
the idea was that the Council would decide in December 2004 if Turkey merited accession 
negotiations, pursuant to the Commission’s annual progress report (Ludlow, 2004, p. 311). As 
Ludlow argues, this was not much of a ‘clear signal’, given that this would be done regardless of any 
decision coming out of the Copenhagen Council, as a review of the Commission’s reports was an 
annual affair. In reality, if it offered any signal, it was that the Council would ignore Turkey’s 
ambitions in 2003. During this dinner, the tone about Turkey was very critical in which Chirac was 
among the most negative. 
The following morning, when the written draft was being reviewed, Blair and Berlusconi 
took the offensive in an attempt to bring their colleagues about (ibid.). One strategy thereto was to 
convince the others that the December 2004 date should be the latest point at which the Council 
should decide about Turkey, and that the matter could be taken up at an earlier time. The brakemen 
were not persuaded, arguing that the December 2004 date for deciding on negotiations was as far as 
they would go. Chirac, tired of the issue, as they had already spent two hours debating Turkey, did 
not comment. 
During the lunch, however, Chirac brought the matter up again, arguing that the Council 
should reassure Ankara that the process would not be without end. Surprised by Chirac’s about-face, 
Berlusconi inquired what had changed since that morning, to which Chirac replied the difference 
was that this position had, in the meantime, been agreed to between the German Chancellor and 
himself (ibid., p.312). It was, in fact, Germany’s insistance that the phrase ‘without delay’ should be 
added to the draft so that the negotiations would not be stalled after the 2004 decision.  
In the final conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, the indicative clause, 
pertaining to Turkey’s progress towards EU membership, read as follows: 
The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process. If the European 
Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the 
Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European 
Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.  
(European Council, 2002c, par. 19). 
In short, the final decision was to essentially opt for the ‘date for a date’ option, whereby another 
date would follow ‘without delay’ after a positive finding by the Council in December 2004. That the 
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rendezvous date – December 2004 – was destined to occur under the Dutch presidency was not by 
accident, according to one high-level member of the Dutch foreign ministry. Given the right-wing 
direction that the first and second Balkenende cabinets had taken in the Netherlands in 2002, it 
likely that the brakemen had ultimately agreed to the 2004 date because it would then take place 
under a brakeman presidency. If this was indeed the brakemen’s aim, their plan miscarried as the 
next chapter will detail. 
Press reports about the summit mostly described the main diplomatic clash between the 
hard and the soft drivers – with Italy and the UK as the most prominent among the former – and 
the Franco-German axis as their opponents (Blitz & Graham, 2002; Dempsey, 2002e; Staunton, 
2002; “Türkei setzt,” 2002). However, while in the entire constellation of opinions none of the 
brakemen happened to be large countries. They were nevertheless numerous and together made up 
a significant bloc, with Denmark, controlling the draft of the presidency conclusions, prominently 
among them. 
Since France and Germany took up the fight against the hard drivers, the council rallied 
around the soft-driver position – ie. the ‘rendezvous date’ – if it were to come to any consensus at 
all. What is more, this allowed France and Germany to present themselves as those who were the 
hard-nosed bargainers on behalf of the Copenhagen enlargement regime, with the hard drivers being 
soft on the rules, and the brakemen being intolerant or even bigoted. Schröder and Chirac also 
showed that the United States and Turkey had not been able to bully them at a delicate time in the 
broader scheme of international diplomacy (Webster & Watson, 2002). This was particularly 
advantageous for both leaders in their domestic politics.  
7.2.10 Aftermath 
Though the conclusions were a very modest victory for Turkey’s proponents, Turkey itself was not 
pleased with the results. It had pushed for a time-table that would have commenced negotiations as 
soon as possible. Prime Minister Gül responded with calling the European Council discriminatory in 
not treating Turkey the same way that it had treated other candidate countries (“Accord pour,” 
2002). In particular Gül blamed Chirac for preventing an earlier date (“Türkei weist,” 2002).  
Chirac and Schröder, however, calmed Gül & Erdoğan’s ire, by convincing them that the 
result was a compromise solution that kept Turkey in the process, which was better than what would 
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have happened if the brakemen had had their way (“Turkey swallows its disappointment,” 2002). 
Tony Blair also put on a brave face, saying “This is the first time that a firm date has really been 
given for Turkey” (Blitz, 2002). 
Many of the heads of state and government, on the other hand, referred to Turkey’s (and the 
United States’) “bullying tactics”, as partially responsible for the meager results. Particularly Jacques 
Chirac is said to have been irritated by this, when he told his colleagues at the Council table to not 
give in to the “Turkish extortion” (Dempsey & Graham, 2002b; Lauber, 2002). He was also quoted 
as lecturing Abdullah Gül, saying that, “It is not enough to accept European law, one must also be 
polite and civilized” (Ridderbusch, 2002d – trans. mine). Juncker remarked that “blackmail is not 
part of the Acquis Communautaire.” He further complained that “Turkey’s tone was unbearable,” 
which, to him, demonstrated that Turkey was not ready for membership. Even Berlusconi, one of 
the most outspoken drivers acknowledged that “many did not appreciate the pressure,” that Turkey 
exercised on the member states (Dubois & Quatremer, 2002; “EU jetzt,” 2002 – trans. mine). 
7.3 ISSUES 
In 2002, three particular issues were present in the broader context within which the debate about 
Turkey took place. The first of these was, again, the Cyprus situation. Concurrent with the 
discussions about timing a date-for-a-date, discussions between the Cypriot communities were 
taking place at Copenhagen and in the run up to the European Council meeting. Secondly, the 
enlargement of NATO was discussed, where Turkey threatened to hold up NATO enlargement if it 
were not treated more favorably by the EU member states, in a similar fashion as Greece threatened 
to hold up EU enlargement if Cyprus did not get more favorable treatment than the member states 
were inclined to give it. Finally, the looming invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies 
created a security debate around the membership question. The United States, which hoped to have 
a northern front from which to invade Iraq, was keen to assist Turkey in getting an earlier date from 
the member states.  
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7.3.1 Cyprus 
Concurrent with the diplomacy about Turkish accession, the related issue of the Cyprus dispute was 
being addressed during the EU summits. European leaders, especially Gerhard Schröder and his 
Greek colleague Costas Simitis supported Turkey’s EU membership aspiration, but frequently also 
mentioned that progress on Cyprus would go a long way toward making the Council agree to a date 
for negotiations to begin. However, other than Greece, the other fourteen member states were 
careful to make explicit that the decision on Turkey was not related to the negotiations about Cyprus 
(Zecchini, 2002d).  
Joscka Fischer declared that there was “no conditionality” between a solution to Cyprus and 
progress toward Turkish membership, but “everything depends on everything else”  (Sulser, Biegala 
& Plichta, 2002 – trans. mine). In Copenhagen, at a parallel venue, the United Nations facilitated 
talks between the Cypriot leaders. However Rauf Denktash, president of the TRNC (the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus, which was only recognized by Turkey), was hampered in his 
participation due to health problems and the talks ended without fruitful result (Buters, 2002).   
In a letter to Rasmussen, however, Gül hinted that if the Council would offer Turkey a date, 
it would create a positive environment in which the Cyprus problem might more easily be solved 
(Lucas, 2002). The scene was set where three connected issues, Cyprus, NATO, and Turkey’s date 
for accessions, could be solved in one stroke in Copenhagen (Boulton, Dempsey, Hadjipapas & 
Hope 2002; Wintour & Smith, 2002). However, most member states preferred a solution to the 
stalemated conflict before being rewarding Turkey with negotiations for membership in the Union. 
Meanwhile, Denktash rejected a UN plan designed to reunite the divided island, and the hopes for a 
solution were dashed.  
7.3.2 NATO – EU relations 
Turkey’s membership in NATO allowed it a certain degree of leverage with the EU, a card it had 
already played in 1999, when it threatened to scupper NATO enlargement if the EU/NATO 
member states were not more forthcoming on its bid for EU membership and concessions 
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concerning Cyprus (see Chapter 5). Until December 2001, Turkey had vetoed any EU/WEU30 use 
of NATO assets, with the argument that EU-member Greece would drive the EU/WEU to 
partiality in the event of any hostilities between the two NATO “allies”.  
This deadlock with Turkey was initially solved by a US/UK initiative involving two 
concessions. First, Turkey would be consulted on all EU/WEU decisions where Turkey’s interests 
were involved, and second, it was agreed that EU military forces would not intervene in conflicts 
between NATO and EU members. Though it seemed like an elegant compromise, this proposal 
antagonized Greece, and thus a Turkish veto on the deal was replaced by a Greek veto (Çayhan, 
2003, p. 47-48; Ridderbusch, 2002a).  
At Seville, the summit at the end of Spain’s presidency during the first half of 2002, the 
EU/NATO conundrum was framed in the light of the Greek-Turkish disputes. In an attempt to 
solve them, the Council offered Turkey a timetable for accession negotiations, but when Turkey did 
not respond to some concessions made by Greece, the Council’s offer was withdrawn again (van 
Lierop & Paalvast). Greece, seeing its demands not met, blocked the EU/NATO agreement with its 
veto. This, in turn, prevented the EU from taking over the NATO peaceforce ‘Amber Fox’ mission 
in Macedonia at the end of october (“Gipfel lässt,” 2002).    
7.3.3 United States & Iraq 
In late 2002, broader diplomatic circles were concerned with possible action against Iraq, as the 
United States was demanding WMD (weapons of mass destruction) disarmament, while Iraq 
opaquely disclaimed the possession of such weapons. The American military strategy sought to use 
Turkish territory as a front to invade Iraq. To obtain Turkey’s willingness, Washington argued 
forcefully to the EU leaders that Turkey should be given a date for negotiations. This pressure 
annoyed several of the EU leaders, notably Jacques Chirac and Berlusconi, both already proponents 
of Turkey (“La Turquie a ‘la capacité’,” 2002).  
In its persuasive endeavors, Washington also leaned on Denmark’s Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
in particular, but he too chafed under the pressure and said he responded that the decision would be 
a European decision, not an American decision (Gelie & Bocev, 2002). To show that not all 
                                                
30 The Western European Union (WEU) was a European framework for military cooperation existing since 1954 that 
was gradually absorbed into the EU.  
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countries were put off by the American interference, Denis MacShane, the British Europe Minister, 
responded to complaints of American lobbying by putting it in a different perspective: “The 
Europeans are always quick to lecture the United States on what it should do in terms of strategic 
decisions,” he said. “I have no problem with Americans making their point of view on Europe 
known to us” (Vinocur, 2002). 
After the decision, lacking the wanted date, the White House still congratulated Turkey (on 
the European decision, thus framing it as a victory for Turkey (“Les Etats-Unis se félicitent,” 2002). 
Yet the pressure exerted by the United States had not exactly been new to the EU. European leaders 
had also chafed under the pressure from Washington in both 1997 and 1999, and would do so again 
in 2004 and 2006. Therefore, the pressure from the United States cannot explain the varying 
European policies on Turkey, even if it was – doubtlessly – on the minds of the European leaders, 
for good or ill.  
In many respects the run-up to the Iraq war in 2003 split the EU member states in their 
policies. France and Germany, in particular, were loud antagonists – Gerhard Schröder won 
reelection based on his opposition to the war. In contrast to France and Germany’s position, other 
European countries were supportive of the United States’ policies on Iraq. In January, eight 
European leaders signed what became known as the ‘gang of eight letter’, expressing their support. 
If this signified a distinction between the Atlanticist countries and the continentals, it clearly did not 
correlate with the member-states’ policies vis-à-vis Turkey. Germany, for instance, was a soft driver 
of Turkey’s membership ambitions.  
7.4 THE MEMBER-STATE POSITIONS 
Categorizing member states as driver/passenger/brakeman in 2002 leaves much to interpretation. In 
that year, there were, essentially, three explicit policy proposals on the table. One option was to end 
the process altogether and opt for a ‘privileged partnership’. However, while this may have been the 
preference of one or two member states in 2002, it was not actively articulated even by the most 
stalwart brakemen.  
The most explicit proposal from the brakeman side of the argument was the ‘wait-and-see’ 
approach, by which negotiations could start at some time in the future, once the Commission and 
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the Council deemed that Turkey had fulfilled the political Copenhagen criteria. The most forward-
leaning approach, articulated by Turkey and the United States was for an ‘early start’ of negotiations 
in 2003. This was also the position of the Italian and British governments, which argued for 
December 2004 to be the latest date at which negotiations should start. The third proposal was for a 
‘rendezvous date’, which was a date at a specific time in the future when the Council would decide 
on opening accession negotiations or not.  
While, in a three-choice decision it would be easy to consider those opting for the ‘wait and 
see’ approach as brakemen, for the ‘early start’ as drivers, and for the ‘rendezvous date’ option as 
passengers, this would mistake adopted strategies for the actual preferences of the member states. It 
would also misunderstand the nature by which the Council would come to its conclusions. The 
‘rendezvous date’ proposal was one hammered out between the French and the Germans, with the 
Germans advocating for the more favorable terms for Turkey and France wanting a longer time 
horizon. The ‘rendezvous date’ proposal would be the most that the drivers could get, given the 
large number of countries supporting the ‘wait and see’ policy, as proposed by the Commission and 
the advocated by the Danish presidency.   
As such, the advocates for the ‘early start’ and ‘rendezvous date’ options are all considered 
drivers. The distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ drivers serves the purpose of illustration. These 
distinctions are not taken up in the analyses of the later chapters in this research. The one exception 
to the rule is France, which is categorized as a ‘passenger’ to indicate its middle position, not because 
it was passive. This will be further detailed in the section on France, below.  
Nevertheless, ‘rendezvous date’ option was still a considerable disappointment for Turkey. 
This was especially so since this date would not be until after the fifth enlargement, which would 
expand the veto-holding members from fifteen to twenty-five, one of whom would be Greek 
Cyprus. Nevertheless, it was a timeline with a medium-term perspective on accession negotiations as 
well as a firm commitment that Turkey would not be left behind indefinitely, regardless of its merits.  
7.4.1 Austria 
The Austrian government proved to be an outspoken brakeman during the 2002 episode. During 
this episode, however, Austria experienced a breakdown in the governing coalition of ÖVP -FPÖ 
(conservative Christian democrat - far-right liberal), due to turmoil within the FPÖ. This turmoil 
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began with a proposed tax reform being delayed due to the summer floods. Jörg Haider, the 
governor of the Austrian state Carinthia and former FPÖ-leader, had initiated the tax cuts to lower 
and middle incomes, whereas the Vice-Chancellor and serving FPÖ-leader Susanne Riess-Passer 
supported the government’s proposed delay of the tax cuts (“Austrian far-right,” 2002). 
Additionally, Riess-Passer supported withholding the party’s veto on the forthcoming EU 
enlargement, whereas the Haider faction desired to keep the unilateral veto option on the table (“FP 
in crisis,” 2002). The crisis in the party caused the resignation of Riess-Passer and her colleagues in 
the government, bringing about elections to be held in November. 
The November elections resulted in considerable gains for Chancellor Schüssel’s ÖVP and 
great losses for the FPÖ. Pursuant to the elections, the political system engaged in three months of 
coalition negotiations with other parties, finally resolving to form another ÖVP-FPÖ coalition in 
2003, though by then with a significantly different power balance between the two parties. 
With regard to Turkey, there are several incidents that demonstrate the orientation of the 
government dealing with the 2002 issues of the EU. In the summer, prior to the political turmoil 
described above, the Turkish Foreign Minister İsmael Cem paid a visit to Berlin, where the Austrian 
Ambassador Marius Calligaris made the comment to the German daily General-Anzeiger that 
Ankara was playing a “risky game” by making its case for a date as powerfully as it did. He argued 
that Turkey was setting itself up for frustration and disappointment by raising such expectations 
(Güsten, 2002).  
Much later, after the pre-summit foreign ministers meeting in Brussels, when most countries 
seemed to be rallying around the Franco-German proposal, Austria dissented from this proposal in 
the press, arguing that the proposed process was too fast (“Turquie: le sommet,” 2002). According 
to one news report Austria was “deeply” opposed to giving any date to Turkey (Dempsey, 2002b) 
Ludlow argued that Austria had been Turkey’s most stalwart opponent at the Copenhagen summit 
itself (Ludlow 2004, p. 311).  
Apart from these specific indications Austria’s position, the press frequently numbered 
Austria among other brakeman countries (e.g. Black, 2002a; Black & White, 2002; Blome & Middel, 
2002; Bocev, 2002; Dempsey, 2002d; Dempsey & Graham, 2002b; Egurbide & Yarnoz, 2002; Fuller, 
2002b; “La Turquie s'invite,” 2002; Modoux, 2002; Peel, 2002; “Türkei kann auf,” 2002; “Türkei 
setzt,” 2002; Zecchini, 2002c, 2002d). 
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7.4.2 Belgium 
Belgium was a ‘driver’, supportive of an earlier date for accession negotiations. Nevertheless, it 
began the season with less enthusiasm for Turkey. After the reform package, which abolished the 
death penalty, among other things, the Belgian Foreign Ministry was hesitant to make a declarative 
statement on the matter, pending a full understanding of the content of the legislation (“Europeos 
consideran,” 2002). According to the Dutch daily Financieel Dagblad, Belgian Prime Minister 
Verhofstad opposed giving Turkey a date to begin negotiations, although he did express his firm 
support for Turkish membership, by saying that refusing eventual membership to a country, because 
it was not yet prepared to meet the criteria, would be too much of a sanction (“Brede instemming,” 
2002).  
In October and November, the Belgian position seemed to slightly warm up to Turkey’s 
cause. Upon the electoral victory of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) in Turkey, Belgian 
Foreign Minister Louis Michel invited AKP leader Erdoğan to “implement his pro-European 
intentions and continue the implementation of constitutional reforms in view of satisfying the 
Copenhagen criteria” (“Le monde veut,” 2002 – trans. mine). In a mid-November speech about the 
EU at the College of Europe in Bruges, Verhofstadt said there was a false debate about this because 
“some people are dreaming of a monocultural Europe, the Europe of Christian values” (van Lierop 
& de Horde, 2002 – trans. mine). In the Belgian prime minister’s opinion, the question whether 
Turkey could join the EU had already been answered positively at the Helsinki summit in 1999. 
Setting a date for the start of negotiations was, in his opinion, up to the Turks (Bulcke, 2002).  
On December 6, having met with Yaşar Yakış, the new Turkish Foreign Minister, Louis 
Michel declared that Belgium would propose both an evaluation date and a date for negotiations to 
begin in 2004. “Having an assessment in 2004 and to also begin negotiations in 2004 would likely be 
more encouraging toward Turkey” (“UE-Turquie,” 2002). “The Franco-German position is 
positive,” he said, “but we would like to express a more pro-active position” (ibid., Akinci, 2002; de 
Barochez, 2002b; Zecchini, 2002c – trans. mine). In a cabinet decision, the Belgian government 
decided to support a date at “for example, the end of 2003,” especially if Turkey would join the 
European position on Cyprus (Middel, 2002e).  
In contrast to Austria, which used the pre-summit foreign ministers meeting in Brussels to 
dissent on behalf of the brakeman position, Belgium complained that the process was too slow and 
that actual negotiations should commence mid-2004 (“Turquie: le sommet,” 2002). Ludlow and 
  243 
numerous news articles number Belgium among the group of countries that supported Turkey for 
either the ‘early start’ or the ‘rendezvous date’ option (Black & White, 2002; Dempsey, 2002b; 
2002c; Dubois & Quatremer, 2002; Gelie, 2002; Gelie & Bocev, 2002; Ludlow, 2004, p. 254; 
“Mehrheit der EU-Staaten,” 2002; Quatremer, 2002; Staunton, 2002; Webster & Watson, 2002; 
Zecchini, 2002d).  
7.4.3 Denmark 
During its presidency in the second half of 2002, Denmark was determined that enlargement would 
be the main focus, particularly of the Copenhagen summit. However, while it was determined to 
solve the remaining dilemmas of the fifth enlargement to Eastern Europe, it was not inclined to 
move Turkey’s candidacy forward. In embracing the ‘wait and see’ approach of the Commission, 
Denmark proved to be a brakeman. 
This assessment was not beyond dispute, however. Several sources, including a confidential 
interview with a Dutch diplomat, identified Denmark as being in favor of Turkey. The majority of 
the news articles cited here as well, including the Ludlow acount, mark Denmark as not being 
opposed to the principle that Turkey might join at some point. However, the Danes were adamant 
that Turkey should not be given a date to begin accession negotiations before it had met the 
Copenhagen criteria, and Denmark very resistant to adopt a rendezvous date. The articles 
contradicting this finding are mentioned below, but their weaknesses are also pointed out. 
Although Denmark had to play the part of consensus-broker in its role of the presidency, 
with regard to the Turkish case it frequently clashed with where the major countries wanted to go. 
During its preparation for Copenhagen, Denmark’s constant refrain on Turkey reverberated the 
‘Copenhagen criteria’ that needed to be unbending in the face of other interests. One Danish 
diplomat, also thinking along these lines, espressed fear that political interests, presumably those in 
Turkey’s favor, would weaken the Council’s resolve to hold Turkey to the Copenhagen standard 
(Sulser & Biegala, 2002). 
Accordingly, the Danish drafts for the presidency conclusions always articulated the most 
reserved position with regard to Turkey. Along with the Commission, Denmark held that though 
Turkey had made respectable progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria on paper, it still had 
to be implemented in practice. Though Turkey should be treated the same as other candidates, it had 
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not met the political criteria and should therefore not be given a date to begin accession 
negotiations.  
In a June interview with Der Spiegel, Rasmussen was asked about Denmark wanting a 
preliminary decision on the accession of Turkey, to which he replied that, “I don’t believe Turkey is 
that far yet. As a candidate they must be treated the same as other candidates. That means: 
negotiations must begin immediately when they have met the political criteria” (Ertel & Schreiber, 
2002 – trans. mine). This response supported the idea of the negotiation beginning ‘without delay’, 
except that the Turks would have to wait until they met the political criteria before setting a 
predetermined date.  
In July, Denmark’s ambassador to Berlin, Christian Hoppe, remarked that Turkey still had a 
great deal to do before it could think of accession negotiations (Güsten, 2002). That is not to say 
that the Danes were unimpressed with Turkey’s progress. The Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig 
Møller called the reform package “good progress” (Gottschlich, 2002). However, their assessment 
was that it was insufficient. On November 9th, responding to Giscard d’Estaing’s interview in Le 
Monde, Rasmussen reiterated that Turkey should be treated the same as the other candidates but 
that Turkey’s progress did not yet merit a date for accession negotiations (Leparmentier & Zecchini, 
2002).  
In the growing rift between Rasmussen and Schröder, as already hinted at, the Chancellor 
was not pleased with the draft conclusions as they were taking shape in Copenhagen. Because of 
Schröder’s displeasure on Turkey as well as the financial package starting to take shape, the 
chancellor circumvented Rasmussen by taking matters straight to Chirac, with whom he agreed on a 
rendezvous date for Turkey. Rasmussen, in turn, rejected the Franco-German common position, 
maintaining that Turkey should not be given any date until it had fulfilled all the political criteria. He 
thus rejected any dates and (inaccurately, as it turned out) affirmed that none would be offered at 
Copenhagen (Kaserer, 2002).  
Througout the episode Denmark remained particularly firm about not offering Turkey a 
date, rendezvous or otherwise, and used its control over the text of the presidency conclusions to 
avoid naming any date, despite heavy pressure from the larger EU members as well as from 
Washington and Ankara (Ludlow, 2004, p. 258). Prior to the summit, Rasmussen received a phone 
call from President Bush, who argued on Turkey’s behalf on strategic grounds. Rasmussen said he 
shared Bush’s concern over the possibility of Turkey sliding into fundamentalism, but maintained 
that a country can only join the European Union when it meets the political criteria set out at 
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Copenhagen in 1993 (van Lierop, 2002). Like others, the Danish leadership was annoyed by the 
American interference. Referring to the phonecall, Per Stig Møller asserted, “that the important 
thing for Turkey is not what Americans think, but what Europeans decide” (Gelie & Bocev, 2002 – 
trans. mine). 
According to Ludlow, there was a certain amount of misunderstanding about Rasmussen’s 
position. There was a “tendency of the Anglo-Americans to assume that he was ‘one of us’” 
(Ludlow, 2004, p. 258). As will be described below, this misperception was also true of the Financial 
Times, despite Rasmussen’s repeated assertions that he was not intending to offer Turkey any dates. 
At Copenhagen, when Turkey’s allies in the Council received their drafts of the presidency 
conclusions just before the summit, the draft stated that the Council would not gauge Turkey’s 
progress until December 2004 after that years’ regular report by the Commission. While this 
accommodated the rendezvous date idea, it did so negatively by excluding the possibility for an 
earlier review rather than simply advocating for negotiations to start as soom as Turkey met the 
political criteria. Ludlow wrote that “The Presidency’s message was in other words heavily 
conditional, dateless and devoid of anything that could be described as genuinely novel” (ibid., p. 
311). It was dateless in the sense that it did not offer a date for accession negotiations to begin if 
Turkey was found to have met the political criteria.  
The German foreign minister suggested that the negotiations should begin ‘without delay’ 
after the 2004 Council decision, Rasmussen opposed this amendment, being profoundly sceptical 
about the wisdom of it (ibid., 312). He argued that it would destroy the conditionality contained in 
the Presidency draft. Rasmussen only reluctantly acquiesced after a tactful explanation from Jacques 
Chirac, supported by Blair and Berlusconi, on how Turkey’s obligations were well understood in 
Ankara, and the conditionality was suffiently implied.  
In summary, while Rasmussen held out the carrot of a nebulous ‘positive signal’, neither he 
nor his foreign policy team ever advocated for a positive signal to be put into the conclusions. The 
draft conclusions were not reflective of the balance of interests among the member states, and none 
of the major member states. In that regard, Denmark behaved no differently than the brakemen, 
despite its role as consensus-broker.  
As already mentioned, several articles in the Financial Times challenged the findings of the 
paragraphs above. Leyla Boulton and Judy Dempsey (2002) mention Denmark as backing Britain 
together with Greece in favor of a rendezvous date, probably in 2003. Boulton & Parker, (2002) on 
the same day (November 9th), also list Denmark among these same countries, along with Germany 
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as wanting to send Turkey a ‘positive signal’. This ‘positive signal’ had indeed been the phrase used 
by Denmark (as read in e.g. Black & White, 2002; Buters, 2002; Fuller, 2002a), but it had never been 
actually backed by a date to start negotiations, not even by a date to set such a date. 
In an article of her own on November 20th, Dempsey (2002b) maintained the driver 
interpretation by writing that Denmark supported offering Turkey a date. Three weeks later, 
however, in Boulton, Dempsey and Hoyos (2002), Rasmussen, after having met with Erdoğan in 
Copenhagen, was cited as saying “As far as a date for the start of the accession negotiations is 
concerned, my answer is clear: Turkey can get a date if and when Turkey fulfils the political criteria.” 
Thereby, at least two of these three reporters contradicted their own previous account of Denmark’s 
position. Curiously, the Financial Times, with Judy Dempsey again as a co-author, in an article on 
December 4th (Daniel & Dempsey, 2002), maintained the conviction that Denmark was a driver, by 
naming Denmark among a group of other drivers (Britain, Greece, Spain and Italy).  
Other articles supporting the classification of Denmark as a brakeman were: Fuller, 2002b, 
Gelie, 2002, and “Mehrheit der EU-Staaten,” 2002, Webster & Watson, 2002.  
7.4.4 Finland 
In 2002, Finland adopted a much more critical stance vis-à-vis Turkey than previously and is here 
numbered among the brakemen. According to the press reports cited below this mostly due to 
Turkey’s human rights record. During a state visit to Germany in early November, Finnish Prime 
Minister Paavo Lipponen took a different position than the German government, when the question 
of Turkey was raised at a press conference. Regarding the date, Lipponen argued that “it is still too 
early” and that there were other ways in which to signal support for Turkey’s accession ambitions, 
while he “wished for a real debate about what sort of Europe was desired and where the borders 
are” (Hollstein, 2002 – trans. mine). 
After an early December bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Costas Simitis of Greece, 
Lipponen agreed with sending Turkey a ‘positive signal’ by supporting its reforms and Turkey’s 
‘European perspective’. However, according to Agence France-Presse, he added that, “the Finnish 
government doubted that one can fix a date for the start of accession negotiations” at the 
Copenhagen summit (“Athènes et Helsinki,” 2002 – trans. mine). The Spanish news agency Agencia 
EFE, on the other hand, also reporting on the bilateral meeting with Simitis in two related articles, 
  247 
mentioned Lipponen and Simitis as agreeing on a date for negotiations to be set at Copenhagen 
(“Lipponen y Simitis,” 2002; “Ministro griego,” 2002). Due to the direct quote in the AFP article, 
which is more genereally supported by the remainder of the Finnish press’ assessment it can be 
concluded that Agencia EFE had probably reported the event inaccurately, especially since Finland 
was frequently mentioned among the brakemen countries in other news reports (Dempsey, 2002d; 
Modoux, 2002; Ludlow, 2004, p. 254; “Türkei kann auf,” 2002). Other articles name ‘the 
Scandinavian countries’ as being brakemen, en bloc, without mentioning Finland (or Sweden) by 
name (Fuller, 2002b; Zecchini, 2002d).  
7.4.5 France 
France’s position in the debate is the most difficult to discern. There was a vigorous domestic debate 
about the issue. Giscard d’Estaing’s opposition to Turkey’s membership ambitions has already been 
mentioned, but his was far from the only voice from the mainstream French right to oppose 
Turkey’s membership ambitions or to call Turkey’s ‘fit’ in the EU into question31. Alain Juppé, prime 
minister until May of that year, for instance, saw Turkey as a bad fit on cultural grounds, while 
Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, argued for a thorough debate about Europe’s identity and 
frontiers (Ludlow, 2004, p. 255).  
The French left, on the other hand, opposed exclusion of Turkey on neither cultural nor 
religious grounds, but on human rights. One exception, socialist Hubert Védrine – de Villepin’s 
predecessor, who had been on board for Turkey during his own tenure as Foreign Minister during 
the 1997 and 1999 episodes – argued that Europe had to end somewhere, and thus a geographic 
rationale for excluding Turkey seemed justifiable (Barotte, 2002; Dely, Guiral & Schneider, 2002; 
“Droite et gauche,” 2002; Zerrouky, 2002). Most socialists, however, articulated a policy of strict 
adherence to the Copenhagen criteria for membership (“Turquie: Les Leaders,” 2002). However, in 
the wake of Chirac’s overwhelming electoral victory in the presidential elections and his party’s 
onslaught in the parliamentary elections, it was the right that called the shots in French policy 
making. 
                                                
31 This assessment need not delve into the opinions of the non-mainstream French right, which were vitriolic on the 
subject of Turkey joining the EU.  
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The question of Turkey remained out of the press for a while until late October, when the 
issue of Turkish accession and the French policy toward that prospect became salient. At the 
Brussels summit, Chirac had distanced himself from Berlin and London by agreeing with the 
Commission’s position that the progress made in Turkey did not yet merit the beginning of 
negotiations. “All the Europeans are impressed with the progress recently made by Turkey, 
particularly in the field of human rights, but they are obliged to note that, as yet, the progress is 
insufficient,” he said, adding: “From there, it is very difficult to set dates.” Nevertheless he argued 
that something could still be done to fix the “hopes and ambitions” of Turkey (Boehm, 2002; 
Dubois, Majerczak & Quatremer, 2002 – trans. mine). 
After the Turkish elections in early November, which brought Gül and Erdoğan to power, 
the French government was cautious about what the new leadership in Turkey would bring. “We 
will be attentive to the actions of the new government,” French Prime Minister Raffarin told Les 
Echos (“Les Européens disposes,” 2002). By late November, the foreign ministry articulated a policy 
in line with the European Commission: that Turkey would start accession negotiations once it met 
the political criteria, but that there was no date for this to happen (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 
2002).  
Chirac meanwhile asserted that Turkey had “its full place” in Europe, thus countering many 
of the right-wing voices in French political circles. “While one can discuss from a strictly 
geographical perspective,” he said regarding Turkish EU membership aspirations, “one cannot have 
such a discussion about history and civilization” (de Barochez, 2002a; “Jacques Chirac,” 2002 – 
trans. mine; Zecchini, 2002b). Chirac also took particular issue with the religious argument, 
addressing the supposed threat of 65 million Muslim Turks invading Europe as soon as Turkey had 
become a member of the EU. “Is there talk of 60 million French Christians?” he asked rhetorically 
(Merchet, 2002 – trans. mine). At the NATO summit soon thereafter, Chirac reiterated that Turkey 
had a place in Europe. He explicitly opposed the view that Turkey’s dominant religion made it 
ineligible for membership, arguing for a more secular interpretation of the question. Instead of 
religion being the defining characteristic, he argued that Turkey should have its place in Europe 
from a political, economic, social and strategic point of view, (“Sommet de l'OTAN,” 2002).  
As of November 27, nearly two weeks before the Copenhagen summit, Chirac declared that 
his government was still undecided about a date, though he indicated that he was working toward a 
European consensus on the issue (“La France privilégie,” 2002; Leclercq, 2002; Manoli, 2002). 
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Chirac also emphasized the importance of the Copenhagen criteria in determining Turkey’s progress 
(Mamarbachi, 2002; “La Turquie a plaidé,” 2002).  
In early December, Dominique de Villepin, held a foreign policy speech in Marseille, in 
which his headline phrase was that the European commitment to Turkey could not be questioned 
(Parenthoen, 2002; Tréan, 2002). His aides later explained this to La Croix as implying France’s 
interest in having the Copenhagen European Council set a date for the start of accession 
negotiations (“Villepin veut confirmer,” 2002). 
The Franco-German pre-summit has already been detailed. At this meeting Chirac and 
Schröder agreed to push for actual negotiations to begin in July 2005, following the 2004 
Commission’s assessment of Turkey’s progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria (Dempsey 
& Guha, 2002). This seems to have been a concession on France’s part, by which it became more of 
a driver than its actual preferences had dictated. 
Nevertheless, while clearly not unsupportive of Turkey’s ambitions, sources around Chirac 
argued that he would not allow negotiations to start by the first half of 2004 (“Frankreich uneins,” 
2002). Regarding this question of timing, Chirac said that he understood Turkey’s desire for a date to 
open accession negotiations, but that the procedures of the Copenhagen criteria dictated when such 
negotiations could begin (“La Turquie a toute,” 2002). 
During the Copenhagen summit itself, Ludlow (2004, p. 311) names Chirac as the ‘most 
brutal’ of Turkey’s critics. Even so, Chirac seemed to move back and forth depending on the precise 
formulations. For example, when he had come to an agreement on the matter with Schröder, he 
adopted the December 2004 date that he had, as mentioned above, previously dismissed (ibid., p. 
312). It may be clear that Gül and Erdoğan did not think of Chirac as their ally after the summit 
(“Tension entre Paris et Ankara,” 2002). More than likely, however, this public displeasure on the 
part of the Turks suited Chirac’s domestic politics just fine. 
Chirac’s position left his prime minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, in a predicament as a majority 
their center-right UMP members vehemently opposed Turkish membership. At the same time, 
Raffarin had to maintain a united front of the the French executive, as was common practice in 
French politics. Even under the uneasy Chirac-Jospin cohabitation, which had resigned in May that 
year, the President and the Prime Minister had always attempted to speak with one voice on 
diplomatic matters (Tabard, 2002). 
In many instances, Chirac and members of his government took very critical –sometimes 
even brutal, to quote Ludlow – stances vis-à-vis Turkey, arguing for longer timetables when Turkey 
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and its allies argued to shorten them. According to well-placed sources, the date Chirac seemed to 
have in mind for the beginning of negotiations was in 2008, rather than 2004 (Ludlow, 2004, p. 255; 
Modoux, 2002). If there were no more to the story, France would certainly have to be numbered 
among the brakemen, but as has already been pointed out, Chirac had, in spite of domestic aversion, 
not played a particularly ill-disposed role in the debates. As one EU diplomat put it, “Chirac... is not 
hostile to Turkey. But... he will be a tough negotiator” (Boulton, Dempsey & Hoyos, 2002).   
It was Jacques Chirac who brokered the ‘rendezvous date’ with Germany,  as opposed to the 
‘wait-and-see’ approach put forward by the Commission and the Presidency. This may still not 
warrant calling France a ‘driver’, especially when its position is compared to that of the 1997 and 
1999 debates. More than likely, though impossible to prove using press reports, France’s stance 
during the 2002 episode was strategic, in that it was highly critical to placate domestic pressure but 
nevertheless yielding toward Germany as all the other major European countries (The UK, Spain, 
Germany, Italy) were drivers. Perhaps France’s position needs to be analyzed with an even broader 
set of interests. For instance, the fact that France ‘lightened up’ on Turkey between the 12th of 
December and the 13th, suggests that some deal had been made with Germany. It is, however, 
beyond the scope of this research to determine what exchanges were made in return for France’s flip 
on Turkey.  
Because France was difficult to place in either the driver or the brakeman category, it will be 
counted as a passenger, though this should not be mistaken for a passive position. 
7.4.6 Germany 
Germany’s position during the 2002 episode appeared to vary, at least in terms of what it expressed 
in the press. The two concurrent developments that seemed to relate to Germany’s position were its 
closely-fought bundestag elections and its relationship with the United States during the run-up to 
the Iraq War. During this episode, Germany’s position seemed to shift from that of a passenger to 
that of an outspoken driver. Then, if shifted policy to appear like a moderate driver, as it was 
building the Council’s consensus together with France. In the final analysis, Germany needs to be 
considered a driver as it adopted a pragmatic position with which France could agree and get a result 
that was more beneficial for Turkey than the common position of the Commission and the Danish 
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presidency, and also more positive for Turkey than the French preference. The following paragraphs 
detail Germany’s evolving positions and analyse the reasons around which the rhetoric evolved. 
As already mentioned, at the end of the Seville summit, Schröder doubted the possibility for 
a binding timetable being offered at Copenhagen, a position that was ascribed to the impending 
Bundestag elections by the Berliner Zeitung (“Problem-Kandidat Türkei,” 2002). In other words, 
Schröder offering the same level of support for Turkey as he had three years earlier was seen as 
hurting the SPD’s electoral prospects. 
In early July, İsmail Cem traveled to Berlin to discuss Turkey’s enlargement perspectives 
with Joschka Fischer. At their meeting, Fischer assured Cem of Germany’s support, but that 
progress towards negotiations was in Ankara’s own hands. He also said that it would be up to the 
Commission to gauge Turkey’s progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria (“Fischer 
unterstützt Türkei,” 2002). As such, while Fischer was expressing his good will toward Turkey, he 
also stressed that the results in Copenhagen would be a function of Turkey’s own policy adjustments 
toward meeting the criteria.  
In August, after Turkey had ratified its reforms, abolishing the death penalty and allowing 
education and broadcasts in Kurdish, Joschka Fischer declared that the reforms were a positive 
signal for Turkey and Europe. Interior Minister Otto Schily said that the ratification was very 
important for relations between the EU and Turkey (“Türkei bringt,” 2002).  The state secretary of 
foreign affairs, Guntar Pleuger, said that, “the Turkish reform package was unthinkable four years 
ago. It is an important step toward Europe. A target date may, on the one hand, contribute to 
dynamism, but on the other hand, if it is not feasible, it will create great frustration” (Ridderbusch, 
2002b – trans. mine). In other words, Germany did not wish to commit its political capital to 
Turkey’s cause, leaving it up to Turkey to advance on its own merits, rather than on its political 
connections.  
Meanwhile, Edmund Stoiber, the CSU (The Bavarian Christian Social Union) candidate for 
Chancellor during that year, also made it clear that he would not shift the CDU/CSU position on 
Turkey when his party was re-elected. His stated grounds for opposing Turkey were based in cultural 
and religious differences and were not going to be shifted by Turkey’s progress toward meeting the 
Copenhagen criteria. In an interview with Die Welt, Stoiber’s ally and coalition partner Wolfgang 
Schäuble, deputy chairman of CDU (Christian democrats) – defined the CDU/CSU position on the 
EU as a community of destiny and identity, in which countries that were only partially in Europe 
could not be full members. Given Turkey’s importance, he advocated for the closest possible 
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partnership and dialogue instead of membership. Interestingly, Schäuble did mention that because of 
the promise of membership made in the sixties, there were expectations in Turkey that one could 
not unilaterally terminate (Schuster, 2002).  
Nevertheless, it was clear that a CDU/CSU-led government would turn Germany into a 
brakeman. It was less clear whether or not the SPD/Grünen, were going to drive Turkey’s case as 
enthusiastically as they had done three years prior, given the unpopularity of Turkey’s candidacy in 
Germany. According to their pre-election rhetoric, both seemed comfortable with letting Turkey 
take care of its own prospects, rather than actively pushing its case forward with the other member 
states. Prior to the Bundestag election they mostly exhibited the behavior of a passenger. 
The German election results of September 22nd were close. The SPD/Greens coalition won 
the elections, commanding a popular-vote lead of less than 600,000 votes, losing 39 seats from their 
majority in the Bundestag. The chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the Turkish national 
assembly hailed the results as “good news for Turkey” (“Geteiltes Echo,” 2002). It is beyond doubt 
that had Schröder not picked up the cause of opposing the Iraq war in his election campaign, 
Edmund Stoiber would have become Chancellor. Many observers remarked how it was the first time 
that Germany had allowed its foreign policy to be usurped by its domestic politics.  
The end of the election did not, however, mean that the CDU/CSU ceased their critique of 
Schröder’s policy regarding Turkey. Both Stoiber and Schäuble maintained their criticism of 
Turkey’s EU membership. ‘Is it a good idea for Turkey to give up its own roots and identity?’ 
Schäuble asked, also remarking that Turkey did not share ‘historical memories’ with Europe 
(Outshoorn, 2002 – trans. mine). Meanwhile Stoiber suggested a free trade area between Turkey and 
the EU (which, in the form of the customs union had already been in practice since 1996). CSU 
chairman Michael Glos, together with Peter Hinze and Friedbert Pflüger32, criticized the 
government’s position, based on demographic, economic, cultural and religious arguments against 
Turkish membership (“Glos gegen Beitritt ,” 2002; “Innenpolitischer Streit,” 2002). The future 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, at the time chairwoman of CDU, also shared this position (“Union 
erteilt,” 2002). 
The FDP (Free Democratic Party, right-wing liberals) leader Guido Westerwelle argued 
against a date for accession negotiations based on the Copenhagen criteria, stressing that Turkey 
                                                
32 At the time, Peter Hinze served as spokesman of the CDU/CSU delegation in the European Parliament, and Friedbart 
Pflüger was the CDU Chairman of the EU affairs committee in the Bundestag. 
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could not become a member of the EU as long as people were still tortured in Turkish jails 
(“Schröder trifft Chef,” 2002; “Westerwelle begrüßt,” 2002). 
After Schröder’s re-election, the Federal government came under American pressure to 
repair the damaged relationship by Schröder’s anti Iraq war campaign, whereby support for Turkish 
accession was considered one way for Berlin to mend the frayed ties with Washington (Frankenfeld, 
2002; Ridderbusch, 2002c; Schuster, 2002b).  
After the publication of the Commission’s report, which did not advise beginning accession 
negotiations or setting a date, Fischer assured the Turkish foreign minister, Şükrü Sina Gürel, that 
Germany supported Turkey’s reforms as well as its EU membership (Fischer reist,” 2002). He called 
again for a “positive signal” and even mentioned the possibility of a date to set a timeline for the 
beginning of accession negotiations. Sources in the German government called it “hypocrisy not to 
give Turkey even a long-term date for the start of accession negotiations” (Blome & Middel, 2002; 
Ridderbusch, 2002c – trans. mine).  
At the Brussels Summit, during wranglings over the presidency text, which commended 
Turkey for its progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria, Commission President Romano 
Prodi attempted to weaken the reference to ‘the opening of negotiations’. In response, Schröder 
strongly insisted, that this reference should not be stricken, and that the pro-Turkey language should 
even be strengthened with a more concrete framework of how the process should progress in the 
future (Ludlow, 2004, p. 194-195).   
Sources in the EU Commission noted Schröder and Fischer’s apparent reversal from their 
pre-election policy of not forcing the Turkish issue. Since their policy was at odds with the 
Commission’s recommendation, these sources expressed their annoyance at Berlin’s new stance 
(“Brüssel irritiert,” 2002; Middel 2002c). This was also personally poignant, because Schröder and 
Fischer’s former colleague, Günter Verheugen, was the enlargement commissioner under whose 
authority the Commission’s recommendation had been written. 
Despite the Commission’s ire, Germany began arguing for the rendezvous date. While the 
government sources themselves argued that Turkey had “a claim for a date” to begin negotiations, 
the Chancellor was then apparently seeking agreement among the member states for the ‘rendezvous 
date’ option that consequently also included a date for the actual negotiations to begin, if Turkey 
met the criteria (Middel, 2002a).  
On November 13 (four weeks prior to the summit), Schröder took it a step further by 
arguing for an actual date to begin negotiations, rather than just the rendezvous date option. He 
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called for making it clear to Turkey that the “door to Europe is open,” and that it was possible for 
the Copenhagen summit to name a date for negotiations (“Bundesregierung will Türkei,” 2002 – 
trans. mine). Schröder also said that the member states would have to learn how the new AKP 
government was planning to live up to its commitments to the EU.  
This rhetorical position shifted again upon Erdoğan’s visit to Berlin on the 19th of that 
month, when it seems that Germany had reverted to embracing the ‘rendezvous date’ as the EU 
policy of choice. In statements made after the meeting between the German and the Turkish leaders, 
Fischer said that while he was determined to send Turkey a “positive signal”, he could not say if they 
were going to be able to as far as Erdoğan would like (“Erdoğan signalisiert,” 2002 – trans. mine). 
On the 28th of November, the Schröder government reiterated its support for the compromise 
‘rendezvous date’ option, with the first date in the beginning of 2004 at the earliest. It turned out to 
be not enough for Erdoğan, who complained that Berlin was the only European capital (that he had 
visited) where he had been denied a firm date for accession negotiations to begin (Middel, 2002d).  
Germany and France were both determined to rebuild their shared leadership of the EU, 
and thus prepared for a pre-summit meeting, where knowing the French reservations, Schröder 
hoped to convince Chirac to adopt the ‘rendezvous date’ option as their common Franco-German 
position (Parenthoen, 2002).  At the Franco-German summit, detailed above, Germany agreed with 
France that they would have a common position on Turkey at Copenhagen. What exactly that 
common position would be, they kept to themselves, but it soon leaked out that they had agreed on 
a timetable of starting negotiations in July 2005, provided that the Commission’s review on Turkey’s 
progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria, would warrant it (Dempsey & Guha, 2002). After 
the meeting Fischer said that, “it will be decisive, whether an Islamic country can go the way of 
democracy, social justice and a market economy or not. … It is unclear if this will succeed. Failure 
will give rise to new potential for terrorist threats. If Turkey succeeds, it will be the biggest success in 
the fight against international terrorism” (Scally, 2002).  
Between the Franco-German meeting and the Copenhagen summit proper, Germany also 
took the effort to point out to the press that an overwhelming majority of states supported offering 
Turkey ‘a date’. In one source, Fischer is quoted as saying ‘double digits’, meaning ten or more 
member states (Boulton, Dempsey, Hadipapas & Hope, 2002; “Cumbre de Copenhague,” 2002). 
This turned out to be a bit optimistic, but it nevertheless created a public image. 
At the summit itself, Germany’s role in the debate did not get much attention in the news 
reports, while the opinions of the hard drivers (Blair and Berlusconi) and the hard brakemen 
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(Schüssel and Balkenende) made their way to the press so much the more. It was, nevertheless, 
Fischer’s motion that amended the presidency draft to read that the negotiations should begin 
‘without delay’ after an assessment of Turkey’s progress in December 2004 (Ludlow, 2004, p. 312). 
As such, it can be surmised that Germany had pushed its preferences not so much in the open 
debates with the member states at the Council table, as in separate consultation with France behind 
the scenes.  
 Afterwards, questions were asked about why Schröder and Fischer had apparently shifted 
their policy toward Turkey’s ambitions from one that was passive to one that was more welcoming. 
One explanation – one that they rejected themselves – was that they were reacting to pressure from 
Washington (“Glos gegen,” 2002; “Innenpolitischer Streit,” 2002; Leersch, 2002a). To this charge of 
Germany adjusting its policy due to American pressure, Fischer responded by saying, “We have 
absolutely no concessions to make. If the door is closed on Turkey, the civilian forces and the 
modernizers will fall. Also, it is not certain that Turkey will ultimately be willing to share sovereignty 
as an EU member. If the Federal Government would follow the advice of the opposition, the 
nationalists and Islamists will rub their hands together” (“Fischer hält,” 2002 – trans. mine).  
A more convincing explanation was that Schröder and Fischer authentically desired to give 
Turkey at least a rendezvous date for negotiations to begin and that their previous ambiguity was to 
deprive their domestic political opponents of campaign fodder. Once the elections were over, they 
were free to enact their authentic preferences. Their timing appeared to be correct. Once Fischer 
and Schröder had shifted their rhetoric in Turkey’s favor, the CDU brought the Turkish question 
into their (successful) campaigns for the state elections in Lower Saxony and Hesse (Leersch, 
2002b). At the same time, Schröder used a major Bundestag address on the economy to warn the 
opposition to not treat the issue of Turkey as a short-term political issue (Simonian & Thiele, 2002). 
In sum, Schröder and Fischer proved to be skillful drivers of Turkey’s cause. Outright verbal 
support might have cost them the Bundestag election, in which case Germany would have most 
certainly become the most powerful brakeman. Even after the elections, Berlin faced challenges. The 
brakemen were more numerous at Copenhagen than they had been at Helsinki and even 
Luxembourg, while France’s enthusiasm for the Turkish cause was clearly less energetic than it had 
previously been. Washington and Ankara’s outspoken pressure was probably not helpful either in 
winning support among the EU members. When Germany became more outright about its support 
of Turkey, this was seen in the press and domestically as bending to Washington’s will in apology for 
its stance on Iraq. Before long, Germany embraced the ‘rendezvous date’ option, and was thereafter 
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cast as the driver’s antagonist, rather than being one of them. As such, they were able to push 
forward their driver agenda without being identified alongside Italy and the United Kingdom as 
drivers without reservations.  
7.4.7 Greece 
In the 2002 episode, Greece was one of Turkey’s most stalwart drivers. Indicating that it sought a 
time schedule for negotiations with Turkey shortly before the publication of the Commission report 
on October 10th, it maintained this position thereafter as well. In a radio interview, Greek Minister of 
Foreign Affairs George Papandreou supported Turkey’s call for for a date to start accession talks 
with the EU. “I believe Turkey must be sent a positive message from (the EU summit in) 
Copenhagen” (Hope, 2002). It was reported that Greece declared its support in order to smooth the 
way for Cyprus’ accession in 2004. Visiting Berlin on November 8, Simitis discussed the question of 
Turkey with Schröder and while both agreed on sending Turkey a positive signal, Simitis argued that 
there were multiple ways of doing so (“Schröder sagt,” 2002). Supposedly, this was meant to be 
beneficial in the Council as well as on the Cypriot front. 
Evidence of Greece’s driver policy towards Turkey were repeated throughout this period. 
One was apparent when Prime Minister Costas Simitis clearly endorsed Schröder’s insistence to 
strengthen the favorable language on Turkey at Brussels (Ludlow, 2004, p. 195). Following the 
publication of Giscard d’Estaing’s interview, Costas Simitis immediate expressed his repudiation by 
stating that the EU would be committing a “serious error,” if it spurned Turkey’s ambitions 
(“Expanding horizons,” 2002).  
To show that this cordiality was mutual, Athens was the second member-state capital (after 
Rome) visited by Erdoğan after the Turkish elections in early November. It was also the first state 
visit from a Turkish leader (albeit an unofficial leader) in over a decade, during which Simitis 
expressed his support, but also conveyed that Turkey ought to “make a gesture,” regarding Cyprus 
(Boulton & Hope, 2002). He also stated that “in principle, we are for a date for Turkey,” whereby ‘in 
principle’ seemed to imply a positive outcome for Greece of the Cyprus negotiations, which were to 
occur simultaneously with the diplomatic process of Copenhagen, where it would also be concluded 
(Antonaros, 2002a).  
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Despite its strong advocacy of Turkey’s membership ambitions, Greece had not relaxed its 
guard vis-à-vis Turkey as a military threat. In an interview with the Financial Times, Yannos 
Papantoniou, Greece’s defense minister, noted that the disputes of Cyprus and the Aegean Sea were 
still very much alive and that rhetoric from certain Turkish politicians and military leaders continued 
to be of a “fairly aggressive nature” (Simkins, 2002). Even so, Papantoniou maintained that his 
country’s support for Turkey’s membership in the EU was the cornerstone of Greece’s détente 
policy toward its neighbor. Not only would it improve the bilateral relations, Papantoniou argued 
further, the accession process, would also transform Turkey internally into a more democratic actor, 
which would, supposedly, make Turkey a less imminent threat.  
Between the Brussels and Copenhagen summits, the press reports and possibly their 
diplomatic sources as well, were imprecise about Greece’s exact policy preferences concerning either 
the actual negotiations date or the date-for-a-date ‘rendezvous’ clause, which were distinctly different 
policy options (e.g. Black, 2002a; Boulton & Dempsey, 2002; Broekhuizen, 2002).  
A week prior to the Copenhagen summit, Greece expressed its desire to have accession 
negotiations proper begin in either 2004 or 2005, even after the Franco-German common position 
advocating otherwise (“Ankara lehnt,” 2002; “La Turquie s’en tient,” 2002; Ludlow, 2004, p. 257; 
“Mehrheit in der EU,” 2002 “Türkei-Frage,” 2002). On December 6, Simitis, joining Berlusconi in 
Rome, again argued for negotiations to start in 2004, because a date in the not-too-distant future 
would encourage the Turks to implement the necessary reforms (“Ankara lehnt,” 2002; Black, 
2002c). 
Just before the summit, Papandreou published an argument in Turkey’s favor, arguing that 
“a belief in an enlarged Europe acting as a catalyst for peace and economic development that has 
prompted Greece to reconcile our historic divisions with Turkey and support our neighbor's EU 
aspirations. … To deny Turkey a European future on the grounds of religion is to deny the existing 
diversity in Europe” (Fuller, 2002a).  
At the summit itself, Greece was one of the ‘hard drivers’, along with Italy and the UK in 
pushing for a more advanced timetable than the French and Germans were proposing (Dempsey, 
2002c; Dempsey & Graham, 2002a; Dubois, 2002; Egurbide & Yarnoz, 2002; Gelie & Bocev, 2002; 
“Griechenland will,” 2002; Ludlow, 2004, p. 254; Staunton, 2002; “Talking Turkey,” 2002; Vinocur, 
2002; Webster & Watson, 2002; Zecchini, 2002d).  
However, while Greece was supportive of pushing the dates forward, at the same time it 
wished to prevent developments without political conditions that would give Greece, as a member 
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of the Council, political leverage on issues such as EU-NATO relations and Cyprus (Middel, 2002e). 
The clear, if not main, reason for Greece’s support was its opportunity to solve the Cyprus situation 
diplomatically, since Turkey had the possibility of making gains in Europe by putting pressure on 
Denktash, president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus for cooperation (Sulser & Biegala, 
2002).  
Other articles mentioning Greece as a supporter of Turkey by way of advocating for a date 
for negotiations to begin are: Black, 2002a; Black & White, 2002; Blome & Middel, 2002; Boulton, 
2002a; Boulton & Dempsey, 2002; Daniel & Dempsey, 2002; Dempsey, 2002a; 2002b; 2002d; 2002e; 
Gelie, 2002; Gonzalez, 2002c; “La Turquie et la Pologne,” 2002; “Mehrheit,” 2002; “Ministro 
griego,” 2002; Peel, 2002; Schröder will Türkei,” 2002; “Türkei kann auf,” 2002; “Turquie: le 
sommet,” 2002; Zecchini, 2002a. 
7.4.8 Ireland  
As in the previous episodes, the press did not comment frequently on the Irish position. Articles in 
the Financial Times conflicted somewhat in the remainder of the records. Nevertheless, the analysis, 
below, indicates that Ireland was among the drivers. 
During Erdoğan’s European tour, he stopped in Dublin on November 21st, where he met 
with the Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, who “assured Mr Erdogan that Ireland will be as helpful as 
possible in terms of Turkey's EU candidature.” When asked about this meeting, Erdoğan responded: 
“We asked for Ireland's help for a date for the EU, with negotiations on Cyprus and the European 
Security and Defence Policy.” To the question if Ahern had pledged Irish support for an accession 
date for Turkey he replied, “Yes” (Crosby, 2002).  
On November 25, Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen (who later became Taoiseach) met 
with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. When the two discussed Turkey, Powell urged Cowen to 
support Turkey’s appeal for a date to begin negotiations at the Copenhagen summit. According to 
the press, Cowen responded by telling Powell that Ireland welcomed Turkey’s commitment to deal 
with the human rights issues in relation to its quest for EU membership and that his country would 
propose for the Copenhagen summit to send a positive signal to Turkey to welcome its efforts 
preparing for membership negotiations (O’Clery, 2002).  
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According to Minister Cowen’s written statement to the Irish Parliament, Cowen had, upon 
Powell’s urge to support a negotiation date for Turkey, “explained” the Copenhagen criteria to the 
Secretary, and had assured him “…that Ireland would be as helpful as possible in regard to Turkey's 
desire to begin accession negotiations, subject to the necessary criteria being fully met” (Ireland, 
2002e). This same rhetoric would be repeated throughout all the parliamentary debates of that year 
(Ireland 2002a; 2002b; 2002c; 2002d; 2002e). 
As with most EU member states concerning Turkey, Ireland too wrestled with domestic 
opposition. Immediately prior to the Copenhagen summit, during a Fine Gael (centre-right) partisan 
debate on Turkey, its leader, Enda Kenny (who would also later become Taoiseach), argued against 
offering Turkey a date for accession negotiations, based on human rights. “Turkey is a divided 
country in many ways,” he said. “There are instances of people being terrorised and murdered that 
would not fit with the Copenhagen criteria. In Turkey, the mentality ranges from a Middle 
Ages/11th-century outlook to an outlook in the leadership that is very modern” (Brennock, 2002). 
This statement was made when Ahern and Cowen announced their intention to support a date for 
accession negotiations, though it had also been stipulated that date would be conditional on Turkey 
meeting the requisite Copenhagen (political) criteria. The Labour and Green parties were less 
opposed, arguing that while Turkey should be required to meet the criteria, it should not be 
excluded based on religious or ethnic background. 
As such, the Ahern government, personified by Minister Cowen, continually spoke of 
Turkey’s need to abide by the Copenhagen criteria – to the extend that the Financial Times classifed 
Ireland as one of those countries that were very skeptical of Turkey owing to its human rights 
record, and therefore not among the drivers (Dempsey, 2002b; 2002d). The Irish press (cited above), 
The Guardian (Black & White, 2002) and the Ludlow account (2004, p. 254), however, note that 
Ireland was among those advocating strongly for an advanced schedule when they were behind the 
closed doors. Perhaps this meant that the Irish leaders simply assumed that the political Copenhagen 
criteria would be met by the advanced appointed time, or that the criteria were of secondary 
importance to them in the broader balance of interests and mostly important just for public 
consumption. 
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7.4.9 Italy 
In 2002, Italy was the most unambiguous and outspoken driver of Turkey’s interests in the 
European Council. Though it is a continuation of the pro-Turkey policy of the previous episodes, 
one curious deviation of this stability deserves to be mentioned. In 1999, at a European People’s 
Party summit, Berlusconi, as the leader of the Forza Italia party, had expressed his opposition to 
Turkish candidacy (“Berlusconi Afirma,” 1999). In 2002, nothing remained of this rhetorical 
position when the same Berlusconi opened debate on Turkey at the Brussels summit by arguing for 
more positive language that what the Danish text read. The clause “Turkey has taken important 
steps toward meeting the Copenhagen political criteria,” was amended to read: “The European 
Council welcomes the important steps taken by Turkey toward meeting the Copenhagen political 
criteria” by Berlusconi’s intervention (Ludlow, 2004, p. 194). 
Italy’s cordiality had not been unnoticed. During his tour of European capitals, Erdoğan’s 
first port of call was Rome, where Italy was named Turkey’s ‘best friend in Europe’ (ibid., p. 253). 
That November and early the following month, Berlusconi joined his Greek colleague Simitis in 
arguing for an early date – January 2004 – to begin negotiations (“Ankara lehnt,” 2002; Black, 2002c; 
Ludlow, 2004, p. 257; “Mehrheit,” 2002; Staunton, 2002).  
Berlusconi’s argument for an advanced date, set before the enlargement in May 2004, was 
ostensibly to encourage reconciliation on Cyprus, before the island could, as a member, veto 
negotiations with Turkey, should the two sides of the island still be at odds with one another by then 
(“Türkei-Frage,” 2002). Joined by the UK and Spain, Italy maintained this position even after the 
Franco-German common position proposed a ‘date for a date’ in 2004 with negotiations 
commencing no sooner than 2005 (“Ankara lehnt,” 2002).  
At Copenhagen, Italy was an even more outspoken advocate for Turkey than the United 
Kingdom (Ludlow, 2004, p. 311). Berlusconi suggested at one point that, “the EU will become a 
superpower” once Ankara joined (Blitz, 2002). Quite a few articles (de Barochez, 2002a; Boulton & 
Dempsey 2002; Dempsey, 2002d; “La Turquie s’invite,” 2002) list Italy’s allegiance to the United 
States as the prime reason for its support of Turkey.  
Other articles that list Italy as a driver are: Beste, Deupmann & Knaup, 2002; Black, 2002a; 
2002d; Black & White, 2002; Blome & Middel, 2002; Broekhuizen, 2002; Crosby, 2002; Daniel & 
Dempsey, 2002; Dempsey, 2002a; 2002b; 2002c; Dempsey & Graham, 2002b; Dubois, 2002; Fuller, 
2002a; Gelie, 2002; Gelie & Bocev, 2002; Gonzalez, 2002c; Hearst, 2002; “Italien hat Vorbehalte,” 
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2002; Kemmer, 2002; “La Turquie et la Pologne,” 2002; Peel, 2002; Quatremer, 2002; “Talking 
Turkey,” 2002; “Turquie: le sommet ,” 2002; “Türkei kann auf,” 2002; “Türkei setzt die EU,” 2002; 
“Turkey swallows,” 2002; Vinocur, 2002; Webster & Watson, 2002; Zecchini, 2002c, 2002d). 
7.4.10 Luxembourg 
In 2002, Luxembourg maintained its brakeman policy in regard to Turkey. Luxembourg’s prime 
minister, Jean-Claude Juncker, claimed as early as July that the Copenhagen summit would not be 
about Turkey (Alexander, 2002). The most telling occasion when Juncker attempted to speak on 
Luxembourg’s policy was after a meeting with Erdoğan on November 29. “Luxembourg’s 
commitment is very clear,” Juncker said to the press, as he launched into something fairly opaque:  
Relations between the EU and Turkey have to be purified from hypocrisy. I mean this: we 
are fifteen countries that will make a decision in Copenhagen. We hope to make a decision 
based on compromise among these fifteen member countries. We think that this decision 
has a distinguishing feature than the decision taken in Helsinki and it has to be based on 
that decision. Copenhagen should be beyond Helsinki for us. And, this means 
confirmation of Turkey’s place in Europe without any ground for hesitations. We have to 
agree on the formula of ‘beyond Helsinki’ in Copenhagen and we have to have similar 
views on certain political issues. These issues have to have a clear and comprehensible 
formula.  
This formula should be a result which is in line with expectations of [the] Turkish people 
and satisfy [the] public of fifteen EU member countries. Also, we should encourage [the] 
Turkish government to abide by every effort to adjust to Copenhagen criteria in a way to 
meet [the] expectations of [the] Turkish people. We know that it is not possible to totally 
fulfil all these conditions before starting the negotiations. But, first of all, progress has to be 
recorded in respect to human rights and similar issues. 
(“EU-Turkey ties,” 2002) 
This researcher reads this to be a roundabout way of saying that, as far as Juncker was concerned, 
Turkey could, in principle, become a member, and that the member states were going to offer 
Turkey something more than what it received at Helsinki in 1999. Yet, he believed there should be 
more progress with respect to the political criteria for the EU to go any further than Turkey had 
offered only rhetoricly so far. After the Copenhagen summit, Jean-Claude Juncker insisted again that 
negotiations with Turkey could not begin if Ankara did not improve, highlighting especially the 
Turkish record on torture (“Synthèse,” 2002).  
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While the international press did not frequently report on its policy, Luxembourg was 
consistently mentioned among the hard-line brakemen, whose preferences clearly sided with the 
Commission and the Presidency, or more opposed still. Articles that mention Luxembourg as being 
antagonistic to Turkey’s ambitions to have an early date for negotiations are Black & White, 2002; 
Blome & Middel, 2002; Dempsey, 2002a; Egurbide & Yarnoz, 2002; Gonzalez, 2002b; Kemmer, 
2002; “La Turquie s'invite,” 2002; Middel, 2002c; Modoux, 2002; “Schröder will Türkei,” 2002; 
“Türkei setzt die EU,” 2002.  
7.4.11 Netherlands 
In contrast to the previous two episodes, when the Netherlands was a driver of Turkey’s 
membership ambitions, in 2002, the Netherlands was among the brakemen. The Dutch position was 
that in Copenhagen, Turkey hear that it should be gauged at some future time for meeting the 
membership criteria. This position did not include any date or concession beyond the determination 
that this re-evaluation should take place at some time before the big-bang enlargement (Broekhuizen 
& Van Oostrum, 2002; van der Velden, 2002c).  
The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer outlined the official Dutch 
position on Turkey in a September 20 letter to parliament. Anticipating the Commission’s progress 
report, he wrote that the Turkish reform package was “welcomed,” and “Turkey should be 
encouraged to forcefully move the amendment process forward and to implement the reforms” 
(Netherlands 2002a – trans, mine). Following the publication of the Commission’s strategy 
document and progress reports on enlargement, the minister outlined the Dutch government’s 
policy on Turkey further by arguing that since Turkey had not met the political membership criteria, 
the Dutch government agreed with the Commission that “no date for starting negotiations should 
be named” (Netherlands 2002b – trans, mine). 
At the Brussels summit, Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende joined his Austrian and Swedish 
colleagues Wolfgang Schüssel and Göran Persson in urging the council toward greater caution than 
the pro-Turkey language being recommended by Gerhard Schröder  (Ludlow, 2004, p. 195).  
During the Dutch parliamentary debate on October 30th, the prime minister made it clear 
that it was not the object of the government’s policy to send Turkey a “discouraging or negative 
signal” (Netherlands, 2002c – trans. mine). However, further policy on the matter largely depended 
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on the outcome of the Turkish elections. He also mentioned that there was talk in Brussels about a 
‘rendezvous clause’, but that the Netherlands was not supportive of this or any date for negotiations 
to begin. 
The prime minister, again reporting to the parliament on December 4, said that before 
Erdoğan’s visit to the Netherlands on 29 November, the Netherlands had been informed of the 
‘rendezvous date’ proposal by several other member states, but that for the Netherlands it was 
inconceivable that negotiations would be allowed to begin without Turkey first meeting the political 
criteria (Netherlands 2002d). Just prior to the summit, however, the prime minister indicated to the 
parliament that the Netherlands would be willing to go along with the ‘rendezvous date’ option, 
though not without reiterating the inconceivability of negotiations beginning before the political 
criteria were met (Netherlands (2002e). 
Prior to Copenhagen, de Hoop Scheffer told the NRC Handelsblad that the Dutch 
negotiating position was that Turkey would only receive a date for negotiation after a future 
examination of its progress toward the criteria – essentially the ‘wait and see’ approach. He 
complained that the Franco-German position (the rendezvous date policy) was gaining ‘significant 
support’ among the member states (Van der Velden, 2002).  
Ludlow’s account of the summit mentions the Dutch delegation with respect to Turkey 
infrequently, but on all occasions as very hesitant and urging caution against being too indulgent 
toward Turkey (Ludlow, 2004, p. 254, 311). On the 13th of December, when the presidency’s draft 
was being reviewed, Balkenende argued in favor of the existing draft, which called for a firm date on 
December 2004, without the additional ‘at the latest’ as was suggested by Berlusconi (Ludlow, 2004, 
p. 311-312).   
The Dutch leaders explained at home, that by siding with this option they had prevented 
France and Germany from offering a date-certain for negotiations to begin (“Politiek vreest,” 2002). 
Interviewed by the Dutch press, Balkenende expressed his satisfaction with the summit results, 
saying that, “we wanted to emphasize the fact that Turkey must first comply with the political 
criteria for membership,” in which Balkenende still found “serious shortcomings” (de Jong, 2002b – 
trans. mine).   
When they reported to parliament on the findings of the European Council, de Hoop 
Scheffer reiterated the Netherlands’ policy regarding Turkey. He argued that pursuant to the 
Helsinki decision, Turkey was to be considered a candidate like any other candidate member state, 
and therefore had to fulfill the political criteria. While some said that the Helsinki decision should be 
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overturned, this was not the opinion of the Dutch government, which saw Turkey, despite its 
admirable recent progress, nowhere near any level of fulfilling the political criteria, whereby 
Balkenende mentioned in particular capital punishment, the rights of minorities, and the role of the 
military (Netherlands, 2002f). 
Like the statement of the Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Irish parliament, the Dutch 
foreign minister’s statements highlighted the central role of the Copenhagen criteria. However, in 
contrast to his Irish colleage, de Hoop Scheffer took a firm stand against Turkey’s wish for a 
negotiation date, while Ireland supported that wish. To the extent that either country was not simply 
hiding its authentic preferences behind the Copenhagen criteria and the political values embedded in 
them, Ireland adopted a carrot policy and the Netherlands that of a stick  
Other articles that mention the Netherlands’ policy orientation among the brakemen are: 
Black & White, 2002; Blitz, 2002; Bocev, 2002; Broekhuizen, 2002; “Bush belt EU-voorzitter,” 2002; 
Buters, 2002; Dempsey, 2002d; Dempsey & Graham, 2002b; “EU beslist,” 2002; “EU breidt uit,” 
2002; Fuller, 2002b; Gelie, 2002; de Jong, 2002a; Kemmer, 2002; Lucas, 2002; Quatremer, 2002; 
“Türkei setzt,” 2002; “Turquie: le sommet,” 2002; Zecchini, 2002c; 2002d. 
7.4.12 Portugal 
Though not the most outspoken (or, leastways, reported on) advocate, Portugal was a driver of 
Turkey’s membership ambitions. It was frequently mentioned as being in the camp of member states 
that lobbied their colleagues for an early and fixed date for accession negotiations to begin. 
In an interview with Le Figaro, Portugal’s Prime Minister José Manuel Barroso spoke against 
erecting religious barriers against candidate countries to the EU. Instead, he argued that the EU 
should be supportive of countries like Turkey, where men and women, in principle, have the same 
rights. He saw the EU in need of examples showing the West’s ability to work together with Islamic 
cultures. Offering Turkey a date would be an encouragement that had been long overdue. However, 
he also maintained that ultimately becoming a member would be up to Turkey and its ability to 
reform itself to the Copenhagen criteria standards (Kovacs, 2002).  
When the Franco-German proposal for a rendezvous date was launched, Portugal was, 
according to the December 6 edition of the Berliner Zeitung, one of the first countries to rally 
around it (“Türkei kann auf,” 2002). Though the Berliner Zeitung took this as meaning that Portugal 
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was a brakeman, like Denmark and Sweden were, the bulk of press articles, took Portugal as being 
supportive of Turkey. This was especially so in reports dated after December 6, when the positions 
taken by the member states had become less ambiguous. Examples of these articles are: Black & 
White, 2002; Broekhuizen, 2002; Dempsey, 2002c; Dubois, 2002; Gelie, 2002; Gelie & Bocev, 2002; 
Gonzalez, 2002c; Ludlow, 2004, p. 254; “Portugal calls,” 2002; Staunton, 2002; “Türkei-Frage,” 
2002; Vinocur, 2002; Webster & Watson, 2002).  
7.4.13 Spain 
At the end of its presidency in the first half of 2002, the Spanish State Secretary for European 
Affairs, Ramon de Miguel, rejected the idea of a date to begin accession negotiations with Turkey. 
He said that this was about principles that they all adhered to (“Verheugen warnt,” 2002). As of 
October, Spain’s foreign minister, Ana Palacio, was also pessimistic about the ability to fix a date for 
negotiations (Gonzalez, 2002a). Prime Minister Aznar, however, was determined to send a strong 
favorable signal to Turkey.  
After the legislative election in Turkey producing a positive outcome for its EU ambitions, 
Ana Palacio issued a statement, saying that the AK Party were verifiably moderate Islamists, and that 
for her there was no obstacle for the European integration of a moderate Islamic country like 
Turkey and that the EU was not a Christian club (“Espana cree Turquia,” 2002; “Gobierno y 
partidos,” 2002; “Le monde,” 2002). She also clarified that Turkey would have to meet the same 
criteria as other candidate countries to warrant membership. 
The Spanish foreign ministry still had concerns about what the newly elected government in 
Turkey would be able or willing to achieve. This left several unknowns, such as the future of human 
rights reforms, how the military would react to an Islamist government, and how moderate that 
Islamist government would prove to be (Egurbide & Yarnoz, 2002).  
During a state visit to Spain, German President Johannes Rau argued that Turkey had a very 
long way to go before it could become a member of the EU, to which Aznar responded that Turkey, 
like any other candidate country, would have to adhere to the same membership criteria, despite its 
different size and population (read: religion) (“Rau dice Turquia,” 2002).  
During the press conference following Erdoğan’s hour-long meeting with Aznar, the 
Spanish Prime Minister asserted again that Turkey would have to adhere to the same membership 
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criteria as other candidate countries. Erdoğan expressed his satisfaction with the meeting and said 
that he and all his advisers were very glad with Aznar’s reactions to their requests of Spain’s support 
for a negotiations date (“Aznar defiende,” 2002; “Aznar subraya,” 2002). Talking to reporters 
afterward, Erdoğan said: “Of course Spain and Aznar’s government will help us in this matter. The 
past positive relations between the two countries are the best guarantee that it will,” (Sanz, 2002 – 
trans. mine).  
After the NATO summit in Prague in late November, where Aznar met with Gerhard 
Schröder and Jacques Chirac, he stated that Spain would support a date for accession negotiations to 
begin, reiterating that Turkey would have to comply with the Copenhagen criteria in the same way 
that other candidate did (Montes & Gonzalez, 2002; Zecchini, 2002b). This point of view was 
repeated in more or less similar phrasing throughout this period.  
After a foreign ministers’ meeting prior to the Copenhagen summit, Palacio said that the 
European Council should set a date for negotiations with Turkey to begin (“Espana pide trato,” 
2002). She said that Spain was aware of “the moment of great historic responsibility and the 
reunification of Europe is not going to stop. It will not be left in the lurch by issues that are, 
ultimately, minor issues” (“Palacio convencida,” 2002 – trans mine). She also mentioned that such 
negotiations should be conducted under the same conditions as with any other country. 
Furthermore, she proposed, in contrast to the Franco-German rendezvous date option, that Turkey 
should begin negotiations as soon as the political Copenhagen criteria were met, and not at some 
artificial later date (“Cumbre de Copenhague,” 2002; Santafe, 2002).  
Concurrent with the Copenhagen summit, Aznar, together with Silvio Berlusconi, prevented 
the adoption of a declaration on March 7th by the European People’s Party in support of a 
‘privileged partnership’ (as opposed to membership) with Turkey, proposed by German Christian 
Democrats (Gonzalez, 2002b) However, their counter-attempt to force a declaration by the same 
party to support starting negotiations by the end of 2004 failed.  
Aznar also defended the proposal to start early accession negotiations at the Copenhagen 
European Council meeting (Broekhuizen & Van Oostrum, 2002; Ludlow, 2004, p. 254). After the 
summit, Palacio defended the result of the ‘rendezvous date’ as a “reasonable” solution that would 
give Ankara eighteen months to reform the Turkish administration and (Turkish) society, which was 
“a term very optimistic, but achievable,” she said (Gonzalez, 2002c – trans. mine). 
As with Italy quite a few articles listed Spain’s allegiance to the United States as a prime 
reason for its support of Turkey (Aljarilla, 2002; de Barochez, 2002a; Boulton & Dempsey 2002; 
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Dempsey, 2002d; Egurbide & Yarnoz, 2002; “La Turquie s’invite,” 2002). Some articles (such as 
such as Daniel & Dempsey, 2002) mentioned Spain’s support, being subject to Turkey meeting the 
political criteria and/or providing a solution for Cyprus. Another article (Dempsey & Graham, 2002) 
claimed that public opinion at home had required Aznar to pipe down his support for an early date 
for Turkey.  
On the other hand, the majority of the articles mention Spain’s unequivocal support, such as: 
Beste, Deupmann & Knaup, 2002; Black, 2002a; 2002d; Black & White, 2002; Blitz, 2002; Boulton 
& Dempsey, 2002; Broekhuizen, 2002; Dempsey, 2002a; 2002b; 2002c; Dubois & Quatremer, 2002; 
Fuller, 2002a; Gelie, 2002; Gelie & Bocev, 2002; Hearst, 2002; Kemmer, 2002; “La Turquie et la 
Pologne,” 2002; “Mehrheit,” 2002; Peel, 2002; Quatremer, 2002; Staunton, 2002; “Talking Turkey,” 
2002; “Türkei-Frage,” 2002; “Türkei kann auf,” 2002; “Türkei setzt,” 2002; “Turquie: le sommet,” 
2002; Vinocur, 2002; Webster & Watson, 2002; Zecchini, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d. 
Spain was clearly a driver, as it advocated,  for an early and fixed date for negotiations to 
begin in 2004. As with other drivers (and brakemen), the necessity of Turkey to meet the political 
Copenhagen criteria was essential, but to Spain the timing thereof should depend on when Turkey 
had met the criteria instead of setting an artificial timetable as was proposed by France and 
Germany. This part of the Spanish argument did not differ from how it was put by the Commission 
and the brakemen, except that Spain, by foreseeing a date in 2004 (possibly even as early as in 
January of that year), attested to its confidence that Turkey would have met the criteria by then. 
7.4.14 Sweden 
In 2002 Sweden was, again, considered among the brakemen, particularly because of to its concerns 
about offering Turkey a date before it had demonstrated compliance with the political Copenhagen 
criteria.  
In June, during debate in the Swedish parliament, Foreign Minister Anna Lindh stated that, 
“Turkey cannot go farther in the [accession] process if it does not credibly show that it takes human 
rights seriously” (“La Suède déplore,” 2002; “Les droits,” 2002 – trans. mine). She, however, did not 
reject Turkey’s EU candidacy, especially because doing so would strengthen Turkish forces that 
opposed democracy and reform, but being a candidate, she argued, meant that Turkey had to 
comply with continuous monitoring. Answering criticism from the former-communist Left Party, 
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for having endorsed placing the PKK on the European list of terrorist organizations, Lindh replied 
that Swedish opposition on that account would have damaged its reputation with Turkey and made 
it less effective in mobilizing public opinion toward greater respect for human rights (ibid.). 
In one telling news item appearing after a late-November meeting between the Swedish 
Prime Minister, Göran Persson and Erdoğan, when the two appeared before the press, Persson 
announced before answering questions, that he did not “want to say anything right now about EU’s 
giving an exact date to start accession talks with Turkey.” When Erdoğan was asked if he got any 
support for a negotiation date during his meeting with Persson, he said, “you must ask this question 
to him” (“Turkey: Erdogan,” 2004) Responding accordingly, Persson replied that the problem of 
Turkey’s candidacy stemmed from its implementation of the Copenhagen criteria, which was 
important for getting such a date. Persson further said that he would discuss the proposed Turkish 
reform programmes with other EU member countries. Concerning the required reforms, he 
particularly stressed the plight of the Kurds in Turkey as being critical to Turkey’s implementation of 
the political criteria (ibid.) 
One way in which Sweden did come onto the radar was over a process dispute. As Gül and 
Erdoğan tried lobbying Chirac and Schröder during the Copenhagen summit, Persson declared that 
the decision of the fifteen member states was “no longer negotiable” (“Turquie: la décision,” 2002). 
Persson was clearly annoyed at the lobbying effort, as though it were to be decided by France and 
Germany and not by all fifteen member states. Furthermore, Persson argued that it was impossible 
to compromise on the Copenhagen criteria and the Cyprus situation. “We must be extremely clear,” 
he said, “there is no possibility of bargaining with the Copenhagen criteria. They must be met. 
Cyprus is another political problem. We must solve these two problems, but they are not linked” 
(“La décision,” 2002 – trans. mine).  
On the whole, Sweden’s position was cited as being ideological with regard to the political 
membership criteria. One example thereof was Anna Lindh’s opinion that the new AKP leadership 
would, due to its personal experience with political persecution, be serious about implementing the 
necessary reforms to meet the criteria (Boulton, 2002b). However, in three articles (Dempsey 2002b; 
2002d; “Talking Turkey,” 2002) Sweden was mentioned together with Ireland, which behind the 
closed doors of the Council, proved to be a driver, rather than a brakeman. Other articles that 
mention Sweden’s caution about giving Turkey a timeline or concrete prospect of membership 
negotiations were Black 2002a, Boulton & Dempsey, 2002, Dempsey, 2002a, Fuller, 2002b, 
Zecchini, 2002c. 
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7.4.15 United Kingdom 
The British position on Turkey was again and unequivocally a stalwart driver on Turkey’s behalf. In 
Mid-October, British Foreign Minister Jack Straw held a foreign policy speech about Turkey and the 
reasons for the United Kingdom’s support for its membership before the German-British Forum in 
London. There, he argued that Turkey’s accession to the EU would benefit Britain and the rest of 
Europe in the war on terror. “Turkey is a key member of NATO and a vital ally in the campaign 
against terrorism,” he said and pointed out that Turkey had made “significant progress” towards 
meeting the necessary political criteria for starting negotiations (Adams, 2002a).  
In November, after the Turkish elections, Britain communicated that it would accept a 
rendezvous date, as it understood that its member-state partners wanted to see Turkey advance 
more toward the political criteria. “Much depends on the next steps in Turkey,” a British diplomat 
said. “Turkey has made significant progress. That should be recognised. Let us see how the new 
government takes shape” (Boulton & Dempsey, 2002).  
One week prior to the Copenhagen summit, Jack Straw said that giving Turkey a firm date to 
begin formal European Union accession talks was “now a matter of obligation”, adding that what 
happened to Turkey would be “of huge importance to the stability not just of Europe but of much 
of the rest of the world” (Dempsey & Guha, 2002). This was echoed by the Minister for Europe, his 
fellow countryman Denis MacShane, who said that, “Europe must offer a firm and proximate date 
for Turkey to begin the process of negotiations, which will be long and arduous” (Adams, 2002b).  
At Copenhagen, Tony Blair suggested that the December 2004 date should be mentioned as 
‘the latest’ date at which the European Council should make its decision regarding the opening of 
negotiations. This would leave the door open for an earlier date, if the Commission (and the 
member states) shifted their assessments in Turkey’s favor (Ludlow, 2004, p. 311). He argued that 
since the Commission’s review of Turkey’s progress was already an annual event, there should be no 
reason not to decide about an earlier date if Turkey had met the political criteria by the 2003 report. 
When Fischer proposed the amendment of starting negotiations ‘without delay’, Blair joined 
Berlusconi and Chirac in supporting the amendment, thus wearing down Rasmussen’s resolve to not 
have any date and preserve what the Dane thought to be a greater respect for the conditionality 
regimen (ibid., 312).  
While the majority of the British press were framing the outcome of the summit as a failure, 
Blair attempted to put a positive spin on the matter by saying, “The deal might not live up to 
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Turkey's expectations, but for 40 years Turkey has been waiting for a firm date and this is a firm 
date. It’s important to emphasise that it is not a question of whether negotiations are opened with 
Turkey: if the tests are passed by Turkey, they will open” (Blitz, 2002).  
A selection of the articles enumerating the UK as a driver are: de Barochez, 2002, Black 
2002a, 2002d, Blitz & Graham, 2002, Boulton & Parker, 2002, Bowcott, 2002, Broekhuizen & Van 
Oostrum, 2002, Daniel & Dempsey, 2002, Dempsey 2002b, Dubois, Majerczak & Quatremer, 2002, 
Egurbide & Yarnoz, 2002; Gonzalez, 2002c, Peel, 2002, “Schröder will Türkei,” 2002, Webster & 
Watson, 2002, Zecchini, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c. 
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8.0  BRUSSELS, 2004 
On May 1, 2004 the EU was enlarged by the 10 new member states Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The episode of the latter 
half was also, ostensibly, about enlargement with the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey 
and Croatia. In 2002, two years earlier, it had been decided that starting accession negotiations with 
Turkey, without delay, depended upon the report and recommendation of the Commission and the 
agreement of the European Council. The Commission was roundly expected to give a positive 
verdict on Turkey’s progress toward meeting the political Copenhagen criteria.  
Because the Council had continually reiterated that Turkey’s membership prospects 
depended on its own progress toward the political criteria, and that this progress would be measured 
by the Commission, the brakemen were left with three options: to contest the Commission’s 
findings, to question the premise of membership, or to derail the enlargement procedure by 
changing the rules of enlargement. 
A few did question the Commission’s report, but none of these had seats in the Council, 
while those who opposed the idea of Turkey’s membership on a priori grounds – such as culture, 
religion, poverty or size – had four decades of EC/EU promises to contend with. The rallying cry of 
the brakemen thus became for changing the enlargement process. The Austrians, and the Danes to a 
lesser degree, began to earnestly propose a ‘privileged partnership’, a formulation that had already 
gained traction among the German Christian Democrats.  
The idea sounded innocent enough: ‘just in case the negotiations failed and membership 
would not work out, here is an alternative that still keeps Turkey involved with Europe.’ What it, 
however, implied was that a named alternative to membership would give the Council the precedent 
formulation for a predestined negative outcome of the negotiations. The regime, as it stood, led to 
full membership at the pace set by Turkey’s ability to reform, but an alternative outcome placed the 
control over the completion of the process more in Brussels’ hands than in Ankara’s. The French 
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right, with the exception of Jacques Chirac, also supported this idea. Yet, given the overwhelming 
weight in favor of the drivers in 2004, the privileged partnership proposal was a non-starter.  
Additionally, there was debate about the terms of the membership. Would Turkish workers 
eventually be allowed the same freedom of movement that other EU citizens enjoyed? Would 
Turkey be able to participate in the agricultural and regional policies? Another debate was over the 
timing and rules of the negotiations, while the relations with Cyprus and the ability to suspend the 
negotiations process were also bones of contention, around which brakemen could chip away at 
Turkey’s progress toward membership.  
8.1 POLITICAL CHANGES 
Between 2002 and 2004, several changes had taken place in the domestic politics of the member 
states. Because the analyses in the later chapters will only test against policy changes in the fifteen 
members that formed the European Union prior to 2004, the political backgrounds of the leaders of 
the ten new member states will not be offered here, and their policy positions will only be 
summarized at the end of this chapter, rather than thoroughly analyzed along side the older member 
states. 
 
 In Turkey, the AKP remained in power, though Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had become Prime 
Minister and Abdullah Gül assumed the foreign minister’s office. 
 In Austria, during the previous episode, political unrest within the coalition-member FPÖ 
party led to elections in that same year. In February 2003, the conservative Christian 
democratic ÖVP and far right FPÖ had renewed their coalition, though now with the ÖVP 
taking a stronger role than it had under the previous coalition. Schlüssel (ÖVP) remained 
Chancellor but Benita Ferrero-Waldner (ÖVP) had vacated her position as Foreign Minister 
when she was nominated as Austria’s Commissioner in the European Commission. Her 
foreign ministry position was taken up by Ursula Plassnik, a close ÖVP ally of the 
Chancellor. 
 In Finland, elections in 2003 replaced the SDP-Centre coalition led by Paavo Lipponen with 
a Centre-SDP coalition led by Anneli Jäätteenmäki. Jäätteenmäki, however, resigned two 
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months later, allowing Matti Vanhanen to become the Prime Minister. Erkki Tuomioja 
(SDP) remained Foreign Minister throughout the entire period. As such, there was no 
significant political change from the Lipponen government in 2002 to that of Vanhanen in 
2004. 
 In Greece, elections in March of 2004 replaced the centre-left PASOK government of 
Kostas Simitis and George Papandreou with the centre-right New Democracy government 
of Kostas Karamanlis, who chose Petros Molyviatis as his Foreign Minister. 
 In Luxembourg, elections brought the Luxembourg Socialist Workers Party (LSAP) into 
coalition with Juncker’s Christian Democrats. The LSAP’s leader, Jean Asselborn took the 
position of Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 In the Netherlands, the first Balkenende cabinet had fallen apart during the previous 
episode. In 2003 elections brought a new coalition, with the previously governing Christian 
democrat CDA and right-wing liberal VVD parties taking a stronger share of parliament. 
The six-member-strong center-left D66 brought the coalition to a slim majority of seats. Jan 
Peter Balkenende of CDA remained prime minister, while Ben Bot, of the same party, 
succeeded Jaap de Hoop Scheffer as foreign minister. 
 In Portugal, Barroso was named as the new President of the European Commission, leaving 
the government of Portugal to Pedro Santana Lopes. António Monteiro, a career diplomat, 
had taken office in July 2004.  
 In Spain, the March 2004 elections – three days after the March 11 Madrid train bombings – 
replaced the government of the center-right José María Aznar with that of the social 
democratic José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Miguel Ángel Moratinos became minister of 
foreign affairs 
 In Sweden, Göran Persson remained Prime Minister and there were no elections. Sadly, the 
Foreign Minister Anna Lindh was assassinated in 2003, and her post was inherited by Laila 
Freivalds. 
In Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the United Kingdom no significant or 
note-worthy changes took place in their governments between 2002 and 2004. 
Like the previous chapters, the first section of this chapter shall discuss the broad sequence 
of events and look at the particular debating points as they developed, because the negotiations in 
2004 were more detail oriented than they had been previously or were in 2006. The following 
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section will consider a few particular issues that related to the debate on Turkey. First is a revisit of 
the Cyprus issue; the second relates to Armenians and their demand for recognition of the 
Genocide. Third is the draft Constitutional Treaty, which several member states had decided to put 
before their citizens in referenda.  
8.2 THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
In 2004, the member states essentially allowed the Commission to lead the process, in that they 
withheld public comment prior to the publication of the annual report on Turkey’s progress. The 
one member state that did solely leave matters to the Commission was the Netherlands, which held 
the rotating Presidency in the latter half of 2004. The Dutch foreign ministry and the prime 
minister’s office collaborated closely with the commission, even while other parts of the Dutch 
government, both in the cabinet and in the parliament, had to decide the Dutch policy preferences. 
Meanwhile, the German opposition attempted to appeal to like minded Christian-democratic 
parties to block Turkey’s process accession and the Turks offended European sensibilities by 
suggesting criminalizing adultery. When the Commission offered its report and recommendation, it 
suggested several requirements of Turkey and procedural mechanisms for the negotiations. With a 
cautiously positive report from the Commission, the member-state politics came into full action, 
with many eyes on the French president, Jacques Chirac. 
In the final weeks, the Dutch presidency determined its own policy. It also decided the 
means by which the technical issues could be dealt with and Turkey’s opponents marginalized. 
Nothing was, however, certain prior to the summit in Brussels where the final decision to open 
negotiations was made.  
8.2.1 The Dutch Presidency  
According to a confidential source, the Dutch foreign ministry suspected that it was no accident that 
the Dutch presided over the decision on opening negotiations. Given the vehemence of the Dutch 
brakemanship at Copenhagen in 2002, it can be presumed that putting a brakeman in charge of the 
process had indeed been by design. As this paragraph and other sections on the Netherlands and its 
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presidency approach will detail, however, the Netherlands was no longer a brakeman, but had 
become an energetic, but artful, driver of Turkey’s cause.  
The Dutch position as a driver was not uncontroversial within the Netherlands or even 
within the governing coalition. There were not a few powerful ministers in the Dutch cabinet who 
were against accession negotiations with Turkey. As such, individual diplomats lobbying in Turkey’s 
favor had to first win over the Presidency before it could help win over the member states. The 
Dutch cabinet itself did not come to a decision on its own preferred policy until November. 
Foremost among these diplomats was EU Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen, who was 
charged with enlargement policies. He made it clear to the Dutch cabinet that the Commission could 
propose long transition periods before Turkish migrants would enjoy the right of free movement 
within the EU’s borders. In a reaction to this, the Turkish ambassador in the Netherlands 
communicated that Ankara would accept such transition periods in exchange for a positive outcome 
to start negotiations at the summit in December (Ludlow, 2005, p. 11; Wynia, 2005).  
Commission President Romano Prodi meanwhile suggested keeping close relations between 
the Commission and the Dutch cabinet, particularly between Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende 
and Foreign Minister Berhard Bot on one side, and Prodi and Verheugen on the other. With these 
avenues of close consultation, the Commission would cooperate closely with the presidency in 
putting forward a positive report and recommendation that would ease into the presidency’s 
diplomatic track with the member states. As such, the presidency would be assured that its concerns 
and the views of the member states would be integrated into the, ostensibly, neutral report of the 
Commission (ibid.).  
Although Balkenende and Bot had room to maneuver in their capacity of the presidency at 
the EU level, the Dutch national position on Turkey still had to be determined before they could 
make any controversial moves (Ludlow, 2005, p. 12). According to the Copenhagen conclusions of 
two years prior, the European Council would make an evaluation of Turkey’s readiness for 
negotiations in 2004, based on the report and recommendation of the Commission. Knowing that 
this report would not be published until October, Balkenende and Bot used the formal rules of 
enlargement to foil the culturally grounded arguments against Turkey, and freeze any discussions 
about Turkey’s suitability as a future member that were not grounded in the political Copenhagen 
criteria. This allowed the presidency team to behave as a driver under the guise of a ‘strict but fair’ 
policy. The clearest exhibit of this is in Balkenende’s Presidency speech before the European 
Parliament in Strasbourg on July 21:  
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In December, too, the European Council is to consider whether Turkey fulfils the 
Copenhagen political criteria for human rights and democracy. If so, membership 
negotiations will be opened with Turkey as well. The decision must be arrived at honestly, 
under the ground rules to which we previously, in 2002, firmly committed ourselves. That 
means strict application of the criteria laid down, but without inventing any new criteria. 
We must not allow ourselves to be guided by fear, e.g. of Islam. Raising barriers to any 
particular religion does not fit in with Europe's shared values. Our opposition should be 
directed not against religions but against people and groups misusing their religion to get 
their way by force. Islam is not the problem. Muslims, Christians and people of other 
beliefs can live together perfectly well. The problem is not religion but misuse of religion to 
sow hatred and intolerance and to repress women. The decision concerning Turkey does 
nonetheless greatly concern and trouble many people. The Presidency wants to make 
possible a well-founded decision, which gains all-round endorsement and will also hold 
firm in future. 
(Balkenende, 2004) 
This approach, which here is called ‘strict but fair’ left the decision on the starting of negotiations 
with the Commission, which was widely assumed to be preparing a positive recommendation. Given 
the open lines of communication between Balkenende and Bot on the one hand, and Prodi and 
Verheugen on the other, the presidency’s neutrality toward whatever the Commission would decide 
was a veneer for a driver policy.  
8.2.2 Merkel’s letter  
After the electoral defeat of Edmund Stoiber of CSU (Christian democrats) in 2002, Angela Merkel, 
Chairwoman of the CDU as well as Helmut Kohl’s protégée, was able to make herself the leader of 
the conservative opposition in the Bundestag. In 2004 she also took up the mantle of leading the 
opposition to Turkey’s membership prospects on behalf of the German Christian Democrats. As 
such, she advocated for derailing the process by proposing a ‘privileged partnership’ rather than full 
membership in the Union (Dempsey, 2004). 
This privileged partnership was a formulation that had already seen some use in EPP circles 
in the previous episode. Then it had been thwarted by Silvio Berlusconi and José María Aznar. 
Angela Merkel, however, pushed it again with her conservative allies in Europe, gaining success at 
the EPP level with support from the centre-right French UMP.  
In her attempt to garner support at the heads-of-government level, she sent letters to the 
other conservative European leaders. Prominent recipients of the letter were Silvio Berlusconi, 
Wolfgang Schüssel, French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, Jean Claude Juncker, Jan Peter 
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Balkenende, Portuguese Prime Minister Pedro Lopes, Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis and 
Estonian Prime Minister Juhan Parts (“German Merkel,” 2004; Halusa, 2004a). 
The attempt largely fell on deaf ears. Even the long-time opponent of Turkish membership, 
Jean-Claude Juncker of Luxembourg, argued that it was too late for that discussion (“Deutsche 
CDU-Spitze,” 2004; Molitor, 2004). The initial reaction of the Austrian Chancellor was lukewarm, 
with a spokeswoman saying that the privileged partnership was “one way of thinking” (Ultsch, 2004a 
– trans, mine). At the time, he preferred to await the Commission’s recommendation of October 6. 
When the Commission found in Turkey’s favor, Schüssel only belatedly embraced the privileged 
partnership formulation.  
8.2.3 Adultery  
Early in September, the ruling Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) floated the idea of 
reinstating the criminalization of adultery, a provision that had been abolished by the Turkish 
Constitutional Court in 1996 for reasons of gender equality (Akinci, 2004a). AKP’s proposal had 
been inserted into the penal code reform being proposed in order to comply with the Copenhagen 
criteria, on other issues. Arguing on behalf of the proposal, Erdoğan said, “we want to preserve 
family values. If the family crumbles, the country will collapse” (ibid. – trans. mine). Gül, meanwhile, 
argued that the proposed law on adultery ought not to overshadow Turkey’s other reforms and that 
every country should have its own laws to preserve its values (“Le projet,” 2004 – trans. mine).  
The commissioner for enlargement issues, Günter Verheugen, kept the controversy from his 
public statements, choosing instead to first raise the matter bilaterally with Turkey. This he did 
during a trip to Ankara by advising that the Turkish government to withdraw its support for the 
provision (Bouilhet, 2004a). Meanwhile, Verheugen’s colleague, Franz Fischler – the agriculture 
commissioner from Austria – decided to weigh in on the adultery matter to the press on the 
sidelines of a meeting of agriculture ministers, saying, “we will analyze the consequences of our 
decision for the Union” (ibid. – trans mine). Alongside this comment about the adultery law, he 
warned that Turkish accession would bring additional costs to the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), and that the prospect of Turkish accession would raise a “wave of referenda” on the matter 
in the member states. Olli Rehn, the incoming Enlargement Commissioner from Finland said that 
the adultery legislation was considered against European judicial practice and would certainly 
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become an obstacle if Turkey would actively pursue it (Staunton, 2004a). After his meeting with 
Erdoğan, Verheugen waived off the adultery matter, saying that he could not imagine that it was a 
serious proposal, even calling it a joke (Akinci, 2004b; “Fin de la visite,” 2004).  
On September 13 Foreign Ministers Karel de Gucht (Belgium), Miguel Ángel Moratinos 
(Spain), Laila Frevalds (Sweden) and Jack Straw (UK), all from sympathetic governments, called the 
adultery law a serious problem for Turkey’s membership ambitions (“Le projet,” 2004; “Turks 
move,” 2004). Subsequently, the Turkish government quietly withdrew the proposal the following 
day, when debate on the matter was scheduled in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Akinci, 
2004c).  
8.2.4 The Commission  
The European Commission’s published its recommendation on Turkey, along with its annual report 
on October 6. As the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council of two years earlier had 
determined that 2004 was the year when Turkey would be gauged, “on the basis of a report and a 
recommendation from the Commission,” this particular report and recommendation carried 
particular weight (European Council, 2002c, par. 19).  While the implicit supposition was that the 
Commission was a neutral arbitor, the veneer was particularly thin. While the report could be seen as 
strictly empirical, the recommendation could not. 
The recommendation had to politically interpret what the rule for accession negotiations 
should be. It had been decided in the past that the candidate countries had to fully comply with the 
political Copenhagen criteria before accession negotiations could begin. This had been the verbatim 
decision at the Luxembourg Council:  
Compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria is a prerequisite for the opening of any 
accession negotiations. Economic criteria and the ability to fulfill the obligations arising 
from membership have been and must be assessed in a forward-looking, dynamic way. 
(European Council, 1997, c. 25) 
As such, the rule was clear – the economic and administrative criteria would be gauged in terms of 
the candidate’s ability to comply with the criteria by the time of accession, while the political criteria 
had to be complied with prior to starting accession negotiations. 
By any reasonable standards Turkey failed to meet those criteria. While Turkey’s reforms and 
advances toward the meeting the political criteria were remarkable, cases of torture were still 
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widespread and imprisonment of political prisoners was routine. Human rights conditions in all the 
member states were not perfect, nor were the candidate countries pure models of liberal democratic 
governance when they began their accession negotiations in 1997 and 1999. However, they had all 
been much closer to the ideal than Turkey was in 2004.33 A positive recommendation was, thus, not 
a reflection of an empirical reality; it was the reflection of a political choice between encouraging 
Turkey to reform further or effectively punishing Turkey for its failure to develop to required 
standards, despite its impressive achievements.  
This controversy was not lost on the College of Commisisoners when several members of 
the Commission publicly expressed severe doubts about Turkey. Fischler’s earlier comments about 
the adultery law and the costs to the CAP have already been mentioned. Following those comments 
Fischler sent his colleague commissioners a nine-page letter, in which he described Turkey as “far 
more oriental than European”, warned about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey and 
doubted its “long-term secular and democratic credentials”. According to him, Turkey’s membership 
would be “a recipe for failure,” (Browne, 2004a). Respecting religion, he wrote that “despite 
Ataturk's legacy, secularism is not engrained in Turkish culture, Islam enjoys public preference, and 
secularism has to be and will continue to have to be (imperfectly) enforced. While there is formal 
freedom of religion, there are implementation difficulties and lack of representation on religious 
minorities in the state apparatus” (Staunton, 2004a). In addition to the religious and cultural 
arguments, he also mentioned human and social rights standards that Turkey did not, in his 
estimation, meet. Referring back to the matter connected to his portfolio, Fischler argued that 
applying the Common Agricultural Policy to Turkey would be more expensive than the total cost of 
extending it to all of the 10 member-states that had joined the EU that year (ibid.). 
The Dutch Commissioner Frits Bolkestein (Internal Market) also made his position on 
Turkey’s EU membership explicit. In a speech at the Dutch University of Leiden on September 7, 
part of which had appeared in the Dutch NRC Handelsblad (Bolkestein, 2004a) and Die Welt 
(Bolkestein, 2004b) three weeks later, he argued that if the EU continued to expand, it would 
become like the Austro-Hungarian Empire and fall apart. In terms of the 2004 enlargement, his 
argument was after-the-fact. It was, however, still a poignant remark with regard to Turkey. As 
related in the introduction, the headline statement he made was when he said that if Turkey joined 
                                                
33 More of this will be detailed in chapter 11. However, Turkey’s failure to meet the political Copenhagen criteria can be 
read in the Commission’s Regular Report (2004), and in independent analyses such as those of Freedom House, the 
Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Datase (CIRI), or the POLITY IV database of democratic governance.  
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the EU “the liberation of Vienna in 1683 would have been in vain” (Boland, Buck & Dombey, 
2004). His argument was that that if the EU were to become a union of diverse peoples like the 
Habsburg Empire, then it ought to expect the same fate. He further said that the EU would simply 
be unable to sustain its current agricultural and regional policy and would implode, if Turkey were to 
join the membership (Gow & MacAskill, 2004). After the speech, Bolkestein’s spokesman34 
attempted to convince journalists that Bolkestein, “honestly”, did “not oppose the accession of 
Turkey to the EU” (Boland, Buck & Dombey, 2004).   
Fischler and Bolkestein were not the only brakemen commissioners. Jacques Barrot (France 
– Regional Policy), Loyola de Palacio (Spain - Energy and Transport), Markos Kyprianou (Cyprus – 
Health and Consumer Protection), and Viviane Reding (Luxembourg – Education and Culture) were 
also considered to have deep doubts about Turkey’s membership prospects (ibid.; Ricard, 2004). In 
the end, however, the College of Commissioners voted in favor of a positive recommendation with 
only one dissenting voice – Bolkestein’s. The recommendation’s crucial statement was formulated as 
follows:  
In view of the overall progress of reforms… the Commission considers that Turkey 
sufficiently fulfils the political criteria and recommends that accession negotiations be 
opened. 
(Commission, 2004, p. 3 – ital. mine) 
By inserting the word ‘sufficiently’, they either interpreted the political criteria in a dynamic way, in 
that Turkey would not have to fully meet the political criteria until accession could be at hand, or 
they simply lowered the bar for what was adequate.  
Nevertheless, the Commission’s document was not without some tough prerequisites In 
general, it highlighted that Turkey was a special case requiring a different approach than other 
candidate countries. More specifically it included the following requirements that are further 
explored below:  
 Recognition that the negotiations were “an open-ended process whose outcome cannot 
be guaranteed beforehand” (par. 2-3). 
 Six additional reform measures requiring implementation (par. 3). 
 The continuing problems between Turkey and Cyprus (par. 4). 
 The emergency brake clause (par. 6). 
                                                
34 A man whose Sisyphean travails are humorously described in Eppink, 2007 
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 The consideration of “long transition periods” or “permanent safeguards” on the free 
movement of persons from Turkey to EU member states, and of the implementation of 
structural and agricultural policies (par. 7). 
(ibid.) 
Each of these questions was brought into the debate in the last few months leading up to the 
December summit, and became the substance of the different opinions. In order to unpack their 
meaning, the following sections explain them in more detail.  
8.2.4.1 Open-ended process  
The key phrase in the document relating to the ‘open-ended process’ was the following: 
This is an open-ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand. 
Regardless of the outcome of the negotiations or the subsequent ratification process, the 
relations between the EU and Turkey must ensure that Turkey remains fully anchored in 
European structures. 
(ibid., p. 2-3 – underline added) 
This was a significant shift in terminology from “…a country destined to join the Union,” as it had 
appeared in the Helsinki conclusions, and was explicitly recalled in the Copenhagen conclusions 
(European Council, 1999, par. 12). The word ‘destined’ did not appear in the Commission’s 
recommendation. By stating that the process was an open-ended one, the Commission implied that 
outcomes other than full membership for Turkey were possible. The clause, referred to as the 
‘Merkel-clause’ in Verheugen’s staff, threw a bone to those who preferred an outcome other than 
full membership (Beste et al., 2004).  
In lage October, the ‘open-ended process’ clause received critical support from Jacques 
Chirac. The French president suggested that there were three ways in which the process could be 
played out. The first, for which he expressed his personal preference, was that Turkey would meet 
all the requirements and an accession treaty would eventually be ratified – in France by way of a 
referendum. The second option would be applicable if the negotiations failed and the process would 
be interrupted.  
The third possibility was that the process might fail because of problems in the essential 
foundations of the relationship, which Chirac expressed as follows: “When in three, four or five 
years, one realizes that we have done things but there are still obstacles that cannot be overcome. 
You will have to find another solution, that is to say, the creation of a sufficiently strong relationship 
consistent with our ambitions for peace and cooperation without integration into the European 
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Union” (“Chirac: l’adhésion,” 2004; “Jacques Chirac,” 2004 – trans. mine). In short, then there could 
be a mutual agreement to create a strong bond short of membership, which was the idea of a 
‘privileged partnership’ that the German Christian democrats had been promoting.  
8.2.4.2 Six additional reform measures 
In order to be seen to have sufficiently complied with the political criteria, the Commission judged 
that six more reforms needed to occur. These were reforms in the: 
 Law on Associations 
 Penal Code 
 Law on Intermediate Courts of Appeal 
 Code of Criminal Procedure 
 Legislation establishing the judicial police 
 Law on execution of punishments and measures 
(Commission, 2004, p. 3) 
By the time the Council met, these six pieced of legislation had been adopted by the Turkish 
legislature. This had, however, been overlooked by the Presidency, whose draft text at the Brussels 
summit still urged Turkey to adopt these measures. The Dutch received an earful from the Turkish 
leadership on this count. In the Council, however, the amendments to the conclusions were made 
without further argument (Ludlow, 2005, 42-43). 
8.2.4.3 Turkey & Cyprus 
In its report, the Commission mostly praised Turkey for its efforts to support the UN-brokered 
solution to the continuing separation of the island. However, the fact that Cyprus had become EU 
member state that year, had weakened Turkey’s bargaining position, of which it was reminded by the 
Commission when it was invited to sign the following additional protocol of the Ankara Agreement: 
The Commission expects a positive reply from Turkey to the draft protocol on the 
necessary adaptations transmitted in July 2004. Moreover, it should be noted that any 
accession negotiations are held in the framework of an Intergovernmental Conference 
consisting of all Member States of the EU. 
(Commission, 2004, par. 4) 
The second sentence reminded Turkey that each of the negotiating chapters required a positive vote 
from the Republic of Cyprus, given that the procedure of an intergovernmental conference (IGC) 
was one that required unanimity. Further, the Commission noted that “Cypriot vessels or vessels 
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having landed in Cyprus are still not allowed in Turkish ports” (par. 15). Both of these points 
touched on the delicate issue of Turkey’s reluctance to recognize the Greek Cypriot government. 
Nearly a week after the publication of the Commission’s report and recommendation, the 
foreign ministers met in Luxembourg to discuss the results, when Cyprus emphasized its right to 
unilaterally veto the opening of negotiations if Turkey did not meet its demands (Dombey & 
Hadjipapas, 2004; Staunton 2004b). In Nicosia, Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos said 
his country's right to veto “was a weapon we have in our hands,” arguing that it should at least lead 
to a reduction of the 36,000 Turkish troops stationed on the island (Dombey & Hadjipapas, 2004). 
In response to the general Cypriot argument, the Turkish foreign minister, Abdullah Gül, 
ruled out any recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and said that if that would lead to Greek and 
Cypriot vetoes in December, “they would have to consider the consequences to themselves” (Zapf, 
2004 – trans. mine). With respect to a solution for the island, the only way forward, according to 
Gül, was the Annan plan, and Turkey had already done its share by promoting that solution, and it 
was unfair to require any more from Ankara. 
8.2.4.4 Emergency Brake 
The ‘safety’ or ‘emergency brake’ clause was another provision in the Commission’s 
recommendation. It was an explicit statement that through continued monitoring of Turkey’s 
political situation, the Commission could recommend a suspension of the negotiations in case there 
was “a serious and persistent breach of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law” (Commission, 2004, par. 6). Referring to this clause, 
Dutch Foreign Minister Ben Bot said in an interview that it would allow the EU to suspend 
negotiations in case of radical changes in Turkey, and that it was mainly a precautionary measure that 
the Union would hopefully not need to apply (“La Présidence,” 2004). 
In the previous enlargement rounds to Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean island states, 
the explicitly mentioned conditionality clause referred to the suspension of financial assistance on 
the basis of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council, not to the suspension of negotiations. 
Still, despite the absence of explicit language, the negotiations with the Eastern and Mediterranean 
countries could have been suspended just as easily, and, as such, the clause was not so much a 
different approach in a legal sense but in terminology. This rendered the Presidency’s embracing of 
the phrase more as fodder for domestic consumptionto reassure the constituents that the train was 
not unstoppable (Ludlow, 2005, p. 23). Furthermore, given that negotiation chapters had to be 
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opened and closed by an agreement of the member states in an IGC, any one of them could hit an 
emergency brake by voting against the openinging or closing of negotiations chapters, which made 
the explicit provision of an emergency brake clause largely redundant (ibid., p. 14).  
8.2.4.5 Permanent Safeguards  
In the previous enlargement round, the EU had imposed transition periods on the new member 
states, allowing them to become members well before their citizens could enjoy freedom of 
movement throughout the Union. The same was true of the Structural and Common Agricultural 
Policy, which they were slowly phased into, rather that able to fully enjoy once they had become 
members in May 2004.  
A few member states, including Denmark and Austria, pushed for a permanent safeguard 
clause enabling countries to prevent Turkey’s 70 million people from having the full right to live and 
work in other states (Browne, 2004c). Essentially, this was a provision whereby Turkey would be 
allowed a place at the decision-making table, but at the same time be a permanently unique member 
of the Union with respect to the migration rights of its citizens. Since the widespread perception of 
the prospect of mass migration from Turkey to the western European states was one of the major 
issues – if not the predominant one – that concerned public opinion in Western Europe, the 
introduction (or possibility) of permanent safeguards on the free movement of persons was a way to 
assuage that fear. Permanent safeguards on the agricultural and structural policies also were a way to 
dampen fears of the fiscal “implosion” that Turkey joining the Union would create in the EU’s 
budget. At the same time, however, the freedom of movement of persons had always been a 
cornerstone element of the European Union and denying that right on a permanent basis to the 
citizens of one member state would be a serious transgression of Europe’s non-discrimination 
norms.  
8.2.5 Timing 
Not long after the publication of the Commission’s report and recommendation, the precise timing 
of when to start negotiations became the next main issue of debate. The Copenhagen conclusions of 
two years prior had stated that after the 2004 European Council decision, accession negotiations 
would start ‘without delay’ when Turkey had been gauged to have met the political criteria.  
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However, with a looming set of referenda to be held in several member states over the 
concurrently proposed Constitutional Treaty of the EU, nervousness over Turkey’s accession 
threatened to become its public Achilles heel, to the detriment of the treaty. As such, there were 
some voices in favor of a delay to the start of negotiations until after the referenda had been held. 
Particularly Jacques Chirac requested such a delay as France was one of the member states where a 
referendum would be held, while the British were eager to agree with the delay in order to capture 
the opening of negotiations for their own tenure in the presidency in late 2005, rather than leaving it 
to Luxembourg in the first half of that year (Ludlow, 2005, p. 28; Zapf, 2004). 
The debate over the timing was not, however, an indicator of which members were 
brakemen or drivers. Firm drivers, like the United Kingdom and Germany, lobbied for a later date, 
somewhere in the fall of 2005. By contrast, Luxembourg, which in the past had been a stalwart 
brakeman, argued for an earlier start of negotiations (“Un Consensus,” 2004).  
8.2.6 The Presidency’s Approach 
Barely two weeks before the summit, after the Dutch government had finally made its policy on 
Turkey, the presidency began lobbying the member states (Ludlow, 2005, p. 15). While already quite 
aware of the diversity of positions, the Presidency had not yet created a draft with which all the 
member states – and Turkey – would agree.  
Of all the member states (25 at that time), only a few had strong reservations – France, 
Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, and Greece (Ludlow, 2005, p. 16). There were also elements over which 
the Turks had concerns. The Dutch strategy was to appease the French and the Danes, put pressure 
on the Cypriots, and to isolate the Austrians. A mistake, confidentially acknowledged by a member 
of the Presidency team, was to take the Turks’ position for granted.  
The Greeks, on the other hand, made it known to the presidency that they would be willing 
to abandon the Cypriots at the Council, if the presidency would be willing to include the persisting 
territorial dispute in the Aegean Sea in its draft. By making it more of a multilateral affair, it would 
warrant arbitration by the International Court of Justice, as the Greek had wanted all along, instead 
of keeping it a strictly bilateral issue between Greece and Turkey, as the Turks insisted it should be. 
As it turned out, the Presidency’s draft reiterated much of the earlier Copenhagen Council 
conclusions – particularly concerning the clause ‘destined to join the Union’, which was a far cry 
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from the ‘open-ended process’/third option being talked about in Paris, Berlin, Vienna and 
Copenhagen (ibid., p. 19). In this respect, the draft was more sensitive to the Turkish view than the 
Commission’s recommendation had been, especially because it also reiterated the phrase ‘without 
delay’ for the timing of the start of negotiations.  
The draft also deviated from the Commission’s recommendation by suggesting a different 
emergency brake procedure, whereby the negotiations could be suspended ‘on the request of at least 
one third of the member states’ (ibid., p. 23). This contrasted to the Commission’s requirement for a 
qualified majority vote, which would create a higher threshold for a coalition of brakemen to cross. 
Again, this was mostly a dispute over rhetoric as the format of the discussions allowed each member 
to prevent the opening or closing of any or all of the negotiations chapters. 
Regarding Cyprus, the Presidency welcomed Turkey’s decision to sign the Additional 
Protocol, though that had not yet been made firm with the Turks. Another calculated presumption 
on the Presidency’s part concerned the Aegean Sea dispute, by a clause that “…welcomed Turkey’s 
commitment to good neighborly relations and its readiness to continue to work with member states 
towards the resolution of remaining border disputes, in conformity with the principle of peaceful 
settlement of disputes in the United Nations Charter” (ibid., p. 21). The mention of ‘… with member 
states’ (plural) was the critical term, making the business multilateral rather than bilateral. During the 
pre-summit haggling, Greece also attempted to include a reference to the settling of disputes by way 
of the International Court of Justice – an element that was not included in the final text (ibid., p. 27).  
At the outset of December, the representatives in Brussels failed to come to any agreement 
on the presidency draft put forward by Ben Bot and the Dutch Foreign Ministry. The Germans and 
the British found it too tough on Turkey, while the French and the Austrians desired a more binding 
and detailed text (Bouilhet, 2004c). There were also calls for a different process to be used for 
Croatia rather than Turkey, but that was rejected by the Presidency out of hand (Ludlow, 2005, p. 
29)35.  
During the pre-summit discussions it became clear that the start of negotiations would be 
postponed until after the French referendum on the EU Constitution, in order to not complicate 
that question more than necessary. Still, there were three particular clauses that remained subject to 
debate: that of the open-ended process, yes or no, the installation of a permanent safeguard clause 
                                                
35 These calls were led by Italy, which was a firm friend of Turkey, but did not want to see Croatia held back by a 
process designed for Turkey, which would undoubtedly slow the process for Croatia. 
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for the free movement of persons, and access to Turkish airports and harbors for Cypriot airplanes 
and ships.   
The main contention between the member states was about the statement in the 
Commission’s recommendation, that the negotiations should be “an open-ended process whose 
outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand”. Particularly Turkey’s allies, Germany and the UK, took 
issue with the clause reappearing in the Presidency draft, while the Danish representative defended 
it, arguing that it only stated the obvious. The French, on the other hand, desired to make more of 
the phrase, by explicitly mentioning alternatives to membership and the possibility of outright 
failure. The Presidency, however, halted the debate on the matter, leaving it for the heads of state 
and government to discuss it further at the summit (ibid., p. 33).  
The Presidency’s design for dealing with the controversy would be to keep the phrase ‘open-
ended’, but supplement it with a preceding statement that the shared objective of the negotiations 
remained accession. It also added a third clause to the paragraph indicating that, if the negotiations 
failed, Turkey should be “fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible 
bond” (European Council, 2004, Art. 23 (4)). While the phrasing ‘privileged partnership’ had been 
specifically avoided, these clauses offered the Austrians and the French, something for their 
constituencies at home. Using personal shuttle diplomacy to broker the deal just three days before 
the summit, Balkenende secured the blessings of both Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder on the 
compromise (Ludlow, 2005, p. 34). In regard to the safeguard clauses, the process in Coreper 
strengthened the text in the direction of the French and Austrian position to make the outcome of 
the process more likely to produce a Turkish membership that did not enjoy all the same rights that 
other member states did (ibid., p. 31).  
At the Foreign Ministers meeting on December 8, however, much of the Council balked at 
the plural nature of the safeguards clause. Ireland and Sweden argued that the safeguard clauses 
should only refer to the free movement of persons, whereas the Commission’s recommendation, 
which had been taken over by the Presidency, also proposed safeguard clauses for the structural and 
agricultural policies. They were joined by Cyprus, Germany, Portugal, Denmark, Slovakia, and, 
surprisingly, Austria, while Finland, Italy, Poland and the UK opposed any permanent safeguard 
clauses whatsoever (ibid, p. 31-32). The Presidency was, however, adamant that the safeguard 
clauses, plural, remain in the draft. 
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8.2.7 The Parliament and the EPP Summit 
On November 30, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament defeated five 
hundred amendments to the central text, including those aiming at proposing the privileged 
partnership (Bouilhet, 2004b). The draft report for the Parliament’s consideration by Dutch 
committee member Camiel Eurlings on December 14 included an ‘open process’ clause, but no 
explicit alternative for membership. It also required recognition of Cyprus, but suggested that 
negotiations should start “without unnecessary delay” (“Un Consensus,” 2004). The report garnered 
407 votes in favor, to 262 voting against, with the bulk of the yes-votes coming from socialist, green 
and liberal parties. The fact that many Christian democrats voted (anonymously) in favor of the full 
membership as the goal, was considered a stinging defeat for the EPP-leadership of German 
Christian democrat Hans-Gert Pöttering (“EU-Parlament öffnet,” 2004). Support for the ‘open-
ended’ clause, however, signaled that the negotiations should in no way be seen as an unstoppable 
train toward membership.  
After the defeat of the privileged partnership clause in the European Parliament, and the 
realization that such a clause would also be defeated in the European Council, the European 
People’s Party, rallied around a new phrase that would become salient in the brakeman’s lexicon – 
‘absorption capacity’. On Thursday the 16th of December, the leaders of the European Peoples 
Party, of whom the Austrian chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel and CDU/CSU leaders – Merkel and 
Stoiber, met in Meise, outside of Brussels. However, drivers from conservative circles were also 
sufficiently present to prevent any decision making that would be too much at odds with the 
consensus forming in the Council (Blasius, 2004). Though the opponents of Turkish membership in 
the EPP deputized Schüssel to press for the privileged partnership, it was clear that the Council was 
dominated by drivers, and that such a motion would be stillborn (Winter & Bergius, 2004).  
Beside highlighting the ‘fourth criterion’, the European Union’s so-called “capacity to absorb 
new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration,” the following seven-
point resolution, recognizing preceding decisions, was adopted as well. 
 Continue and deepen the decades old cooperation and partnership with Turkey.   
 Expect that Turkey will sign the protocol regarding the adaptation of the Ankara 
agreement. 
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 Have a political instrument to ensure that negotiations can be put on hold, 
suspended or broken off if serious problems arise regarding the Union’s 
fundamental values or if important targets along the way are not met. 
 It is essential that member states remain masters of the whole process, underling 
that a strong monitoring system should be maintained during the whole process. 
 Ensure the complete fulfilment and implementation of the Copenhagen criteria. 
 New accession negotiations with candidate countries can only be concluded after 
the establishment of the Financial Framework for the period from 2014. 
 Reaffirm the open-endedness of the negotiation process, but should the 
negotiations fail, Turkey will be firmly anchored in the European structures. 
(European People’s Party, 2004) 
By and large, there was nothing in this document that had not already been suggested in the 
Presidency draft. Here too, any mention of the privileged partnership was absent, but so was any 
explicit statement that the goal of the accession negotiations was, in fact, accession.  
In addition to this EPP meeting, leaders of the liberal ALDE group (Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe) also met in Brussels prior to the European Council meeting. It was attended 
by, among others, Guy Verhofstad, Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Matti Vanhanen, who commented 
afterward on the requirement of Turkey to sign the additional protocol of the Ankara Agreement 
and what this would signify concerning legal recognition of the Greek government in Cyprus. Their 
individual statements will be dealt with in more detail in the member-state sections below. 
8.2.8 The Brussels Summit 
The Brussels summit took place on the 16th and 17th of December. The Peter Ludlow (2005) 
account, supplemented by Syp Wynia’s (2005) detailed article in Elsevier, relates a tale of diplomatic 
derring-do, with behind-the-scenes negotiations happening during the proceedings. According to 
Ludlow, the discussion on Turkey began peaceably enough, despite Austrian Chancellor Schüssel’s 
tenacity and Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson having his toes stepped on by the Presidency. 
During the working dinner, Austria was the lone voice arguing for the prospect of the privileged 
partnership, about which it remained isolated among the member states, the Danes demurring (“Les 
collègues,” 2004). 
The real trouble began by the Council’s assumption that if the Council agreed to the opening 
of accession negotiations, Erdoğan would have no trouble extending the additional protocol of the 
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Ankara Agreement to all of the 25 member states (i.e. including Cyprus) before those negotiations 
actually began. This presumption was disturbed when Balkenende brought the ‘good’ news to 
Erdoğan, and the Turkish Prime Minister balked at it, irritated by the fact that Balkenende had taken 
the issue to the press before discussing it with the Turkish delegation. The uncomfortable dispute 
between the Presidency and Turkey over Cyprus was, however, solved by the late-night ingenuity of 
diplomatic staffers, yet several other matters remained stuck in the Turks’ craw – the Aegean border 
dispute, the permanent safeguards, and the resolution passed in the European Parliament, which the 
Turks took as ‘humiliating’.  
To solve these issues, the Presidency sought the assistance of Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder 
and Jacques Chirac. These were to put pressure on Greece’s prime minister, Kostas Karamanlis to 
accept some subtle changes in the text to imply that the border dispute remained a bilateral affair. 
Furthermore, they requested Karamanlis’ presence during a meeting with the president of Cyprus, 
Tassos Papadopoulos. However, when Papadopoulos joined them, he protested against the 
strongarming and threatened to veto everything. At this juncture Chirac, making good on a promise 
to the Presidency, came into action and successfully pressured Papadopoulos to stand down. This, 
however, did not fully mollify the Turkish leaders who threatened to fly back to Ankara. They in 
turn were dissuaded from doing so by Blair, Schröder and Berlusconi, though the Turkish delegation 
wanted it to be made clear that signing the additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement was not the 
same as recognizing Cyprus (also: Laitner & Minder, 2004).    
The dispute over the permanent safeguard clauses was solved by the Presidency introducing 
the supposed clarification that these clauses “…are permanently available as a basis for safeguard 
measures” (European Council, 2004, par. 7). This formula suggested that when Turkey should 
become a member, the safeguard clauses would not (necessarily) mean that Turkey would 
permanently be a second-class member whose citizens would not enjoy the same the freedom of 
movement that other EU citizens did. However, what the clauses will actually prove to mean, should 
Turkey ever become a member of the EU, is anyone’s guess.  
Much of the summit was conducted in small groups or bilateral meetings, rather than full 
Council sessions (Ludlow, 2005, p. 2). In this process, the Presidency found particular allies in Blair 
and Schröder in its efforts to secure an agreement by the Turks to the aspects of the framed 
consensus that was emerging (Bouilhet, 2004d; “Les Vingt-Cinq,” 2004). With respect to Cyprus, 
Jacques Chirac proved to be particularly deft at encouraging the Cypriot president to acquiesce to 
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the great majority of member states, even to the degree that Papadopoulos reaffirmed the 
consensus, even when Erdoğan provoked him during the final session.    
8.3 ISSUES 
In 2004, three issues were closely connected to the politics of opening accession negotiations. As 
before, and since, Turkey’s relationship with Cyprus was a sticking point. Another issue that became 
more salient than it had previously been was that of the Armenians and the 1915 Armenian 
Genocide. Finally, the expected implications of the start of negotiations with Turkey on the 
outcome of several ratification referenda on the Constitutional Treaty were a complicating factor on 
the timing of the start of those negotiations. 
8.3.1 Cyprus 
In the early months of 2004, a plan to settle the dispute had been worked out by the leaders of the 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides, under the guidance of the UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan. His efforts resulted in the Annan peace plan that was put to the inhabitants of the island by 
referenda in April. Both communities voted on the plan, with strikingly different outcomes, but with 
equally high turnout figures (88% for the Greek Cypriots and 87% for the Turkish Cypriots).  
The Turkish Cypriots approved the plan by a margin of 65% in favor to 35% against, 
whereas the Greek Cypriots rejected it with 76% in favor to 24% against, by which the peace plan 
was rejected. Little more than a week later, the still-divided island became a member of the 
European Union. Furthermore, the leader of the campaign to reject the plan, the Greek Cypriot 
President Tassos Papadopoulos, then took his seat at the European Council table. Moreover a 
November 7th poll found that 52% of Greek Cypriots desired that their president would unilaterally 
veto the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey (Ludlow, 2005, p. 17). 
While the outcome of the referendum and Greek Cyprus’ accession was a bitter result for 
the Turkish Cypriots, Ankara had, in a way, demonstrated that it was not Turkey (or its troops) that 
stood in the way of a solution to the island’s problems. Nevertheless, a Greek Cypriot government 
had become a veto-holding member of the EU. In its recommendation, the European Commission 
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recognized that Turkey had been and continued to be actively supporting efforts to resolve the 
Cyprus problem, in particular by agreeing to the solution put forward in the peace plan of the UN 
Secretary General (Commission, 2004, par. 4). 
Regarding Cyprus’ own position on Turkey, Papadopoulos had stated throughout the 
summer and early fall that he would not exercise a unilateral veto on Turkey. However, in 
November, after a strategy session with Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis, he said that he 
would not rule out using the Cypriot veto in the European Council if Ankara denied the recognition 
of the Greek Cypriot government (Bouilhet, 2004c; “La Présidence,” 2004; Leparmentier, 2004; 
Nerbollier, 2004).   
Responding to this ultimatum, Erdoğan ruled out any concessions on the matter before 
December 17th, arguing that the Cyprus situation was not a matter for the EU, but of the United 
Nations (Rivais, 2004). The outstanding issue, however, was that the Commission required Turkey 
to sign an additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement (concerning customs and migration laws 
between Turkey and EU member states) to take account of the accession of the ten new member 
states, including Cyprus. This amendment to the EU-Turkey Custom Union required Turkey to 
open its airports and harbors to flights and ships from Greek Cyprus, and – arguably – implied its 
official recognition of the Greek Cypriot government. The Commission also stated that it expected a 
positive reply from Turkey to the draft protocol on the necessary adaptations transmitted in July 
2004 and that accession negotiations would be held in the framework of an Intergovernmental 
Conference consisting of all Member States of the EU (Commission, 2004, par. 4). This, again, 
reminded Turkey that Cyprus would be at the table and therefore be in a position to unilaterally veto 
the opening and closing of each of the 32 chapters of the acquis communautaire during the negotiation 
process. When Erdoğan insisted at the end of the summit that his country did not recognize the 
Greek government of Cyprus, the member states balked at his behavior, but did not overturn their 
conclusion to open negotiations (Wynia, 2005). 
 Thus the summit ended without a Turkish signature to the additional protocol, by which its 
recognition of Cyprus would have been implied, though there was both a requirement by the EU 
and a promise from Turkey to sign the document before negotiations would begin in 2005 
(Bouilhet, 2004e). Immediately upon hearing the news of a concession regarding Cyprus, at least a 
concession that might take place before the negotiations began, Erdoğan was lambasted at home by 
the Turkish press and the domestic opposition (ibid.). Oguz Demiralp, at that time the head of the 
Turkish mission in Brussels, would indeed sign the additional protocol in June 2005. However, 
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reservations remained in the text, which would become the sticking point between the EU and 
Turkey in the 2006 episode, detailed in the next chapter. 
8.3.2 Armenians 
During this period, Armenian communities in Europe lobbied extensively to make Turkey’s 
recognition of the 1915 genocide a precondition for membership and/or the start of negotiations. 
The Armenian diaspora population is particularly large in France (see table 8.1) and is particularly 
concentrated in Marseilles. Having both relatively and absolutely the largest population of this ethnic 
group in Western Europe, the issue was (and remains) particularly relevant to French politics 
(“Négociations d'adhésion,” 2004; Rama, 2004). For example, during a visit to Jean-Claude Gaudin, 
the UMP mayor of Marseilles, Chirac was personally pressed to push for the necessity of Turkey 
recognizing the genocide over a bowl of bouillabaisse at Gaudin’s home (“Des députés UMP,” 
2004).  
Table 8.1: The Armenian and Turkish diasporas in the fifteen member states.   
Member State Arm. Pop. (2012) % Turk. Pop. (2004) % 
Austria 3,000 0.04% 217,000 2.66% 
Belgium 10,000 0.09% 161,000 1.55% 
Denmark 3,000 0.05% 54,000 1.01% 
Finland 1,000 0.02% 6,000 0.12% 
France 450,000 0.70% 381,000 0.61% 
Germany 42,000 0.05% 2,280,000 2.76% 
Greece 20,000 0.18% ? ? 
Ireland 50 0.00% 300 0.01% 
Italy 2,500 0.00% 13,000 0.02% 
Luxembourg 10 0.00% 500 0.12% 
Netherlands 3,000 0.02% 352,000 2.16% 
Portugal ? ? 200 0.00% 
Spain 1,000 0.00% 2,000 0.00% 
Sweden 5,000 0.05% 65,000 0.73% 
United Kingdom 18,000 0.03% 112,000 0.19% 
Source: Armeniandiaspora.com (retrieved: January 27, 2012), and own estimates, see Statistical 
Appendix C. (Considering the first source as promoting the political interests of the Armenian Diaspora, and 
the difficulties of gathering such numbers, these should numbers should not be treated as demographic fact.) 
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It must be noted that, in comparison to the numbers of Turkish immigrants in European countries, 
the relative sizes of the Armenian Diaspora are negligible, with the exception of France. In France, 
the populations of Armenians and Turks are very similar in size, with an advantage to the 
Armenians. That said, given the earlier migration of Armenians and the incorporation of Armenia 
into the Soviet Union, ethnic Armenians are assumed to be much more likely to have citizenship, 
and therefore voting rights, in the member states than ethnic Turks are. 
The issue of the Genocide, however, touched a raw nerve in Europe. Much of the rhetoric 
justifying the European Union’s political construction has been aimed at seeing European political 
integration as the solution to the centuries of warfare that culminated in the Holocaust of World 
War II. By denying the Armenian genocide, the Turks put themselves into a similar category as 
Holocaust-deniers. Yet, admission to one’s contested history, or whether or not the tragedies of 
1915 should legally be considered genocide, does not appear in the formal rules of EU enlargement 
or the Copenhagen criteria. From the Turkish perspective, if Europe was to live up to its word on 
treating Turkey the same as any other candidate for membership, as the Turks argued, the Armenian 
issue ought not play a role, and Turkey should not be pressured into the acknowledgement that 
genocide was committed in its Ottoman history.  
Nevertheless, at the summit, Jacques Chirac warned Turkey that it ought to recognize the 
genocide anyway, saying that “The whole history of European integration is the history of dialogue, 
respect for others and recognition of the mistakes we have made in the past,” and, “The working 
memory [travail de mémoire], which is only natural today in the minds of Europeans, should be 
considered an unavoidable necessity,…” (“Génocide arménien,” 2004 – trans. mine). As such, 
Chirac warned that the French electorate would likely make recognition of the genocide an unofficial 
membership criterion if or when an accession treaty would be put to referendum. 
8.3.3 The Constitutional Treaty 
In June 2004 the intention to establish a constitutional treaty for the European Union reached a 
pinnacle when its draft was issued, in which former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing had a 
leading role as chairman of the convention charged with its preparation. In a September interview 
with the International Herald Tribune, Giscard d’Estaing held that the adoption of the treaty would 
make Turkish accession practically impossible, owing to the ‘double-majority voting’ mechanism 
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introduced into the draft, which required both a majority of 55%36 in the Council and that the 
countries voting in favor represented at least 65% of the EU’s population. This system put greater 
emphasis on population size, and thus gave more power to populous Turkey than the other member 
states would likely be willing to countenance (Bennhold, 2004).  
According to Ana Palacio, the former Foreign Minister of Spain, this “proposal was not 
tabled in innocence,” suggesting that Giscard d’Estaing, who had so strongly opposed Turkey’s EU 
aspirations in 2002, had designed the mechanism intentionally to torpedo Turkey’s membership. 
“Having been a member of the convention, I know what I'm saying,” she added (ibid.). Giscard 
d’Estaing neither confirmed nor denied this accusation. 
In 2004, however, the real problem to the proposed Constitutional Treaty was its timing 
with the concurrent debates on when to start negotiations with Turkey. Turkey’s allies worried about 
what effect this might have on the referenda about the treaty that were to be held in eight member 
states, starting in 2005. This was particularly salient in France, where the leaders feared (and the 
opposition hoped) that the ‘threat’ of Turkey in the EU would incline the electorate to oppose the 
Treaty more than it would do otherwise. In an attempt to forestall this prospect, the French leaders 
proposed a separate referendum on Turkey and tried to delay the start of negotiations with Turkey 
until after the referenda on the Constitutional Treaty had taken place.  
A fuller account of this can be found in the paragraph on France, below, but in the 
referendum held there on May 29 2005, it would turn out that 55% would vote against the 
Constitutional Treaty with a turnout of 69%. According to the post-referendum public Flash 
Eurobarometer (2005a) survey, only 6% of the no-voters had cited opposition to Turkey as one of 
the reasons why they had voted against the Treaty. This finding was, however, belied by the leading 
global research company Ipsos exit poll, in addition to other post-election polls (cited in Ivaldi, 
2006), the outcome of which suggests that the issue of Turkey had been of considerable influence. 
The opposition to the treaty had evidently successfully exploited the issue of Turkey in order to sink 
the referendum. Had the French leadership been prescient, they might have decided to not have 
held the referendum or would have taken even greater care to separate the two issues.   
Following the French referendum, the Dutch electorate also faced a constitutional 
referendum in 2005, whereby pre-referendum polls showed mixed messages about the influence of 
the Turkish ‘threat’ on the outcome thereof. In the government sponsored national public news 
                                                
36 Or 72% when acting without the initiative of the Commission 
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broadcaster poll (cited in Nijeboer, 2005) explicitly on the question of Turkey becoming a member 
playing a role, 68% responded with no to 22% yes. Like the French case, the Flash Eurobarometer 
(2005b) on the Dutch referendum also suggested that the Turkish issue had less bearing on voting 
intentions, as only 3% of the no-voting respondents gave ‘does not want Turkey in the European 
Union’ as one of the reasons for voting ‘no’. This finding, like the Flash Barometer on France was 
belied by Dutch independent pollster Maurice de Hond (2005), whose panel polling, held after the 
referendum, found between 40% and 44% of no-voters suggesting antagonism toward Turkish 
accession as one of the main reasons for their no-vote. On June 1 2005, three days after the French 
referendum, which negative results may have had a bearing on the outcome in the Netherlands, the 
Dutch voters rejected the treaty even more than the French had, with 61% voting no to 39% yes in 
a turnout of 62%. 
However, in 2004, the pro-treaty Dutch leaders were still confident that the Constitutional 
Treaty would be approved by the referendum and did not pay attention at the time to the Turkish 
aspect. While they went along with the strategy to push back the referendum date, there is little 
doubt that this was done more to acquiescence to French demands than to safeguard their own 
referendum.  
In Spain and Luxembourg, where referenda were also held in 2005, the treaty was accepted. 
Public opinion in Spain has generally been positive toward Turkish accession37, while in 
Luxembourg 17% of no-voting respondents saw Turkey as a contributing reason for their vote, at 
least according to the Flash Barometer (2005c). In regard to opposition to Turkey arising out of 
concerns for the adoption of the Treaty, only France clearly allowed its position to be swayed. It 
proposed a separate referendum on Turkey and lobbied for the delay of the accession negotiations.  
Austria, a brakeman, ratified the treaty by Parliamentary act, while Denmark Portugal, 
Poland, Ireland and the UK also had referenda scheduled that were indefinitely postponed after the 
failures in France and the Netherlands. By contrast, Tony Blair had hoped to use the start of the 
negotiations with Turkey as a launching pad from which to begin his own campaign on behalf of the 
Constitutional Treaty in the British referendum (Adams, 2004). 
While much of the above may be interesting for its own sake, it threatens, by this jump into 
the future, to confuse the hypothetical causal pattern. In 2004, the European leaders were deciding 
their policies on Turkey, still uneffected by public voting results of 2005. In France, the leadership 
                                                
37 In Spain’s Flash Barometer, the question on Turkey was not asked. 
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was clearly becoming concerned over the connections being made between the Constitutional Treaty 
and Turkey, and together with other domestic political concerns, adjusted their policy on Turkey 
accordingly. Hindsight demonstrates that doing so did not have the hoped-for effect of rescuing the 
treaty.  
In the Netherlands there is little evidence that the treaty’s proponents in the government or 
the opposition took its fate into account when deciding their policy on Turkey. However, the 
emerging policy on Turkey had the unforeseen effect of unleashing a particular parliamentary actor, 
right-wing politician Geert Wilders, who later engaged in the campaign to defeat the Constitutional 
Treaty and stir up even more public antagonism to Turkey’s accession in the EU. But, as said, that 
was unforeseen in 2004.  
8.4 THE MEMBER-STATE POSITIONS  
In 2004, the main question before the Council was whether or not to start the accession 
negotiations. At Copenhagen in 2002 it had been decided that negotiations would begin ‘without 
delay’ when, based on the findings of the European Commission in 2004, Turkey had met the 
political criteria for membership. One of the main arguments used by the drivers was that the 
European Council had to keep its word to Turkey. Given that the Commission came with a positive 
assessment and recommendation in October, brakemen had to either renege on the promises of 
Helsinki and Copenhagen, dispute the findings of the Commission, or alter the terms of the process.  
In the European Parliament there was certainly debate about the Commission’s assessment, 
but none of the member-state brakemen embraced this tactic. None of the heads of state or 
government argued that Turkey’s candidacy ought to be disqualified on prior grounds of its 
European-ness. As such, reneging on Copenhagen or disputing the Commission’s emperical findings 
was off the table for the member-state government. Instead, those who opposed Turkey did so by 
attempting to alter the terms. 
In many respects, like the previous episodes, the identification of brakemen vs. drivers is not 
easily made, given that there were nuances in the positions. In regard to the discrete question at 
hand – whether or not to start negotiations – there was only one member state threatening to halt 
the process altogether, which was Cyprus. Cyprus, however, aimed at forcing Turkey to recognize 
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the Greek government of Cyprus, than at questioning the principle of Turkey’s EU membership 
suitability. The other brakemen, meanwhile, opted to alter the terms of the process, in which the 
privileged partnership was re-cast as an acknowledgement that the negotiations were to be an open-
ended process, leading to either full membership or to something else. Another element of the 
altered terms was the introduction of safeguard clauses – especially with the intention to install them 
permanently.  
With respect to the timing of the negotiation, and the danger of blending the issue of Turkey 
into the issue of the Constitutional Treaty in the upcoming referenda on the latter, even some 
stalwart drivers were convinced of the wiser course of starting the negotiations in the latter half of 
2005. While this move would abrogate the ‘without delay’ clause, for which the drivers had fought 
hard at Copenhagen, it was seen more as a means of not diminishing the chance of the 
Constitutional Treaty passing the referenda than means of derailing Turkey’s prospect for 
membership. 
8.4.1 Austria 
In the 2004 episode, Austria was, again, the most stalwart brakeman against Turkey’s membership 
ambitions among the EU-15. Domestically, Austria’s public opinion was also the most dead set 
against Turkish membership, exceeding or equaling even that of the Cypriots, who would have 
happily seen their president unilaterally veto the entire prospect. Furthermore, Jörg Haider’s right-
wing FPÖ threatened to bring down the center-right ÖVP-FPÖ coalition government if Chancellor 
Wolfgang Schüssel supported accession negotiations with Turkey (Browne, 2004b; Traynor & 
Henley, 2004). 
Incidentally, Jörg Haider, himself, presented a curious case, because while his views were 
outspoken against immigration and Islamic compatibility with western values, he paradoxically 
expressed his personal support of Turkey’s ambitions for EU membership. He argued that Turkish 
membership was a matter of security policy. However, he was clearly isolated about this support 
among his party, who were puzzled over these seemingly mixed messages (“Haider soll,” 2004; 
Lugmayr, 2004; Reichstein et al, 2004; Smonig, 2004).  
Meanwhile, the opposition of Social Democrats (SPÖ) also began to take the brakeman 
position, even to the point of trying to tie the Chancellor’s hands to a veto at the Council. Their 
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motion to that effect, however, failed in the National Council, Austria’s lower house (Dannhauser, 
2004). The SPÖ-leader in Parliament argued that negotiations should only be opened if membership 
was ruled out, and would only concern a looser connection, such as under the European Economic 
Area (Höhler, 2004).  
Between brakemen pressures at home, and near-isolation among the member states, 
Chancellor Schüssel opted to not veto the negotiations, but to argue that they were “with an open 
aim,” i.e. with the possibility of a ‘pivileged partnership’ (Boland & Dombey, 2004a; “French PM 
says,” 2004; “Les collègues,” 2004). Receiving a great deal of support from the German Christian 
Democrats and center-right UMP members in France, Austria was the outspoken advocate for the 
privileged partnership option at the heads of government level (“EU blijft verdeeld,” 2004; Ludlow, 
2005, p. 16).  
At home, Schüssel was also supported by members of his cabinet when he expressed his 
doubts about Turkey’s prospect for full membership during the summer and early fall. Austria’s 
foreign minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner had done so even earlier in June, when she said: “Turkey 
today is not yet ready for joining the EU,” adding that “…the EU today is not yet ready for such a 
step either ... given that we have just completed the biggest enlargement in the Union’s history” 
(Dombey & Hope, 2004). Finance Minister Karl-Heinz Grasser said in September, “Turkey’s 
membership of the EU would not be helpful. I am amazed that in the debate going on in Europe 
that practically no one has the courage to say that openly” (Browne, 2004b; Staunton, 2004a). Upon 
assuming the position of foreign minister in October, Ursula Plassnik (ÖVP) said that the 
negotiations should be open-ended, without any guarantees of accession, also underlining the 
absorption capacity of the EU, but leaving the last word to the (Austrian) Parliament (“Le chancelier 
autrichien,” 2004; Ultsch, 2004b). 
At the foreign ministers meeting following the publication of the Commission’s 
recommendation, the Austrian delegation argued for the privileged partnership and suggested that it 
was too soon to start the negotiations. They further urged for a delay of the negotiations until the 
impact of Turkish membership on the EU’s institutions had been investigated. This, essentially, 
revived the ‘fourth criterion’ of the EU’s ability to institutionally absorb new members, also known 
as the absorption capacity (Staunton 2004b).  
Like Chirac (see below), Schüssel promised the Austrian population a referendum on the 
accession of Turkey (“L’UE et la Turquie,” 2004). “In the event of a positive result of the 
[accession] negotiations, the people shall be consulted before accession [of Turkey]” he told the 
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press, adding that, “at the end of the process, the Austrian people shall have the last word, and not 
only the Parliament… I think that it is an important decision in a democracy like Austria” (“Le 
chancelier autrichien,” 2004 – trans. mine). Heinz Fischer, the Austrian President of the Social-
Democratic party, suggested a Europe-wide referendum on the subject (“L’Autriche souhaite,” 
2004). This was a softer approach than Schüssel’s (or Chirac’s), since a positive outcome would be 
more likely in a Europe-wide referendum, than in only those countries where opposition to Turkish 
membership was the strongest. 
In the diplomatic run-up to the December summit, Austria, together with Denmark, pushed 
for the permanent safeguards on the free movement of workers (Bouilhet, 2004e; Browne, 2004c). 
Advocating for the privileged partnership, Schüssel was delegated by the EPP summit to be the 
conservatives’ spokesman in the Council. However, becoming aware of the degree to which his 
voice was alone, Schüssel soon backed down from being too insistent on explicit mention of 
alternative outcomes to full membership. 
A drop in the bucket of articles supporting Austria’s antagonism toward Turkey’s EU 
membership or accession negotiations are: Benoit & Parker, 2004, Bergsma & van de Poll, 2004, 
Blasius, 2004, Bouilhet, 2004c, Cruz, 2004, “Développement UE-Turquie,” 2004, Glachant, 2004, 
Leparmentier, 2004, “Les dirigeants,” 2004, “Les eurodéputés,” 2004, Pinon, 2004, van Rooij, 2004, 
Staunton, 2004c, “Un Consensus,” 2004, Volkery, 2004, Yárnoz, 2004. 
8.4.2 Belgium 
In 2004, Belgium was again among the drivers of Turkey’s membership prospects. However, this 
position altered temporarily when the Turkish ruling AKP floated the proposed law on adultery. 
Belgium’s foreign minister, Karel de Gucht, strongly condemned it and considered its direction 
toward Islamic legislation “out of keeping with European values” and thus “a serious problem” for 
Turkey’s integration into the EU (“Belgian minister condemns,” 2004). As detailed above, other 
drivers – Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom - joined Belgium in its public criticism of the 
adultery ban.  
In early November, in an interview with the Dutch opinion magazine Elsevier, de Gucht 
waxed poetic about Turkey, arguing how “the perspective of accession has unleashed a dynamism 
that was previously absent. Look at the modernization of the country, or to the changed treatment 
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of the Kurds. I know there is a difference between the adopted legislation and the implementation, 
but between Martin Luther King and the equal treatment of blacks in America took a whole 
generation. I am in favor of the accession of Turkey, even if I understand that full integration will 
not be easy. We must learn from our mistakes” (Camps, 2004 – trans. mine). 
On the first of December, at a bilateral summit meeting between Belgian Prime Minister 
Guy Verhofstadt and his German colleague Gerhard Schröder in Berlin, both leaders expressed their 
support for accession negotiations to begin the following year and their opposition to the privileged 
partnership idea. Speaking to the press, Verhofstadt said, “We do not need a new form of privileged 
partnership. We need normal negotiations with Turkey” (“Deutschland und Belgien,” 2004 – trans. 
mine).  
At the pre-summit foreign ministers meeting, Belgium argued against the permanent 
safeguard clause preventing the free movement of workers, arguing that such a clause would relegate 
Turkey to a second-class status in the EU (Mahony, 2004). At the ALDE group meeting, preceeding 
the summit, Verhofstad commented on Rasmussen’s assertion that Turkey would have to sign the 
additional protocol of the Ankara Agreement before negotiations could begin (see below). 
According to Verhofstad it was more important to learn that Turkey had the intention of signing 
without worrying about when exactly this would have to take place (“Rasmussen veut,” 2004). 
During the summit itself, Verhofstad did not make the news much. Wynia (2005) reports that, 
together with Tony Blair, he quieted down on the safeguards after the Swedish prime minister 
Persson made too much of a case for it, and it was clear that the brakemen were going to remain 
firm on the issue.  
Other articles that list Belgium as being a driver are: “Germany, Italy,” 2004; “Les 
dirigeants,” 2004; “Les eurodéputés,” 2004; Ludlow, 2005, p. 6; Staunton, 2004c. Articles that list 
Belgium as divided are “Human rights,” 2004 and Traynor & Henley, 2004. Both implicitly mixing 
public opinion into the analyses of where the member states stood, rather than focusing specifically 
on the negotiating position of their governments. Gow & MacAskill (2004) mention Belgium as 
“resistant” toward Turkey, along with both France and Germany, but the inclusion of the latter 
suggests that this may have been skewed due to the adultery ban issue, as the article was published in 
early September, when that issue was still in the headlines. 
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8.4.3 Denmark 
No longer carrying the presidency, Denmark made less news about its position vis-à-vis Turkey’s 
membership prospects less than it had two years before, and the reports that did reach the press 
were somewhat contradictory. On the whole, however, given the greater weight of articles in 
support of Denmark’s position as antagonistic to Turkey’s interests, such as its embrace, along with 
Austria, of the ‘privileged partnership’ option (Bergsma & van de Poll, 2004; “Développement UE-
Turquie,” 2004; van Rooij, 2004; “Un Consensus,” 2004) and the permanent safeguard on the free 
movement of workers (Bouilhet, 2004e; Browne, 2004c), Denmark must be categorized as 
brakeman. 
According to Ludlow, however, while Austria’s position was staunchly unwavering in its 
brakeman position, the Presidency believed that Denmark’s could be appeased by the insistence on a 
very strict application of the Copenhagen criteria (Ludlow, 2005, p. 17). This notion was also 
supported by a poll conducted among Danish members of Parliament, wherein 77 or the 127 
members polled, supported Turkish membership, provided that Turkey met the membership criteria 
(“77 députés danois,” 2004). Furthermore, once the Commission had published its report and 
recommendation, Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen told the Danish daily newspaper 
Berlingske Tidende, that if the Commission judged the conditions for starting negotiations as met, 
negotiations should begin. However, he did argue for the emergency brake procedure in case 
developments in Turkey took a wrong turn (“Danemark: ‘oui’,” 2004).   
After a meeting of the ALDE group leaders, just prior to the summit, Rasmussen told 
reporters that Turkey should have to sign the additional protocol of the Ankara Agreement, which 
would amount to the legal recognition of Cyprus (“Rasmussen veut,” 2004; “Solana fordert,” 2004). 
At the summit itself, he said that there should be no double standards with respect to the conditions 
for the entry of new members (“Erdogan más,” 2004). On the other hand, several reporters noted 
that, at the same time, Denmark was still among those countries pushing for something other than 
full membership (Bergsma & van Lierop, 2004; Browne, Hurst & Watson, 2004; Dirks & Lanting, 
2004). As far as some public opinion was concerned, protestors in Copenhagen covered the city’s 
signature statue, the Little Mermaid, with a black burkha and a sign around her neck reading 
“Turkey in the EU?” (Hurst & Browne, 2004).  
The reports about Denmark’s brakemanship were not unanimous, however. Boland & 
Dombey (2004b), mention Denmark as a country that, although it did have reservations concerning 
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Turkey’s humans rights, it was prepared to move ahead as long as Turkey maintained the reforms. 
That said, the following day, the same journalists (Boland, Dombey & Parker, 2004), identified 
Denmark as arguing for permanent safeguard clauses on farm subsidies, regional aid and the free 
movement of workers.  
Other articles that support interpretation of Denmark’s stance as a brakeman are: Benoit & 
Parker, 2004; Blasius, 2004; “EU blijft verdeeld,” 2004; “Les dirigeants,” 2004; “Les eurodéputés,” 
2004; Pinon, 2004; Staunton, 2004c; Traynor & Henley, 2004; Volkery, 2004; Yárnoz, 2004.  
8.4.4 Finland 
Like many of the smaller countries, Finland made minimal international news on the issue, but the 
evidence available points clearly toward a driver position. 
In June, the former Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen wrote a letter-to-the-editor in the 
Financial Times concerning the enlargement that had just occurred, whereby he argued that, “at this 
stage the promise of membership should not be extended to more countries.” He preceded this 
main point, however by acknowledging that “the coming enlargement by Bulgaria and Romania, the 
western Balkans and, eventually, Turkey, presents a great but positive challenge,” suggesting that he 
was not opposed to Turkish membership, but that his concern was more aimed at countries on the 
eastern rim of Europe, such as Ukraine, about which he advocated for an enhanced neighborhood 
policy rather than a full EU membership (Lipponen, 2004).  
In a mid-October interview with Der Spiegel, the Finnish foreign minister Erkki Tuomioja, 
said, “When the Copenhagen criteria were first drawn up in 1993, it was unimaginable that Turkey 
would ever be able to join. Turkey, however, quickly made itself master of the membership 
perspective, and I am wholly on its side” (“Spielball,” 2004 – trans. mine). When asked about the 
proposed national referenda about Turkey’s membership, Tuomoija argued that they were only the 
playthings of domestic political interests, and that it was irresponsible to make such questions the 
subject of referenda. Responding to suggestions that the Commission had made a decision that was 
not being accepted, and whether or not the recommendation had come too soon, Tuomoija 
answered that “the Commission’s report has satisfied all the requirements of the member states. 
Now we do not dare go back to zero and revisit the fundamental decision” (ibid.).  
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In November, after a summit between the Finnish President Tarja Halonen and Prime 
Minister Matti Vanhanen, and the Bulgarian president Georgi Purvanov, the question of Turkey was 
also discussed about which Halonen stated that, just as before, Finland’s attitude to Turkey’s 
accession was very positive. If a positive decision for beginning negotiations with Turkey or any 
other country was taken, the specific features of each state should be born in mind, she said, as well 
as the fact that each of them has its own different approach and process towards accession, whereby 
Turkey has made considerable progress in recent years (“Bulgarian, Finnish,” 2004).  
At the ALDE group leaders meeting, Vanhanen distanced himself from Rasmussen’s point 
that Turkey should sign the additional protocol before negotiations could begin, joining 
Verhofstad’s more permissive approach. “The position of Finland is that the signature is not part of 
the criteria [for EU membership],” he said, “but, of course, Turkey will not become a member of 
the EU without resolving the question of its relations with Cyprus” (“Rasmussen veut,” 2004 – trans 
mine; “Solana fordert,” 2004).  
At the pre-summit foreign ministers meeting, Finland joined Belgium and others opposing 
the permanent safeguard clause against the free movement of workers (Ludlow, 2005, p. 31-32; 
Mahony, 2004). Finland also opposed any alternatives to membership that were mentioned in the 
conclusions (“Türkei-Gipfel,” 2004). Other articles that list Finland as being a driver are: “Human 
rights record,” 2004, “Latvian, Finnish,” 2004, “Les dirigeants,” 2004; “Les eurodéputés,” 2004, and 
Traynor & Henley, 2004). 
8.4.5 France 
In 2004, France was as difficult to categorize as it had been in 2002. President Chirac repeatedly 
expressed himself in favor of negotiations and their goal of full membership. Domestically, however, 
his own party vigorously opposed this policy and he received little political cover from the left. As a 
result, the French position on Turkey was pulled away from the President’s expressed personal 
preferences and into the outright brakeman camp. Given this complexity, it is worthwhile 
thoroughly dissecting the French position. 
In April, UMP members of the European Parliament had voted with other conservative 
members of the EPP in favor of an amendment that called for a privileged partnership rather than 
full membership (Barthelemy, 2004). The amendment failed, but one week later, the whole UMP 
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party came out against Turkey at the launch of its 2004 European Parliament election campaign (de 
Bresson, 2004). Alain Juppé – the UMP’s president – explicitly called for privileged partnerships, not 
only with Turkey, but also with the countries of the Maghreb (Northwest Africa) and the southern 
former-Soviet bloc, at the risk of antagonizing Jacques Chirac (“L'UMP contre,” 2004; Masson, 
2004; Zemmour, 2004).  
Chirac, however, maintained his own driver preference. At the end of April, he gave a rare 
press conference marking the upcoming accession of the Eastern European countries. With respect 
to Turkey, he stated that it was his “deep conviction, which I know is not shared by everyone, [that] 
Turkey has a European vocation… It is a country closely tied to European civilization… If it is 
rejected on ethnic or religious grounds, it would play into the hands of those who want to put Islam 
and the West into opposition [with one another]” (Fulda, 2004a – trans. mine). 
In June, at a NATO conference in Istanbul, Chirac called the march of Turkey toward 
membership both “desirable” and “irreversible” (de Barochez, 2004a – trans. mine). Nevertheless, 
he also reminded people (especially US President George Bush, who had continued to put pressure 
on the EU to accept Turkey) that asking the EU to adopt Turkey was like asking the United States 
to adopt Mexico. In August, Chirac reiterated his position on Turkey, saying, “In the world of 
tomorrow, the interest of the Union, like Turkey, is to take a common path” (“Les réticences,” 2004 
– trans. mine). 
Cutting at least one domestic opponent short, Alain Juppé found himself convicted on 
corruption charges that summer. When it became clear that the sitting minister of finance, Nicolas 
Sarkozy, would be elected to replace him in November, the already existing political conflict 
between Sarkozy and Chirac widened. The President would clearly not be able to count on Sarkozy’s 
support regarding Turkey (Waintraub, 2004).  
In September, Chirac and the other UMP leaders were concerned about a possible negative 
spillover effect of the unpopular issue of Turkish accession on the referendum about the 
Constitutional Treaty for the European Union. The UMP supported the Constitution and the 
President, Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, and Sarkozy all had their personal prestige tied to its 
fate (Tabard, 2004). With Sarkozy opposed to Turkey, the President in favor, and Raffarin vacillating 
in between, the UMP was split on how to manage the issue of Turkey in light of the effect it might 
have on the Constitutional referendum. 
From the left, Laurent Fabius – the former Socialist Prime Minister – in opposing the draft 
constitution lamented that while Chirac supported the European project in the same spirit as 
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Mitterand had done, he had clearly forgotten the institutional and geographic boundaries of Europe, 
thus taking a swipe at Chirac for his support for Turkish accession (Sauvage, 2004). On the whole, 
however, the left was at least nominally in favor of Turkish accession, provided that it met the 
criteria, though some also stressed that Turkey should recognize the Armenian genocide (“La 
Turquie divise,” 2004). 
On September 23rd, the Wall Street Journal published an interview with Prime Minister Jean-
Pierre Raffarin, in which he was said to ‘demur’ on Turkey’s EU bid (Carreyrou & Bilefsky, 2004). 
Although he said that, “we don’t think we should tell Turkey that the doors of Europe are forever 
closed to it,” he did question if Erdoğan’s successors would be as willing to make the reforms as 
Erdoğan had been. Ultimately, Raffarin argued, it was not up to the Turkish leaders, but Turkish 
society to embrace Europe’s human-rights values. “Do we want the river of Islam to enter the 
riverbed of secularism?” Raffarin asked, rhetorically.  
Despite his explicit statement that he opposed shutting the door on Turkey, the interview 
was broadly taken as critical of Turkey’s accession process. While the article’s authors characterized 
Raffarin’s position as ‘demurring’, the French press (e.g. Dumoulin, 2004; Fulda, 2004b; “La visite 
d'Erdogan,” 2004) characterized it as being at odds with the President, and rooted in the Prime 
Minister’s alleged belief that Muslims were incompatible with the EU or its values. Alluding to the 
latter Foreign Minister Michel Barnier, attending the UN General Assembly, reiterated that religion 
was not a part of the Copenhagen criteria. “The dominant religion of this or that country is not, and 
has never been, a criteria for membership,” he said (“La religion,” 2004 – trans. mine). 
With Raffarin publicly expressing doubts about Turkey’s accession to the EU, the field was 
opened for Sarkozy to demand a referendum on the subject in a Sunday television program. “It is 
not because it is a Muslim country,” he told his interviewers, “but because Turkey represents the 
equivalent of the accession of the ten new countries from Eastern Europe together” (“Nicolas 
Sarkozy,” 2004 - trans. mine). A day later, Barnier supported Sarkozy’s suggestion. “As this is a very 
important decision,” he told the Assembly of French Citizens Abroad, meeting in Paris, “I offer my 
personal opinion, [that the accession of Turkey] should be [treated] as it was done with the United 
Kingdom, a referendum when the time [for accession] comes” (“Michel Barnier … referendum,” 
2004). A day later again, Barnier made it clear that he, himself, favored Turkish accession. “The 
benefits for us and for Turkey outweigh the difficulties we may encounter,” he said. “Geopolitical 
risks, including those of this great country tilting away from Europe, are immense if the process 
were to be blocked (“Michel Barnier … l'adhésion,” 2004 – trans. mine).  
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During a UMP meeting in Argenteuil at the end of September, Raffarin also spoke in 
support of Sarkozy’s suggestion of a French referendum on the accession of Turkey (“France 
L'UMP,” 2004; “Raffarin pour,” 2004). François Hollande of the PS, meanwhile, criticized Raffarin 
for bringing up the ‘rivers’ of Islam and secularism, but also suggested that all future enlargements 
should be subject to a French referendum (“Le chef du PS,” 2004). As such, political pressure in 
favor of a French national referendum on Turkey was mounting.  
According to inside sources, Chirac was far from pleased with Sarkozy forcing his hand by 
the proposed referendum, though Sarkozy had warned him in advance about what he was going to 
say on television (Schneider & Guiral, 2004). Meanwhile, Michel Barnier was sent to do an interview 
with Le Monde, in which he berated the press for misunderstanding Raffarin’s statement in the Wall 
Street Journal, whereby he again stressed again his support for eventual Turkish membership as well 
as the idea of a referendum, which, in any case, would still be a long time coming (Ceaux & 
Jakubyszyn, 2004). 
After a meeting with Gerhard Schröder in Strasbourg on October 1st, Chirac again stressed 
his support for Turkey, seeing, “the prospect of entrenching democracy and peace throughout the 
European continent in the broadest sense [to be in our interest] in order to avoid the mistakes and 
violence of the past” (“Chirac pour,” 2004 – trans. mine). At the same time, encountering so much 
pressure for a referendum on Turkey’s accession at home, he announced that there ought to be a 
referendum when negotiations had been completed, which, to his estimate, would take ten to fifteen 
years (“Chirac, Schröder d'accord,” 2004). Recognizing and expressing his support for the revision 
to the French constitution that would allow for the French public to vote on EU enlargements, he 
added that it should not be binding for Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania (“Chirac pour,” 2004). 
Turkish officials, meanwhile, said that each country ratified treaties in their own way, and a French 
referendum was not one of particular concern to them. The promise of a referendum was, in their 
opinion, merely a matter of French domestic politics (“La Turquie minimize,” 2004; Semo, 2004).   
After the Commission had published its report and recommendation, Jean-Louis Debré 
(UMP), the Speaker of the National Assembly, announced a debate without vote on the matter of 
opening negotiations with Turkey. Fifty UMP deputies called for a debate and a vote, doubtlessly 
intending to stop Turkey’s accession process, in its tracks then and there, but Raffarin denied them 
this. “The debate will take place,” the Prime Minister attempted to reassure them. “It will take place 
in Parliament and it will be held in the country,” but he did not want the process shut down before 
it even started, saying “The debate deserves to get to the bottom of things. Should European 
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humanism systematically push Turkey into fundamentalism? Has humanism slammed the door?”(de 
Barochez, 2004b – trans mine). 
Some leading lights in the Socialist Party, meanwhile, sought to maintain the connection 
between Turkey and the Constitutional Treaty, the latter of which they opposed. Still led by Laurent 
Fabius, they argued that the European construction was undemocratic, and Turkey’s progress 
toward accession was an example of this. As such, they argued in favor of a parliamentary debate, 
with a vote, on the matter (Quino, 2004). Fabius and his faction, however, did not speak for the 
entire PS, as former Minister of European affairs Pierre Moscovici and Martine Aubry (mayor of 
Lille and the daughter of Jacques Delors, former president of the European Commission), opposed 
their argument, saying that a debate without vote was quite legitimate and the agitation against 
Turkey was a matter of demagoguery (ibid. & Valbay, 2004).  
The dispute of the parliamentary debate with or without a vote, triggered a discussion about 
the French constitution, when the President underlined his ‘domaine reserve’ with regard to foreign 
policy, while his antagonists – many from his own UMP – argued that parliament had the right to 
debate and vote on any drafts or proposals issued by EU institutions. Speaking to French television 
during an October state visit to China, Chirac assured his audience that France was entirely free to 
use its veto with regard to Turkish accession and that parliament would be informed, listened to and 
consulted, before and after the European summit meeting on December 17th, “in the spirit and letter 
of our constitution” (“Adhésion de la Turquie,” 2004; du Limbert, 2004). In effect, Chirac thus 
stressed his presidential powers, both in terms of maintaining his ‘domaine reserve’ in foreign policy 
and his ability to exercise the veto in the European Council. In his loyalty to the President, Debré 
too stressed that “diplomacy is not for parliament; it is for the government.”  
During the parliamentary debate itself, which took place on October 14, the Prime Minister 
asserted that Turkey was not ready for membership, nor was Europe ready to accept Turkey as such. 
However, unlike many of the other speakers who followed him, Raffarin again invited the French 
not to prematurely answer with a “non” without a long debate (“Développement Adhésion,” 2004). 
The prime minister also upheld that parliament would not vote on the matter after the debate, 
arguing that it was the president not the legislature who negotiates treaties, (“Turquie: débat,” 2004). 
He also reassured his audience that the French people would have the last word about it in a 
referendum (“Raffarin: demande,” 2004).  
In the ensuing debate in the National Assembly, Bernard Accoyer, the leader of the UMP, 
argued on behalf of the privileged partnership (“Accoyer defend,” 2004). Jean-Marc Ayrault, the 
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leader of the PS, on the other had, argued that though Turkey did not at that time meet the 
conditions for membership, it nevertheless had the ‘legitimate right’ to accession negotiations. He 
further used the opportunity to criticize the UMP and the president about leading France into a 
crisis of confidence about the EU (“Ayrault: ‘il ne peut’,” 2004). Demonstrating the divisions among 
the socialists, Laurent Fabius, though not physically present in the debate, haunted the corridors of 
the Assembly building with his argument that Turkey had not met the democratic criteria, had not 
recognized the Armenian genocide, still mistreated minorities, and was not part of Europe 
geographically (“Fabius énumère,” 2004). The communists meanwhile called the whole thing a 
diversion from the real issue, which was the Constitutional Treaty (“Le débat,” 2004).  
While the parliamentary debate did not force Chirac’s hand by way of a vote, he shifted his 
position, by talking about the possibility of Turkey not reaching full membership. After a meeting 
with Prime Minister Erdoğan, followed by a Franco-German summit in late October, Jacques Chirac 
announced his position that, while “the results are not a foregone conclusion.” Full membership 
remained the final goal, which he believed to be in the interests of both France and Europe, but that 
it was necessary for Turkey to adapt to the European Union, and not the other way around. He also 
said that although it was his “dearest wish” that negotiations with Ankara would lead to the 
accession of Turkey, the process of meeting all of the criteria would take “fifteen years at the least,” 
(“Chirac: l'adhésion,” 2004 – trans. mine). Turkey joining the EU would further be “in the interests 
of peace, security and democracy in the world and our region” (de Barochez, 2004c; “Chirac et 
Schröder,” 2004 – trans. mine). With this formulation he had maintained his preferred driver policy, 
while, with its prediction of a lengthy process that would not automatically lead to full membership, 
he also offered the UMP something that they might be able to live with, given his personal 
preferences.  
Especially the prediction of the lengthy process gave the French opponents some air. After 
all, Turkey might fail to meet all the criteria (including the administrative criteria to be addressed in 
the negotiations), or choose another path at some point in the future in the meantime. Furthermore, 
there was the prospect of a referendum in France prior to actual accession (de Bresson & Marion, 
2004). Yet Chirac’s subtle shifts nor the parliamentary debate did not prevent a symbolic vote of 
‘Non’ in a public demonstration, organized by Armenian activists and attended by 250 deputies from 
UMP, UDF and PS, outside the National assembly building (“Adhésion Turquie,” 2004).  
After meeting with Jan Peter Balkenende in early November, Chirac was asked about Turkey 
during the post-summit press conference. He answered that his position was already known, and 
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that if Turkey were to adopt all the European values, both Europe and Turkey would be 
strengthened by Turkish membership in the Union. However, he again raised the possibility of 
Turkey’s inability to complete the process. “If [Turkey] does not accept [all the reforms], because it 
cannot or does not want to, then there will be a breakdown in negotiations” (“Point de presse,” 
2004).  
In the meantime, behind the scenes in Coreper, the French delegation managed to tighten 
the presidency’s language in the draft conclusions, with regard to the continuous monitoring of 
Turkey’s adherence to the political criteria. Also, by mentioning the ‘open-ended process’ if 
negotiations should fail, that there should be another means of keeping Turkey politically close to 
Europe (Ludlow, 2005, p. 5; 25, 33-34). During November, French officials also started lobbying for 
a later date to begin the negotiations (Sonumut, 2004). 
Three days prior to the summit, Foreign Minister Michel Barnier argued for pressuring 
Turkey to recognize the Armenian Genocide, saying: “France will pose this question. I think Turkey 
as a big country has a duty to remember” (Mahony, 2004). He add that, “I believe that when the 
time comes, Turkey should come to terms with its past, be reconciled with its own history and 
recognize this tragedy.” His use of the innocent term ‘tragedy’, however, won him criticism from the 
Armenian group CDCA (Comité de Défense de la Cause Arménienne), for not calling it ‘genocide’ 
(“Des Arméniens,” 2004). As far as Cyprus was concerned, however, Barnier joined the Presidency 
in believing that the recognition of its Greek-Cypriot government was not a legal prerequisite for 
launching negotiations, but that it would be necessary if Turkey were to eventually become a full 
member (“Un Consensus,” 2004). 
By the time the Brussels Summit took place, on 16 and 17 December, the positions of the 
political parties had become settled with the UMP (Chirac notwithstanding) together with the UDF 
and the Front Nationale dead-set against Turkey joining the EU. The PS meanwhile expressed a 
position essentially similar to that of the president (in favor of negotiations and the open-endedness 
of the process, while additionally demanding the recognition of the Armenian Genocide. The 
communists were in favor of Turkey’s membership provided that its democratization had 
sufficiently progressed by the time it entered the EU, while the greens were unconditionally on 
board with Turkey joining the Union (“La position des parties,” 2004). 
As a final pre-summit communication, Chirac released a taped interview on French National 
TV channel TF1 on December 15 – the eve of the summit – addressing the issue of Turkey. In it he 
posed the question if France had more to gain by accepting Turkish membership than to lose by 
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rejecting it. His own answer was “yes, if.” Yes, if Turkey met all the necessary conditions before 
joining the EU (“Turquie: le plaidoyer,” 2004). This televised communiqué was taken with gratitude 
in the Turkish press, and considered “remarkable” by Erdoğan (Nükte, 2004).  
Chirac’s maneuvers at the summit itself have already been mentioned. They were further 
evidence of his own commitment to Turkey, despite France’s overall souring toward it. After the 
summit, Raffarin defended the president’s position in front of the UMP deputies to the National 
Assembly, arguing “Yes to a Turkish entry into the Union in time, if she meets the accession criteria 
of the European Union… because if the conditions are met, it would be in the interests of France 
and Europe” (Forcari & Lebegue, 2004; Vial, 2004 – trans. mine).  
Despite Jacques Chirac’s outspoken support for opening negotiations and eventual Turkish 
membership along with his personal pressure behind the scenes of the Council to prevent a 
unilateral Cypriot veto, he also paved the way for French brakemanship on three particular fronts. 
On the first he promised the French electorate a referendum on Turkey at some unspecific point in 
the future before an actual accession treaty would be signed. Secondly he argued for a later 
negotiations date. Both of these first two measures aimed at forestalling the defeat of the proposed 
Constitutional Treaty by the French electorate in the next year’s referendum. Lastly, he had his share 
in the documented acknowledgement of a third option besides full membership and the rejection 
thereof in the Presidency Conclusions.  
Despite these three issues and his sovereignty as president over foreign policy, it is clear that 
he was politically forced to bend on the issue of Turkey. Because one man’s idiosyncratic behavior is 
not the purpose of this research, the acknowledgement that the pro-Turkish preferences of the 
president were at odds with the remainder of the French government and certainly with public 
opinion, will have to suffice here.  
Therefore, while Chirac appears to have authentically been a driver, the policies to which he 
conceded were clearly along the same line as those of the brakemen. The timing issue was of little 
consequence, other than a minor annoyance to the Turks. The ‘third option’, however, was in fact a 
veiled privileged partnership. But much more importantly, the prospect of a unilateral French veto 
of Turkish accession by way of a failed referendum – even if this would happen at some time in the 
nebulous future or not happen at all, is a profound threat to the process ever resulting in a full 
membership for Turkey. Not only because France could suggest having a referendum on the matter, 
but also because others, like Austria, where public opinion was even more opposed to the prospect 
of Turkish membership could institute the same. Such referenda would make at least a decade of 
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negotiations and the accomplishment of all the political reforms of the criteria subject to the public 
whim of one day.  The prospect of a veto by referendum in the distant future could also easily 
discourage Turkey from making further progress. In sum, President Jacques Chirac’s personal 
predilections aside, the French maneuvers domestically and its amendments to the presidency’s text 
made the outcome far less in Turkey’s favor. For these reasons, France is categorized as a brakeman. 
8.4.6 Germany 
In Germany, the Red-Green Schröder-Fischer coalition maintained the driver policy of 1999 and 
2002, while the opposition Christian Democrats advocated for the privileged partnership.  
In September, Fischer made the argument that “a European Turkey is indispensable for the 
war against international terror: “… if we slam the door to Europe on that country, we strengthen 
the forces opposed to democracy and western values. And then it becomes dangerous for us!” 
(“Fischer: Türkei,” 2004). Meanwhile, the political opposition led by the Christian democrats, 
strongly advocated against Turkey. The Bavarian minister president and former Chancellor 
candidate, Edmund Stoiber, called starting negotiations a “problem and loss for the Union,” 
(“Gehört die Türkei,” 2004 – trans. mine). Chairman of the CDU/CSU coalition in the Bundestag, 
Wolfgang Schäuble, argued that if Turkey would become a member, the EU would be unable to act 
in foreign and security affairs (“Union und FDP,” 2004). The CDU Chairman of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee in the European Parliament, Elmar Brok, argued that a positive recommendation was 
incomprehensible because torture still occurred in Turkey (“Gehört die Türkei,” 2004). The CDU 
was not fully unanimous in this, however, with the former defense minister under Helmut Kohl, 
Volker Rühe and Ruprecht Polenz, a CDU foreign policy specialist active in European-Middle 
Eastern as well as Atlantic dialogue projects, in addition to the CDU mayor of Hamburg Ole von 
Beust, rejected the mainline of the CDU’s opposition to Turkey (Middel, 2004b).  
Unanimity was also absent on the social-democratic side of the political aisle. Martin Schulz, 
the leader of the social democrats in the European Parliament, noted that there were significant 
deficiencies in Verheugen’s expected report (ibid.). The domestic policy spokesman for the SPD in 
the Bundestag, Dieter Wiefelspütz, said there were serious reservations among the backbenchers 
about supporting Turkey. Rainer Wend, the chairman of the economic committee said that the issue 
was not popular with the SPD’s base, and former SPD parliamentary leader, and enlargement critic, 
  313 
Hans-Ulrich Klose, complained that raising the issue opened one to accusations of being racist and 
Islamophobic (“Verheugen kündigt,” 2004).  
This lack of unanimity aside, the social democrats accused Angela Merkel of playing political 
games with the issue with her privileged partnership proposal. The SPD spokesperson on foreign 
policy issues, Gert Weisskirchen, said that, “Merkel means, with her Turkey politics, to create 
nationalistic resonance in Germany,” accusing her of populist politics and inciting hatred (Güsten, 
2004 – trans. mine; Wania, 2004).  
Guido Westerwelle of the secular right-wing FDP joined CDU in criticizing Commissioner 
Verheugen’s forthcoming progress report for being “prematurely established and painted on one 
side,” suggesting that the report did not offer a fair assessment of Turkey’s true progress toward the 
criteria (“Union begehrt,” 2004). He felt that Turkey was “neither economically or constitutionally 
ready for accession, and the EU is not capable of absorbing” Turkey, though he clarified that if the 
European Council made a binding agreement to start negotiations, any future government of which 
the FDP would be a part, would honor it (Dausend & Halusa, 2004 – trans. mine). Should it come 
to negotiations, they should be open ended, the FDP-leader argued, whereby the EU should 
consider the consequences of Turkish membership or a rejection when Turkey had fulfilled the 
criteria, because an Islamic fundamentalization of Turkey was not in Europe’s interest.  
Beste et al. (2004) argue that both Schröder (SPD) and Merkel (CDU), attempted to stifle 
debate on Turkey in order to maintain party-discipline within their factions. As a result many of the 
complexities and potential problems with Turkish membership were barely discussed or kept on a 
simple level. Discussions about the potential impact on the German economy and the actual human 
and women’s rights situation in Turkey were kept under the table in the SPD, while in the CDU the 
discussion mainly circled around the privileged partnership as a way to not flatly say ‘no’ to prevent 
alienating the growing domestic Turkish population, while still playing to the domestic audience, 
which was opposed to Turkish membership. 
After Angela Merkel had taken the debate to the European level by attempting to involve 
other conservative European leaders in her September letter, Schröder responded in an address to 
the German-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, saying, “if the Commission confirms that the 
criteria are met, the European Union must keep its word” (“Berlin und Brüssel,” 2004). 
When Verheugen, after a meeting with Prime Minister Erdoğan in Brussels, said that he saw 
no further obstacles to starting accession negotiations, Joschka Fischer, attending the United 
Nations, welcomed Verheugen’s statement, yet referring to the length of the reform process, which 
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would take at least ten or fifteen years (“EU macht,” 2004; “Fischer rechnet,” 2004). Angela Merkel, 
however, responded by declaring that she would redouble her efforts to stop the start of accession 
negotiations, and should they begin, they ought to consider a privileged partnership, not full 
membership (Gack, 2004).  
In a meeting with Erdogan, a few days before the publication of the Commission’s 
recommendation in October, Schröder assured him that Germany would give Turkey “no 
problems” during the Brussel’s summit in December and that, “Turkey has always been a reliable 
partner for Germany and NATO… I expect a positive vote, and Germany will emphatically support 
this. We are for the start of negotiations with the purpose of accession – and no other” (Klau, Zapf 
& Mertins, 2004a; 2004b – trans. mine; “Verheugen kündigt,” 2004; Wania, 2004). He also said that 
Turkish accession would also “strengthen its political weight,” and show that Islam, modernity and 
democracy do not contradict each other. Turkey would be an example of this to other Islamic 
countries.  
Once the Commission’s recommendation and report had been published, the Christian 
Democrats suggested collecting signatures for a petition against Turkish membership and in favor of 
a privileged partnership. CSU-leader Michael Glos based the idea on an anti-dual citizenship 
campaign by Hessian Prime Minister Roland Koch in 1999, which had won Koch headline attention 
and electoral success (Klemm, 2004). For this tactic, they were heavily berated by the parliamentary 
leader of the Grünen, Claudia Roth, who accused Merkel’s proposal of being “a heinous example of 
the depravity of the political culture in the CDU/CSU… and should be understood as a campaign 
against German Turks,” and to maintain party cohesion within the CDU (“Union erwägt,” 2004 – 
trans. mine). Fischer called the suggestion irresponsible (Kröter & Pries, 2004). Members of 
Merkel’s own CDU also criticized the measure. Friedbert Pflüger, the Foreign policy spokesman in 
the Bundestag, advised against a petition, and Elmar Brok, the leader of the CDU in the European 
Parliament, said the proposal gave him a stomachache (Klemm, 2004).  
Westerwelle also opposed the idea, suggesting that it was purely a means of motivating the 
CDU/CSU’s political base and called on Merkel not to force the matter, because it would risk a 
change in the continuity of the fundamental principles of Germany’s foreign policy (Eintracht, 2004; 
Kröter & Pries, 2004). The FDP’s General Secretary, Cornelia Pieper denounced the idea as 
“irresponsible populism” (“Unterschriftenaktion,” 2004). Under the barrage of criticism within the 
CDU/CSU and among the other political parties, Merkel had retreated on her suggestion by mid-
October (“Neufassung Deutsche,” 2004; “Union verzichtet,” 2004). Under this barrage of criticism 
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from all sides, Merkel withdrew her suggestion by mid-October (“Neufassung Deutsche,” 2004; 
“Union verzichtet,” 2004).  
Gerhard Schröder, meanwhile, acknowledged the risk of overburdening the European 
Union, but said that this threat was outweighed by the potential of increased security, the possibility 
of stabilizing Turkey, and providing a model for other Islamic countries (Eintracht, 2004; “Union 
erwägt,” 2004). Fischer also highlighted the risk of what might happen if Turkey were turned away 
in December. “In the decade before us, there are no alternatives [to accepting Turkey, considering] 
the question of the future of the Mediterranean, the Near East and the core issue of security for us 
all,” by which he suggested that if the accession should fail, and situations in the Mediterranean, the 
Near East, and everyone’s security were to worsen, the CDU/CSU would be to blame (“EU-
Türkei,” 2004). This stance of the German government did not go unreckognized in Ankara. 
Visiting Berlin, Abdullah Gül acknowledged that “Germany was among the countries that are the 
strongest supporters of Turkey,” (“Réticences françaises,” 2004). 
Objecting to increased criticism of German support for Turkey’s membership, Fischer  
pointed out in the Bundestag that the opposition of the CDU/CSU and the FDP was only of a 
recent nature, while CDU/CSU had supported Turkey for forty years. He thereby recalled that 
Walter Hallstein, first President of the European Commission and a CDU member, had welcomed 
the idea in 1963 that one day Turkey would be a member of the EEC and that even Michael Glos of 
the CSU, Merkel’s partner in suggesting the petition, had supported the idea of full membership 
when Helmut Kohl had been Chancellor in 1997 (Weiland, 2004). A ‘no’ to Turkey was “extremely 
shortsighted and against the security interests of [Germany] and Europe,” while there were sufficient 
safeguards built into the process to take away the anxiety of the opposition (“Hitziche Debatte,” 
2004 – trans. mine). In summary, he left no doubt that the Federal government would support the 
opening of negotiations. 
November saw little public debate on the issue, except when Eberhardt Sinner (CSU), the 
Bavarian Minister for Europe stated that a study examining the feasibility of Turkey’s EU 
membership, commissioned by the Federal Finance Minister, Hans Eichel (SPD), had been held 
back because it contradicted governments’ arguments (Middel & Halusa, 2004). The study had, 
reportedly, found that the government’s three main arguments – that the accession of Turkey would 
prevent a ‘Clash of Civilizations’, that the failure to permit full membership would cause Turkey to 
backslide on the human rights front, and that Turkish accession would be like a D-Day assault in the 
War on Terror – were all deeply flawed. Wolfgang Schäuble pursued a similar argument, saying that 
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the integration of Turkey into the Union would make further European integration impossible, thus 
compromising the entire political integration process (Wichert, 2004). 
The debate was picked up again at the beginning of December, when Schröder sought 
support for Turkey’s membership prospects in bilateral meetings with his EU colleagues. At the 
bilateral German-Belgian summit, Schröder agreed with Verhofstad that the negotiations should be 
about membership, “and not about anything less than that” (“Deutschland und Belgien,” 2004 – 
trans. mine). During a meeting with Jacques Chirac in Lübeck, Schröder reiterated that the 
negotiations had only one goal, which was membership (Winter & Pries, 2004 – trans. mine). 
In other statements made before the summit, Schröder and Fischer both continued to 
underline that the purpose of the negotiations was membership. “The goal is accession and that goal 
will not be mitigated,” Schröder vowed (“EU-Türkei Schröder,” 2004; Volkery, 2004 – trans. mine). 
Fischer added, “any dilution of this objective I would consider a dismantling of the preceding 
reform processes leading in Turkey” (ibid.). They did not seem to see an inconsistency between this, 
and the ‘open-ended’ nature of the process that had apparently been slipped into their views as well, 
which was clear when Schröder, after having spoken with Jan Peter Balkenende, said that “We are 
figuring with ten or fifteen years, and the end is open,” while Fischer said that the negotiations 
would not automatically lead to membership. As such, they implicitly embraced the wording of the 
open-ended process, so long as alternatives to membership did not have a name. 
Meanwhile, Edmund Stoiber upped the ante, arguing that Turkish membership would 
increase the threat of terror, and that a CDU/CSU-led federal government would work, with 
partners such as France, to prevent Turkey from becoming a member (Proissl, 2004). In the 
Bundestag, in a motion titled ‘Don’t Hide the Problems with Turkey’, the Christian Democratic 
faction warned of increased gang crime and the threats of islamization and terrorism, if Turkey were 
to become a member (“Erdogan greift,” 2004). Angela Merkel declared that Turkey could be an 
election issue in 2006, and if the Christian democrats were victorious (which they were) they would 
prevent Turkish accession (which, to date, they have not) (Graw & Fiedler, 2004; Günsche, 2004; 
“Türkei-Beitritt,” 2004). Nevertheless, the red-green majority supported the government’s position 
on Turkey, and a motion by the CDU/CSU to propose the privileged partnership failed 
(“Beitrittsgespräche,” 2004). 
At the summit itself, Schröder played several roles. The first was to broker a deal in advance, 
coming to agreement with France on the mention of an open-ended process and the prospect of 
securing the ‘strongest possible bond’ with Europe, should the negotiations fail (Ludlow, 2005, p. 
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34). Secondly, Schröder played a behind-the-scenes role during the summit. This involved being at 
hand when pressure was being put on the Greeks and the Cypriots, and keeping Erdoğan from 
leaving the summit prematurely in protest (Ludlow, 2005, 45).  
Nevertheless, Germany had reportedly joined Austria, France, and Denmark in defending 
the idea of keeping safeguards permanently (Bouilhet, 2004e). Germany had also been a party to the 
decision to delay the start of negotiations until October of the following year. Ludlow (2005, p. 29) 
suggests that this was agreed to in light of the French concerns over the influence the negotiations 
might otherwise have on the referendum about the Constitutional treaty, and not out of preferences 
related to Germany’s own interests. For the remainder, Schröder had kept the debate simple. He was 
in favor of negotiations and keeping the CDU formulation of ‘privileged partnership’ out of the 
conclusions.  
8.4.7 Greece 
In 2004, Greece also maintained its previous driver policy with the caveat of promoting its own 
interests regarding the dispute in the Aegean Sea and the Cyprus dispute. While public opinion 
strongly opposed Turkey’s EU membership, the government itself was an avid advocate and was an 
asset to the drivers when it came to curtailing Cypriot objections (de Hen, 2004; Traynor & Henley, 
2004).  
When the Commission’s recommendation was published, a government spokesman 
commented: “We believe that a European Turkey is not only good for the Turkish people, but also 
for the stability, security and welfare of our region” (van Wetten, 2004 – trans. mine). Other articles 
also mention Greece’s welcome of the positive recommendation (e.g. van Lierop, 2004; Welgraven, 
2004). Only a few days later, the Greek President, Konstantinos Stephanopoulos, publicly weighed 
in on the matter, though not without some reference to the regional conflicts. “Obviously, Greece 
must help Turkey to become a European country, which is in the interest of the EU and Greece... 
but we must also remind them of their obligations vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus,” he said during the 
annual commemoration of the historic 1571 battle of Lepanto (“Ankara doit,” 2004 – trans. mine). 
Referring to the patriarchate in Istanbul, the president’s spokesman also brought up the issue of 
Greek sovereignty in the Aegean Sea. On the matter of negotiations, however, Greece favored a 
green light.  
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Yet, Greece was willing to use the matter in order to extract concessions. At the foreign 
ministers meeting on October 12, it supported Cyprus’ demands for a reduction in Turkish troops 
stationed on the island, permission for Cypriot-flagged ships to dock at Turkish ports, and an end to 
Turkish vetoes on Cyprus’ bid to join the OECD and OSCE, though Greek officials made it clear 
they would not countenance a Cypriot veto on Turkey in December (Dombey & Hadjipapas, 2004). 
Meanwhile, hostile encounters between Greek and Turkish ships in the disputed waters around the 
islets of Imia/Kardak in October and September heightened the realization that a solution needed to 
be found, and that the December summit was an ideal venue to pressure Turkey on this issue 
(Ludlow, 2005, p. 20).  
In November, after a state visit to Cyprus, Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis, asserted that 
“The possible accession of Turkey will depend not only on convergence with the constitutional and 
political norms of the EU, but also its foreign policy and particularly its attitude vis-à-vis Cyprus” 
(“La Présidence,” 2004 – trans. mine). As such, Karamanlis stated that Turkey would have to 
recognize Cyprus before accession negotiations could begin. Nevertheless, he also urged Cyprus’ 
President Papadopoulos to rule out a unilateral veto (Boland, Hadjipapas & Hope, 2004). 
Before the summit, during a presidency visit to Athens, Karamanlis urged Balkenende to 
adopt the phrase “unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations,” to the Presidency 
conclusions (Ludlow, 2005, p. 27). In keeping with its position as a driver, Greece also argued 
against the permanent safeguard clauses at the pre-summit foreign ministers meeting (Ludlow, 2005, 
p. 31-32; Mahony, 2004). 
The events at the summit itself have already been described. It is, however, worth noting 
that when decisions had to be made, Karamanlis backed down from his earlier insistence to make 
the territorial dispute a multilateral affair, though he refused to discuss the Cyprus situation without 
the Cypriot president in the room (Ludlow, 2005, p. 44). He further attempted to maintain the early 
start of negotiations. When he tried to reinstate an earlier date for negotiations to begin in the debate 
of the council, he was firmly shut down by Jacques Chirac (Peel, 2004).  
Other sources that support the Greek government’s position as a driver are: Bouilhet, 2004c, 
Dombey & Hope, 2004, “Human rights,” 2004, Ludlow, 2005, p. 6, “Welcome Turkey,” 2004. 
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8.4.8 Ireland 
Ireland also continued its driver policy for Turkey, albeit without much attention from the media, 
which made it useful to sift through the parliamentary debates to obtain some insight into the 
positions of its political parties. 
In April, while Ireland still held the rotating Presidency, the Joint Committee of European 
Affairs of the Oireachtas (Irish parliament) hosted a delegation from the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, and legislators were able to express their positions on Turkey. Michael Mulcahy of the 
centrist ruling party Fianna Fáil expressed his strong support for Turkey, but still had human rights 
concerns. Pat Carey (also of Fianna Fáil) underlined these concerns, though not without first 
mentioning how much he had once enjoyed a holiday in Turkey. More seriously, the committee 
chairman, Gay Mitchell of center-right Fine Gael, commented on the positive prospects of greater 
immigration from Turkey, considering Europe’s declining population and the need to meet pension 
costs in the future. Mitchell further suggested to the Turkish delegation that rather than highlighting 
its progress toward the Copenhagen criteria, the Turkish argument ought to be focussed on the 
positive aspects of Turkey’s EU membership (Ireland, 2004a). 
In July, the Joint Committee asked Deputy Dick Roche (Fianna Fáil), the Minister of State, 
for an update on Turkey. His answer in regard to Ireland’s position was non-committal: “I do not 
know what will be the European Commission findings but decisions will be made during the Dutch 
Presidency and we will have them towards the end of the year. I anticipate that if the decision is to 
open negotiations, there will be a relatively long lead time” (Ireland, 2004b). When Roche was 
questioned again on the matter in September, due to the before mentioned public statements on 
Turkey by Dutch European Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, he replied that Bolkestein’s personal 
opinions were not shared by the Irish government and that, “the Irish Government view has always 
been that if a country meets the Copenhagen criteria, it is entitled to have an objective appraisal of 
its position” (Ireland, 2004c). 
During the parliamentary debate following the publication of the Commission’s report and 
recommendation in October, contrary voices took the floor. Though Foreign Minister Dermot 
Ahern (Fianna Fáil; no relation to the Taoiseach) welcomed the report, some brakemen members of 
parliament thought it important to state their cases, such as Senator Ann Ormonde (also of Fianna 
Fáil), who expressed her strong reservations about Turkey, concerning, “human rights, honour 
killings, discrimination, education and equality of opportunity in employment.” In her address to 
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Ahern, she expressed her preference of the Commission’s use of the phrase ‘open-ended process’ 
(Ireland, 2004d). 
In response Ahern reiterated the government’s previous position, saying that, “the 
Commission has laid out a map for the accession of Turkey. It will be reasonably lengthy, but 
provided that Turkey meets the criteria over the period set out by the Commission, it will become a 
member,” thus affirming as a fait accompli that the whole question hinged on Turkey’s progress 
toward the criteria. This failed to win over some members. Senator Derek McDowell (Labour) 
articulated his reasoning against extending membership to Turkey not in terms of the political, 
economic, or administrative Copenhagen criteria, but in the Union’s ability to attain an ‘ever closer 
union’. “It is questionable if this project is possible in the context of a country that is so different, 
far away and un-European,” he said. “The important question is whether it is a European country 
and what will be the effect of its accession on other member states.” The sitting chairman, Deputy 
Sean Haughey (Fianna Fáil) agreed with McDowell, expressing his “doubts as to whether a 
predominantly Muslim country can become part of the democracy that is the EU.” Michael 
Mulcahey, who had expressed his support for Turkey in April, then agreed with Haughey, saying 
that, “the question of Turkey’s accession is as much about culture and identity as about meeting 
criteria” (ibid.). 
McDowell also observed that, “there is a perception that Ireland has taken issue with 
Turkish accession in the past.” However, “following a conversation which took place only six 
months ago between the Taoiseach and [Erdoğan], there seems to be less scepticism.” It was 
therefore his recommendation that, “the committee should exert its influence on this issue sooner 
rather than later,” ostensibly to reverse the government’s supposed slide toward being uncritical 
driver (ibid.).  
When Deputy Noel Treacy, the newly installed Minister of State, reiterated the government’s 
position in October by ‘explaining’ the process, he too encountered disagreement. Deputy Aengus 
Ó Snodaigh (Sinn Féin) cautioned the minister to not allow Turkey to start negotiations before it 
had fully complied with the Copenhagen criteria and had addressed its occupation of Cyprus 
(Ireland, 2004e).  
The matter was taken up again in early November when the Committee decided to vote on 
its own recommendation on Turkey. Deputy Haughey, who had made the motion, not only called 
into question the degree to which Turkey met the criteria, but also “whether Muslims can integrate 
and conform and whether the moderates can prevail over the increasing number of 
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fundamentalists,” and “whether Turkey is a European country at all” (Ireland, 2004f). After having 
listened to a presentation by the Irish Institute of European Affairs citing substantial reform in the 
field of democracy and human rights in Turkey, the issue was again debated in Parliament though 
this time more to question the representative of the institute than to declare substantive positions 
(Ireland, 2004g).  
On December 8, a week before the summit, the Joint Committee again sat down with Noel 
Treacy to hear the government’s position on Turkey, before voting on the matter. During the 
exchange, Treacy said he expected an agreement by the EU member states to open negotiations in 
the second half of 2005, though he did not explicitly reiterate the government’s own position. To 
questions about the Turkish-Cypriot difficulties, the Minister of State replied that, “it is the 
Government’s wish that we can move forward, albeit in a measured, practical, planned, positive and 
progressive way; that in doing so we will move everyone forward together and help Turkey in its 
relationship with Cyprus, and that under the umbrella of enlargement of the European Union, we 
can improve the situation to everyone’s benefit. That is the goal of the European Union which 
Ireland fully supports” (Ireland, 2004h). 
The final product of the Joint Committee’s efforts was a report that, according to Noel 
Tracy’s, strengthened the Taoiseach’s position, “by having the considered input of [the] committee”  
(Ireland, 2004i). It called on EU leaders to open accession negotiations with Turkey, but also warned 
that Ankara had a long way to go before fulfilling all the union's membership criteria (Beesley, 2004). 
At the summit, Ireland played a minor role, but was numbered among Turkey’s champions 
for an early start of negotiations (Staunton, 2004c; Traynor & Henley, 2004). It opposed the idea of 
permanent safeguards, such as that for the free movement of persons, which would have relegated 
Turkey to a second-class member (Ludlow, 2005, p. 31) It also joined Sweden, Germany and the UK 
in objecting to the presidency’s phrase ‘European community of values’, considering it not germane 
to the question of Turkey’s future membership (ibid, p. 26). Ireland spoke against using a general 
framework to govern Turkey’s accession rather than one specifically designed for Turkey, fearing 
that doing so would hold back Croatia’s accession by tethering it to a general framework including 
Turkey (ibid., p. 29, n. 37).  
After the summit, the Taoiseach welcomed the agreement as an important message to 
Muslims, including Ireland’s 25,000-strong Islamic community, saying that they belonged in Europe. 
“We are now embarked on a process that will lead to Turkey's membership of the EU,” he said 
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(Staunton, 2004d). However, Erdoğan’s parting comment vis-à-vis Cyprus was, in Ahern’s opinion 
quite unnecessary and had left him with a bitter aftertaste (Gonzalez & Cruz, 2004).  
Other articles that mention Ireland’s position as a driver are: “Beitrittsgespräche,” 2004, 
“Human rights,” 2004, “Germany, Italy,” 2004, Traynor & Henley, 2004. 
8.4.9 Italy 
Though the issue of Turkey heated up in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, it did not get much 
attention from the media in Italy. Even Berlusconi’s stance on it was hard to find in the international 
newspapers. In the Ludlow account, Italy’s position was not mentioned much either. It would be 
beyond the scope of this research to delve into the reasons why Italy seemed so little in the picture 
about it. Nevertheless, in the available sources Rome was counted ubiquitously as a strong driver of 
Turkey’s membership prospects.  
In September, prior to the publication of the Commission’s report and recommendation, 
Italy’s foreign minister, Franco Frattini called for a positive decision on negotiations at the summit 
in December, saying “Italy hopes that the Heads of State and Government of the Union may take a 
positive decision for Turkey in December” (“UE: l'Italie pour,” 2004 – trans. mine). Still, Italy was 
not entirely without some disagreement on the matter. During the negotiations over the draft 
conclusions in Coreper, Rocco Cangelosi, Italy’s permanent representative, led the charge against the 
Presidency’s plan to introduce a general framework for negotiations that had been designed to 
govern not only Turkey’s accession process, but also that of other candidates. Again, the diplomatic 
sparring over this issue was not between the drivers and brakemen of Turkey’s progress, but 
between those who wanted a general framework and those who did not want this mechanism to 
hold back Croatia’s accession (Ludlow, 2005, p. 29).  
At the summit, Italy joined the chorus against the permanent safeguards (Ludlow, 2005, p. 
31-32). Regarding Cyprus, Berlusconi had argued during the earlier discussions on Cyprus that 
Turkey ought to simply recognize Cyprus and have the issue done with (ibid., p. 40). When the 
debates heated up and Erdoğan threatened to depart for Ankara prematurely, Berlusconi joined the 
delegation of European leaders that went to his room on the seventh floor of the Council building 
and managed to dissuade him from doing so (ibid., p. 45).  
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After the summit, Berlusconi made a brief statement about Turkey to the press. Unlike other 
European leaders, who had cautioned about (or sought reassurance in) the long time it would take 
for Turkey to complete the negotiations, Berlusconi hoped that Turkey could become a member “in 
the shortest possible time” (“CDU streitet,” 2004).  
Other articles mentioning Italy’s driver position are: “Abrir la puerta,” 2004; Adams, 2004. 
Bennhold, 2004, Benoit, Milne & Parker, 2004, Bouilhet, 2004c, Bowley, 2004a, “Chirac pone la 
nota,” 2004; Cruz, 2004; Dombey, Laitner & Parker, 2004, de Hen, 2004, “Human Rights,” 2004, 
“Les dirigeants,” 2004, “Les eurodéputés,” 2004, Nerbollier, 2004, Staunton, 2004c, Traynor & 
Henley, 2004. 
8.4.10 Luxembourg 
In 2004, Luxembourg proved to be a surprising case. In previous episodes, the Grand Duchy – 
represented by Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker – had been a firm brakeman. This changed in 
the course of late 2004, when Luxembourg made an about-face and became a driver of Turkey’s 
membership ambitions.  
In September, sources still mentioned Luxembourg as a brakeman (Bowley, 2004a; Traynor 
& Henley, 2004). According to a September article in Die Welt, Juncker had joined the chorus of 
leaders calling for an open-ended process, implying that the negotiations would not necessarily lead 
to full membership (Middel 2004a). Nevertheless, he also said that it was too late for a discussion 
about the privileged partnership that Angela Merkel had been attempting to promote (“Deutsche 
CDU-Spitze,” 2004). In another article Juncker said that Turkish membership should not be realized 
quickly (“French PM says,” 2004; Halusa, 2004a).   
In a strange October turnaround, Juncker suddenly supported a quick start of negotiations 
(“Germany and Italy,” 2004; “Juncker souhaite,” 2004). When asked by Le Monde about when 
negotiations with Turkey should begin, he answered that a mandate for negotiations could be drawn 
up in a matter of months (Courtois, Elkrief & Séguillon, 2004). According to the Turkish Daily 
News Juncker expressed his support for Turkish membership. Juncker had telephoned Erdoğan 
mid-October, offering April 26, 2005 as a date to commence the accession negotiations, which 
would then take place under the Luxembourg Presidency in the first half of 2005 (“Judge receives,” 
2004).    
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After a bilateral summit between Erdoğan and Juncker, in mid-November, Juncker reiterated 
to the press that he believed the membership negotiations with Turkey would commence in the first 
half of 2005, under the Luxembourg presidency (“Les négociations,” 2004; Sonumut, 2004). He 
further said that there would be no provision for any other status for Turkey than full membership, 
and that he opposed any plan for an alternative form of partnership between Turkey and the EU. 
Additionally, he said that the reforms achieved by Turkey particularly in the previous two years and 
the political will it had demonstrated to meet the Copenhagen political criteria could not be ignored, 
in view of which a decision should be made to commence the negotiations in 2005. A precise date 
however would still have to be determined, given that Jacques Chirac – with whom he had spoken 
for two hours earlier that day – was still ambivalent about it. When asked about the Cyprus affair, 
Juncker said that Turkey had met its obligations in that respect to the EU, even though the dispute 
had remained unresolved between Turkey and Greece. Concerning the privileged partnership 
proposal, he said, “if partnership means only political and not institutional relations, then that would 
mean a lack of respect for Turkey” (“Fight over Date,” 2004). This statement he strengthened by 
saying: “The EU will remain incomplete without Turkey and will only be completed with Turkey's 
accession” (“Press Freedom,” 2004; “Religion not a Barrier,” 2004) 
When pressed by Die Welt on his change of heart, with respect to his earlier position, 
Juncker said, “I have simply changed my mind… Turkey has achieved great progress. The entire 
country is gripped by a strong will to reform. It would not be good for us, nor for the Turks, if this 
desire would wane. On human rights issues Turkey has moved significantly in the European 
direction. Also, the government in Ankara has freed itself from military rule… I was against granting 
Turkey membership status in 1997 because I was worried about the EU enlarging too much.” 
(Halusa, 2004b; “Juncker,” 2004 – trans. mine). 
Prior to the summit, however, Juncker’s enthusiasm seemed to have slackened somewhat 
when he was quoted as saying, “No one is very enthusiastic [about Turkey], but no one has the heart 
to say it.” (Evans-Pritchard, 2004; Riegert, 2004). At the summit he declared that, though critical 
public opinion should not be ignored, it should not set aside forty years of history between the 
EEC/EU and Turkey either (“Beitrittsgespräche,” 2004). 
During the closing ceremonies of the summit, Erdoğan’s parting shots at Cyprus seem to 
have antagonized the Luxembourgers, about which its foreign minister, Jean Asselborn, said 
afterwards, “the provocative way in which [Erdoğan] spoke of Cyprus at the final reception was 
unacceptable… It is about time Turkish politicians realized that we are not carpet traders.” Juncker 
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commented that, “at some moments, the debate with Turkey had been hardly tolerable” 
(“Luxembourg ministers,” 2004; “Les Vingt-Cinq,” 2004) 
As mentioned above, some articles in 2004 still listed Luxembourg as a brakeman (e.g. 
Bowley, 2004a; “Human rights record,” 2004; Traynor & Henley, 2004), but they were thin on detail 
or seemed outdated. The Guardian and the International Herald Tribune hardly expanded on 
Luxembourg’s position, while two of their articles were written in September and were evidently 
based on statements made by Luxembourg officials in previous episodes. Articles that further 
mention Luxembourg as being favorable toward beginning accession negotiations are: “Entretien 
Chirac-Juncker,” 2004; “Développement UE-Turquie,” 2004; “French president,” 2004; “Germany, 
Italy,” 2004. 
8.4.11 Netherlands 
The position of the Netherlands presented an interesting case because of the domestic deadlock it 
had to deal with before coming to its decision, which also had an impact on the performance of the 
Dutch leaders during their presidency in the council. Much of the following account is the result of 
interviews with Dutch leaders, legislators and diplomats, rather than what is usually only found in 
newspapers and other forms of documentation, such as the Ludlow account. Beyond the personal 
interest of the researcher, Ludlow (2005, p. 53) also recognized the ‘Dutch-Dutch dimension’ (by 
which he means the debate over Turkey within the Netherlands and even within the Dutch cabinet) 
and its particular influence on shaping the Presidency’s behavior.  
In all, the Netherlands proved to be a reluctant but effective driver for Turkey, owing to the 
influences of certain individual actors in the Dutch decision-making system. The Netherlands’ policy 
decision was, however, one that was closely fought and might have easily turned out the other way 
had any amount of factors been different. The paragraphs above that have dealt with the 
Netherlands’ behavior in the role of the Presidency, the internal ‘Dutch-Dutch dimension’ have 
been left out, but it will now be dealt with.  
The final decision turned out to be highly political in the domestic realm, and took a long 
time to arrive at. It also represented an about-face for what was, mostly, the same government which 
had been such a staunch brakeman at Copenhagen. Between the events of 2002 and 2004, 
government elections saw the return of the two major coalition partners of the previous 
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government, the Christian-democrat CDA and the right-wing-liberal VVD. Instead of the anti-EU 
and anti-Turkey LPF as their former (smaller but still significant) third coalition partner, they were 
joined by the pro-EU and pro-Turkey, but politically rather weak, social liberal D66, with only four 
seats in Parliament. 
Though it had long been certain that Turkey would be on the year-end European Council’s 
agenda, Turkey was not explicitly mentioned in the 2003 coalition agreement. This felt left the 
decisions for the cabinet, where Turkey’s friends were a distinct minority among the ministers. In 
addition to the political change in the coalition, there was another particular development that 
became crucial for the opportunity of a policy shift in Turkey’s favor. In January, the sitting foreign 
minister, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer became Secretary-General of NATO, vacating his post at the 
foreign ministry.  
In his place, Jan Peter Balkenende appointed Bernard Bot – the long-serving permanent 
representative for the Netherlands in Brussels. Prior to his post in Brussels, Bot had also served as 
the Dutch ambassador in Ankara for two years in the 1980s. In choosing Bot, Balkenende certainly 
chose someone who was thoroughly knowledgeable about the EU and could help lead the 
presidency. Yet Bot was not a neutral choice. While he was certainly chosen for his long-standing 
and intricate familiarity with the EU and its workings, he was also an outspoken proponent of 
Turkish membership (Wynia, 2004a).  
Yet, even with Bot, the VVD ministers and a good number of CDA ministers still opposed 
starting accession negotiations. These internal divisions within CDA and also VVD also existed in 
Parliamentary factions, in the parties generally, and with their voters. Two-thirds of VVD voters 
were opposed, but a slight majority of CDA voters supported opening negotiations (de Hond, 
2004). 
Significantly, however, Bot allowed a group of diplomats within the foreign ministry who 
had, for at least a year prior to Bot’s appointment, been generating means by which to successfully 
move the domestic and European debate more in Turkey’s favor. That said, according to Ludlow 
(2004, p. 6; 2005, p. 11), the crucial individual in determining the direction remained the Prime 
Minister, whose personal preferences on the matter remained opaque. To venture any possible 
description of Balkenende as a driver from personal conviction might only be possible by reverse-
engineering the analysis from the outcome. His public statements, such as his speech to the 
European Parliament, cited above, had been strictly related to the process, not the substance. If a 
description can be the result of personal estimations, it should be noted that none of the political 
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leaders interviewed in the course of this research, neither within the cabinet’s chambers nor in other 
discussions, were able to cite him as anything other than a neutral chairman over the ministerial 
council. As such, the prime minister was able to remain above the fray, while allowing himself to 
maintain the ‘strict but fair’ policy rhetoric, while his lieutenants – Bot chief among them – 
maneuvered energetically on Turkey’s behalf. 
In preparation for the decision, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Ministry commissioned 
several advisory reports. In July, the Advisory Council for International Affairs (AIV) – a foreign 
policy advisory body – argued that negotiations should begin. Its report, however, made several 
caveats, such as the requirement that the Cyprus situation would have to be solved prior to 
accession, though not necessarily before negotiations could begin and that Turkey should be held to 
some specific points of action based on the political Copenhagen criteria38 (AIV, 2004, p. 24-25). In 
August, the Scientific Council on Government Policy (WRR) presented the conclusion of its inquiry 
into the Prime Minister’s question if Turkey’s dominant religion could create a barrier to its 
membership prospects. It, unsurprisingly, replied that this was not the case, due to the secular basis 
of the European Union’s institution (WRR, 2004). 
Though debate over the matter was played out on several levels, not only in different levels 
of government, but also in the media, public fora, and within the party constituencies, the actual 
decisions were made in the cabinet and parliament, which is where this analysis will place its focus. 
Interestingly enough, as the paragraphs below will make clear, the dynamic of the debate in the 
cabinet differed from that in Parliament. In both, the split between drivers and brakemen manifested 
itself initially within the political parties rather than among them, while the cabinet ministers 
appeared to be less induced to maintain party discipline than members of parliament were.  
The division in parliament between support and rejection of negotiations first occurred 
within the political parties themselves until the factions decided to on unified courses of action. The 
debates within CDA and VVD, to come to some consensus were very heated. Following the 2002 
murder of a Dutch politician, Pim Fortuyn, who had rapidly gained much support for his strong 
criticism of Muslim immigration, public opinion against Turkey’s EU membership had flared up 
considerably, which was also apparent in the decreased support for political parties who opposed 
draconian limits on immigration, and/or were part of the political status quo of the 1990s. While the 
CDA had initially been supportive of Turkish accession, this policy became increasingly problematic 
                                                
38 These ‘points of action’ did not perfectly overlap with the six additional measures suggested by the Commission. 
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with a considerable decrease in popularity among its members and the electorate (“Emoties en 
ratio,” 2004; Van Straaten, 2004). That a slim majority of voters still supported negotiations in 2004 
was likely the result of the ‘strict but fair’ approach of the CDA leadership in the cabinet. 
According to participants and descriptions of Dutch European policy making, policy on 
Europe is generally set by those ministers with a European portfolio: the prime minister, the foreign 
minister, and the ministers of agriculture, finance and economic affairs. Among these, there 
appeared to have been an equal balance between drivers and brakemen, with Bernard Bot and 
Laurens Jan Brinkhorst (Economic Affairs) of D66 clearly as drivers and Gerrit Zalm (Finance) of 
VVD and Cees Veerman (Agriculture) of CDA as the brakemen. It might have tipped the scales to 
the driver’s side if Balkenende had been personally involved in the debate on Turkey’s behalf, which 
according to the interviews not been the case. Atzo Nicolaï, the State Secretary for European Affairs 
(VVD) did not have a vote in the cabinet, but seems to have been a driver (van de Poll, 2004). 
Outside the core of the European policy ministers in the cabinet, a majority of brakemen 
manifested itself. These included Johan Remkes (Interior – VVD), Piet-Hein Donner (Justice – 
CDA), Karla Peijs (Traffic and Water – CDA), Rita Verdonk (Immigration and Integration – VVD), 
and Hans Hoogervorst (Health, Welfare and Sport – VVD) (Koele & Peeperkorn, 2004; Moerland, 
2004; Wynia, 2004b). This, in all, put the drivers in the minority. Thom de Graaf (Minister of 
Governmental Renewal – D66) can be presumed to have been a driver. 
The crucial development that seemed to have tipped the scales in the other direction 
occurred when Minister of Economic Affairs Laurens Jan Brinkhorst (D66) succeeded in convincing 
his CDA colleague Cees Veerman (Agriculture) to vote for the drivers’ side, despite his reservations 
about Turkey belonging in the Union. This was rather surprising as Brinkhorst belonged to the 
smaller and relatively uninfluential coalition party and Veerman to largest with the greatest influence. 
Perhaps the explanation can be found in the friendly relationship the two had developed, possibly 
owing to Brinkhorst’s former tenure as Minister of Agriculture in the previous cabinet (Kok II), and 
thus Veerman’s predecessor in that function. With Veerman on board, and thus the majority of the 
European policy ministers, the drivers were able to push their policy through the cabinet as a whole.  
The cabinet communicated this position to Parliament on November 23. It was voted in 
favor there too the day after, although parliament required that Turkey adopted the six pieces of 
legislation identified by the Commission, and reiterated that Turkey should be subject to continuous 
monitoring of its progress toward the political criteria (Ludlow, 2005, p. 14). This mandate paved 
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the way for Bot and Balkenende to take a more full-throated case to the other member states in their 
capacity of the rotating Presidency, as described earlier in the chapter.   
Yet, the parliamentary side was not without its interesting developments. The Christian 
democrats in Parliament had become increasingly critical or the driver policy (van Oostrum, 2004). 
Throughout the months leading up to the decision, a curious pattern had emerged. While the cabinet 
ministers of the CDA moved toward the driver position, the CDA parliament members moved in 
the opposite direction, ultimately voting against opening accession negotiations, despite the support 
for negotiations from ‘their’ people in the cabinet. In parliament, the highest-profile driver was 
Senator René van der Linden (in a legislative system where members of the upper house do not tend 
to have high profiles at all).  
Following the CDA vote in the lower house, the faction leader, Maxime Verhagen and the 
foreign policy spokesman, Jan Jacob van Dijk, made increasingly critical remarks. One week before 
the summit CDA faction leader Verhagen and van Dijk (2004) published an op-ed in one of the 
leading Dutch newspapers, the Volkskrant, arguing that the heads of state and government had 
weakened the political criteria in order to allow accession negotiations with Turkey. They supported 
the idea that the process should lead to full membership if Turkey could prove itself to be like the 
Netherlands, Belgium or Sweden, but while torture persisted and Christians were unable to form 
congregations and build churches, Turkey had, in their opinion, not met the Copenhagen criteria, 
and should therefore not be permitted to start accession negotiations.  
The reverse was true for the VVD. Where the VVD members of the cabinet were opposed 
to opening negotiations, in the parliament (both houses), the faction, in the end, advocated in 
Turkey’s favor. However, arriving at that position was a very painful one. The faction leader, Jozias 
van Aartsen – who had been the Foreign Minister in the second Kok government and a supporter 
of the driver position in 1999 – advocated for the driver position, while the foreign policy 
spokesman, Geert Wilders, vehemently opposed opening negotiations, or permitting Turkey to ever 
become a member. A slim majority of the faction supported the leader. When it was required of 
Wilders to speak on that majority’s behalf in his capacity as spokesman, he flatly refused and 
threatened to leave the party, and take his seat with him. Neither van Aartsen nor Wilders were 
willing to budge, and in September Geert Wilders indeed left the party to form a single-member 
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faction.39 With Wilders gone, the VVD faction lent its support to the driver policy. Hans van Baalen, 
Wilders’ replacement as foreign policy spokesman, argued the matter poetically: “When we cross the 
Bosporus with the EU,” he said, “we must not do it with weak knees, but with granite guarantees 
that Turkey fulfills the political criteria at the moment of accession” (van den Boogaart, 2004).  
The third coalition partner, D66, with its four seats, along with the left-wing parties of the 
opposition supported the government, while the smaller Christian parties and the remnants of the 
LPF joined the CDA in voting against (Peeperkorn, 2004). Much like the SPD in Germany, the 
Dutch left has tended to receive a great deal more support from the Turkish community of Dutch 
citizens. The LPF remained true to its anti-immigrant position, arguing that Turkish membership 
would necessarily bring more immigration. The smaller Christian parties – CU and SGP – held their 
position on cultural grounds, arguing that Europe must have (Christian) borders. 
8.4.12 Portugal 
A noteworthy development in Portugal in 2004 was the appointment of its Prime Minister, José 
Manuel Barroso as the new President of the European Commission. He was replaced by Prime 
Minister, Pedro Santana Lopes, who had previously been the mayor of Lisbon. With Barroso’s 
departure from Portuguese politics, Santana Lopes also took over as the leader of the conservative 
Social Democratic Party. His government maintained the driver policy of his predecessor, frequently 
referring to the Commission and its recommendation as its guide on the matter. 
When France had declared its intention to hold a referendum on Turkey’s EU membership, 
press questions circulated about which other countries might follow suit. After meeting with Santana 
Lopes and President Jorge Sampaio, in early October, Barroso made a statement about the question 
of referenda on Turkey. Diplomatically supporting the French President’s recent decision to do so, 
he said “it would be a mistake,” if the member states ruled in favour of Turkey's accession to the 
European Union, “against the will of the European people.” “The Turkish issue is very serious. This 
is why it is crucial that a final decision is taken based on the support lent by the European people” 
(Bastos, 2004). With that caveat, Barroso expressed his personal support for Turkish accession. 
                                                
39 The entire episode was covered extensively in the press, but the insider account is written by Bibi de Vries (2006), van 
Aartsen’s erstwhile deputy. 
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In late October, after a bilateral meeting between Santana Lopes and Gerhard Schröder, they 
too expressed their agreement on Turkey, both taking the Commission’s recommendations to open 
negotiations as their guideline (“Berlin et Lisbonne,” 2004; “Gobiernos seguirán,” 2004; 
“Portuguese, German leaders,” 2004). Afterward, Portugal’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, António 
Monteiro confirmed this position, adding that talks could start as soon as Turkey had completed the 
political reforms required by the EU, presumably referring to the six pieces of legislation 
enumerated by the Commission. He further argued that Turkey, a country of nearly 20 million 
Muslims, was of economic and cultural significance to the EU and its accession would improve the 
international status of both the EU and NATO. However, he also said that the start of talks would 
not necessarily lead to Turkey’s EU membership, and that Turkey had to show its sincerity by taking 
all of the necessary measures (“Portugal supports,” 2004). 
During an early November visit from Abdullah Gül, Monteiro declared his government’s 
intention to “follow the recommendation of the European Commission.” He added that they would 
“follow the rules established by the European Union itself,” and so “we will decide on 17 December 
to set a date for the start of negotiations” (“Ankara est confiant,” 2004 – trans. mine).    
On the first day of the summit, Monteiro was interviewed on the Portuguese radio, RDP 
Antena 1, on the matter of Turkey. “We have a very firm position in this case,” he declared. “We 
follow the recommendation of the commission’s report, which is very clear and says that Turkey is 
in a position for the negotiation process to start. Therefore Portugal is in favor, in the exact terms 
proposed by the commission. Our idea is that what we should propose to Turkey should be the 
same as what is proposed to all other candidates. There cannot be any discrimination against Turkey, 
but there is a need to observe the conditions proposed by the commission and which have been 
accepted by Turkey itself” (“Portugal backs,” 2004).  
Portugal’s role at the summit itself was muted to the point where they failed to reach the 
media or Ludlow’s radar, with the exception that Lisbon was among those who objected to the idea 
of permanent safeguards as far as the free movement of persons was concerned (Ludlow, 2005, p. 
31). After the summit, Santana Lopes ruled out a Portuguese referendum on Turkey because 
according to him, Turkey was not a controversial issue in Portugal, since it was a tolerant country 
that endorsed multiculturalism and was open to the prospect of the accession of more countries to 
the EU (de Sousa, 2004). Other mentions that support Portugal’s status as a driver are: “Human 
rights,” 2004; Les dirigeants,” 2004; Ludlow, 2005, p. 6; Nerbollier, 2004; Traynor & Henley, 2004. 
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8.4.13 Spain 
The 2004 elections, which had been directly preceded by the March 11 Madrid train bombings, took 
José María Aznar of the conservative Partido Popular (People’s Party) from power and brought the 
government to José Luis Zapatero and his social democratic Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
(Socialist Workers Party). The new government not only maintained the driver policy, but gave 
Turkey even more enthusiastic support. Turkey had not been a bone of contention between his 
party and Aznar’s People’s Party (Cruz, 2004; Kahl, 2004). The press also recognized that Zapatero 
was not going to shift its policy. Prior to the publication of the Commission’s report, the Spanish 
national daily newspaper El País wrote that both Zapatero and his foreign minister Miguel Ángel 
Moratinos were confident that the recommendation and report would be positive and that 
negotiations would be opened (“Abrir la puerta,” 2004).  
At the UN General Assembly meeting in September Zapatero introduced his phrase – 
‘Alliance of Civilizations’ – which was his retort to Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’, that saw 
people's cultural and religious identities as the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War 
world. This was still a year before he would institute the thus-named international initiative against 
extremism, co-sponsored by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the 59th General Assembly of the United 
Nations. 
During the September contention about Turkey’s proposed adultery law, Moratinos was 
publicly protested against it, expressing his hope that it would not be adopted because it would send 
a negative signal to the EU member states about Turkey’s membership ambitions. He, nevertheless, 
reiterated Spain’s support for Turkey, both in terms of its entry into the EU and as a positive vote 
for negotiations in December (“Projet de loi,” 2004).  
Zapatero’s support for the start of negotiations had also been repeatedly mentioned in the 
media In early October, he gave an interview during a state visit to Portugal for an Iberian summit, 
in which he again declared his support for Turkey, but also noted that it “would need time to join 
the Union, and would have to meet all the requirements” (“Zapatero quiere,” 2004). He also made 
clear that Spain would not, like France, propose a referendum on the issue (“Cumbre ratifica,” 
2004). On October 5, the day prior to the publication of the Commission’s report and 
recommendation, Moratinos phoned his colleague, Abdullah Gül, assuring his counterpart of Spain’s 
support. “It is better to have Turkey inside than outside [the EU], but [Ankara] must meet the 
membership criteria,” he said afterward (“Chirac pone la nota,” 2004; “Nouvelle manifestation,” 
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2004 – trans. mine). Soon thereafter, the Spanish State Secretary for European Affairs Alberto 
Navarro said that the European leaders should offer Turkey a date for negotiations “without delay” 
(“French PM says,” 2004). Referring to Turkey’s predominently Muslim population and its place in 
the region, Navarro added that Turkey could help the EU to have an important role in maintaining 
peace there. On October 29 on the occasion of the signing of the Constitutional Treaty in Rome, 
during which occasion Zapatero met with Erdoğan. In their meeting Zapatero again promised 
Spain’s support for Turkey at the Brussels’ summit (“Zapatero reiteró,” 2004).  
When asked about Turkey’s prospects in a November interview with Der Spiegel, Zapatero 
answered that he saw Turkey eventually joining the European Union. In a follow-up on what the 
Muslim Turks had in common with the historical, cultural and political values of Europe, he 
answered that, “The Turks also want to be European citizens. And the European identity is 
grounded in our idea of a community of citizens, the values of the Enlightenment and reason. That 
is why we respect diversity in religion, culture and language” (Zuber & Ihlau, 2004 – trans. mine).  
During the preparations for the summit, Carlos Bastarreche, the Spanish representative to 
the EU, argued that the Presidency text should be pared down in length, and that Turkey should be 
given a clear and unambiguous message that the Union was ready for negotiations (Ludlow, 2005, p. 
29). Less than two weeks before the summit, on the occasion of the League of Arab States 
embracing Zapatero’s ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ initiative, Moratinos stressed that Spain’s active 
support for Turkey was part of the Alliance project to which he added that “the EU was not ‘a 
Christian club’.” (“Liga Arabe,” 2004). 
Before traveling to Brussels for the summit, Zapatero appeared before Spain’s parliamentary 
inquiry into the March 11 attacks and said that the Alliance of Civilizations initiative was expressly a 
counter-terrorism project, also aimed at crossing the religious divide, to which the engagement of 
Turkey by supporting its EU membership ambitions, would be the expedient step te take (“Zapatero 
propondrá,” 2004). Regarding the timing, Spain expressed its preference to have the negotiations 
start as soon as possible, it did not seek to make it a case and get into a conflict with Chirac about it 
(Cruz, 2004).  
At the summit, Zapatero’s role was, like that of his Portuguese counterpart, muted by the 
haggling between the Presidency, the Turks and the ‘Big Three’ going on behind closed doors. Yet, 
during the debate over the permanent safeguard clauses, Zapatero took a firm stand opposing them 
(Yárnoz, 2004). After the summit, Zapatero called the decision to open negotiations an “important 
step” for the proposed reconstruction of the EU by “extending the principles of a model of 
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coexistence based on the values of peace, democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (“La UE 
abre puertas,” 2004; “La UE y Turquia,” 2004; “Zapatero: Negociacion,” 2004; “Zapatero ve ya 
una,” 2004).  
Other articles that list Spain as a driver include: Bennhold, 2004, Bowley, 2004a, Dombey, 
Laitner & Parker, 2004, Gonzalez & Cruz, 2004, “Human Rights,” 2004, “Les dirigeants,” 2004, 
“Les eurodéputés,” 2004, Staunton, 2004c, Ludlow, 2005, p. 6, Traynor & Henley, 2004, “Zapatero 
planteará,” 2004. 
8.4.14 Sweden 
In a surprising turnaround, Sweden changed its policy from that of a brakeman in 2002 and before 
to a driver in 2004, though not entirely without a few reservations.  
In February, during an official two-day visit to Turkey, Prime Minister Göran Persson 
discussed Turkish membership ambitions with Erdoğan. During the press conference afterward, 
Erdoğan answered a Swedish journalist to the question of what Sweden could do to support Turkey 
in its EU bid. “We’ve discussed this issue in detail,” he said. “This is a process and Sweden supports 
us from the beginning. I hope Sweden's support will also continue in this process. We are becoming 
a family; we expect support in December” (“Turkish, Swedish premiers,” 2004) 
Persson, for his part, said he was pleased about the start of negotiations on Cyprus, stressing 
the constructive role Erdoğan had played therein. Expressing his appreciation of Turkey’s attitude 
and program to fulfil the necessary criteria to start accession talks, he also said that Sweden was a 
strong advocate of the EU enlargement process and that it would support Turkey in the EU’s 
decision about the start of negotiations and its fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria. In spite of all 
these praises however, he also noted that due to Turkish human rights issues, that were very 
important to Sweden, it was not possible for his country to “automatically accept Turkey as a EU 
member”, to which he added that much depended on the Commission recommendations (ibid). 
During the events surrounding the proposed adultery ban in September, Foreign Minister 
Laila Freivalds called the proposal “very unfortunate,” joining other drivers - Belgium, Spain and the 
United Kingdom, as well as Günter Verheugen, in criticizing the measure (“Turks move,” 2004). On 
October 5, the day before the Commission published its report and recommendation, Freivalds was 
visiting Turkey at the invitation of Abdullah Gül. The Anatolia news agency (cited by the BBC: 
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“Swedish foreign minister,” 2004), reported her as saying: “We pursue projects about women’s and 
human rights in Turkey… we have come to Turkey to examine on which stage these projects are… 
There will be many recommendations in the progress report. However, we consider that the report 
will be positive. We are also expecting positive results from the meetings, which will be held in 
December. Sweden supports Turkey's accession to the EU. Surely, there are different views in the 
European society. Turkey is a very big country but there are several reservations of the European 
society because Turkey's reform process is still continuing. However, I would like to consider the 
issue in long term and I think reforms will advance in long term.” 
The day after the publication of the Commission’s report, she welcomed its 
recommendation, saying, “We wish the negotiations to start soon,” to which she added, “Sweden is 
deeply convinced that Turkey belongs in the EU,” and, “Turkey should now continue its path, and 
show that it can change” (“Elargissement de l'UE,” 2004; “La Suède souhaite,” 2004 – trans. mine; 
“Turkish, Sweden,” 2004). Visiting Jacques Chirac at the Elysée palace in Mid-October, Göran 
Persson said that it was “quite right,” that Turkey should become a member of the European Union, 
although he stipulated that Turkey should still be required to meet the human rights criteria and 
safeguard minority rights for the Kurds. However, he also added that once negotiations had begun, 
the goal should be the accession of Turkey, and not some privileged partnership (“Persson: la 
Suède,” 2004 – trans. mine). 
In the days prior to the summit, Sweden argued against imposing special rules and 
restrictions on Turkey, about which Freivalds reasoned that, “there should be general rules for the 
future about the framework within which negotiations on EU membership can be conducted and 
which offer the possibility of introducing special conditions. This is a way of extending the issue so 
that it covers more than Turkey” (“Sweden opposes,” 2004). Sweden also joined Finland, Sweden 
and Belgium in opposing the permanent safeguard clauses, arguing that such a clause would relegate 
Turkey to a second-class status (Mahony, 2004).  
At the summit, Persson declared that since Turkey had fulfilled all the conditions to start 
negotiations, it now had the right to do so (“Beitrittsgespräche,” 2004). On Swedish radio, Persson 
was quoted as saying that the European Union should open membership talks with Turkey because 
the Turks deserved the chance of EU membership. He dismissed calls for Ankara to recognize 
Cyprus in return for a green light to start EU membership talks (“Swedish PM: Turks,” 2004). When 
he found little support from his allies, Blair and Verhofstad for his argument to have the mention of 
permanent safeguards stripped from the Presidency’s text, he backed off and dropped the matter 
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altogether, but he stuck to opposing any alternative to membership mentioned in the conclusions 
(“Beitrittsgespräche,” 2004; “Türkei-Gipfel,” 2004; Wynia, 2005).  
Other articles that mention Sweden as a driver are: Boland & Dombey, 2004b, Bouilhet, 
2004c, “Human Rights,” 2004, “Les dirigeants,” 2004, “Les eurodéputés,” 2004, Ludlow, 2005, p. 6, 
Traynor & Henley, 2004, while the only report contradicting this came from Benoit, Milne, & 
Parker, stating that Sweden had been under political pressure domestically to vote against the 
negotiations, but the narrative above attests to the fact that they had not given in to that pressure.  
8.4.15 United Kingdom 
In 2004, the United Kingdom carried on its driver policy. During his airing of concerns over the 
threat of Turkish membership, Austrian Commissioner to the EU Franz Fischler, said that Britain 
and the US were among the loudest advocates for Turkish membership, but that their motives were 
questionable. “Their concern is the preservation of the Western alliance and the dual membership - 
as far as possible - of the EU and NATO with a view to preserving NATO’s relevance. Whether 
Turkey's accession weakens the Union's political project is not their primary concern, and may even 
be on their wish list,” he said (Staunton, 2004a).  
Following the publication of the Commission’s report and recommendation, Denis 
MacShane, the minister for Europe, made it clear that Britain would oppose the Commission’s move 
to impose the permanent safeguards on Turkish workers migrating to other areas of the EU, 
considering it particularly unacceptable at a time when negotiations had not even started yet and 
were projected to last at least until 2015. He would rather cross that bridge when they got to it, he 
said, where Turkey should be allowed to open accession talks in good faith and on the same basis as 
any other country. Adding more weight to his argument against the permanent safeguards, he said: 
“By 2020 Europe’s ageing population may be such that people will want young, educated Turks to 
work in the rest of the EU… the Turkey which joins then will be a very different country and the 
process of the entry negotiations should promote as radical a reform process as that initiated by 
Ataturk” (Gow, 2004).  
Later Prime Minister Tony Blair commented that, “Turkey is a key NATO ally - we want her 
as an EU partner too… I look forward to a decision by the European Council in December to start 
negotiations without delay” (Boland & Dombey, 2004a). Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said, on his 
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way to Ankara for talks, that Turkey had undergone remarkable changes and that EU must now 
deliver its side of the bargain (Gow & Smith, 2004). In an interview with the German newspaper 
Bild a few days later, he stressed the importance of a stable and democratic Turkey in the EU and 
considered its membership “a huge win for Europe”. The European Union would be larger, more 
diverse and more dynamic with Turkey (cited in “Blair unterstützt,” 2004; Thornhill, 2004).  
When copies of the Dutch Presidency draft were leaked to the press, Blair commented on 
the requirement of Turkey to recognize Cyprus, even though it was rather tacitly put, asserting that 
Turkey should not face more hurdles than any other prospective member. The country was not 
actually asking for special favors, but for the same treatment, he pointed out during a Downing 
Street news conference. There should be no more obstacles put in its way than were already posed 
upon by the Copenhagen criteria (Bowley, 2004b). At about this time, the British government put 
together its own draft of the presidency conclusions expressed in a way that was more to its liking 
(Ludlow, 2005, p. 34).  
Days before the summit, the Guardian reported that Downing Street was expected to 
propose some ‘sweeteners’ on Turkey in order to make the deal more attractive to some of the more 
critical drivers (Watt, 2004). One concession was the agreement with the French proposal to delay 
the start of accession negotiations until later in the next year, which ‘coincidentally’ would put the 
start of negotiations under the British presidency during the last six months of that year, instead of 
under Luxembourg, as Jean-Claude Juncker had hoped for, during the first six months. Another 
concession was to rewrite the rules of the EU to ensure that Turkey would not be able to dominate 
it the EU with its weight of population in the EU’s councils and in the European Parliament. A third 
concession consisted of Blair’s proposal for a ‘get out’ clause, which would hold out the prospect of 
refusing entry to an aspiring member. Given that the emergency brake mechanism had already been 
discussed and Chirac had been speaking about a ‘third option’ for some time, this was not a novel 
idea.  
A source leaking these proposed concessions told the Guardian that the new clauses would 
only be agreed to by Britain if they were dressed up in positive language that would not include the 
‘privileged partnership’. A day later, an article in The Times rephrased this by stating that Britain 
might accept some formula (called “a matter of words” by officials) that would allow for some form 
of a half-way house into membership, as long as it was not construed to permanently bar Turkey 
from full membership (Maddox, 2004).  
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A senior British official, cited anonymously by the Financial Times, however, made clear that 
London wanted to minimize the number of safeguards and restrictions on Turkey’s membership and 
avoid half-hearted language in the communiqué (Adams, 2004). Nevertheless, true to the first 
proposed ‘concession’, the United Kingdom agreed with the desire to see the accession negotiations 
start at a later date than the ‘without delay’ formulation had implied previously. It either understood 
Chirac’s preference for a delay until after the referenda on the Constitutional Treaty, and/or 
earnestly desired to be in the presidency at the outset of those negotiations (Ludlow, 2005, p. 28). 
Yet, London was still among those who rejected the idea of permanent safeguards on the free 
movement of persons, which would have relegated to a second-class member (ibid., p. 31). 
At the summit, Blair moved the alternative draft conclusion drawn up by his government, 
but the Dutch made it clear that their own draft, which included the Franco-German understanding 
of membership as the goal, be it with an open-ended process coupled with the clause ‘ensuring that 
the candidate state concerned is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest 
possible bond,’ was preferred. Facing apparently unchalllenged Dutch stubbornness on this account, 
Blair relented (ibid., p. 38). 
On the matter of Cyprus, Blair did not find anything disturbing in the formula of the 
additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement that the Dutch had come up with. Ludlow suggests 
this was an oversight on the British part and that he should have been cognizant that the Turks 
would be most upset with this language and that he should have warned his colleagues that it would 
lead to acrimony. When it did, he was part of the team that put pressure on Papadopoulos and kept 
Erdoğan and Gül from flying back to Ankrara (ibid., p. 44-45). In conference with the Turks, Blair 
insisted on Erdoğan working directly with the Dutch in order to find the right phrasing to make the 
deal acceptable for most parties (ibid., p. 46). His own contribution to the deal was suggesting that 
he, Balkenende, Chirac and Schröder would all stress in the press conferences after the summit, that 
signing the protocol was not the same as recognising Cyprus. In the end the formulation that suited 
all parties was finally drawn up by Turkish, Dutch and British diplomats working in a huddle. After 
the summit, Tony Blair called it “an immensely significant day for Europe,” and a sign of the 
fundamental principle that “the fact that Turkey is a Muslim country does not mean it should be 
barred from the EU” (Laitner & Minder, 2004).   
The UK’s position on Turkey as a driver was further confirmed in numerous other articles, 
of which the following are a sample: “Abrir la puerta,” 2004; Bennhold, 2004, Bouilhet, 2004c, 
Bowley, 2004a, Browne, 2004b; 2004d, Cruz, 2004, Dempsey, 2004, Dombey, Laitner & Parker, 
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2004, Gow & McCaskill, 2004, “Human Rights,” 2004, “Les eurodéputés,” 2004; Staunton, 2004c, 
Traynor & Henley, 2004. The one exception to the UK’s driver-like policy statements was during the 
events surrounding the proposed adultery ban in September; Foreign Secretary Jack Straw joined 
other drivers to criticize it, arguing that the proposal “would create difficulties for Turkey” (“Projet 
de loi,” 2004; “Turks move,” 2004). However, the UK was far from the only driver to criticize the 
proposal. 
8.4.16 The New Member States 
As mentioned before, the EU-15, analysed in this and previous chapters, were no longer the only 
members of the EU in 2004. Eight countries from Central and Eastern Europe and the two 
Mediterranean island countries had joined on May 1.  Although their positions have been left out for 
reasons explained above, a few comments may serve to complete the overview of this period.  
Cyprus and its position has already been mentioned. The other new member states had not 
been given much attention in the press nor were they given the same level of attention in the 
Ludlow account, as the longer-standing members were. Of course these countries still had their 
positions regarding Turkey, and a small number of news articles mention them (with the exception 
of Malta). Although these articles did not always agree with one another, they all agreed that 
especially Poland and the Czech Republic were firm supporters (“Chirac pone,” 2004; “Les 
dirigeants,” 2004; Staunton, 2004c). Slovenia and the Baltic countries - Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia – were also identified as drivers (“Les dirigeants,” 2004).  
There was, however, disagreement about Hungary and Slovakia. Agence France-Presse (“Les 
dirigeants,” 2004) reported them as being drivers, while the Irish Times (Staunton 2004d) considered 
them brakemen. The Guardian (“Human Rights,” 2004) listed Slovakia and Hungary as drivers, even 
though the latter was not pupported by Hungarian public opinion. The Financial Times (Dombey & 
Hadjipapas, 2004) reported that Slovakia, especially its three governing Christian-democratic parties, 
expressed concerns over Turkey, arguing that Turkey should not be treated more favorably than 
they had been, referring to their own failure to be allowed to start accession negotiations in 1997. 
Ironically, Turkey had been treated similarly that year, though Slovakia had enjoyed better treatment 
with financial support, which Turkey had been left without. In summa, it is the safest to say that the 
press was not yet sure what to make of these new member states.  
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9.0  BRUSSELS, 2006 
2006, one year into accession negotiations, was rough for Turkey. The debate in the European 
Union was much narrower than it had been before, in that it focused on the issue of Turkey’s 
troubled relationship with Cyprus, while the debate about Turkey’s suitability for membership as a 
European country was very limited to discussions for an alternative. It had some major outspoken 
antagonists to deal with in Edmund Stoiber, the German Christian Social Union chairman of Bavaria 
and Nicolas Sarkozy, then still the Interior Minister of France. While Angela Merkel, the new 
Chancellor of Germany, also shared their views, she was bound by a coalition agreement with the 
Social democrats whose views on Turkey remained what they had been under Schröder’s leadership. 
While the Commission identified a slowing of Turkey’s reform process toward the still 
unfulfilled political Copenhagen criteria – of democratization, human and minority rights – the 
critical and narrow debate about the Turkish accession process was overwhelmingly focused on 
Turkey’s maintenance of closed harbors and airports to Cypriot planes and ships, which transgressed 
the agreement of two years earlier. Among the agreements in 2004 had been that Turkey would 
ratify the additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement, which would extend the EU-Turkey 
Customs Union to all the new member states, including (Greek) Cyprus. Turkey did so, with the 
caveat that it would not open its airports and harbors to the Cypriots.  
Among the brakemen, outrage over Turkey’s broken promise fueled the argument to halt the 
accession negotiations, if not to derail the process altogether. Meanwhile, the gentlemen’s agreement 
that the EU would lift the decades-old embargo on Northern Cyprus also went unfulfilled, after the 
failed referendum on the UN-sponsored ‘Annan-plan’ to settle the legal-political impasse between 
the two Cypriot communities, and Greek Cyprus’ maintenance of a veto threat on all attempts to 
open the EU to Northern Cyprus. 
The main thrust of the 2006 episode was an attempt by the Finnish presidency to broker 
some deal that would settle the impasse. For the other member states, the debate concerned what 
sort of sanctions to impose on Turkey’s accession negotiations process when and if the Finns failed 
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to broker a deal.  Meanwhile, other issues, such as Turkey’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide 
or a Turkish law condemning ‘insults to Turkishness’ made the news, but did not feature 
prominently in the political debates, other than the Armenian issue in France alone. 
Despite the Finnish effort, both parties remained intransigent in their positions, neither 
being willing to offer unilateral concessions. With that effort having failed, the member states were 
left with a decision on how to punish Turkey, given that any individual brakeman could hold up the 
accession negotiations, and Cyprus was more than willing to do so. By year’s end, the Foreign 
Ministers opted for the Commission’s recommendation to freeze eight negotiations chapters that it 
considered to be related to the customs union, a decision that was fairly easily embraced by the 
heads of state and government.   
9.1 POLITICAL CHANGES 
Before embarking on a closer analysis of the developments, it is again necessary to map out the 
political landscape of this period. Between 2004 and 2006, several changes had taken place in the 
domestic politics of the member states. 
 
 In Austria federal elections were held (in Austria) on 1 October 2006, resulting in a handover of 
power from the ÖVP/BZÖ40 coalition to a new coalition consisting of the Social Democratic 
SPÖ and ÖVP with Alfred Gusenbauer taking over as Chancellor. This handover, however, did 
not take place until January 2007. 
 In France, Jean-Pierre Raffarin had resigned as prime minister after the failure of the 
Constitutional Treaty in the 2005 referendum. Jacques Chirac appointed Dominique de Villepin 
to take up that post. Michel Barnier was removed from the office of Foreign Minister, making 
place for Philippe Douste-Blazy. Chirac remained the President. Nicolas Sarkozy returned as 
Minister of the Interior in the cabinet of his political rival, de Villepin. 
                                                
40 After the events of the summer of 2004, Jörg Haider and his allies in the Schüssel government broke away from the 
FPÖ in April 2005 in order to form the BZÖ (Alliance for the Future of Austria). The coalition thus became one 
consisting of the ÖVP and BZÖ. 
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 Germany held elections in September 2005, resulting in a Grand Coalition of CDU/CSU and 
the SPD with Angela Merkel (CDU) serving as Chancellor. Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD) took 
the post of Foreign Minister. 
 In Italy Romano Prodi returned as Prime Minister in May 2006, after elections in April gave his 
Union coalition a majority in the Chamber of Deputies and a razor-thin plurality over 
Berlusconi’s House of Freedoms in the Senate. The former Prime Minister, Massimo D'Alema, 
was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 In the Netherlands a cabinet crisis in June 2006, caused by a refusal of D66 to maintain its 
confidence in Minister of Immigration Rita Verdonk, led to the fall of the second Balkenende 
cabinet. Early elections were called for November 22, while a minority cabinet (Balkenende III) 
reliant on CDA and VVD continued as interim government. The November elections resulted 
in a CDA-PvdA(Labor) coalition after a formation process of two and a half months later. Jan 
Peter Balkenende remained prime minister and Ben Bot remained minister of foreign affairs 
throughout. 
 In Portugal, after months of perceived instability under the prime ministership of Pedro Santana 
Lopes, President Jorge Sampaio called for new legislative elections. The February elections 
brought the Socialist Party back in power under the leadership of José Sócrates. Freitas do 
Amaral served as Foreign Minister until July 2006, after which he resigned, leaving the post to 
Francisco Pinto Balsemão. 
 Sweden held elections in September 2006 and brought a new cabinet of a center-right wing 
alliance of parties led by Fredrick Reinfeldt’s Moderate Party with a slim majority in the Riksdag 
(Parliament). Reinfeldt’s cabinet returned Carl Bildt as minister of foreign affairs. It also 
established the position of Minister of European Union Affairs, which was filled by Cecilia 
Malmström. 
The governments in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom essentially remained the same. In Turkey, the AKP remained in power, with Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan as Prime Minister and Abdullah Gül in the foreign minister’s office. 
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9.2 THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
As mentioned above, the real crux of the matter in 2006 concerned access to Turkish airspace, 
airports and harbors for Cypriot planes and ships. The previous episode of 2004 had ended with a 
promise by Turkey to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, extending 
the EU-Turkey Customs Union to all the new member states, which implicitly included the Republic 
of Cyprus. At the time, political discussion about the protocol had been diplomatically phrased to 
free Turkey from the idea that the ratification of the protocol signified recognition of the Greek 
government on the island. When Turkey had signed the protocol on July 29 2005, it had added a 
signing declaration in which it explicitly excluded Cyprus, stating that, “the Republic of Cyprus 
referred to in the Protocol is not the original partnership State established in 1960,” and that, 
“Turkey will continue to regard the Greek Cypriot authorities as exercising authority, control and 
jurisdiction only in the territory south of the buffer zone, and [they] do not represent the Turkish 
Cypriot people and will treat the acts performed by them accordingly” (Turkey, 2005). At the end of 
the declaration, Turkey indicated that it had “…thus fulfilled all its responsibilities for launching the 
accession negotiations with the EU.” 
The European Council, answering Turkey’s challenge on September 21 of that same year, 
disagreed, stating that, “the European Community and its Member States make clear that this 
declaration by Turkey is unilateral, does not form part of the Protocol and has no legal effect on 
Turkey's obligations under the Protocol,” and that, “the Council will ensure a follow-up on the 
progress made on all these issues in 2006” (European Council, 2005). The scene was set for a 
diplomatic impasse between the European Council and Turkey. 
During the first six months of the year, there was little development in the positions of the 
member states in the Council. The process was mostly in the hands of the Commission, which was 
conducting a screening of Turkey’s administrative system to provide a knowledge base with respect 
to the negotiating chapters (Ludlow, 2005, p. 8-9). This screening was intended to gauge what 
amendments would have to be made in order for Turkey to comply with the acquis communautaire, 
consisting of 35 chapters, of which only the chapter on Science and Research had been opened and 
provisionally closed in June. 
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9.2.1 Train Crash 
The matter was taken off the backburner in late March 2006 when the Finnish Enlargement 
Commissioner Olli Rehn, a former advisor to Finnish Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, warned that 
the talks were headed toward a “train crash”, over Turkey’s refusal to ratify the additional protocol 
and open its airports and harbors to Cypriot planes and ships. “The Commission is working to avoid 
a train crash at the end of the year,” he said. “The Finnish presidency will have to use all its 
diplomatic skills, inherited from the period of neutrality policy, to avoid this train crash,” timing the 
critical moment to happen after the annual report on Turkey’s progress and under the Finnish 
presidency (Taylor & Grajewski, 2006; Watt & Gow, 2006 – emph. mine). 
One aspect of the impasse about the protocol, which largely went unrecognized during the 
more heated debate over Turkey in general, was the position of the Turkish Cypriots. While Turkey 
maintained a unilateral embargo on Cypriot shipping and overflight, the EU maintained a 
multilateral embargo toward the unrecognized portion of the island under Turkish Cypriot control. 
Throughout, the European Commission’s position was that the two embargoes were not legally 
equivalent. According to the Commission, Turkey was legally bound to open its harbors, airports, 
and airspace to Cypriot shipping and flights, under the Additional Protocol to the Ankara 
Agreement, while the EU was bound by little more than a gentleman’s agreement, which it was 
unable to uphold, owing to the veto threats of the Republic of Cyprus and Greece (Smyth, 2006a).  
9.2.2 The June Summit 
The European Council met in Brussels on June 15 and 16 2006, then still under the Austrian 
Presidency. Dealing with the enlargement part of the agenda, the presidency conclusions included 
paragraphs for both Turkey and Croatia, the only two candidates at that time engaged in accession 
negotiations. In preparation for the summit, the Austrians had drawn up a document revealing a 
tougher stance on Turkey than on Croatia, as it included additional ‘contractual obligations’ for 
Turkey to comply with, referring to the additional protocol. Austria, as a long-standing brakeman, 
was not alone in insisting upon the tough language. In the preparatory diplomacy on the formulation 
of the conclusions, the Spanish permanent representative, Carlos Basterreche, even sought to 
strengthen the severity of the Austrian version, while the French sought to make the mention of the 
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September 21 2005 Declaration about the Ankara Agreement Protocol explicit (Ludlow, 2006a, p. 
61).  
In the end, most of the paragraphs in the conclusions were identical for both countries, 
except that the one for Turkey called for the fulfillment of its obligations under the Association 
Agreement and the additional protocol, which meant the opening of Turkey’s harbors and airports 
to Cypriot shipping, and, indeed, recalling the declaration of the previous September. This put 
Turkey on notice that by the end of the year, the European Council would “follow up on the 
progress made on all the relevant issues included in the above mentioned Declaration” (European 
Council, 2006a, par. 54). Effectively, this gave Turkey the ultimate choice to either allow Cypriot-
flagged planes and ships to land and dock, or to forget about any progress toward its EU 
membership aspirations, since the suspension of negotiations, provided for under the ‘Emergency 
Brake’ procedure inculcated in the 2004 Conclusions, was not ruled out  (“L’UE et la Turquie,” 
2006).  
9.2.3 The Presidency’s approach. 
In late June, a few days before the Finns took over the rotating presidency, Finland’s foreign 
minister, Erkki Tuomioja, sent a letter to his member-state colleagues, outlining his approach on 
General Affairs and External Relations issues, such as EU enlargement, about which he wrote: 
The Council's general debate on enlargement will… include a discussion on the union's 
absorption capacity on which the Commission has been invited to prepare a report. It is 
important that the discussion will not lead to new criteria for enlargement nor to a 
withdrawal from the commitments previously given by the EU… As for Turkey and 
Croatia, the accession negotiations will be brought forward in accordance with the agreed 
principles. In late autumn, the Union will examine the 2006 Commission Progress Reports.  
(Tuomioja, 2006) 
This told recipients that the Finnish presidency was willing to entertain the debate on the absorption 
capacity of the EU, but that this should not be used instrumentally as an excuse to prevent Turkey’s 
accession, or change its membership requirements.  
In August, the Commission proposed to have the United Nations run the Northern Cypriot 
ports, such as Famagusta. Goods could then be shipped with UN paperwork and customs 
declarations, rather than those of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, making them legally 
acceptable to international trade. The new arrangements would, presumably give Turkey enough of a 
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concession to lift its ban on Greek Cypriot ships and planes (Castle, 2006a). The Commission also 
proposed referring the matter to the European Court of Justice. However, given broad expectations 
that it would lose such a case there, Ankara did not respond.  
Meanwhile, the presidency and the Commission began to readdress their approach. Having 
used the expression of a ‘train wreck’ as a prospect for Turkey’s accession process for months, 
without the desired effect on Turkey, the need for a ‘Plan B’ arose. A Plan B would allow the 
process to at least to “muddle through” until presidential and parliamentary elections had taken 
place in Turkey the next year (Boland, Dombey & Parker, 2006). The Commission realized that in 
the run-up to these elections, the Turkish leaders would be effectively unable to compromise on 
Cyprus for fear of a domestic political trouncing over the issue. Ali Babacan, Turkish minister of 
economic affairs and EU negotiator had made it clear: “Turkey is not going to do anything 
unilaterally on ports and airports,” further saying that a breakdown of negotiations would be 
“devastating” not just for Turkey’s prospects, “but also for the future of the world” (Dombey & 
Parker, 2006). 
The play for time, either to get past Turkish elections or to send the matter to a European or 
the International Court of Justice, was firmly rejected by the Greek Cypriots, who called the idea 
“…categorically a non-starter… Our government is not in the business of giving Turkey extra time 
for free” (ibid.). While a legal option would likely have favored the Greek Cypriots, the Republic of 
Cyprus was hesitant to take that route because taking the matter to either court would be time-
consuming and would diffuse the moment’s pressure on Turkey to give in to the EU’s demands 
(Boland, Dombey & Parker, 2006). 
The political negotiations with the Turks fell to the Finnish Presidency and began in earnest 
when in early September it communicated to Turkey that the impasse over Cyprus could cause a 
delay in the negotiations. In this communication Tuomioja pointed out that Turkey had to comply 
with the legal commitments resulting from the expanding borders of the customs union with the 
addition of the new member states, including Cyprus. Ankara, for its part, expected that the chapters 
dealing with the provisions of the customs union might be suspended, but Tuomioja indicated that 
an amicable solution might be worked out (“EU droht Türkei,” 2006; Watt, 2006). Those 
negotiations, however, were conducted in the context of other developments in the European 
Parliament and the Commission, as described below. 
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9.2.4 The European Parliament 
Camiel Eurlings, the Dutch MEP who carried the Turkish accession issue as Rapporteur, spoke of 
“insufficient progress” in his darft report that was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the 
parliament’s foreign affairs committee on September 4 (“Europarliament,” 2006). In addition to not 
having ratified and implemented the additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement to open airports 
and harbors to Cypriot shipping, the report mentioned “persistent shortcomings” on other political 
criteria issues such as the freedom of expression and religion and the rights of minorities, women 
and unions (“Veel kritiek,” 2006 – trans. mine).  
The most controversial issue dealt with in the draft report, however, was that of the 
Armenian Genocide. Eurlings’ original draft included the opinion that the recognition thereof had to 
be “unavoidable” because a country must come to terms with its past. French socialists took this 
even a step further by an amendment to make the recognition a requirement of membership 
(Dijkstra, 2006a; Hekking, 2006; Jongsma, 2006; “Strasbourg juge,” 2006; “Turkije geïrriteerd,” 
2006).   
The report was discussed and adopted in Plenary Session on September 27, in which it 
deplored the condemnation of Hrant Dink, the Turkish-Armenian newspaper editor who was 
prosecuted for advocating recognition of the Armenian Genocide, under Article 301 of the Turkish 
Penal Code. The requirement for recognizing the Armenian Genocide was, however, scrapped in the 
final draft (Dijkstra, 2006b; Kranenburg, 2006a). Rather than requiring recognition of the Armenian 
Genocide, it stressed that Turkey’s recognition of the alleged genocide was “indispensable for a 
country on the road to membership.” It also expressed its disappointment that Turkey was not yet 
permitting Cypriot vessels to dock at its harbors and planes to fly over its airspace (European 
Parliament, 2006, pars. 11, 56, & 58).  
While parties differed on where the process should lead, there was broad consensus on 
Turkey’s need to step up its democratic and liberal reforms, admit Cypriot ships and planes, and 
recognize the Armenian genocide. Even Turkey’s allies in the Parliament, such as Joost Lagendijk – 
the Dutch Chairman of the EU-Turkey parliamentary delegation – called for more action (“Veel 
kritiek,” 2006). Responding to the critical debate in Parliament, Louis Michel (European 
Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid), speaking on behalf of his colleague Olli 
Rehn, said that the November report was not going to be “a story for children,” but “as much as 
Turkey needs Europe to modernize and democratize, Europe needs Turkey, especially on sensitive 
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issues such as security, peace and dialogue among civilizations” (“Parlement Européen,” 2006 – 
trans. mine). He also reminded the European Parliament that recognition of the Armenian Genocide 
had never been part of the Copenhagen criteria. 
9.2.5 The European People’s Party 
In late September, the EPP – ever the bastion of European Brakemanship toward Turkey – met in 
Lyon for a “summer university” attended by center-right political and economic policymakers, 
during which Turkey was a dominant issue of discussion. At this seminar the German Konrad-
Adenauer Foundation, politically associated with the centre-right CDU, presented a document 
suggesting that non-member states could be chosen to participate with the EU in either one of four 
integration options: 
1) the European Economic Area, like Norway; 
2) an “enlarged association” which temporarily or permanently excluded the free 
movement of workers; 
3) a “differentiated integration”, with no fixed outcome; and finally  
4) a “privileged partnership” which obliged the EU to clarify at the outset that there would 
be no membership perspective in the future  
(“La Famille,” 2006). 
In other words, the Foundation was attempting to get the ‘privileged partnership’ instituted by 
European People’s Party, thus solidifying it as a future option for Turkey. 
At this meeting, however, Carl Bildt – Sweden’s foreign minister – who had just returned 
from Istanbul, which he described in glowing terms, told the gathering in Lyon, “I know that one 
day we shall reach the limits of the Europe of the Treaty of Rome, but we are not there yet… I urge 
caution: drawing lines on a big map of the east of Europe is a dangerous exercise” (ibid. – trans. 
mine). Agreeing with Bildt was the Secretary-General of the European Automobile Manufacturers 
Association, Ivan Hodac, who said that Europe deserved a Nobel Prize in irresponsibility for its 
treatment of Turkey. 
9.2.6 October haggling 
During October, the broad parameters of the Finnish proposal became clearer, in which Turkey was 
required to allow Cypriot ships and planes into its harbors and airports, as per the additional 
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protocol. In return, international traffic to Northern Cyprus under United Nations supervision 
would be permitted through the port of Famagusta, provided that Turkish military forces were 
withdrawn from the port area (Leibl, 2006).  
The Greek Cypriots rejected this idea of concessions to Turkey on Northern Cyprus, as 
making such concessions to Turkey undermined the legitimacy of the EU, they argued. The 
government of Cyprus was, however, willing to talk about it if Varosha, formerly a famous but now 
abandoned seaside resort of south of Famagusta proper, would be ceded to Greek Cyprus. If the 
UN Annan Plan to resolve the Cyrpus dispute had been adopted, Varosha would already have been 
returned to the Greek side and opened to Greek Cypriot settlement, but Greek-Cypriot voters had 
rejected the plan in 2004 (“Decades,” 2006; “Gül” 2006; Proissl & Schmid, 2006). Solidifying their 
position in 2006, the Greek-Cypriot government made it clear that it would not accept any plan that 
did not return the town to its former inhabitants (Smyth, 2006a).  
In response, the Turkish-Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat declared that ceding Varosha to 
Greek Cyprus in order to clear the way for Turkish accession to the EU was not an acceptable 
solution (“Les Chypriotes,” 2006). Given that the Varosha concession had been a part of the Annan 
plan, meant that either the entire Cyprus situation would have to be solved together with the 
opening of Turkish harbors and airports, or the solution to the Cypriot shipping and flights problem 
would take Varosha off the table of a future settlement of the Cyprus situation (“Decades,” 2006). 
During the presidency-brokered negotiations, the Greek Cypriots remained unwilling to recognize 
the Turkish Cypriots as legitimate interlocutors, thus making a solution to the overall Cyprus 
situation unattainable (Ferenczi & Shihab, 2006).  
The Turks, meanwhile pressured into making a choice between pursuing the accession 
negotiations and their interests in Northern Cyprus, called the tactics used by Cyprus and the EU 
“blackmail”. Speaking to a Turkish-Cypriot audience in North Nicosia, Gül affirmed that Turkey 
would not allow itself to be blackmailed by the EU. The matter should be taken up at the UN, he 
argued, because with the accession of Greek Cyprus, the EU has “lost its neutrality by including only 
the Greek Cypriots” (Shibab, 2006). As such, Turkey simply took the Varosha issue as a new 
provocation on Cyprus’ part and rejected it (Dombey, 2006a).  
Nevertheless, all sides declared the desire to see the negotiations over the impasse succeed. 
The president of (Greek) Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, suggested that while the Republic of 
Cyprus earnestly did not want an end to accession negotiations with Turkey, it was still adamant that 
a resolution to the impasse needed to be found that would give its ships and planes the right to dock 
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and land in Turkey (“Chypre n’entrave,” 2006). Erdoğan, however, was not optimistic that the deal, 
offered by the Finnish presidency, was workable. “We can negotiate the plan,” he said, “but it is not 
very reasonable… The EU must honor its commitments and lift the sanctions [on Turkish Cyprus]. 
Until this is done, nobody should expect anything from us” (“Le Premier minister turc émet,” 2006a 
– trans. mine).  
Even though Olli Rehn used the ‘train wreck’ phrase again in October, when he urged 
Turkey to “relaunch the reform process with full determination and meet its obligations on Cyprus,” 
he also said that to speak of a “crisis” with Ankara was “exaggerated”. Still, he called for the 
situation to be solved in what would perhaps be the last chance to do so for years to come. German 
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier chimed in, saying, “One should not consider a ‘Plan B’,” 
given that ‘Plan B’ referred to some sanction on the negotiations, if not freezing them altogether 
(“Turquie: l’UE adoucit,” 2006 – trans. mine). 
By November, the last-ditch efforts to come to an agreement before the Commission report 
was due to be published, had failed, with different parties pointing the blame in different directions. 
On November 3, Tuomioja declared that the Presidency’s attempt to negotiate a settlement to the 
impasse before the publication of the Commission’s report had also failed. “We were ready to 
organize in Finland a round of talks between the Presidency and all parties involved,” he said. 
“Unfortunately, this has not been possible before the November 8 publication of the Commission 
report on Turkey, but of course we continue to work to find a solution” (“Decades of division,” 
2006; Ferenczi & Shihab, 2006; “Poursuite des négociations,” 2006 – trans. mine). 
9.2.7 The Commission’s report 
When the EU Commission published its progress report on November 8, the Michael Leigh, 
director-general of DG Enlargement, who had already presaged the report a few days prior, said that 
the speed of Turkey’s reforms had indisputably been tempered (Bouwman & Kranenburg, 2006). 
Officials within the Commission had already begun to debate on how many chapters ought to be 
closed should the negotiations fail to offer a solution to the impasse, during which the positions of 
the Commissioners essentially reflected those of their countries. Olli Rehn (Enlargement – Finland) 
and Barroso (Commission President – Portugal) argued for three chapters linked to trade, while 
Jacques Barrot (Transport – France), Benita Ferrero-Waldner (External Relations – Austria), Markos 
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Kyprianou (Health and Consumer Protection – Cyprus) and Stavros Dimas (Environment – Greece) 
suggested much stronger measures (Bounds & Dombey, 2006).  
Unlike the previous years, including 2005, the report omitted general evaluation paragraphs 
at the end of the political criteria sections, which had previously offered overall assessments. Instead, 
the reader had to conclude from each of the separate sections on democracy, human rights, and 
regional issues, specific measure by specific measure, how Turkey had fared. Concerning the 
impasse over Cyprus, the Commission did not explicitly recommend a suspension of accession 
negotiations by the ‘emergency brake’ procedure. Still, in order to maintain the pressure, it 
anticipated a recommendation on how to move forward, which it would publish before the 
European Council meeting. The report, however, stated the case with regard to Turkey’s 
requirement to implement the protocol as follows: 
Moreover, under its declaration of 21 September 2005, the EU expects full, 
nondiscriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol, and the removal of all 
obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on means of transport. The 
EU will monitor this closely and evaluate full implementation in 2006. The declaration also 
stressed that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession 
process and underlined the importance it attaches to the normalisation of relations between 
Turkey and all EU Member States, as soon as possible. 
(Commission, 2006a, p. 24) 
This paragraph did not explicitly state that the Commission recommended the use of the ‘emergency 
brake’ procedure for the suspension of negotiations, but made clear that the situation would be 
evaluated before the end of the year, with the strong implication that this would happen before the 
European Council meeting (“Bruxelles diffère,” 2006; Kranenburg, 2006b).  
The Commission did not express any criticism in the report itself, but summarized its 
position in the associated strategy paper that covered all the ongoing enlargement candidates and 
applicants. Regarding Cyprus and the additional protocol, the strategy paper stated that the 
Commission would make relevant recommendations ahead of the December European Council, if 
Turkey had not fulfilled its obligations by then (Commission, 2006b, p. 11). The absence of a clear 
recommendation in either document was a deliberate omission in order to buy the presidency time 
to find a diplomatic solution (Ludlow, 2006b, p. 14). As Olli Rehn said in a press statement, that the 
publication of the report was not the moment to make a recommendation on how to move forward, 
lest it would “disrupt the efforts” of the Finnish Presidency (Ferenczi, 2006a;  “Bruxelles diffère,” 
2006 – trans. mine). 
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The member states did not explicitly differ in opinion with the Commission’s findings, nor 
with its opinion that a solution would have to be found by which Turkish harbors and airports 
would be opened to Cypriot vessels. Even the British, always Turkey’s most stalwart supporters, 
called on Turkey to take the necessary steps to avoid a suspension of negotiations (“Bruxelles 
diffère,” 2006). Angela Merkel, meanwhile, identified the report as being “unambiguous”, saying that 
Turkey had to fulfill its commitments by the end of the year or face the consequences (“Merkel 
somme Ankara,” 2006). “It will not be possible to just continue like this,” she warned in Berlin 
(Ferenczi, 2006a – trans. mine).  
The report was hailed in Nicosia and Athens, with Cypriot Foreign Minister George Lillikas 
saying, “We are pleased because [the report] said that Turkey must fulfill its obligations towards 
Cyprus” (“Bruxelles diffère,” 2006 – trans. mine). Speaking several days later, when the ‘what next’ 
question had begun to arise, Lillikas argued that Cyprus favored a partial suspension of the 
negotiations if the harbors and airports were not opened. “There are two extreme positions today,” 
he said, “One school of thought says that we should suspend only relevant sections [pertaining to 
the EU-Turkey customs union], while others are for a total freeze. We do not support either one or 
the other of these ideas” (“Chypre pour,” 2006 – trans. mine). He did not, however, spell out exactly 
the formula that he himself was advocating for. 
Erdoğan, on the other hand, remained defiant, cautioning the EU to not expect Turkey to 
open its ports so long as there was no end to the isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (“Bruxelles diffère,” 2006; Marchand, 2006a). Abdullah Gül did not directly comment in his 
response to the report on the Cyprus issue, though he said, “We are aware of our shortcomings, but 
we believe in the continuity of the process, and we are firmly determined to make Turkey a more 
democratic country, which applies the best European standards” (“Pas de suspension,” 2006; 
Marchand, 2006a – trans. mine). The Turkish Foreign Ministry nevertheless made it clear that it 
rejected any link between the accession negotiations and the impasse over Cyprus. 
9.2.8 November Haggling 
Negotiations about Cyprus continued after the publication of the Commission’s progress report. It 
was politically clearly a very delicate matter for Turkey, especially with its upcoming presidential and 
legislative elections in 2007, which gave the AKP government an incentive to be unbending toward 
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Cyprus and the EU (Ferenczi, 2006a). Despite their firmness on the subject, allegations circulated in 
the Turkish press that Ankara had offered some concessions, though this was denied by Gül. “We 
consider Cyprus as a national issue. We’ve done everything we can to protect the Turkish Cypriot 
people,” he said before the Turkish parliamentary committee on budget and planning. “Taking into 
consideration all these developments, I am really surprised at these allegations that Turkey had made 
concessions on Cyprus. If we had made concessions, we would have said yes to everything.” He 
found the allegations particularly surprising as, in his words, the Finns, “have not submitted their 
documents. They themselves could not tell me their proposals” (“Le ministre turc,” 2006 – trans. 
mine). 
At a mid-November Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels, there was downbeat assessment 
on the likelihood of a breakthrough. Cyprus’ foreign minister Lillikas said he no longer held out 
hope the deadlock could be broken by compromise between Cyprus and Turkey. He advocated for 
strong measures on Turkey, considering it was not enough to suspend talks on a limited number of 
topics. Austria’s Ursula Plassnik also called for a complete “time out” from the negotiations. By 
contrast, both the United Kingdom and France argued for the continuation of negotiations, though 
not without freezing a few chapters (Bilefsky, 2006; Dombey 2006b). French Foreign Secretary 
Catherine Colonna said: “If there is no progress, the negotiations will not continue as if nothing had 
happened” (“Türkei droht,” 2006). 
A critical factor among the member states, however, was that the issue was heating up in 
Germany. While the impasse over Cypriot shipping continued in November, Chancellor Angela 
Merkel made it clear that Turkey would have to give in or face consequences for its continued 
refusal to implement the protocol. Her own CDU/CSU constituency – especially in the person of 
Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber – was calling for a complete suspension of negotiations 
(see below).  
The Turks, on the other hand, had dismissed the notion that a failure on their part to 
unilaterally open their harbors and airports to Cypriot ships and airplanes would lead to a 
suspension. Erdoğan disputed the idea that the negotiations were headed for a train-wreck, saying, 
“Suspensions, ruptures, trains stopping at stations, such things are impossible… Our efforts will 
continue. Even a country like Great Britain waited 11 years before it became a full member” 
(“Erdogan exclut,” 2006 – trans. mine). Speaking at a different occasion in Brussels, Babacan argued 
that a suspension of negotiations would not only have consequences for his country, but also for the 
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EU and the whole region. Responding to this, Olli Rehn said that Turkey should not overestimate 
its strategic importance, especially if it did not keep its promises (Hostettler, 2006a). 
On November 21, the presidency upped the ante by reminding Turkey that the deadline for 
them to change their policy about Cyprus would be around December 6 when the Commission was 
expected to issue its recommendation. This was also in connection with the December Foreign 
Ministers meeting in Brussels less than a week later, during which Vanhanen had determined the 
question would be dealt with by the foreign ministers, rather than leaving it to the heads of state and 
government to decide (“Ankara n’a plus,” 2006; “Le 6 décembre,” 2006; Bottolier-Depois, 2006a). 
The message to Turkey was clear: It would have to open its airports and harbors to Cypriot 
shipping, or the EU would suspend at least a portion of the negotiating chapters (Pantförder, 2006). 
Vanhanen further expressed his preference to keep the issue off the agenda for the European 
Council proper, leaving it instead to the foreign ministers to decide. Tactically, this was slightly more 
favorable to Turkey, because in the Foreign Ministers’ meeting Germany would be represented by 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, whose position on Turkey was far more permissive than that of the 
Chancellor.  
When the Finns made it clear to the Turks that they were facing a deadline, Gül responded 
that issues like Cyprus could not be solved by blackmail or setting deadlines (Bilefsky, 2006). 
Furthermore, he argued that the accession negotiations were a technical administrative process that 
was unrelated to the political process of finding a solution to the Cyprus problem. The Turkish 
Cypriots meanwhile had not needed Vanhanen’s reminder of a deadline. Underlining the idea of a 
revived UN-track, Turkish-Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat reinvited the United Nations to begin 
negotiations between the two Cypriot communities in January 2007. After meeting with Kofi Annan 
in Geneva on November 20, Talat told reporters that the plan developed in 2004 by the UN to put 
an end to the division of the island remained the basis of any solution. Like Gül, he stressed that the 
Cyprus problem should be resolved through the UN and not the European Union (EU) because – 
with Cyprus as a member, the EU could not be impartial (“Ankara n’a plus,” 2006). 
During the last weekend of November the foreign ministers of the Mediterranean EU 
members met in Tampere, Finland, in proximity to the concurrent negotiations between the 
presidency, Turkey and the Cypriots. On the sidelines, the Turks expressed themselves optimisticly 
about a solution for the impasse, but the Cypriots were pessimistic (“Chypre pessimiste,” 2006; “Le 
Premier ministre turc pense,” 2006b). By the end of the talks, no solution was found. The Turks 
continued to refuse to open their airports and harbors to Greek Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots refused 
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to lift their veto on the continued isolation of Turkish Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots refused to 
allow Varosha to be handed over to Greek Cyprus. Even though Talat maintained that Varosha 
could be part of an overall solution to the conflict, he feared that by returning it then, the interest of 
the Greek side to a total solution would be diminished even further, since it would at that stage only 
have been a one-sided gesture. Furthermore, Greek Cyprus’ offer to allow Turkish Cypriot wares to 
be traded with the EU by way of Southern Cyprus was rejected by Talat on the grounds that Turkish 
Cypriot trucks would then incur higher transportations costs and taxes levied in the South 
(Hillenbrand, 2006).  
Visibly disappointed, Tuomioja announced the end of his separate discussions with Gül and 
Lillikas, concluding that the conditions were not met for an agreement during the Finnish 
presidency. “At this stage circumstances do not permit that an agreement could be reached during 
the Finnish presidency,” Tuomioja had said speaking in Helsinki (Dirks, 2006; “EU drops bid,” 
2006; Hillenbrand, 2006; Hostettler, 2006b). Though he did not see this as “a rupture between 
Turkey and the EU”, he said that consequences would be inevitable, without further speculating on 
the particulars thereof (“UE: un gel,” 2006 – trans. mine; Hostettler, 2006b). 
Only one day later, however, on the 28th of November, there was a surprising turnaround in 
the prospects when Vanhanen suddenly announced a new round of negotiations, which he would 
start himself by flying to Ankara later that week (“Vanhanen spricht,” 2006). Simultaneously, news 
about a coincidence that could also influence the current state of affairs came out of an entirely 
unexpected corner: Pope Benedict XVI was going to pay a visit to Turkey. 
9.2.9 A Papal Visit 
It was also on November 28 that Pope Benedict traveled to Istanbul and met with Erdoğan on a 
mission of reconciliation with the Turks. The pope, in his previous incarnation as Cardinal Joseph 
Ratzinger, publicly held the position that Turkey joining the European Union was a mistake because 
of its cultural and religious differences (de Ravinel, 2004) He had, during a lecture at the University 
of Regensburg in Germany on September 12, further incited antagonism from Muslims by including 
certain quotations from a Byzantine Emperor who had disparaged Islam’s erstwhile conversion 
methods (Marchand, 2006b). 
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In Turkey, there had been domestic agitation against the Pope’s coming, including 
conspiracy theories on collusion between the pope and Angela Merkel creating a scandal that would 
keep Turkey out of the EU for good. Some, predictably, compared Pope Benedict XVI to Hitler and 
Mussolini. These opinions, however, did not extend to public officials (Seibert, 2006). Prior to his 
arrival, there were heated concerns about how the pope might genuflect when visiting the Hagia 
Sophia, or what it would mean if he visited the Blue Mosque (Traynor, 2006a). Out of precaution, 
Benedict XVI exchanged his standard Pope Mobile for an armor-plated car, given the expected 
hostilities. The Vatican would confirm nor deny the bulletproof vest under Benedict’s robes. 
When the Pope had indicated that he would indeed visit the Blue Mosque in a conciliatory 
gesture toward Islam, Erdoğan agreed to “find time” to meet with him at Ankara’s airport before the 
prime minister departed for the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia (Owen, 2006a). When they met, 
Erdoğan questioned the pontiff on Turkey’s EU membership prospects, about which Erdoğan 
declared afterwards that the Pope had said, “we're not political, but we wish for Turkey to join the 
EU.” Vatican officials suggested the Pope had told the Prime Minister that that the Vatican did not 
have the power or competence to intervene but “viewed positively and encouraged” the process of 
Turkish entry into the EU “on the basis of common values and principles” (Gerçek, 2006; Owen, 
2006b; Samir, 2006; Traynor, 2006b). 
9.2.10 The Commission’s recommendation 
On November 29, the day after Erdoğan’s tête-à-pape and a week before it had been expected, the 
Commission published its recommendations for moving forward with the negotiations (Ludlow, 
2006b, p. 4) It also included a block on opening the following eight chapters that dealt specifically 
with the Customs Union: 
 Chapter 1) free movement of goods,  
 Chapter 3) right of establishment and freedom to provide services,  
 Chapter 9) financial services,  
 Chapter 11) agriculture and rural development,  
 Chapter 13) fisheries,  
 Chapter 14) transport policy,  
 Chapter 29) customs union, and  
 Chapter 30) external relations. 
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The Commission recommended further that no more negotiating chapters should be provisionally 
closed until Turkey was judged to have lived up to its commitments of the additional protocol 
(Commission, 2006c). Commenting on the recommendation, Olli Rehn said there would be no train 
crash, but a slowing down of the still moving train because it was not acceptable that Turkey had not 
fulfilled its obligations (Berger, 2006). The presidency embraced the proposal, considering it “a good 
basis for discussion,” as Vanhanen said in a statement. According to another source, cited in the 
AFP, Vanhanen made it clear that it had always been Finland’s main objective to keep the 
negotiations going and avoid a complete or large suspension of chapters (“Turquie: la présidence,” 
2006 – trans. mine).  
From the sidelines of the NATO summit in Riga, the European leaders also commented on 
the Commission’s proposal to freeze the eight chapters. Blair, who had spoken with Erdoğan, felt it 
was a mistake to put such a heavy penalty on Turkey, for which he feared it would turn its back on 
Europe. He and the leaders of Spain, Italy and Sweden wanted no more than three chapters closed 
(Boland & Parker, 2006). Prime Minister Jose Luis Zapatero of Spain urged leaders to keep the 
prospect of full membership open to Ankara, rather than changing it into a privileged partnership 
(Kanter, 2006a).  
Angela Merkel, on the other hand, felt that the Commission had sent Turkey a strong signal  
in which she was joined by Jacques Chirac (“Coup de froid,” 2006; “Blair met,” 2006; “Merkel 
approuve,” 2006). This was not a surprise since both had previously advocated for freezing more 
than ten chapters (Boland & Parker, 2006). One source even said that France had wanted as many as 
seventeen of them blocked (Berger, 2006).  
Greece embraced the recommendation, while Cyprus, though absent at Riga because it was 
not a NATO member, declared the Commission’s proposal too weak and threatened to use its veto 
power to hold up the negotiations altogether. “We believe that they [the EU] are not putting any 
pressure on Turkey to fulfill its obligations,” Papadopoulos said (“Athènes incite,” 2006; “Zypern 
droht,” 2006 – trans. mine). 
Turkey denounced it as unacceptable. Erdoğan, making use of the occasion at the NATO 
summit, confronted the leaders of the member states with his indignation, but failed to find much 
support there. During separate conversations with Chirac and Prodi he was told that the 
Commission had had little choice but to make such a recommendation. According to diplomats, 
Prodi had been apologetic about it, whereas the exchange between Chirac and Erdoğan had been 
restrained (Boland & Parker, 2006; Bouilhet, 2006a). By the time that Erdoğan had returned to 
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Ankara, his indignation had changed into resignation when he said that though the freeze would 
cause a little slowing of the process, it was not stopped, while Turkey had stuck to its guns about its 
rejection of any concession over Cyprus (“Erdogan minimise,” 2006; Leante, 2006). 
9.2.11 Down-to-the-Wire Diplomacy 
After Tampere and Riga, the Turks and the Presidency resumed talks. In a statement before flying to 
Ankara, Vanhanen said: 
In recent months, the Finnish Presidency pursued intensive discussions with a desire to 
find a solution that would have allowed us to continue the accession process of Turkey 
without interruption. On Monday, the Presidency came to the conclusion that no 
agreement could be reached under the present circumstances. Turkey is obliged to 
implement the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement on the Customs Union. As 
stated by the Declaration of the European Union in September 2005, the opening of 
accession negotiations on the relevant chapters depends on Turkey's fulfillment of its 
contractual obligations. 
At present, Turkey has not fulfilled its obligations vis-à-vis the Additional Protocol. The 
General Affairs Council on 11 December will decide how this affects the process of 
Turkey's accession to the EU. The Commission submitted a recommendation to this end. 
The Presidency considers that this recommendation is a sound basis for discussion in the 
Council. The decision to adopt December 11 should reflect the feeling of waiting for EU 
candidate countries fulfill their obligations. This should ensure the continuation of the 
accession process and allow them to be normalized when the conditions were satisfied. 
I go to Ankara on Friday 1 December to discuss the situation with Prime Minister Erdogan.  
(Vanhanen, 2006 – trans. mine) 
It had been Vanhanen’s mission to see if Turkey could not be persuaded, in a last attempt that was 
not without some external political pressure, to offer unilateral concessions to Cypriot flights and 
shipping. He had more or less counted on previous experience when pressure on Turkey had come 
down to the wire at the European Council summit in 2004 and Erdogan had signed the Protocol in 
the end. 
To some degree, however, the threats and deadlines were merely rhetorical. The ‘freezing’ of 
chapters was nothing more than a decision not to open them. As of December 2006, only the 
chapter on Science and Research, which had not required any aligning, had already been opened and 
provisionally closed. None of other chapters had yet been opened. Opening a chapter was 
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something the Cypriots could, in any case, unilaterally prevent. In that regard, nothing was being 
‘decided’ by the Foreign Minister’s Council, so much as recognized (Graw, 2006a). 
The recommendations were therefore no more than a political theater that was, in many 
regards, beneficial to Erdoğan politically at home. With Turkish public opinion toward EU 
membership souring, standing tall for the Turkish Cypriots demonstrated proud resolve on the 
prime minister’s part. Conversely, with the public opinion in many of the member states deeply 
skeptical, this also showed critical resolve on their part toward Turkey. As such, Vanhanen did not 
get satisfaction with still ten days before the Foreign Minister’s meeting. Speaking to a joint press 
conference after their meeting, Vanhanen stressed that the proposed freeze would only be a 
temporary setback (“Le PM finlandais,” 2006).  
Germany, meanwhile, still advocating for a tougher approach, suggested an eighteen-month 
deadline for Turkey to comply with the additional protocol afterall. What exactly would be the 
consequence if Turkey failed to do so by then was left to circumspection, but it was implied to be a 
full suspension of all the negotiations. According to the German-edition of the Financial Times, this 
approach was embraced by France, Cyprus, Greece and Portugal (Proissl & Hollinger, 2006). 
The Commission disagreed with the eighteen-month deadline, about which Rehn remarked, 
“we do not need new political psychodrama.” So too Britain, Sweden and Finland opposed Merkel’s 
suggestion.41 A Finnish diplomat was quoted as saying, “We don't think there should be an 
additional clause. The Turks already feel strongly punished by the Commission’s proposal as it is” 
(Buck, et. al., 2006; Proissl & Hollinger, 2006). George Lillikas expressed his support for the 
measure, saying that, “without clear dates, Turkey would have “no incentive to fulfill its obligations” 
(“Chypre salue l’idée,” 2006 – trans. mine). 
9.2.12 Franco-German-Polish summit 
On December 5, Angela Merkel and Jacques Chirac invited the Polish President, Lech Kaczynski, to 
join them for a pre-summit meeting in Saarland (Germany), after the two had met there informally 
to discuss Merkel’s proposal of an eighteen-month deadline for Turkey (Buck, et. al., 2006; “Top 
voor Pools,” 2006). The triangular summit, called the ‘Weimar Triangle’, after the first meeting of 
the three countries in Weimar (Germany) in 1991, was primarily held about an acrimonious gas vs. 
                                                
41 Proissl & Hollinger, 2006, mention ‘the Scandinavian countries’, but this, presumably, did not include Denmark. 
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meat dispute between Poland and Russia, and a Russo-German plan to build a gas pipeline 
circumventing Poland, but also touched the impasse between Turkey and Cyprus. Before this 
summit, French diplomats had suggested that France supported Merkel’s ‘rendezvous date’ proposal 
for Turkey, which made it rather remarkable that it had apparently been dropped quietly after the 
summit (Graw, 2006b; Kohl, 2006; “Première triangulaire,” 2006). Some reports suggested that 
another opportunity to hold Turkey to account would present itself again after the Commission’s 
2007 report (Bennhold, 2006a; Bocev, 2006; “Paris et Berlin,” 2006).  
During the post-summit news conference Merkel said that they did not want to set any kind 
of ultimatum and insisted that Germany had not sharpened its position. Yet, as expectations had not 
been met, there ought to be consequences (Bennhold, 2006a). Chirac reiterated his support for the 
German position, though, according to Ludlow (2006, p. 15), it had been he who had talked Merkel 
out of a harder line during the summit. In other words, Chirac had declared, a priori, that he agreed 
with the Chancellor, but then made sure, after the fact, that what he was agreeing to was something 
that he would agree to.  
During the same conference Kaczynski declared that his country’s support for Turkey’s EU 
membership had not changed (Scally, 2006). Turkey’s accession was “close to the heart of Poland,” 
and while “the standards should certainly be observed, this also counted for the European Union,” 
by which he reminded the EU of its own promises to Turkey about Northern Cyprus (“Paris et 
Berlin,” 2006 – trans. mine). Chirac characterized Poland’s position as being in agreement with the 
Franco-German position. According to an anonymous French functionary, cited in the Dutch daily 
Financieele Dagblad, France and Germany had wanted to set a hard date for Turkey, but under 
pressure from other member states, they had decided to not set timelines and opt for a more 
permissive approach (“Merkel ziet,” 2006). 
9.2.13 A Turkish Offer 
On December 7, less than a week before the foreign ministers’ meeting in Brussels – and mere 
hours before the matter was discussed in Coreper, an unofficial Turkish offer emerged (Kranenburg, 
2006c). Though the details varied in the news reports, the core of it seemed to have been that 
Turkey would provisionally open one major port to Cypriot ships in return for the prevention of 
freezing the previously-mentioned eight negotiations chapters (“Ankara fait,” 2006; “Ankara 
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propose,” 2006; “Chypre rejette,” 2006; Gottschlich, 2006; “Türkei bietet,” 2006; “Turks gebaar,” 
2006).  
Erkki Tuomioja, to whom Abdullah Gül had made the offer, called it at least a starting point 
for a deal, though he too did not elaborate on the details, neither to the press nor to the member-
state ambassadors in Brussels (Dijkstra, 2006c; “La Finlande,” 2006; Kanter, 2006b; Smyth, 2006d). 
However, according to the Turkish media the Gül offered to open one major Turkish seaport and 
one of its airports, without specifying which, to Cypriot ships and planes. This would be in return 
for keeping the negotiations going along with the opening of Famagusta’s harbor and Ercan airport 
in Northern Cyprus to international traffic for a trial period of twelve months, during which it was 
hoped that a solution to the continuing division on the island could be found (“Ankara fait,” 2006; 
Smyth, 2006c).  
The Presidency welcomed the offer as a positive gesture, but said the details were still 
unclear and would have to be put in writing before they could be taken into consideration (“EU-
landen verdeeld,” 2006; “La Finlande,” 2006; Ingenrieth & Seibert, 2006). A day later, when no 
clarification seemed to be forthcoming, Tuomioja toughened his earlier remarks by saying that only 
an “unconditional opening” would lead to a reconsideration of the slow-down in the accession 
negotiations, while Vanhanen stressed that not enough had been said by Ankara to base any decision 
on (“Türkei bietet,” 2006; “Vorstoß der Türkei,” 2006).  
The Turkish foreign ministry meanwhile declined to publicly confirm or deny that it had 
even made the offer (“La Turquie n’en,” 2006; “Türkei knüpft,” 2006). Within Turkey itself, the 
proposal was openly opposed by Yaşar Büyükanit, the chief of the Turkish general staff, who stated 
in the Turkish daily newspaper Hürriyet that the military had not been consulted about the proposal 
and, as such, did not constitute an official offer from the Turkish state, while opposition and even 
outrage also came from other circles in Turkish society (“Le chef de l’armée,” 2006). 
Addressing the call for clarity in black and white, an anonymous senior Turkish official 
explained to the Agence France-Presse that proposals in writing might be exploited by members of 
the EU who were a priori opposed to the accession of Turkey, because it would enable them to 
prevent the talks “by extracting some terms and playing them up.” “The goal of oral communication 
is to reach an agreement without losing time to the vocabulary,” the official added (“Ankara ne 
mettra,” 2006 – trans. mine). This argument was, however, lost on the Finns who needed clarity and 
the offer in writing so it could be sent to the member states. When they failed to obtain this 
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December 8, the presidency declared that the offer was not substantial enough to stave off the 
matter being be dealt with by the foreign ministers (“UE La présidence,” 2006). 
Nicosia, at any rate, firmly rejected any such deal (“Chypre rejette,” 2006; “Nicosie 
s’oppose,” 2006). Greece declared the offer to simply be a repackaged old formula that had already 
been rejected (“Ankara sur Chypre,” 2006). France, the Netherlands, and the German Chancellor 
joined Greece and Cyprus in calling for at least a freeze of the eight negotiations chapters without 
further delay (“EU-landen verdeeld,” 2006; “Turks compromis,” 2006; “Turks gebaar,” 2006).  
9.2.14 Foreign Ministers Meeting   
On December 11, when the foreign ministers met in Brussels to decide on how to proceed about 
Turkey, the International Herald Tribune published an op-ed written by Adbullah Gül. In his appeal, 
he mentioned that, “the European Union is about to make a decision that has the ominous potential 
to redefine the course of Turkey-EU relations.” However, nowhere in his article did he explicitly 
mention Cyprus and the question over which the ministers would be wrangling, focussing instead on 
the referenda that had been previously promised by certain countries to their citizens about Turkey’s 
accession to the EU.  He reminded his readers of the weight of the matter by saying that, “a 
formidable project that transcends the borders of the Continent in its full political, economic, 
cultural, and strategic implications. It is, if you like, a high calling responding to the most persistent 
challenges of our times.” Implicitly hinting at the Cypriot impasse he advised that, “EU decision 
makers should consider all of the issues on the merits. Pressuring Turkey to fulfill unilateral 
conditions while ignoring other obligations carries the risk of derailing the process, and … [losing] 
sight of the big picture” (Gül, 2006). 
Despite Gül’s appeal, the foreign ministers decided that if Turkey was not going to fully 
relent over Cypriot shipping, they would adopt the Commission’s recommendation and advise the 
European Council to do so as well. Within chambers, however, the ministers still haggled over the 
amount of chapters to freeze, with the drivers (named as: United Kingdom, Sweden and Spain) 
arguing for fewer and the brakemen (named as: Cyprus, Greece, France, Netherlands and Austria) 
for more (Dijkstra, 2006d; Hekking & van Oostrum, 2006a). According to Ben Bot (Netherlands), 
who later spoke with the press, the scene inside the Council had been akin to a bazaar with the 
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ministers bargaining over the precise amount of chapters as if they were low priced merchandise 
(Dijkstra, 2006d).   
Afterwards the Council’s press release stated its conclusions as follows:  
As concerns Turkey, the Council decided in particular to suspend negotiations on eight 
chapters relevant to Turkey's restrictions with regard to the Republic of Cyprus, and will 
not close the other chapters until Turkey fulfils its commitments under the additional 
protocol to the EU-Turkey association agreement, which extended the EU-Turkey 
customs union to the ten member states, including Cyprus, that joined the EU in May 
2004.  
(European Council, 2006, p. 2) 
This was a bitter pill for Turkey. Yet, while it had not been explicitly stated in the Commission’s 
press release, the Council made it explicit that other chapters than the designated eight relating to 
the EU-Turkey Customs Union were to be opened as normal in the following statement:  
The Council emphasised that chapters for which technical preparations have been 
completed will be opened in accordance with established procedures.  
(ibid.) 
This was, implicitly, a message to Cyprus to not exercise its right in the context of the 
Intergovernmental Conference, to unilaterally veto the opening of any chapter that was not 
connected to the Customs Union. This, however, went unnoticed in the press. What did strike 
journalistic observers, however, was the lack of any timeline by which Turkey would be called to 
comply with the additional protocol (Bennhold, 2006b). Given that Chirac and Merkel had already 
stepped away from this at their Saarland summit, this was not a particular surprise.  
One element that had found its way onto an otherwise empty single page headed ‘Other 
Business’ touched the future of the divided island. Indicating that the Northern Cypriots had not 
been forgotten, the Council stated that: 
The Council agreed that the presidency should publish a statement on efforts towards a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue under UN auspices. 
(ibid., p. 14) 
This was a consolation for Turkey, and suggested that the EU would attempt to rectify the 
economic isolation of Northern Cyprus. Placing this text separate from the sections about Turkey, 
or, indeed, enlargement in general, was supposed to indicate that there was no linkage between 
Turkey’s legal obligation to open itself to Cypriot trade and travelers and the EU’s moral 
responsibility to cease the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots (Dijkstra, 2006d). The problem remains, 
however, that pretending that it is an issue unrelated to the question of Turkish membership, 
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suggests that this is an impasse between EU members, which cannot be resolved because one 
member state insists on isolating a large segment of the population over which it claims sovereignty, 
rather than an impasse between an EU member and a candidate country, where the EU member is 
holding up the candidate’s progress, because of that situation. 
Once it was done, there seemed to be a sense of relief among the foreign ministers about the 
compromise they had reached between breaking off negotiations and letting Turkey get away with 
not meeting the set requirements. After the meeting, French Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy said: 
“We believe today that the Commission’s position is a balance that does not lead to a rupture with 
Turkey, but sends a clear signal to Turkey’s obligation to fulfill its commitments concerning the 
customs union” (“L'UE ‘punit’,” 2006 – trans. mine). Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett 
said, “I'm sorry to disappoint you. There will be no train crash… The train is in fact still firmly on 
the track,” suggesting that some members were hoping to use the Cypriot-Turkish dispute as an 
excuse to derail the Turkish accession process (Bennhold, 2006b).  
Erdoğan, however, denounced the foreign ministers’ position as an “injustice” when he 
spoke to the AKP parliamentary group of the Turkish Grand National Assembly: “Despite all our 
good will, the decision of the Council is an unfortunate injustice to Turkey,” he said, adding, 
“Relations between Turkey and the EU are subject to a severe test.” He also stressed that his 
government would go ahead with the same determination in the process of reforms needed to meet 
European standards (“UE-Ralentissement,” 2006).  
From London, Tony Blair also denounced the Council’s decision, saying it would be a great 
strategic error for Europe to turn its back on Turkey and that he supported Turkey's admission 
wholeheartedly (“Tourner,” 2006). Even so, he noted that the news was not as bad as it might have 
been since “some of those that want to see a halt to this process have not been successful in doing 
that.” “I hope we regain the momentum,” he concluded (“Prime minister’s,” 2006). More 
dramatically, from Nicosia, Tassos Papadopoulos declared: “Turkey should realize that it cannot 
push its way into the EU as it did with Cyprus in 1974” (Borowiec, 2006b).  
9.2.15 The European Council 
“It will not become a Turkey summit,” Tuomioja had happily declared about the upcoming meeting 
of the EU leaders in Brussels on December 14-15, after the foreign ministers had dealt with the 
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issue of Turkey at the GAERC meeting (van Rooij, 2006). Since the immediate controversy over 
Turkey had essentially already been settled by the foreign ministers, it would take a powerful head of 
state or government who disagreed with his/her foreign minister to take up the matter once more. 
Angela Merkel did not do so, relenting instead to the GAERC’s consensus (“EU-Gipfel,” 2006).  
The European Council, however, still had some matters to discuss on enlargement in general 
that also concerned Turkey. Up until then the Finns had kept their hand largely to themselves, 
having disseminated the draft conclusions no earlier than the beginning of December for the Antici, 
the permanent representatives and the foreign ministers to mull over. By December 8, one of the 
Antici declared that the permanent representatives had arrived at a “new consensus on enlargement” 
(Ludlow, 2006b, p. 4-5). Much of what the Finns had put forward left the process intact, except that 
the phrase “integration capacity is not a new criterion,” which had been in the Presidency draft of 
December 7 did not reappear in the December 9 draft (ibid., p. 11-12). 
Unlike previous European Council meetings on enlargement, there was not much dissention 
over the presidency’s draft text, which had steered very close to the Commission’s strategy paper. 
Both Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende and his Belgian colleague, Guy Verhofstadt, 
attempted to make institutional reforms to the EU a precondition for enlargement – meaning that 
the EU would have to reform before it could further enlarge – but their calls were twice rejected by 
their colleagues (Ludlow, 2006b, p. 6, 11). Regarding Turkey and enlargement in general, the 
European Council had little to alter.  
9.3 ISSUES 
Much of what has been written above has spelled out the rancorous diplomacy about and toward 
Turkey, especially regarding the Cypriot shipping issue. The relatively undramatic debate about 
enlargement in general, however, belied the shifts that took place and the importance those shifts 
will have for Turkey going forward. The following paragraphs detail what happened in the 
enlargement debate and what that might mean in the future. The pursuant paragraphs will also deal 
with the issue of Turkish Penal Code Article 301, making it illegal to insult Turkishness, and the 
threat it posed on Turkey’s continued reform toward fully complying with the political Copenhagen 
criteria. 
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9.3.1 The General Enlargement Debate 
After the massive accession of ten countries in 2004 and another two countries, Bulgaria and 
Romania to join in 2007, it was seen by many that the European Union had done a great deal of 
enlargment and that it would need some time to adjust itself before it should think of further 
enlargement. Furthermore, the failure of the Constitutional Treaty left the EU with the Treaty of 
Nice as the governing compact on issues such as the relative weights of power given to the different 
member states in the EU’s institutions. Nice had only provided the EU with an agreement on how 
power should be divided among the 25+2. Before the EU could enlarge again, they would have to 
devise a new treaty to govern the institutional amendments necessary to integrate new members. 
The June European Council had decided that a debate on enlargement in general would be 
on the agenda for the December meeting of the heads of state and government. Specifically, the 
concern was to stipulate: 
…the Union's capacity to absorb new members and further ways of improving the quality 
of the enlargement process on the basis of the positive experiences accumulated so far. It 
recalls in this connection that the pace of enlargement must take the Union's absorption 
capacity into account. The Commission is invited to provide a special report on all relevant 
aspects pertaining to the Union's absorption capacity, at the same time as it presents its 
annual progress reports on enlargement and the pre-accession process.  
(European Council, 2006a, par. 53) 
‘Absorption capacity’ and ‘enlargement fatigue’ had become the new code words for reasons why 
certain member states might not be allowed to join. Given Turkey’s size and relatively low 
GDP/capita, it was evident that the prospective impact it would have on the EU’s finances, policies 
and institutional politics was profound. 
Regarding the European Council’s desire to have a debate on EU enlargement in general, 
and its ‘absorption capacity’ in particular, the Commission’s November Strategy Paper replied to the 
June Council’s request for a definition of the term and the promise to rate future members 
according to their prospected impact on the Union’s functioning. It also offered a brief, and 
positive, history of enlargement and related institutional reform. Its definition of the factors 
involved was: 
The EU’s absorption capacity, or rather integration capacity, is determined by the 
development of the EU's policies and institutions, and by the transformation of applicants 
into well-prepared Member States.  
(Commission 2006b, p. 17) 
  367 
The second element of this statement – “transformation of applicants into well-prepared Member 
States” – was governed by the candidate countries’ own abilities to transform themselves in 
compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, especially with regard to their administrative reforms, 
which were led by the process of accession negotiations. As such, it only really fell into the category 
of being a factor in the ‘absorption capacity’ to the degree that the evaluation and negotiations 
process accurately and constructively facilitated the candidate countries to reform themselves. 
The first element – the development of the EU’s policies and institutions – however, was 
entirely different in the practical sense. To some degree there was a technical aspect in determining 
the impact of newly acceding countries on the EU’s policies and institutions. Ultimately, however, it 
would be a matter of political choice whether or not the Union and its member states would be 
willing to abmit new members. The Commission’s role would be limited to offering the Council and 
the European Parliament accession impact assessments of new candidate countries, which was 
stated by the Commission as follows: 
The capacity of would-be members to accede to the Union is rigorously assessed by the 
Commission on the basis of strict conditionality. Integration capacity is about whether the 
EU can take in new members at a given moment or in a given period, without jeopardizing 
the political and policy objectives established by the Treaties. Hence, it is first and 
foremost a functional concept. The Commission will in the future prepare impact 
assessments at all key stages of the accession process. Where such assessments are made, 
the specific characteristics of each country will be taken into account.  
(ibid.) 
Essentially this threw the debate back to the European Council, which had to decide how that 
impact should be measured along the lines of acceptability and, linked to this question, to what 
degree the Union’s institutions and purposes should be allowed to increase its capacity by absorbing 
new members. From a certain point of view, this was the Commission refusing to be complicit in 
the desire of some brakemen to instrumentally erect institutional barriers to enlargement. 
Part of this debate, however, was also what had been frequently termed ‘defining Europe’s 
boundaries’. According to an earlier draft that had been seen by the press, the Commission had 
added that: the “EU is defined by its values rather than by fixed geographical limits,” to which the 
Commissioner for Transport Jacques Barrot (France) objected (Bounds & Dombey, 2006; Smyth, 
2006b). This addition appears to have been omitted in the Commission’s final paper, in exchange for 
the following definition: 
The term ‘European’ combines geographical, historical and cultural elements which all 
contribute to European identity. The shared experience of ideas, values, and historical 
  368 
interaction cannot be condensed into a simple timeless formula and is subject to review by 
each succeeding generation. 
(Commission 2006b, p. 18) 
Thus, geography, history, and culture were re-included into the idea of Europe, ideas that – 
brakemen would argue – could easily be invoked to exclude Turkey, insofar as they should wish to 
reawaken an official debate of Turkey’s identity as a European country. At the same time, this 
formula was a direct admonition to those who would have preferred permanently fixed European 
boundaries in order to exclude certain candidates or future applicants. Brakemen, however, could 
find some solace in the pursuant paragraph: 
The legal basis of the enlargement is Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, which 
states that “Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may 
apply to become a member of the Union”. However, this treaty provision does not mean 
that all European countries must apply, or that the EU must accept all applications. The 
European Union is defined first and foremost by its values.  
(ibid.) 
In this statement the Commission left implicit what those values ought to be, if they were not simply 
the values of democracy, rule of law, and the human and minority rights enshrined in the 
Copenhagen criteria. Yet, it did make explicit further on in the paper that the EU would honour 
existing commitments made towards countries already in the process, though it would be cautious 
about assuming any new commitments in the future, which made clear that for any use of 
‘absorption capacity’ as a foil to reject Turkey, brakemen would not have a friend in the Commission 
(ibid., p. 3). 
In line with the Commission’s proposals, the European Council determined that there would 
be no pre-set dates for accession anymore, whereby new members could join when their individual 
accession process had been fully completed. Much of this was in retrospect of the decisions about 
Bulgaria and Romania, whom, many felt, were going to become members before they had fully been 
reformed (“Zusammenfassung,” 2006). However, the proposal was not about Bulgaria and 
Romania, as the decision about their accession could not be reversed, but about new and current 
applicants – with Turkey as the elephant in the room. With respect to accession dates, this meant 
that Croatia could advance toward membership without having to wait for Turkey to catch up, and 
that Turkey would no longer be helped forward by being in the same class as Croatia (or any other 
future candidate).  
This decision of the European Council was seen as a victory for the brakemen of EU 
enlargement in general, especially those opposing the rapid expansion thereof. Among them were 
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Germany (Merkel), France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, who were also seen as brakemen of 
enlargement to Turkey in particular, whereas those identified as drivers of enlargement in general – 
the United Kingdom and Sweden in the forefront – had emerged as Turkey’s champions as well 
(Drewes, 2006; Hostettler, 2006c; “Zusammenfassung,” 2006). To that extent, the general debate on 
enlargement bled over onto the debate on Turkey in particular, and vice versa. 
The debate about the ‘fourth criterion’ of Copenhagen - the capacity of the Union to absorb 
new Member States while maintaining the momentum of the European integration process – 
remained unresolved. Matti Vanhanen declared at the conclusion that there would be “no new 
criteria,” and that “the door was open,” to new and current candidates. This was contradicted by 
Angela Merkel when she said that “absorption capacity” would be the central criterion going 
forward. “We know that we cannot accept every country wanting to join,” she declared 
(“Zusammenfassung,” 2006 – trans. mine). In other words, the fourth criterion, could be interpreted 
as a means of excluding countries by brakemen and by the drivers as a spur for reforming the Union 
allowing it to encompass new members.  
The fourth criterion was not new as it had already been explicitly included in the 1993 
Copenhagen conclusions. To that extent, Vanhanen had been correct. However, in the previous 
enlargement rounds, countries had not been refused entry based on the grounds of ‘absorption 
capacity’ and the Union had evolved in orer to accommodate new member states. By saying that not 
every country wanting to join could be accepted, Merkel argued that this did not only pertain to 
future candidates, while she also implied that the Union should prefer to keep applicants out rather 
than reform the EU’s institutions to accommodate them. Since she probably did not mean that 
countries like Moldova and Macedonia would be too much for the EU to swallow, it seems likely 
that she was referring to Turkey or Ukraine in her statement.  
9.3.2 Insults to Turkishness 
Much was said in 2006 about Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which made it an imprisonable 
offense to insult ‘Turkishness’, the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the 
government, the judicial institutions, the military, or other security institutions of the Turkish state. 
The sentences for such slanders were made even more severe for those who committed them 
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outside of Turkey. Ironically, the article, which had taken effect in June 2005, had been part of the 
Penal Code reforms that had helped Turkey win the start of accession negotiations in 2004. 
Those who were brought up on charges included several high-profile Turks, such as authors 
Orhan Pamuk (who later received a Nobel Prize), Elif Shafak and Perihan Mağden and the Turkish-
Armenian editor Hrant Dink (who was murdered in 2007 by Turkish nationalists) and resulted in 
much protests abroad. Joost Lagendijk, the Dutch MEP who chaired the EU-Turkey Parliamentary 
delegation, appeared as a witness for the defense of Shafak and was, himself, briefly charged for 
violating the article (Birch, 2006). Shafak’s case was thrown out of court in late-September (Freely, 
2006). The cases against Pamuk, Dink and Mağden were dropped in January, February and July 
respectively, though Dink had charges brought up against him again in May, for which he was 
convicted and sentenced to six-months imprisonment (“Turkish court,” 2006). 
In spite of international pressure, the prosecutions continued during the run-up to the 
European Council meeting. The Commission (2006a, p. 9) noted that the application of the law in 
Turkey’s judicial process had been inconsistent with European human rights standards, and that, 
“although this article includes a provision that expression of thought intended to criticise should not 
constitute a crime, it has repeatedly been used to prosecute non violent opinions expressed by 
journalists, writers, publishers, academics and human rights activists” (ibid., p. 14). As such, the 
Commission judged that the Penal Code needed to be “brought into line with the relevant European 
standards” (ibid., p. 15). 
The AKP government was clearly willing to amend the law, especially since Erdoğan, 
himself, had been imprisoned in 1998-1999 under a similar law. Meeting with representatives of 
Turkey’s trade unions and other NGO’s in early November, he said in response to questions asked 
about the article, “We are ready for proposals to make Article 301 more concrete if there are 
problems stemming from it being vague…We are studying several options to avoid any violation of 
freedoms that was not intended by the makers of the law” (“Erdogan dit envisager,” 2006; 
“Government mulls,” 2006). In all, it was a fairly tepid response, but would give Erdoğan political 
room to maneuver. 
  371 
9.4 THE MEMBER-STATE POSITIONS 
The 2006 episode was different from the four preceding episodes in that critical debate was not 
taking place among the member states, except during the discussions about the number of chapters 
to freeze, but among Turkey, Cyprus and the Finnish Presidency about the impasse over Cypriot 
shipping. The other member states, therefore, had a reason or excuse to remain relatively 
uninvolved, allowing the negotiations to run their course without their interverence. While it might 
have been feasible for a strong brakeman to play the role of a spoiler and derail the negotiations with 
external rhetoric, none who could command a European-level stage stepped forward to take on that 
role.   
9.4.1 Austria 
Austria was again one of the most vocal brakemen in 2006. Endowed with the rotating Presidency in 
the first half of 2006, it was expected that it might want to use its position in favor of Croatia and 
against Turkey with regard to enlargement. Yet with both countries still in the screening phase, there 
was little for Austria to do but allow the Commission to do its work. Ludlow’s December 2005 
expectations for the Austrian presidency predicted restrictions on Austria’s influence on Turkey’s 
process, not only due to the screening phase, but also because the only matter on the negotiations 
table would, by the end of their term, be the potential passing of a few completely uncontroversial 
and unproblematic chapters of Turkey’s accession negotiations (Ludlow, 2005, p. 8-9).  
In June, however, Austria was, then, the author of the tough text at the European Council 
meeting (Ludlow, 2006a, p. 60-61). As has been mentioned above, this text used nearly identical 
language in two separate paragraphs for the two negotiating candidates, with the distinctions in the 
text being much tougher language for Turkey than for Croatia. In Austria’s defense, however, 
Turkey was also a tougher case than Croatia, given impasse over Cyprus. Also, in the context of the 
raising of the of ‘absorption capacity’ concept, France found a willing ally in Austria, even if it was 
bound by its duty in the Presidency to be more even-handed (Avril & Bouilhet, 2006; Smyth, 
2006b). 
In the months following Austria’s presidency, its political scene heated up with campaigns 
for legislative elections to be held on October 1. The issue of Turkey was a significant bone of 
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contention between the ruling Christian Democratic ÖVP of Wolfgang Schüssel and the right-wing 
FPÖ, which had split from its members in the cabinet over the issue. Even former members of the 
FPÖ, who had remained with the government after joining the conservative liberal BZÖ, accused 
Schüssel and his ÖVP foreign ministers (Ferrero-Waldner succeeded by Plassnik) of allowing the 
start of negotiations with Turkey (Kern, 2006).   
To make matters worse for Turkey, it did not find much solace from Austria’s left either. 
Given the general hostility of Austrian public opinion toward Turkish EU membership, the SPÖ did 
not make Turkey a campaign issue. Instead the Social Democrats advocated for slower enlargement 
in order to consolidate the recent additions and prevent the EU from being little more than a free 
trade zone. The Grünen, meanwhile, supported a decision on Turkey that would allow accession 
after the ten-to-fifteen years it would take for the prospect to realistically materialize. Finally, the 
former SPÖ MEP Hans-Peter Martin made no secret about opposing Turkish membership (“Zu 
viele,” 2006). On October 1st, Alfred Gusenbauer’s SPÖ won the election by a slim margin, with 
Schüssel’s ÖVP as the only realistic option for a coalition. The resulting SPÖ-ÖVP coalition 
government was not sworn in until January 8th of 2007, leaving Schüssel’s ÖVP- BZÖ government 
in a caretaker capacity.  
In November, the Commission’s progress report arrived in the College of Commissioners. 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Austria’s Commissioner (External Relations), and former minister of 
foreign affairs, argued for a firm line on Turkey and to clearly distinguish it from Croatia, which was 
the parallel interest of her country’s government (Bounds & Dombey, 2006; Smyth, 2006b).  
When the progress report, in turn, arrived before the foreign ministers, Austria’s serving 
foreign minister, Ursula Plassnik, called for a “breathing pause” in the negotiations if a breakthrough 
in the shipping impasse did not succeed by the end of December (EU-Außenminister uneins,” 
2006b; Fischer, M., 2006; Hostettler, 2006a; “Plassnik pour,” 2006; “Türkei droht,” 2006; “Zypern-
Frage,” 2006). In this, she did not see any good in freezing certain chapters, but rather in putting the 
whole process in “the freezer”, which made the Austrians join the Cypriots in pushing for a 
wholesale suspension of the negotiations process if Turkey would not relent on the issue (Ludlow, 
2006b, p. 15). However, when the Commission’s formula of eight frozen chapters had later been 
adopted, the Austrians, including Plassnik, embraced it, calling it a wise and sensible decision. “This 
is a massive slowing down and breathing space in the negotiations,” she said, pleased with the 
results. “We have averted a crisis at the summit and found a consensus on how to assess the 
situation.” It was not about an ultimatum, she added, but, “it must be clear, there can be no 
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reduction in the implementation of the obligations” (“Acht Verhandlungs-Kapitel,” 2006; Bennhold, 
2006b; Ingenrieth & Seibert, 2006).  
Other articles that identify Austria as a brakeman are: Bottolier-Depois, 2006c; “Cancilleres,” 
2006; Dijkstra, 2006d; Dombey, 2006b; “EU-lidstaten,” 2006; Fischer, J. 2006; “l’Europe divisée,” 
2006; “L'UE affiche,” 2006; Ludlow, 2006b, p. 15; “Ministri EU,” 2006, Missé, 2006a; van Oostrum, 
2006a; Proissl, Schmid & Ehrlich, 2006; “Turkey and EU,” 2006; Weingärtner & Hillenbrand, 2006. 
9.4.2 Belgium 
During the 2006 episode, Belgium was scarcely in the news concerning Turkey. However, a few 
instances demonstrated its policy as remaining that of a driver. 
After the European Council in June, a diplomat in Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt’s 
entourage declared in the French newspaper Le Figaro, “we have always supported, without 
ambiguity, the candidacy of Turkey” (Avril & Bouilhet, 2006 – trans. mine). While the French 
pushed for explicit recognition of the ‘absorption capacity’ as a condition for enlargement during the 
same occassion, a ‘Belgian leader’, who remained anonymous told the same newspaper that 
“absorption capacity is an old criterion pulled out of the closet, which means nothing,” and that 
“France has always had problems creating coalitions with smaller countries. On enlargement 
Belgium is disagrees with France” (ibid., – trans. mine).  
At the end of October, Belgian Foreign Minister Karel de Gucht traveled to Ankara to 
assure the Turks of his country’s support for the continuation of the accession negotiations 
(Lannoo, 2006). Following the publication of the Commission’s report and the subsequent foreign 
ministers’ meeting in Brussels, Karel de Gucht said that to stop the negotiations would be a disaster 
with great consequences for the role the EU played worldwide (“Europa zwaar,” 2006).  
The clearest statement about Belgium’s position, however, was made in an op-ed written by 
de Gucht and published in the Dutch daily Trouw, in which he wrote how the debates in the EU 
about its values, cultures, boundaries (of Europe) and absorption capacity, naturally generated mixed 
feelings about Turkey. Nevertheless, he also stressed, that the Belgian liberal-socialist coalitions of 
Guy Verhofstad had always favored enlargement and given Turkey the benefit of the doubt about its 
ability to fit in, due to its geographical location and democratic secular identity, which was unique in 
the Muslim world (de Gucht, 2006).  
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He further argued that not while Turkey had to certainly fulfill its promise to open its ports 
to Cyprus, that the EU should also fulfill the promises it had made, which de Gucht did not 
enumerate, but likely regarded the Northern Cypriots and a continuation of the process without 
derailments. This was, however, an after-the-fact statement as it was published two days after the 
November Foreign Minister’s meeting had already decided on freezing the before mentioned eight 
chapters.  
At the European Council, Verhofstadt, together with Balkenende, made a push to realize 
institutional integration concurrently with geographic integration (deepening and widening), but after 
speaking with Tony Blair, the matter was dropped (“EU maakt,” 2006; Ludlow, 2006, p. 6, 11). 
Another article in which Belgium was identified as a driver was: van Oostrum, 2006b. 
9.4.3 Denmark 
In 2006, Denmark had a peculiar row with Turkey. With the Danish cartoon controversy of the 
previous year still fresh in the memory, a new free speech/media dispute erupted concerning Roj TV 
– a Kurdish-language satellite television station broadcasting from Denmark. Ankara accused the 
station of being tied to the PKK and inciting its viewers to participate in a three-day violent protest 
in the southeast of Turkey in April (Schleifer, 2006). In response to the official protest by Turkey 
against the Danish government and an avalanche of Turkish hate mail received by the same, the 
Danish Ambassador to Turkey, Christian Hoppe made it clear that the accusations against Roj TV 
would be dealt with by the Danish court system, but that the Danish government was not allowed to 
meddle in the workings thereof (Altayli, 2006). The Turkish press however seemed hardly sensitive 
to this argument and continued its verbal attack on the Danish government. 
Bilateral diplomacy was not particularly helped when Turkey’s negotiatior and minister of 
economic affairs, Ali Babacan, on a tour of European capitals, was searched by Danish customs 
officials upon his arrival at the Copenhagen airport when he had been there to meet with the Danish 
leadership. Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller later apologized for the incident, calling it 
“unfortunate”. Babacan downplayed it by saying that it must have stemmed from a technical delay 
and lack of communication between the units involved. Incidentally, a similar incident happened a 
week later in Washington, when Gen. Ergin Saygun, the Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff 
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was also searched upon entering the White House, for which the US also apologized later 
(“Anavatan deputy,” 2006; “US Apologizes,” 2006). 
In early September, Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen visited Cyprus for a 
two-day visit with Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos to discuss several issues, among 
which the island’s problems. After their meeting, Rasmussen called on Turkey to open itself to 
Cypriot traffic and warned that if it did not comply with a full and unconditional implementation of 
the additional protocol, there could be serious consequences for the opening of negotiations on a 
number of chapters (“Le Danemark,” 2006). Such an approach and rhetoric, at the forefront of 
Finland’s turn to seek a rapprochement between Nicosia and Ankara, can hardly be considered the 
action of a driver or passenger of Turkey’s cause. 
After the publication of the Commission’s report, Anders Fogh Rasmussen told reporters 
that “it is deeply worrying to note that Turkey is creating obstacles for itself in its negotiations with 
the EU,” by refusing to respect the customs union protocol, Rasmussen told reporters. “We 
consider this protocol to be an entirely decisive condition for further progress in the negotiations 
between the EU and Turkey,” he added (“EU politicians,” 2006).  
When the Commission’s recommendations emerged at the end of November, Rasmussen 
indicated that he was open to the idea of a partial suspension, in contrast to Blair and Zapatero, who 
said that sending any negative messages to Turkey would be a “serious mistake” (“Leaders split,” 
2006). He further said that the EU had to “send a very clear signal” to Turkey that it must live up to 
its promises on Cyprus and speed up the slow pace of its reforms. His argument was that it was 
Turkey that had to adapt to the EU and not the other way around (“EU might suspend,” 2006).  
Responding to the same question at the NATO summit in Riga, Rasmussen told the Danish 
Daily Politiken, I have not yet seen the Commission's proposal, but it goes without saying that the 
fact that there are a number of problems must have consequences for Turkey.” “I agree that we 
must hold Turkey firmly to a European line. But we also have to send out a very clear signal that 
there are a number of very clear conditions. It is Turkey that must fall into line with the EU - and 
not vice versa. And we are not breaking off the process if we do this. We are simply slowing down 
the process” (Wind-Friis & Lauritzen, 2006). 
Between the time of Riga and the deciding foreign ministers’ council, the drivers felt that 
freezing three chapters sent a sufficiently ‘clear signal’ to Turkey to motivate it to sanction it for its 
failure to fully adopt the additional protocol. While this, in itself, may be insufficient to categorize 
Denmark as a brakeman, it is clear that Denmark had not become a driver. Rasmussen embraced the 
  376 
eight chapters option. It was the opinion of the Danish journalists that Rasmussen’s overall 
comments put him in the brakeman category, even if the Prime Minister was not as strident as 
Cyprus, France, Austria and Greece. The daily newspaper General-Anzeiger of Bonn, on the other 
hand, put Rasmussen on the same line as the Greek and the French, in the way consequences should 
be demanded if the Turks would not fulfill their obligations (“EU setzt Gespräche,” 2006).  
Ironically, the Turkish Press, which had so taken him to task earlier in the year, cited 
Rasmussen as less of a brakeman for two reasons. The first one because he had said, after the 
meeting of ALDE-group leaders, that no line should be drawn across Europe and that the EU 
should be open for European countries that fulfill the necessary criteria (“Sarkozy says,” 2006). This 
may very well have been said in the context of enlargement in general and not about Turkey in 
particular. Denmark had certainly been a driver of enlargement quite aside from its approach to 
Turkey, which had been an exception in other aspects of EU enlargement before. The second 
reason was because Rasmussen expressed his support for the EU’s possible move to launch direct 
trade with Turkish Cypriots in the Turkish Daily News (“Turkish press yesterday,” 2006). 
Despite the last-minute conciliatory gestures on Denmark’s part, Copenhagen’s overall 
approach to Turkey – its early punitive rhetoric as well as the timing of the Nicosia visit – in 
addition to the opinion of the Danish journalists, it is safe to categorize Denmark as a brakeman, 
even if Denmark kept itself relatively low-key and did not make a public call for more than eight 
chapters to be closed or a wholesale suspension of the negotiations. 
9.4.4 Finland 
Assessing Finland’s position is a tricky undertaking, since it assumed the EU Presidency during the 
last six months of 2006 and had been as such Turkey’s main interlocutor during the ongoing 
impasse over the Cypriot shipping problem. This meant that the Finns had to not only represent the 
Union, which included Cyprus, in the EU membership negotiations with the Turks, but also act as 
mediator between the Turks and the Cypriots, while the Finns were of course also in close 
cooperation with the European Commission, Olli Rehn in particular. 
Due to this role, a different method of assessment has to be used, whereby it is necessary to 
look at the degree to which the actor attempted to make a deal workable so that the process could 
move forward. Also, to what degree the opposite party recognized the presidency as an honest 
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broker. In that regard, the Finns proved to be drivers, because they were recognized for attempting 
to arrive at a workable deal for both parties, which included Turkey. The Finns spent a great deal of 
time and energy and attempted to solve in six months what had been, in essence, a thirty-two year 
problem, which the United Nations had also failed to solve two years previously. Had the Finns 
been brakemen, they would not have taken on the burden beyond a pretense, and could easily have 
simply allowed the process to fail. Had they been passengers they could have done a good deal less 
and have left it up to the parties to find a solution. Instead, the Finns’ indefatigable attempts to solve 
the problems, did not go unnoticed by their Turkish counterparts Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and 
Abdullah Gül who repeatedly commented on the Finn’s good and honest intentions, the Turkish 
leaders also recognized the impossible of convincing the Cypriots, who had not shown up to a 
Finnish invitate to bring the two parties together (Ferenczi & Shihab, 2006). Much of the timeline 
account above has already detailed many of the presidency’s activities in attempting to broker a deal 
to allow the accession process to continue unabated or constrained. This section, by contrast, 
assesses some of the public rhetoric used by the Finns in the course of their presidency. 
As has been mentioned before, the September debate about Turkey was also taken to the 
European Parliament. In response to the highly critical manner in which the subject was discussed 
there, Finland’s minister for foreign trade and development, Paula Lehtomäki, reminded the 
members of the European Parliament that all candidates deserved equal treatment, and that a 
solution to the Cyprus problem needed to be found under the aegis of the United Nations 
(“Parliament Européen,” 2006). The UN (aside from the International Court of Justice) was the 
preferred forum of the Turks, whereas the Cypriots preferred the EU, given that they had 
membership there. The UN-brokered deal had, furthermore, been accepted by the Turkish Cypriots 
and rejected by the Greek Cypriots in 2004. 
When Finnish Foreign Minister Tuomioja spoke on the subject of EU enlargement at the 
University of Helsinki on the 5th of October, he praised Turkey for playing a constructive role in 
moderating the dialogue between the West and the Islamic world. He saw Turkey and the EU 
benefitting from integration and political and cultural development at all levels strengthened. He 
further argued that neither Turkey nor Croatia should have new accession criteria imposed on them 
under the pretext of ‘enlargement fatigue’. “Do not make enlargement a scapegoat for domestic 
problems of slow economic growth or high unemployment,” he said. “According to all economic 
studies, the recent enlargement in 2004 stimulated economic growth.” Speaking about the threat to 
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suspend negotiations, he said that it was in everyone’s interest to continue negotiations and to assist 
both Turkey and Croatia in meeting all the accession criteria (“La Turquie a un rôle,” 2006). 
At the end of November, when the Tampere negotiations had failed to find a solution in the 
conflict over Cyprus, Tuomioja said that in spite of the cordialities between the Finnish presidency 
and the Turks, that the EU member states could not simply continue as if nothing had happened 
and that there needed to be consequences for Turkey’s unwillingness to compromise (“Stoiber 
fordert schärfere,” 2006). Abdullah Gül however assessed the problem differently, drawing an 
implicit distinction between the accession negotiations, which had been characterized as a technical 
process, and the Cyprus situation, which he characterized as a political problem that could be solved 
under the auspices of the UN together with the goodwill of the Finnish presidency, about which he 
added his appreciation (“Echec des dernières,” 2006). 
When the Commission published its recommendations, Finnish Prime Minister Matti 
Vanhanen expressed in a communiqué that the Presidency considered the recommendations a solid 
basis for discussion, while sources inside the Finnish government called them a “reasonable 
proposal”, but that “Finland has always kept the principal objective of maintaining negotiations and 
avoiding a complete suspension or a suspension of a large number of chapters” (Bouilhet, 2006a; 
“Turquie: la présidence,” 2006 – trans. mine). After the Foreign Ministers had come to their 
conclusion that the EU would freeze eight chapters, about which Tuomioja pointed out that it was 
not the same as a suspension, and that no one had questioned Turkey’s eligibility for membership 
once it had met all the criteria (Bouilhet, 2006b). In other words, while the negotiations might still 
fail, Turkey would not be derailed or set upon a path toward a ‘privileged partnership’ because of 
any factors other than its own ability to meet the Copenhagen criteria. 
Other articles that underlined Finland’s energetic attempts to find a solution to the impasse 
were: “Merkel estime,” 2006, “Merkel presse Ankara,” 2006, “Présidence de l’EU,” 2006, “Turquie: 
l'UE adoucit,” 2006. Additionally, Gottschlich (2006) and Proissl, Schmid & Ehrlich (2006) 
considered Finnland outright drivers alongside with Britain and Sweden. 
9.4.5 France 
While Chirac’s personal preference for Turkish accession in the longue durée occasionally shone 
through, by and large France was widely considered to be on the side of the brakemen. 2006 was 
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Chirac’s last year in office and the rising popularity of his Nicolas Sarkozy, whose outspoken 
opposition to Turkey was already propelling him toward the Presidency, strengthened the 
government’s opposition to Turkey. Sarkozy, then minister of the interior, was all but officially 
nominated by the ruling UMP (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire), France’s mainstream right-
wing party.  
The Socialists were meanwhile plagued by inner splits about Turkey and a willingness to give 
in to Armenian desires. Among the PS (Parti Socialiste) members these internal differences on 
Turkey were accentuated by the struggle of its three major nominees for the presidential candidacy, 
during which Laurent Fabius advocated for the privileged parnership, Ségolène Royal for a French 
referendum on Turkey’s accession and Dominique Strauss-Kahn against a suspension of accession 
negotiations, lest Turkey decide to ‘switch sides’ away from Europe, while the party also had a wing 
that attempted to appeal to the Armenian minority. 
The debate about Turkish accession became even directly related to the debate about the 
Armenian Genocide, officially recognized by France in 2001, when the PS introduced a bill in April 
2006 to make the denial thereof an offence, punishable by up to a year imprisonment and a €45,000 
fine. In open debate, Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy (UMP), argued against the bill, finding 
it a hostile gesture to Turkish people and negatively affecting France’s position, not only in Turkey, 
but in the entire region surrounding it, while it was better to leave the ‘memory work’ of such a 
delicate nature to the Turks themselves. He was severely berated for it by his own party, the centrist 
democratic UDF, and PS deputies, who even accused him of being blackmailed or bought off by the 
Turks. Upon his argument that Turkey was a valuable economic trading-partner benefitting many 
French businesses, even his own party members cried “c’est scandaleux!” (France, 2006).  
Before Chirac paid a state visit to the Armenian capital Yerevan in late September, an 
interview with him appeared in the monthly Nouvelles d’Arménie Magazine, an ethnic Armenian 
magazine published in Paris, in which he stated that Turkey would be required to acknowledge the 
Armenian Genocide in order to become a member of the EU, “in the spirit of European 
integration”. According to the president, Europe was “primarily an effort of reconciliation, peace, 
respect and openness to others” that “always and everywhere led to an ‘effort of memory.’42 Even if 
it would be a long and difficult process, he had confidence in Turkey’s ability to carry out this “duty 
                                                
42 Chirac, in this instance, refers to ‘effort de mémoire’. Previously, the President and Douste-Blazy had referred to 
‘travail de mémoire’, or ‘memory work’: engaging the past by way of a subjective understanding.  
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of memory to its end”, because the issue was “the very spirit of European integration” (“Chirac lie 
implicitement,” 2006 – trans. mine). Chirac, however, reiterated that it was “essential” that Turkey 
remained anchored in the West. 
After the visit with President Kocharyan of Armenia in Yerevan, at the post-summit press 
conference, Chirac again stressed the necessity for Turkey to recognize the Armenian Genocide. 
“Every country grows by acknowledging its dramas and errors,” he said, citing Germany’s 
acknowledgement of the Holocaust as an example, adding that “Turkey would do well, considering 
its history, its deep tradition, its culture, which is also a humanistic culture, to draw the 
consequences” (“Chirac: la Turquie,” 2006 – trans. mine).  
When asked if he supported the bill pending in the National Assembly to penalize the 
Armenian genocide denial, Chirac reminded the audience that France had already officially 
recognized the Armenian Genocide in 2001 and that French law condemned incitement to 
discrimination, hatred and racial violence. “The rest,” he said, “is more polemics than judicial 
reality”, by which he seemed to dismiss the bill as political grandstanding (“Présidence de la 
République,” 2006 – trans. mine). About the introduction of the Armenian Genocide recognition as 
at least an informal condition of EU membership, Chirac was hailed by the Armenian sympathizers 
in the National Assembly, who saw it as a great breakthrough, though the President’s aides were at 
pains to explain later that there had been no policy shift on the part of the President, suggesting that 
the president meant it as a moral responsibility rather than an official condition of membership 
(Goulliaud, 2006; Nougayrède, 2006). 
When the National Assembly adopted the controversial bill on October 1243, the outrage in 
Turkey was extensive, with calls to boycott all French products. EU Commission President Barroso 
reacted by saying that the Commission would “of course comply with all decisions taken by the 
French Parliament,” though he added that he did not think it would be beneficial to the relationship 
between the EU and Turkey (“UE-Turquie: des relations,” 2006 – trans. mine). Upon the bill’s 
passage Chirac telephoned Erdoğan to apologize for the decision of the French National Assembly 
and to let him know that he understood his feelings and shared them (“Le president français,” 2006). 
Meanwhile, the Cypriot-shipping impasse was dominating the overall debate on Turkey’s 
accession in France. Responding to the Commission’s November 8 report, Douste-Blazy suggested 
consequences for Turkey if it failed to meet its obligations according to the Additional Protocol. “If 
                                                
43 At the time of editing (in February 2012) it has only recently been adopted by the Senate but still faces legal challenges. 
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Turkey still does not recognize the 25 member states, of course including Cyprus, at the end of the 
year then it seems necessary to revise the timetable for Turkey's accession to the European Union,” 
he told the National Assembly. “Today, it is clear that Turkey still does not open its ports and 
airports to ships and aircraft from Cyprus. It is obvious that Turkey today does not meet its 
obligations” (“Revoir le calendrier,” 2006).  
At the mid-November foreign ministers meeting, France sided with the United Kingdom in 
embracing the option of freezing a certain amount of chapters rather than suspending the 
negotiations altogether, which was the view of the Cypriots and the Austrians (Boland & Dombey, 
2006; Dombey 2006b). After the failure of the late-November Tampere meeting to find a solution 
for the impasse, followed by the publication of the Commission’s recommendations a day later, 
Douste-Blazy said on the sidelines of the NATO meeting in Riga that a slowdown in the 
negotiations would probably be unavoidable as long as Turkey did not fulfill its obligations (“UE: un 
gel partiel,” 2006).  
During a later interview with Radio France Douste-Blazy said that, “we must draw all the 
consequences of this refusal of the Turks.” “The European Union must respond to Turkey’s refusal 
to implement the customs union with Cyprus by being firm on our demands,” he stressed, saying, 
“it is inevitable that the pace of negotiations should be influenced so long as Turkey has not fulfilled 
its obligations”. The Foreign Minister further articulated the need “to be firm and at the same time 
well to ensure that the entire negotiation process may resume as soon as the obligations of the 
Customs Union are met by Turkey” (“Union douanière,” 2006 – trans. mine).   
Chirac, also speaking about the matter on the sidelines in Riga, expressed his support for the 
Commission’s recommendation for the freezing of eight chapters, explaining to Erdoğan that the 
Commission did not have any other choice (Bouilhet, 2006a; Bresson et al., 2006; “Bruxelles 
appelle,” 2006; “L'UE affiche,” – trans. mine). According to the French daily Libération, one 
Commission official had said that if the Commission had not recommended the eight frozen 
chapters, Chirac and Merkel would have set the tone at the European Council summit, which may 
very well have lead to freezing more than eight chapters (Quatremer, 2006). Some reports 
mentioned that Chirac had even suggested freezing seventeen rather than eight of them (Berger, 
2006; Docquiert, 2006b). Others reported that he had joined Germany in calling for more than ten 
(Boland & Parker, 2006; “Coup de froid,” 2006).  
After having expressed his support for the German position at Riga, the President began 
hearing news of hardening rhetoric coming across the Rhine (see below). Chirac’s spokesman 
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maintained that France and Germany shared the same position (Proissl & Hollinger, 2006). 
Subsequent events suggest that the chancellor was going further toward the hard brakeman position 
than Chirac was comfortable with, and Chirac’s spokesman covered an ambiguity as to which 
Germany, exactly, France was in agreement with, given the divergence of views within Berlin. The 
outcome of the December 5 Franco-German-Polish summit stripped the eighteen-month deadline 
from the argument, which Merkel had been articulating, urging instead for a Commission report that 
would have been published regardless (see above). Ludlow (2006b, p. 15) reports that Chirac had 
been instrumental in pulling Merkel back from a firmer line suggests that the president was at heart 
still in the driver camp, even though the rest of his government clearly was not.   
When the news of the before-mentioned Turkish back-channel overture for a solution to the 
impasse circulated several days before the foreign ministers’ meeting of December 11, the French 
foreign ministry asked for a confirmation thereof as well as a written clarification with the terms 
being offered from Ankara (“Türkei bietet,” 2006). None emerged before the said meeting. 
Although Douste-Blazy made it known afterwards that nobody wanted to break off discussions he 
still strongly supported the outcome of freezing the eight negotiation chapters (Bouilhet, 2006b). 
Nicolas Sarkozy also hailed the outcome, arguing that Turkey had to understand that if it wanted to 
be part of the EU, it had to adapt to its values and recognize all of its members. “Recognizing all the 
states that constitute the EU is not a prerequisite, it is a principle, an absolute necessity,” he said 
(“Nicolas Sarkozy,” 2006 – trans. mine).  
After the heads of state and government had also endorsed the Foreign Ministers’ decision 
at the year-end summit, Jacques Chirac defended it by saying that since Turkey had been unable or 
unwilling to meet its commitments it was only natural that, without condemnation or drawing firm 
conclusions, the EU should take steps to encourage a return to compliance with European rules as 
quickly as possible, particularly those relating to trade relations with Cyprus. Speaking for himself, he 
claimed that he had always been in favor of negotiations, knowing full well that they would be long 
and difficult. Not being able to know the eventual results he still hoped that these negotiations 
would continue until they had led to an agreement (“Chirac justifie,” 2006; Ferenczi, 2006b – trans. 
mine).  
Other articles that named France as a brakeman in 2006 include: Bottolier-Depois, 2006c, 
“EU-landen,” 2006, “EU setzt Gespräche,” 2006; Fischer, J., 2006; Missé, 2006a; van Oostrum, 
2006a; “Turchia diplomazia,” 2006; “Turkey and EU,” 2006; “Turks compromis,” 2006. 
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9.4.6 Germany 
In 2006, Germany was a difficult country to gauge as far as its position on Turkey was concerned, 
despite the outspoken preferences of the chancellor. The 2005 federal elections had led to a Grand 
Coalition between CDU/CSU and SPD with Christian-democrat Angela Merkel as Germany’s new 
Chancellor. Both personally and as the leader of her party, she had never hidden her opposition to 
Turkish membership and a preference for the privileged partnership option. Yet, as Chancellor she 
had to respect the will of the coalition, as well as previously made decisions. Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier, the SPD Foreign Minister, on the other hand, was in favor of Turkish membership, 
which had created a fault line between the two coalition partners (Höhler, 2006; “Merkel weiter,” 
2006). This fault line had to be plastered over and carefully worded to encompass both points of 
view for a coalition agreement. It read as follows: 
Germany has a special interest in closer relations with Turkey and in binding the country to 
the European Union. 
The negotiations on launched 3 October 2005 with the aim of accession are an open-ended 
process that does not establish an automatism and the outcome of which cannot be 
guaranteed beforehand. This presents economically, demographically and culturally an 
extraordinary challenge. Against this background, we welcome the reform efforts initiated 
in Turkey. We want to support the forces that promote the democratic, constitutional and 
economic development of Turkey, with which we are also closely linked to NATO. 
The negotiating mandate, and the declaration of the European Community and its 
member states of 21 September, contained conditions, including the absorption capacity of 
the EU which must be strictly adhered to. Thereto belongs accordingly the Copenhagen 
criteria, also the exercise of fundamental freedoms including the freedom of religion. 
Should the EU not be capable of absorbing [Turkey] or Turkey not be able to comply with 
all the obligations of membership, Turkey must develop its privileged partnership with the 
EU to be bound as closely as possible to the European structures. 
(“Gemeinsam für Deutschland,” 2005 – trans. mine) 
This coalition agreement anticipated the presidency conclusions of the December 17, 2004 Brussels 
summit. Much of the CDU text had been adopted, with Merkel’s long-favored privileged 
partnership explicitly stated, yet with the concession to Steinmeier’s SPD that the objective of the 
process was full membership. By explicitly mentioning the 21 September declaration it also explicitly 
recognized the Cypriot shipping issue as a critical problem that would have to be dealt with. The 
coalition agreement in effect indicated that Germany still preferred to keep the process on track, 
rather than – as many CDU constituents would have preferred – to derail it. It also highlighted that 
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the recognition that absorption capacity might prevent Turkey’s accession, though there is no 
discussion of what conditions would limit that capacity. 
This agreement still put Angela Merkel in a precarious position, as she would be watched 
with Argus eyes for any action on her part that might still be directed at pursuing her own 
preference for derailing Turkey’s accession process. Given this tension, she frequently had to explain 
that she had two distinct roles to fulfill: one as the Chancellor, who had to maintain a policy in 
accordance with the coalition agreement and, the other, as the chairwoman of the CDU/CSU, who 
preferred the privileged partnership. By the same token, because of her position as Chancellor and 
the fact that all eyes were upon her, she possessed the metaphorical megaphone. By contrast, Frank-
Walter Steinmeier, whose position on Turkey was more driver-like, had the benefit to able to 
operate more under the radar and maintain his own preference during his actions among the foreign 
ministers, though it came with a smaller degree of influence on the overarching rhetorical aspect of 
the debate. If his actions were too far out of step with those of the Chancellor he might have to face 
her unilateral ability to pull the question of Turkey into the European Council, rather than leave it 
up to a foreign ministers’ decision. 
Delivering the keynote address at the International Bertelsmann Forum on world economy 
in Berlin on September 22, Angela Merkel made some remarkable statements about the EU’s 
relationship with Turkey. For one she called for a clear definition of Europe’s boundaries, without 
which she saw Europe struggling in the future to survive in a rapidly changing world. In that 
context, she expressed her doubts that deepening could continue while the EU continued to enlarge. 
To address this, not only recommended that the EU should not make new membership 
commitments but also look at that the negotiating candidates.  
For those conducting negotiations the criteria must be met. These criteria include the 
absorption capacity of the existing European Union; that is how we, at least, understand 
the Copenhagen criteria. We have started accession negotiations with Turkey – I want to 
address that specifically. It is also there that it is necessary that all criteria be fulfilled. I do 
not want to expand on that, but we have a catchphrase that concerns us; that catchphrase is 
Cyprus. A solution must be brought to this question, if the criteria and requirements of the 
European Union are to count for everyone.  
(Merkel, 2006) 
In this paragraph she highlighted the problems being faced by the process of Turkey’s candidacy, 
without which she highlighted any of Turkey’s promises. Furthermore, she leaves inspecific what 
particular limitations would mean that the EU’s absorption capacity would be insufficient to 
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accommodate Turkey as a member. She also does not specify what criteria would fail to count for 
everyone regarding Cyprus.   
Meanwhile, Schröder and Fischer, who had retired to private life but still continued to 
advocate on Turkey’s behalf from the sidelines, returned to the fray of the political debate more 
directly. Speaking on October 2 at the launch of the French edition of Foreign Policy Magazine, 
Schröder repeated his support for Turkish accession to the EU, seeing “no reasonable alternative,” 
to membership because a “stable Turkey is in the interest of the European Union” (“Plaidoyer de 
Schröder,” 2006 – trans. mine). On that same day Fischer published an op-ed article in Le Figaro, 
following another in the Süddeutsche Zeitung on September 27, arguing in both that in light of the 
then-recent Lebanon crisis, Europe needed to define a grand strategy for the Middle East, in which 
Turkey would necessarily have to be included, while he found it astonishing that, Europe was going 
in the opposite direction by antagonizing the Turks. In the articles, he recalled the promise Europe 
had made to open trade with Northern Cyprus, which would make it possible for Turkey to do the 
same with Southern Cyprus (Fischer, J., 2006). 
Also at the beginning of October, Angela Merkel traveled to Turkey on an official state visit. 
In anticipation of her visit she had let it be known that she expected a “clear signal” from Turkey to 
Cyprus (Volkery, 2006). At the joint press conference with Erdoğan, she said that, “the Cyprus issue 
is a necessary condition. The issue must be settled for the continuation of talks” (“Angela Merkel en 
Turquie,” 2006; “Merkel presse Ankara,” 2006 – trans. mine). “I hope we solve this difficult 
problem,” she assured reporters (“Merkel drängt,” 2006 – trans. mine).  
She also promised that the negotiations – which she officially would be heading in her 
upcoming role of the EU presidency in 2007 – would be “fair and open-ended.” “What is promised 
will also continue,” she said, adding, “we are reliable partners” (Vieregge, 2006 – trans. mine). In 
front of an audience of Turkish businesspeople, she again explained her dual position, in which she 
was personally dedicated to the concept of a privileged partnership as head of the CDU, but as 
Chancellor she was bound by what the EU had agreed with Turkey. “I adhere to the principle - pacta 
sunt servanda,” that a responsible government complies with its treaties (“Merkel estime,” 2006; 
Müller, 2006; Schellenberger, 2006 – trans. mine). The Turkish audience gave a thundering applause, 
but this message had a double meaning. One of the Chancellor’s central messages on her trip was to 
push Turkey on the Cyprus issue, wherein Turkey was also called to live up to its (as yet unratified) 
treaty with the EU. Responding to a much-used criticism of the EU – that it constantly invented 
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new hurdles for Turkey to meet – she simply denied it by declaring that this was not the case and 
affirmed that Germany would not “make additional problems” (ibid. – trans. mine). 
On November 6, just ahead of the publication of the Commission’s report, Merkel gave an 
interview with the Süddeutsche Zeitung, in which she raised the question of Cyprus and Turkey, 
saying: 
I hope very much that the meeting cancelled with the Finnish Presidency on the Cyprus 
question will not be Turkey's final word on this matter. We need implementation of the 
Ankara Protocol guaranteeing free trade with Cyprus. Otherwise a very, very serious 
situation will arise with regard to the continuation of the accession negotiations. I urge that 
Turkey do everything it can to avoid putting itself and the European Union in such a 
complicated situation. 
(Kornelius, S. & Schwennicke, 2006) 
Pressed to clarify what the consequences would be if Turkey would did not comply, she offered no 
specifics other than that “The EU would not be able to continue on this basis. Turkey needs to 
know that there will be no nod of approval if there is no movement with regard to the Ankara 
Protocol” (ibid.). When she was asked about how a third hat, that of presiding over the EU the 
following year, beside the two she was already wearing as Chancellor and CDU Chairwoman, would 
complicate matters vis-à-vis Turkey, she dismissed the idea that the different roles would offer 
complications, seeing at least two of them as quite compatible with one another, since in the process 
much would be left to the Commission. From reports following this interview, as well as from 
clarifications issued by Merkel’s staff, there should be a suspension of the negotiations altogether as 
far as she was concerned if Turkey did not open its ports to Cyprus (“Bondskanselier waarschuwt,” 
2006; Calla, 2006). 
At around that same time, on the eve of a meeting between Vanhanen and Merkel on 
November 7, the Turkish question provided a wedge in the grand coalition that fed in the German 
press. One of its main instigators of this wedge, Minister-President of Bavaria, Edmund Stoiber 
(CSU), argued that the accession negotiations should be frozen, as Turkey was “violating the 
treaties” by refusing to implement the additional protocol (“Stoiber: Gespräche,” 2006). Even if the 
impasse were solved, Stoiber opined, there ought to be no question of membership, whatever the 
conditions. “Turkey is not a European country and therefore can not join the EU,” he said. To this 
end, he called for a meeting in Munich with the Federal Government and the EU Commission, in 
order to freeze the ongoing negotiations and to prevent the opening of new chapters (“Streit um 
EU-Beitritt,” 2006; “Uneinigkeit,” 2006).  
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From the other side of the coalition government, sentiments were significantly different. The 
Chairman of the SPD, Minister-President of Rhineland-Palatinate Kurt Beck, argued that an 
interruption of talks would be a serious mistake. “We are at the beginning of negotiations and not at 
the end of a road that will decide whether Turkey can join,” Beck said. “We talk about stages, and if 
[these are] not achieved, you have to continue your efforts to reach them” (“Türkeifrage,” 2006 – 
trans. mine).  
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, supported by the SPD vice chancellor, Franz Müntefering, 
acknowledged the tough report. Yet, as they felt that success of the negotiations was desirable, he 
still hoped that a fair compromise to the impasse could be found, in which Turkey would open itself 
to Cyprus and the EU would do the same with Northern Cyprus (“Stoiber: Gespräche,” 2006). The 
report should therefore be seen as an encouragement for Turkey to brave the path forward and not 
as the means to bring about the failure of negotiations, reinforcing the impression that Turkey was 
not welcome in the EU (“Türkeifrage,” 2006). He further welcomed Erdoğan’s statements regarding 
Article 301 as demonstrating that Turkey was open to further change.   
  As such, there were stark differences between the CDU/CSU approach on the one hand 
and SPD on the other. Müntefering, nevertheless, maintained that there was no crisis in the 
coalition. Germany was only negotiating a constructive approach and even though the issue was a 
difficult one, it did not constiture a conflict in the coalition. Turkey needed to do its homework, he 
argued, but it also deserved a fair chance at membership (“Müntefering,” 2006; “Türkeifrage,” 2006; 
“Uneinigkeit,” 2006).  
After having met with Matti Vanhanen, the Chancellor, expressed the middle ground, calling 
on Turkey to respect its commitments and implement the additional protocol before the end of the 
year (“Brüssel will Türkei,” 2006). Steinmeier, in mid-November, used the same language, saying 
that he was aiming to avoid an ‘escalation’ between Europe and Turkey (Fischer, M., 2006). For the 
time being, then, the coalition agreed that Turkey should offer the unilateral concession of fully 
implementing the additional protocol. The disagreement was on what should happen if Turkey did 
not comply. 
At the CDU Conference in Dresden, held on November 27-28, Merkel – winning reelection 
as CDU party chairwoman on the first of the two days – maintained that Europe was not a Christian 
club, but a club with fundamental values (Développement Allemagne,” 2006 – trans. mine). The 
following day, Stoiber maintained his anti-Turkish stance, saying, “in my view, no more chapters can 
be opened until Turkey has fulfilled its obligations.” He also reiterated his fundamental position, 
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saying “Turkey is not a European country, and whoever admits [Turkey], will change the character 
of Europe, and I do not want that. That is why I say ‘no’” (“Stoiber fordert wegen,” 2006a – trans. 
mine). 
After the breakdown in negotiations at Tampere, the question of what to do with Turkey 
became the point on which drives and brakement diverged. According to the Financial Times 
(Boland & Parker, 2006), Germany had joined France in advocating for the freezing of more than 
ten chapters. However, when the Commission’s recommendation to freeze eight was published, 
Merkel, attending the NATO summit in Riga, initially responded favorably, calling it a “strong 
signal” to Ankara (Jach, 2006; “l’Europe divisée,” 2006; “Merkel approuve,” 2006). This did not 
seem to be enough for Edmund Stoiber, when he argued that Turkey needed clear guidance from 
the EU about what was and what was not acceptable in a European Partnership. It cannot be “that 
Turkey wants to be newly admitted into the European family, but will not accept the family member 
Cyprus,” he argued (“Stoiber fordert schärfere,” 2006b – trans. mine). Elmar Brok in the European 
Parliament also argued against the Commission’s soft approach toward Turkey (ibid.). 
In the Bundestag, further, Christian Democrats also demanded stronger measures, such as 
the opening of no new chapters and at least semi-annual reviews of Turkey’s progress toward 
meeting the EU’s demands. The Commission’s recommendation for freezing eight chapters was 
called such a weak response, that it might even be considered a reward for Turkey’s delaying tactics. 
Andreas Schockenhoff, the Vice-Chairman of the CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag, called the 
Commission’s proposal “inadequate, ineffective [and] unreliable” (Jach, 2006 – trans. mine). This 
earned him a personal phone call from the Chancellor calling him to account for his criticism of the 
Commission’s recommendation after she had already endorsed it. Schockenhoff defended himself 
by saying that his stated position had been the internally-agreed position of his Bundestag faction for 
the preceding six weeks.  
After her more favorable statements about the recommendations at Riga, and her argument 
with Schockenhoff Angela Merkel also hardened her language. She indicated that the Commission 
had not gone far enough and she advocated for more oversight on the process by the member 
states, adopting the objectives of her fellow party members in the Budestag. Furthermore, she 
advocated for a stronger review clause, by which the Council could reassess Turkey’s progress after 
eighteen months (Berger, 2006). Steinmeier’s position, meanwhile, diverged from where the 
Chancellor was going. He regretted the confrontation with Turkey and felt that the Commission’s 
recommendations were reasonable and responsible, and they offered the assurance that there would 
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be no breakdown in the negotiations, (Proissl & Zapf, 2006). As such, he supported the 
Commission’s position of the eight chapters, which were insufficiently strict for the Chancellor. 
Between the Riga NATO summit and the Franco-German-Polish summit, Angela Merkel 
received support for her review clause from other member states, in which she wanted the 
European Council to put the whole negotiations process on ice if Turkey had not met its Ankara 
Agreement obligation to open its ports to Cyprus. The german edition of the Financial Times 
Deutschland reported these as being France, Cyprus, Greece and, surprisingly, Portugal. The 
Financial Times Deutschland also reported that Steinmeier was not on board with her proposal 
(Proissl & Hollinger, 2006).  The rather sharply contradicting views within the coalition, and 
Merkel’s apparent shifting on the issue between her dual role as Chancellor and party leader led to 
the press to characterizing German foreign policy as being adrift in domestic politics – a cardinal sin 
in German foreign policy making – one that in recent years had become a virtue honored in the 
breach. That her position shifted again after the triangular Weimar summit did not set this critique 
to rest.   
The foreign minister, for his part, was also culpable of undermining the single voice of the 
German government. When the back-channel Turkish offer emerged Frank-Walter Steinmeier was 
quick to suggest that this looked to be positive and “a cautious willingness of Turkey to make a 
concession” (“Türkei bietet,” 2006; “Türkei knüpft,” 2006 – trans. mine). He was also the source of 
more tension when on December 9 it leaked that Der Spiegel would publish an interview with 
Steinmeier two days later, in which he claimed to have warned the chancellor about her engagement 
in what he called an “unmeasured reaction” against Ankara; that if Turkey turned away from Europe 
it would be a serious strategic loss for the EU (Beste & von Hammerstein, 2006). The news about 
the interview immediately led to a storm of public criticism. Responding to the phrase “unmeasured 
reaction,” Volker Kauder, the faction leader of the CDU in the Bundestag, called it “completely 
unnecessary,” and sending Turkey “false signals” (König, 2006 – trans. mine). Schockenhoff, 
Kauder’s deputy, called on the Foreign Minister to not take a fundamentally different position than 
the Chancellor44 (Lachmann, 2006; “Offener Koalitionsstreit,” 2006; “Unterschiedliche Signale,”).  
Beyond the frustration over the tone between the chancellor and the foreign minister, the 
SPD and CDU leaders in the Bundestag took up debate on the substance. Peter Struck – the SPD 
leader in the lower house – reminded his CDU colleagues that there was no majority for their 
                                                
44 Which, given the exchange between Merkel and Schockenhoff less than two weeks before, was ironic. 
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preferred privileged partnership. Struck’s deputy, Walter Kolbow, referring to Turkey’s apparent 
overture, argued that since Turkey had shifted, the EU foreign ministers should continue with the 
negotiations, to which Matthias Wissman, the CDU Chairman of the Europe Committee, responded 
that Turkey had not even said if it was going to ratify the full additional protocol and that 
negotiations should only continue if and when Turkey unequivocally committed itself to the 
ratification (Dausend, 2006 – trans. mine). In the midst of this coalition squabble, Wolfgang 
Schäuble, the interior minister at the time, argued that “the negotiations must not fail,” though he 
also defended the privileged partnership concept (“Scharfe Töne,” 2006 – trans. mine).  
The Foreign Ministers (GAERC) meeting in Brussels on December 11 had seemingly settled 
the matter as far as the presidency was concerned. Addressing the differences within the coalition, 
Steinmeier acknowledged them to be “substantive”, but arguing his own case, he advocated for a 
“sense of proportion” regarding the impasse with Turkey. “That which has grown over many years, 
we shall not destroy in a matter of days,” he declared (“EU-Außenminister,” 2006a – trans. mine). 
Edmund Stoiber disagreed, saying, “a clearer answer to Turkey’s breach of treaty would have been 
preferable” (“Erdogan wirft,” 2006). Rebuking Steinmeier for his post-GAERC meeting advice to 
the chancellor about not destroying the EU-Turkey relationship, Volker Kauder told him that 
Merkel “did not need any advice” about Turkey (Bennhold, 2006b). 
At the European Council meeting proper, Merkel went along with the other EU-leaders to 
accept the GAERC consensus on Turkey, though she warned that during the German Presidency, 
there would be a role for “other forms of cooperation than membership” (“EU-Gipfel,” 2006 – 
trans. mine). Steinmeier, again, saw matters differently. Preluding what the German priorities were to 
be regarding Turkey, he confirmed that the door to negotiations was not closed, and the EU might 
open two to four new negotiation chapters during Germany’s tenure (“L'Allemagne révèle,” 2006). 
Given the differences between the German Foreign Ministry and the Chancellery on Turkey, 
it is a tricky matter to gauge where Germany, as a whole, stood in the debate. Many articles that gave 
overviews of the member states put Germany in the brakeman camp. Given that the foreign 
minister maintained the same position as the Commission – which, in essence, was in the political 
center of the debate – and Chancellor Merkel had emerged as the main advocate for a tougher 
approach on Turkey, it is impossible to maintain the argument that Germany was a passenger, and it 
was certainly not a driver of Turkey’s membership ambitions. It must therefore be concluded that, 
on balance, Germany was a brakeman. Articles that came to the same conclusion were: Bilefsky & 
Dempsey, 2006; Bouilhet, 2006b, Bresson et al., 2006; “EU-landen,” 2006, Fischer, J., 2006; Missé, 
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2006a; Nougayrède, 2006; Proissl, Schmid & Ehrlich, 2006; Schlamp, 2006; “Turkey and EU,” 2006; 
“Turks compromis,” 2006. 
9.4.7 Greece 
In 2006, the relationship between Ankara and Athens cooled dramatically as compared to the 
previous years, mainly due to the specific impasse over Cyprus. While the Greeks never wavered in 
their desire to eventually see Turkey become a member of the EU, the Cypriot issue, touched an 
issue particularly close to their perceived core national interests and prompted them to use their vote 
against Turkey if necessary. Unlike the majority of the other brakemen, who appear to have used the 
Cyprus issue as the instrument for slowing or stopping Turkey’s progress, the Greeks used the threat 
of slowing down Turkey’s progress as an instrument in pursuit of Cyprus’ shipping interests. It is 
likely the case that Greek domestic politics made doing anything else untenable, just as in Ankara it 
was politically untenable to open trade with Greek Cyprus while the EU remained closed to 
Northern Cyprus. This caveat aside, Greece cannot be considered anything other than a brakeman 
in 2006.  
When Athens Mayor Dora Bakoyannis took the office of foreign minister in February, she 
was greeted with enthusiasm in the Turkish press (“Bilgehan sees,” 2006). According Mehmet Ali 
Birand, a notable opinion leader and columnist for the Turkish Daily News (the English-language 
version of the secular-nationalist Hürriyet), she was “one of the few Greek politicians who knows us 
well,” and brought hope that “she might help bring back some of the sparkle from the Papandreou 
era” (Birand, 2006). The international press thought so too, seeing Bakoyannis as having an easier 
manner with the Turks than her conservative predecessor, Pétros Molyviatis (“L’ambitieuse Dora,” 
2006; Kunz, 2006). These expectations, however, would prove to be somewhat premature. 
Though most of her comments were dressed up with cordiality towards Turkey, they were 
seldom without forgetting Greece’s interests. When on March 1 Tassos Papadopoulos, president of 
the (Greek) Republic of Cyprus, met with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the Greek Foreign 
Ministry declared it a positive step (“La rencontre,” 2006). Two days later, however, the Austrian 
Die Presse published an interview with Bakoyannis, in which she called the Annan Plan “history”. 
Given that the Greek Cypriots had rejected the peace plan in 2004, there was no use in discussing 
the it any further, despite Greece having seen more positive than negative in the plan. During the 
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rest of the interview she declared Greece’s continued to support for Turkey on its way toward the 
EU, though not without full implementation of the additional protocol. When asked about Turkey’s 
Europeanness, Bakoyannis responded: “The question is not, if Turkey is European enough today, 
but if Turkey is European at the end of the road… Of course, Turkey still has some domestic and 
foreign policy changes to make” (Ultsch, 2006 – trans. mine).  
Her rhetoric on the Annan Plan disappointed the Turkish press. They quickly interpreted her 
as being more hawkish than her predecessor (Aktar, 2006).  Bakoyannis’ declarations on the plan as 
being dead were a signal that reconciliation between the Cypriots would not happen along the lines 
that had been proposed by the UN two years prior, but some formula which would be more in tune 
with Papadopoulos’ harder line. 
After meeting with Abdullah Gül on the sidelines of the March 10-11 foreign ministers 
meeting in Salzburg, she declared that while Turkey was not ready for “a common market,” Greece 
was “always in favor of a European perspective for Turkey. We are neighbors and it is in the interest 
of Greece to have a European Turkey on our borders… We reviewed our bilateral relations and I 
had the opportunity to tell [Gül] once again that Greece has shown that it is working on stability in 
the region, and that [Greece] is in favor of a European perspective for Turkey, which in the end will 
depend on its attitude” (“Turquie et UE,” 2006 – trans. mine).  
On May 23, two Greek F-16s intercepted a sortie of Turkish fighter planes flying in or near 
Greek airspace over the Greek island of Karpathos. The ensuing mock dogfight caused a collision 
between a Greek and a Turkish F-16, resulting in the death of the Greek pilot. After 
communications between the Greek and Turkish foreign ministries, the Greek foreign ministry 
spokesman said, the two ministers had expressed their sorrow about the incident, and agreed on the 
fact that it would “not affect the ambition of both countries to improve their relations” (“Collision 
F-16,” 2006 – trans. mine). Ten days later, however, another fatal incident took place in the Aegean 
Sea, when a Turkish-operated cargo ship colliding with a Greek tanker. Despite diplomatic attempts 
to plaster it over again, the Aegean skies were said to be darkening (Borowiec, 2006a).  
These darkening skies manifested themselves during the impasse over Cypriot shipping and 
Turkey’s accession negotiations. After the Commission’s screening reports had been completed, 
Greece, together with Cyprus, vetoed the opening of negotiations chapters (other than Science & 
Research) in order to pressure Turkey into opening its airports and harbors. “I wouldn't call it a 
veto,” A Greek diplomat told the Irish Times. “It is more a consideration. We must go slowly as we 
want Turkey to honor its commitments,” he said adding that both states would not allow any new 
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chapters to be opened before November 8th when the Commission’s annual report on Turkey was 
due (Smyth, 2006a).   
In October, the Greek Foreign Ministry spokesman warned Turkey about the annual report 
and the slow pace of reform in Turkey it was bound to mention. He reiterated that Ankara should 
fulfill its commitment under the additional protocol by opening its airports and harbors to Cypriot 
vessels (“Athènes… réformes,” 2006). Speaking to the Greek Parliament at the outset of November, 
Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis said that if Turkey really wanted to advance toward Europe, it 
should be aware of its commitments toward the 25 member states and even though it was 
recognized that there had been some reforms, Ankara had not made any significant steps to fulfill all 
of its obligations to the EU (“Athènes… obligations,” 2006). Referring to the Greek Orthodox 
community in Turkey, he argued that Ankara had made insufficient progress as far as minority rights 
and religious freedoms were concerned and its refusal to recognize one of the EU member states 
was a paradox that could not continue endlessly.  
Following the recommendations, Karamanlis said at Riga that Ankara had to meet all its 
obligations to the EU and the Commission’s recommendation was a “basis for further talks and 
discussions within EU bodies” (“Athènes incite Ankara,” 2006; “Stoiber fordert,” 2006b – trans. 
mine). In that pursuit, Athens was ready to wield far more stick than carrot. In the meantime Greece 
had also joined other member states that looked at freezing ten chapters rather than the 
recommended eight. Still, after the Brussels foreign ministers meeting of December 11, Dora 
Bakogianni expressed her satisfaction with the decision to close eight of them, saying, “it is 
important that there is a consistent and clear message toward Ankara from the 25” member states 
(“Erdogan wirft,” 2006 – trans. mine).  
As brakemen went, Athens was far less strident than others, as it was clearly still interested in 
keeping Turkey on the track toward eventual accession. It would, however, not countenance 
Turkey’s continued policy toward Cyprus, and would have preferred a slightly tougher sanction on 
its negotiations than the Commission recommended. For this reason it is considered a brakeman. 
Other articles that support this reading of Greece’s policy are: Boland & Dombey, 2006, Bounds & 
Dombey, 2006; Buck, et. al., 2006; “Decades of division,” 2006; Dijkstra, 2006d; “EU-landen,” 2006, 
“EU setzt Gespräche,” 2006; Missé, 2006a; van Oostrum, 2006a; “Turks compromis,” 2006. 
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9.4.8 Ireland 
As had been the case in the previous episodes, Ireland’s position on Turkey barely made the news in 
2006. From what could be found in the press and in the parliamentary record, the Irish appeared to 
have been passively supportive of Turkey’s progress, though also critical of both Turkey and the EU 
in the way conditions were met.    
In mid-June, during the Austrian presidency, Irish Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern corrected 
Austrian Chancellor Schüssel’s statement that absorption capacity was, and had been, a condition of 
membership. It was not a condition, Ahern enigmatically pointed out, but a “concept” that had to 
be taken into account (Brennock, 2006). In other words, it was not a hard rule that could definitively 
keep Turkey out, as it lacked firm definition. 
Especially the Cyprus conflict received much criticism from the poltical right wing. When 
the Finnish ambassador Seppo Kauppila spoke to the Irish Joint Committee on European Affairs at 
the outset of the Finnish presidency, Fine Gael Deputy Bernard Allen, asked the ambassador how 
the EU could “continue to deal with that enlargement in a realistic way while such an affront is 
being visited upon one of our member states?” (Ireland, 2006a). Deputy Allen later that month 
asked the minister of state for European affairs, Noel Treacy (of the ruling Fianna Fáil party), in 
parliament, if there was “any indication that the ongoing cancer in the negotiations will be excised” 
(Ireland, 2006b – emph. mine). Allen’s opinion was shared by Fianna Fáil Deputy Paschal Mooney, 
who called it “scandalous” that no ship under the Cypriot flag was accepted in a Turkish port and 
requested an Irish lead in opposing it at the European Union level. The Minister of State assured 
them both that the Irish position on Turkey, demanding full implementation of the additional 
protocol, had been made absolutely clear, though he was also pleased about the attempts of the UN 
to bring about renewed dialogue between the two parties (ibid.).  
The Irish government, though not uncritical about the Cyprus impasse, was apparently not 
ready to abandon its support for Turkey’s accession over the matter and did not forget to remind 
the EU of its own commitments to Turkey. In a written answer to parliament questions about the 
status of EU accession negotiations the Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern replied:  
While the negotiations with Turkey raise particularly difficult issues, it is important that the 
Union should abide by the commitments given to Turkey by successive European 
Councils. It is also essential that Turkey should fulfil its obligations, including the 
implementation of the Ankara Protocol. Ireland has made it clear that, while we do not see 
Turkish recognition of the Republic of Cyprus as a condition for accession negotiations, it 
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will be an absolute requirement for eventual Turkish membership of the Union. 
Meanwhile, it is vitally important that Turkey should normalise its relations with Cyprus as 
required by the Ankara Protocol.  
(Ireland, 2006c) 
On the same day however, replying to a question asked about the Irish position on the economic 
implications for Cyprus brought on by the unilateral and punitive restrictions imposed on it by 
Turkey, Dermot Ahern replied that Ireland “fully supported the efforts by the [Finnish] presidency 
and hope that they will lead to a solution” (Ireland, 2006d). The statement suggests that although 
Ireland expressed its concern with the shipping impasse, it was going to allow itself to be led by the 
Presidency for further developments at the EU level.  
Before the publication of the Commission’s report Turkey’s minister of economic affairs, Ali 
Babacan, visited Dublin on his European tour, attempting to convince his audiences that Turkey 
would make a “real global power” of the EU. Seemingly unimpressed with the prospect, Irish 
legislators gave him an earful on a host of Turkey’s less-promising qualities, ranging from human 
(and particularly women’s) rights to free speech, with the Kurds and the Armenian Genocide in 
between. Noel Treacy further told him that the Irish Government was “disappointed” about the 
pace in which progress was made in the negotiations with Turkey and he called on Ankara to lift its 
current ban on Cypriot vessels and aircraft (de Bréadun, 2006).  
Dermot Ahern, also meeting with Ali Babacan, rebuffed the Turkish Minister’s entreaties for 
Irish support and pointed out that as an EU candidate, Turkey was in no position to disrespect EU-
member Cyprus (Purcell, 2006). Reporting on the conversation to the Dáil (Irish parliament), Ahern 
wrote: “I impressed upon [Babacan] the importance we attach to the resolution of this issue so as to 
prevent the accession negotiations from being adversely affected” (Ireland, 2006e).  
Taoiseach Bertie Ahern also made some statements distinguishing his government’s position 
from that of the “pro-Turkey lobby”. Answering questions on the subject in the Dáil in early 
December – before the determinative foreign ministers’ meeting of December 11 – he said, “I have 
been sympathetic in recent years towards President Papadopoulos, who has been under much 
pressure. It is not just another issue in Cyprus, it is enormously important for the Cypriot people.” 
Papadopoulos’ position “as he sees it and as we supported during the Irish presidency is that if 
Europe does not stand by one of its own members, which is the issue, [Papadopoulos] will take a 
tough line” (O'Halloran, 2006). Expressing his expectation that the matter would be referred to the 
European Council, rather than be dealt with by the foreign ministers, he said, “The European pro-
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Turkey lobby will take its line to smooth a way of continuing the process. We are in for a lively 
session on this issue,” distinguishing Ireland from that lobby (Ireland, 2006f).  
This prediction however would not come true, since the Foreign Ministers meeting did deal 
with the lively issue, which was a reasons why the European Council would turn out not be lively at 
all. After the latter, the Irish Times reported about the support given by the Taoiseach to the 
outcome of the eight suspended chapters as Turkey’s penalty for failing to open up its ports to 
Cyprus (Hennessy, 2006). 
Ireland is another country that is difficult to gauge. Much of the rhetorical pushback against 
Turkey, on Cyprus’ behalf, makes it clear that Ireland was not a driver. Yet, while its rhetoric was 
brakemanlike, as its focus on one side of the issue – Turkish openness to Cyprus– was severe, there 
is no evidence that Ireland advocated for anything more than what the Commission recommended 
and the presidency embraced. What is more, that rhetoric did not go beyond the Irish shores, except 
to Turkish ears. Likewise, the annual review of Irish foreign policy in the Irish Studies in 
International Affairs journal names the issue of Turkey and the Cypriot-shipping conundrum on 
several occasions, but does not identify an Irish position (Rees, 2007). Since Ireland appeared to 
have been neither a driver nor a brakeman, it must be concluded that it was a passenger. 
9.4.9 Italy 
In 2006, Italy proved to be a tactical driver of Turkey’s membership ambitions. Prime Minister, 
Romano Prodi was much subtler in his approach toward the process than his predecessor (and 
successor) Silvio Berlusconi had been. This was especially the case at the end of November and early 
December, when his approach seemed to be one of depoliticizing the matter, which would allow the 
negotiations process to continue out of the limelight and away from the big clashes at the level of 
the heads of state and government. 
Ali Babacan, visiting Rome on his European tour in late September, met with his Italian 
counterpart, Minister of European Affairs and International Trade Emma Bonino, as well as the 
prime minister and Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema. At the after-meeting press conference 
D’Alema spoke on the issue of Cyprus: “The issue of Cyprus must be resolved. All airports and 
seaports must be opened to Greek-Cypriot vehicles. At the same time, the isolation of the Turkish 
Cypriots must be ended. Italy wishes for a solid solution in Cyprus. We support consensus between 
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the two communities in Cyprus.” D’Alema further told the press corps that Italy supported Turkey’s 
overall EU process: “Supporting Turkey is part of our national policy. By taking into consideration 
reforms made recently in Turkey, we intend to continue with this policy.” In that light he added that, 
“Turkey must go on with reforms in providing political freedoms and freedom of expression. The 
rights of minorities must be recognized by Turkey. Italy does not want to see any crisis in Turkey-
EU negotiations” (“Turkish minister,” 2006).  
In another display of friendly relations between the two countries, at the end of October the 
Italian ambassador to Turkey, Carlo Marsili officially announced a set of high-level diplomatic 
encounters between Italy and Turkey. Foreign Minister D’Alema’s was to visit Turkey in the coming 
days, Gül was to participate in a Turkish-Italian Dialogue Forum in Rome in November and Turkish 
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer was to visit Italy in January, while Romano Prodi was set to visit 
Turkey that same month. Commenting on Italy’s policy vis-à-vis Turkish accession to the EU, 
Marsili repeated D’Alema’s statements about his country’s full support for Turkey’s bid to join the 
European Union, to which he added Italy’s disagreement with the privileged partnership proposal. 
“If a problem occurs in Turkish-EU relations, Italy will strengthen its ties with Turkey even more,” 
he said cordially. Speaking on the matter of Cyprus, Marsili said both Turkey and Europe had to 
fulfill their obligations, though he said there was no link between the opening of ports and ending of 
the Turkish Cypriot isolation. “We have always insisted that direct trade is vital to Turkish Cypriots. 
We are still committed,” he said (“Marsili says Prodi,” 2006). 
On the verge of the publication of the Commission’s report, Romano Prodi warned about 
an inevitable suspension of EU accession talks if it would turn out to be “absolutely negative”, 
though he hoped it would not be. Considering the very complexity of the negotiations, he thought 
they should not be conducted in haste, lest they should result in failure, but they should certainly not 
stop either, as some of the other EU member states recommended, because it was still a great 
historical challenge to pursue (Barber & Peel, 2006; “Prodi droht Türkei,” 2006).  
Later in November, after the report but before the recommendation, Prodi was asked about 
his thoughts on Turkey in an interview with Le Figaro. His response was non-committal but 
modestly positive for Turkey, echoing the earlier statement:  
The Turkish question has become a domestic political issue in Europe. To achieve a 
membership of Turkey, must take its time. If you go too fast, you will fail. This also relates 
to the Cyprus issue. The only way to avoid failure is to be aware it will take the time 
necessary to bring the negotiation to its successful conclusion. 
(Rousselin & Heuze, 2006 – trans. mine) 
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Here Prodi suggested that member-state motivations went beyond the specific issue of Turkey and 
finding solutions to the policy problem at hand. Instead, he identified member-state domestic 
politics as being at stake.  
Once the recommendations had been unveiled, Erdoğan communicated his response – 
“unacceptable” – by way of a ‘private’ conversation with Romano Prodi at Riga (Castle, 2006b). In 
return the Italian leader told him that he was sorry, but that “it was difficult to do otherwise” 
(Bouilhet, 2006a – trans. mine). ). The Italian newspaper ‘Corriere della Sera’ published a fairly 
detailed account of the exchange between the Turkish and Italian Prime Ministers. It tells of Prodi 
patiently bringing their discussion back to specifics, with frequent appeals for realism, after a lengthy 
‘tirade’ [sfogo] by Erdoğan. It characterizes Prodi’s approach as one of tactical ‘firefighting’, as 
contrasted to the blanket support of the British, which in Prodi’s opinion, would undermine the 
Commission’s balanced approach and probably cause the breakdown of the negotiations. This 
approach, the article suggests, created the space for the negotiations to continue on a ‘depoliticized’ 
and ‘technical’ level (“E Prodi rassicura,” 2006 – trans. BBC). D’Alema, meanwhile said, “the 
proposal of the Commission is fairly balanced, containing the signal that we want to continue the 
negotiations with Turkey (ibid.; Leante, 2006; “L’UE affiche,” – trans. mine). This was, again, a 
significant contrast to the British and Spanish responses to the recommendations, which criticized 
the Commission’s stance as being too tough (Docquiert, 2006b). 
During an early December visit to Athens, Prodi declared in a press conference after 
meeting with his Greek colleague Karamanlis, that “keeping doors open” was the common 
perspective on Turkey among the EU member states. The number of chapters to be opened or 
closed by the European Commission was again “a technical matter” and by giving priority to its 
conclusions, Prodi considered himself released of the “struggle” to make decisions about “one 
chapter more or less” (“Prodi: EU’s doors,” 2006). In response to the 18-month timeframe 
proposed by Angela Merkel at that time, Prodi replied that he proposal could even be useful for 
Turkey, if it gave Ankara time for its elections to pass, and therefore room to maneuver on the 
Cyprus issue. He was, however, against any new conditions being imposed on Turkey’s candidacy 
(“German-French coalition,” 2006).  
When the news of the Turkish offer emerged, Prodi called the proposal “a step forward,” 
(“Türkei bietet,” 2006). According to multiple news sources, Italy had been one of the member 
states that had preferred freezing three chapters rather than eight (Boland & Parker, 2006; 
Weingärtner & Hillenbrand, 2006). Other sources that called Italy a driver of Turkey’s ambitions 
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were: Bottolier-Depois, 2006c, Bouilhet, 2006b, “EU must make,” 2006, Missé, 2006a, 2006b, van 
Oostrum, 2006b, “Turchia diplomazia,” 2006, “Turkey and EU,” 2006; “La UE, dividida,” 2006. 
9.4.10 Luxembourg 
In 2006, Luxembourg was, again, on the brakeman side of the balance, though it had made a point 
more than once of not wishing to undermine Turkey’s candidacy altogether. 
At the mid-November foreign Ministers meeting Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn, meeting 
with his EU colleagues, made no secret about his view on the Cyprus conflict when he said, “If 
Turkey does not budge on Cyprus, we cannot continue as if nothing has happened” (Docquiert, 
2006a – trans. mine). Apart from excluding a permanent discontinuation, he remained vague about 
what, precisely, he was suggesting, a partial or complete suspension of negotiations (“Plassnik pour,” 
2006). 
On November 24, the Stuttgarter Zeitung published an interview with Jean-Claude Juncker. 
Regarding Turkey, he said that while… 
…most people in our part of Europe cannot imagine Turkey as an EU member, it would 
have been a big mistake not to open accession negotiations with Turkey. Anything else in 
the eyes of the Turks and many others would have been seen as a European refusal to 
imagine a common future with Turkey. I must remark that the negotiations with Turkey 
are a lengthy process. Turkey must change itself fundamentally in order to be ready for 
accession. Turkey must also know that this phase is an open process. It is not an empty 
formality. Only at the end of this negotiations path will there finally be a decision about the 
possibility of accession. That means that it is up to Turkey to prove that it is ‘fit for 
Europe’. 
(“Viele Polen,” 2006 – trans. mine) 
With this statement Juncker defended the driver position Luxembourg had taken two years prior, as 
has been described in the previous episode, but that there was still strict conditionality in the 
membership prospects. If Turkey did not adjust, the negotiations would fail. 
After the late-November breakdown of negotiations at Tampere, Asselborn commented on 
Turkey along those same lines. He said that nobody wanted to cut off the negotiations, but that they 
should maybe be put on the backburner, again without specifying if he wanted a freeze of all or only 
some of the negotiating chapters (Bottolier-Depois, 2006b).  
Upon Asselborn’s arrival in Brussels for the December foreign ministers’ meeting, he 
declared: “Today it is not just Turkey that is at stake in the debates, but also the credibility of the 
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EU. We must show that the EU is not just an amalgam of national interests,” suggesting that the EU 
should stand together, rather than simply offer a lowest-common-denominator outcome (“Turquie: 
les 25,” 2006 – trans. mine). With ‘credibility of the EU’ he implied that the EU should take a 
tougher stand against Turkey about the Cyprus issue; not letting it get away with its unwillingness to 
open its ports, though at the same time he also said again that the EU could not “close the door 
completely” (“La UE, dividida,” 2006 – trans. mine). After the meeting, Asselborn declared that he 
and his colleagues did not want to let the matter wind up at the European Council and that nobody 
wanted another Turkey summit (“Acht Verhandlungs-Kapitel,” 2006; “La UE, dividida,” 2006).   
The citations above can be subject to different interpretations, but by and large, reporters 
viewed Luxembourg more as a brakeman than anything else. Though Luxembourg did not wish to 
create a break with Turkey, and did not advocate for a privileged partnership, it repeatedly argued 
for a firmer handling of Turkey in the form of a tougher sanction for its failure to enact the 
additional protocol. Other articles that categorized Luxembourg as a brakeman are: “l’Europe 
divisée,” 2006, “Ministri EU,” 2006; Proissl, Schmid & Ehrlich, 2006. 
9.4.11 Netherlands 
The Netherlands proved to be a brakeman in 2006. During the year its policy on Turkey was very 
much dominated by the concurrent campaigns for the November 22 elections for the Tweede Kamer 
(lower house of parliament). In this context, there was a divide between the foreign ministry’s 
preferred policy on Turkey, which was more permissive of Turkey’s position on Cyprus, and that of 
dominant members of Parliament, who inserted get-tough-on-Turkey rhetoric into the campaigns. 
The elections were necessary because of the failure of the CDA-VVD-D66 coalition. The 
resignation of the cabinet that had taken place at the end of June, resulting from the loss of 
confidence by the minor social-liberal coalition party D66, put the cabinet, including Foreign 
Minister Ben Bot, in a ‘demissionary’ status – making the cabinet unable to make controversial 
decisions. It should be noted here that the Netherlands had already taken a brakeman tone toward 
enlargement in general before this occurred (Avril & Bouilhet, 2006; “EU-lidstaten twijfelen,” 2006).  
After the European Parliament’s draft report on Turkey, drawn up by Camiel Eurlings, had 
been adopted in the European Parliament’s foreign relations committee, the Dutch foreign ministry 
appealed to the European Parliament’s “common sense” and to amend the sections about the 
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Armenian Genocide (“Turkije geïrriteerd,” 2006). This allowed the debate over the Armenian 
Genocide to enter into Dutch politics, with parliamentary elections on the way, whereby both the 
Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Labor party (PvdA) removed Turkish candidates from their 
lists for not recognizing the events of 1915 as genocide. The relatively smaller centrist Christian 
Union (CU) even proposed an amendment to make Armenian Genocide denial a criminal offense, 
as France had introduced that same year (Plasterk, 2006).  
In parliamentary debate, the Turkish issue had been avoided until October, when Mat 
Herben, the leader of the remnants of the late Pim Fortuyn’s party, motioned for government 
inquiries into Turkey’s willingness to opt for a privileged partnership rather than membership, if 
necessary in exchange for substantial compensation (Netherlands, 2002a). The CU meanwhile 
attempted to provoke their Christian competitors of the CDA into reopening the debate on the 
suitability of Turkey as a EU membership candidate, but Jan Jacob van Dijk, CDA’s foreign affairs 
spokesman, did not take the bait, considering such a debate ill timed at that stage, though still bound 
to arise at the end of the negotiations. The Cyprus issue was closer at hand, about which van Dijk 
and his faction suggested a suspension of negotiations until Turkey complied with the Ankara 
Protocol (Netherlands, 2002b).  
Picking up on the Armenian Genocide debate in mid-October, Mark Rutte, the new leader 
of the right-wing liberal VVD, called on Turkey to stop prosecuting those who affirmed the 
Genocide. “If Turkey wants to become a member of the European Union,” he said, “it must never 
again prosecute someone who wishes to raise the question of the Armenian genocide of 1915” 
(“Rutte (VVD): Turkije,” 2006 – trans. mine). Though he did not go as far as making the recognition 
itself an official condition for membership, he did see the freedom to express opinions on the 
matter, as well as Turkey’s official recognition of Cyprus before January 1, 2007 as a “hard 
condition”. 
When Ben Bot called for ten rather than eight chapters to be frozen after the publication of 
the Commission’s recommendations (“EU-Außenminister,” 2006a; Weingärtner & Hillenbrand, 
2006). This did not go far enough for the parliament. VVD foreign affairs spokesman Hans van 
Baalen motioned to halt negotiations altogether as long as Turkey did not comply with the additional 
protocol. In order to be even-handed, van Baalen’s motion suggested allowing EU trade through the 
‘occupied’ Northern Cypriot port of Famagusta. Prior to debate with the foreign minister, the Dutch 
daily Financieele Dagblad reported the motion as having the support of CDA, VVD, PvdA (Labor) 
and the Socialist Party, a clear majority of the house (“Merkel ziet,” 2006). On December 7, 
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however, the motion was defeated when neither CDA nor PvdA supported it. This unexpected turn 
about was evidently brought on by some last moment’s deeper reflection on the concequences. Bot, 
van Dijk, and PvdA spokesman Frans Timmermans reasoned that the motion would force the 
Foreign Minister to unilaterally veto further accession negotiations with Turkey, which would have 
been a stronger stance than even Cyprus had been taking (“Bot Voelt,” 2006; Netherlands, 2006c). 
Explaining his vote, Timmermans argued, that a hard veto would isolate the Netherlands among the 
member states (Netherlands, 2002d). With the motion having failed, Bot was sent to Brussels with 
his earlier proposal, demanding ten frozen chapters rather than the Commission’s eight, with 
Chapters 7 (Intellectual Property Law) and 22 (Regional Policy) as the two additional chapters to be 
frozen.  
The decisive foreign ministers meeting failed to adopt the Dutch proposal to also freeze 
chapters 7 and 22. Afterward, Bot reminded the press that since any member state could veto the 
unilateral opening of any chapter, the Netherlands could still prevent the two chapters from being 
opened if and when it chose to do so (Hekking & van Oostrum, 2006). Later, the Irish Times 
reported that the Netherlands, together with France, might indeed attempt to prevent the opening 
of any negotiations chapters before Christmas (Smythe, 2006d). 
Other articles that pointed out the Netherlands’ brakeman position were: “Acht 
Verhandlungs-Kapitel,” 2006, “Cancilleres europeos,” 2006, Fechtner, 2006; Proissl, Schmid & 
Ehrlich, 2006, “Turkey and EU,” 2006, “Turks gebaar,” 2006. 
9.4.12 Portugal 
As before, Portugal made little press in 2006 about its position on Turkey, but apart from two 
Financial Times articles, it was described as a driver. 
In early November, after meeting with Portuguese State Secretary for EU Affairs Manuel 
Lobo Antunes, Ali Babacan announced that Portugal had once more reiterated its support to 
Turkey's EU membership, while Antunes declared that his country was optimistic about Turkey’s 
prospect to become an EU member one day and that problems faced during the negotiations could 
be overcome by compromises. Referring to the Cyprus problem he added that, “everybody should 
get on the same ship and take responsibilities” (“Portugal reiterates,” 2006).  
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In early December, just before the Foreign Ministers’ meeting, Prime Minister José Socrates 
invited Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to visit Lisbon in 2007 in order to discuss the accession negotiations 
and boost bilateral relations in preparation for Portugal’s assumption of the rotating Presidency later 
that year. In his message, he said that Portugal had always maintained a clear position regarding 
negotiations for the accession of Turkey to the EU and that Portugal would continue to defend clear 
and honest negotiations between the two sides, with the objective of completing the political and 
economic criteria defined in the process (“Primer ministro,” 2006 – trans. mine).  
Ahead of the foreign ministers’ meeting, Luís Amado, Portugal’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
was cited among the member states desiring a decrease in the recommended number of chapters to 
be suspended (Bottolier-Depois, 2006c).  
As mentioned above, the only disparity in the classification of Portugal as a driver could be 
found in the two Financial Times articles, one in its British edition and the other in the German 
version (Buck, et. al., 2006 and Proissl & Hollinger, 2006, respectively). These numbered Portugal, 
together with Cyprus and Greece, among the member states that had embraced the Franco-German 
approach toward Turkey, which proposed an eighteen-month deadline. The articles did not state 
why Portugal was numbered among them. Articles that numbered Portugal among the drivers were: 
“Cancilleres europeos,” 2006, “EU-Außenminister ringen,” 2006; “EU must make,” 2006; Ludlow, 
2006b, p. 17, “Portuguese foreign minister,” 2006).  
9.4.13 Spain 
Despite Spain’s argument for tougher wording in the Presidency conclusions of the June European 
Council, Spain was a firm driver of Turkey’s ambitions in 2006 (Ludlow, 2006a, p. 61). 
In mid-October, Prime Minister Zapatero traveled to Turkey to speak with Erdoğan about 
the ‘Alliance of Civilizations’, his 2005 initiative to stimulate international action against terrorism 
and broader cooperation between the West and the Middle East. In his address after meeting with 
his Turkish counterpart, he called the entry of Turkey into the EU an unavoidable objective, which 
could not be mitigated by the difficulties of negotiations. In that context, he avoided reporters’ 
questions about the Commission’s report and the issue of Cypriot shipping (Egurbide, 2006).  
During his trip, Zapatero gave an interview to the French daily Le Figaro, in which he 
reaffirmed his support for Turkey in the EU. When he was asked why, he answered: “Because I 
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have confidence in the European project. Had this not been the case, Europe would not be here! … 
Europe cannot stay quietly in his corner. We must prepare for the future beyond our borders. 
Otherwise we will not be a middle power in the world of tomorrow” (Rousselin & Cambon, 2006). 
What he hinted at was that Europe enlarging to Turkey would make Europe more of a power on the 
world stage, while failing to do so will diminish its power and authority, being eclipsed by China and 
the United States.  
Meanwhile the Spanish government sent their Secretary of State for Europe, Alberto 
Navarro, to attend the mid-November foreign ministers’ meeting, during which he said: “Spain 
strongly supports the accession of Turkey. We think that Turkey is a European country and an ally, 
[and will] no doubt also help stabilize the Middle East, so we want the negotiations to progress 
forward and succeed” (“España defiende,” 2006).  
On the sidelines of the Mediterranean conference in Tampere and the Finnish-led 
negotiations between Turkey and Cyprus, Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos declared that 
Turkey should become a full member of the EU, thus implicitly dismissing talk of the privileged 
partnership option (“Conferencia Euromed,” 2006). Two days later, responding to the 
Commission’s recommendation to freeze eight chapters, Zapatero said, “we must leave the door 
open for Turkey” (Bouilhet, 2006a; “Stoiber fordert schärfere,” 2006; “L’UE affiche,” 2006 – trans. 
mine). He further called on the EU negotiators and Ankara to make “the maximum effort” to avoid 
a crisis (Boland & Parker, 2006). 
Almost immediately at the onset of the December foreign ministers’ meeting Moratinos 
urged his colleagues to minimize sanctions on Turkey and warned that the decisions they were about 
to make were of strategic importance and should not be rushed. Adding that all diplomatic efforts 
had to be exerted to find a solution that would satisfy all parties involved, he called for a “last” 
attempt to avoid a crisis (“Cancilleres europeos,” 2006 – trans. mine). Later he made Spain’s position 
on the question clear when he called his country “a faithful supporter” of “a modern Turkey” 
joining the European Union (Missé, 2006b).  
After the meeting, Moratinos joined the chorus that publicly explained the ministers’ 
decision to freeze eight chapters, whereby he stressed the importance of the double signal it sent, as 
there would be “no train crash”, but “a slowdown”. Even so, according to Weingärtner & 
Hillenbrand (2006), Spain had been among the member states that had preferred to freeze three 
chapters, rather than eight (also: Boland & Parker, 2006).      
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Other articles that categorized Spain as a driver were: Bottolier-Depois, 2006c, Bouilhet, 
2006b; Docquiert, 2006a; 2006b; “EU-Außenminister,” 2006a; “l’Europe divisée,” 2006, “EU must 
make,” 2006; Gottschlich, 2006; Ingenrieth & Seibert, 2006; Ludlow, 2006b, p. 17; Missé, 2006a; van 
Oostrum, 2006b; “Turchia diplomazia,” 2006; “Turkey and EU,” 2006; “La UE, dividida,” 2006. 
9.4.14 Sweden 
In 2006, with the outspoken advocacy of its foreign minister, Carl Bildt, Sweden was, for a second 
episode, a driver of Turkey’s EU cause.  
Bildt’s pro-Turkey speech in the EPP lions’ den of anti-Turkish sentiments in Lyon has 
already been recounted above. In addition to speaking likewise at other gatherings as well, Bildt 
authored several op-ed articles to plead Turkey’s cause. In one of these, titled “Open wide Europe’s 
doors,” which appeared in the International Herald Tribune on the same day that the Commission 
published its progress report, he sharply criticized both the concept and the wording of ‘absorption 
capacity’ and warned about the dangers posed by what he called a Huntingtonian clash of 
civilizations. His answer to the threats of political conflicts, terrorism or nuclear proliferation, in 
addition to the civilizational clash, was to develop (or stave off the reduction of) soft power, because 
“at the end of the day peace is built by thoughts and by ballots more than by tanks and by bullets.” 
The eventual membership of Turkey in the European Union was thereby of considerable strategic 
interest, not only because of the modernization of Turkey, but also because “it would have a 
profoundly positive impact on the prospects for stability in the entire region of the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea”, adding “important elements of economic dynamism, 
demographic vigour and cultural diversity that could only enrich our common European efforts” 
(Bildt, 2006a).   
Referring to the impasse over Cypriot shipping, he reminded his readers that a solution was 
not failing because of Turkey, but because the Greek Cypriot leadership had refused to accept the 
plan by the UN secretary general that had been supported by the European Union. As such, he put 
the onus of the solution on the Greek Cypriots, rather than on Turkey (ibid.). 
Nearly a month later, when the Commission published its recommendation to freeze eight 
chapters, Stockholm felt the proposal was too harsh. Carl Bildt’s responded that there was “a clear 
risk that if you brake too hard, it will be difficult to regain speed.” He and his country feared that 
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this could even stop the process completely, which would be “a calamity for EU policy in a volatile 
and sensitive area.” The risk of “collateral damage” would be considerable, while the EU should 
have an interest “in limiting damage instead of creating it”. He further warned that if the negotiation 
process would thus be impeded there would also be no prospect for overcoming the division of 
Cyprus (“Adhésion,” 2006; “L’UE affiche,” 2006 – trans. mine). 
While the tough rhetoric on Turkey was heating up in Germany in early December, Carl 
Bildt again took to writing. Together with Urmas Paet, the foreign minister of Estonia, he published 
an op-ed in Die Welt, arguing on Turkey’s behalf. Opening their article with a plea for a European 
Union that was looking outward rather than inward, and noting the successes of the different 
enlargement rounds to poor and/or undemocratic countries, they listed reasons why Turkey ought 
to be considered an asset to the EU. Apart from the economic (e.g. by a facilitated flow of oil 
supplies to Europe) and geopolitical advantages, the EU would also benefit from Turkey’s assistance 
in combating terrorism, drug trafficking and illegal migration. Most important, they judged, was the 
symbolic value of Turkish accession vis-à-vis the Clash of Civilizations, and the spread of 
prosperous and stable democracy (Bildt & Paet, 2006). 
Getting to the impasse at hand, they argued that while Turkey had to open its harbors and 
airports to Cypriot shipping, the EU should, in return, end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots in 
return. Even if there was no formal link between the two concerns, they were connected in terms of 
political reality. They further argued that reunification of the island could only be solved by tying 
Turkey closer to Europe, whereas a rejection of Turkey carried the risk of a permanent division of 
Cyprus. Praising the Finnish presidency for its efforts to broker a solution, they called on European 
leaders to take their responsibility and get out of the dead-end street by ensuring Turkey’s continued 
path toward democratic reform, prosperity and stability (ibid.). 
Between the publication of the Commission’s recommendations and the foreign ministers’ 
meeting, Bildt traveled to Ankara to stand in solidarity with the Turks. “We are both convinced of 
the need to retain the strategic perspective for Turkey and the EU,” he told the Turks, adding, 
“Whatever happens we must have a continuation of the negotiating process” (Bennhold, 2006a). 
During the foreign ministers’ meeting, Bildt remained the last holdout for a more permissive 
approach toward Turkey. According to Ludlow’s account (2006b, p. 16), Bildt’s main argument was 
not about the amount of chapters to be frozen, but an adjustment of the EU’s policy toward 
Northern Cyprus. Although he found himself isolated on this account, it did win him an amendment 
to the text of the conclusions in which the EU would make “efforts towards a comprehensive 
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settlement of the Cyprus issue under UN auspices” (European Council, 2006, p. 14). Additionally, 
Bildt won a declaration on opening EU markets to Northern Cyprus, though this would not appear 
until January 2007, and would not lead to a substantial opening of trade with Northern Cyprus.  
Other articles that list Sweden among the drivers driver were: Boland & Parker, 2006; 
Bottolier-Depois, 2006c, Bouilhet, 2006b, Bresson et al., 2006, “Cancilleres europeos,” 2006, “EU-
landen,” 2006, “EU must make,” 2006, “l’Europe divisée,” 2006, Gottschlich, 2006; Ludlow, 2006b, 
p. 17; Missé, 2006a, 2006b; van Oostrum, 2006b; Proissl, Schmid & Ehrlich, 2006; Strittmatter, 
2006; “Turkey and EU,” 2006, “UE/Chypre,” 2006; “La UE, dividida,” 2006; Weingärtner & 
Hillenbrand, 2006. 
9.4.15 United Kingdom 
Once again, the United Kingdom was viewed as one of Turkey’s main drivers, even if the British 
were less tactical than the Italians and less outspoken than the Swedes (or, at least, than Carl Bildt).  
The issue did not receive much attention in Britain until late September when the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey and Cardinal Cormac Murphy O’Connor, the Catholic 
primate of England and Wales, questioned Turkey’s suitability for joining the EU, echoing the 
Pope’s Regensburg speech, which had been held on the 20th of that same month (McGarry, 2006).  
When it became clear in early October that the Commission was preparing a rather critical 
report, while the impasse over Cyprus was far from being solved, Tony Blair and Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan met at Downing Street to discuss formulae for solving the impasse, which included the 
plan to open Famagusta in exchange for the return of Varosha to the Greek Cypriots (MacAskill & 
Gow, 2006). Although the two leaders did not offer statements to the press, the meeting had 
apparently not led to discord between them since Blair’s spokesman maintained afterwards that, 
“Turkish membership in the EU is firmly in the EU's interest, to help with the fight against 
terrorism, human trafficking, organized crime and drugs” (“Erdogan wins,” 2006).  
Soon after the Commission’s report was published, the United Kingdom made it clear that if 
negotiations chapters were to be frozen, the number of frozen chapters ought to be limited to three 
(Kranenburg, 2006b). When it became clear that the Commission recommended freezing eight 
chapters, Blair expressed disagreement with the Commission, accusing it of making a major strategic 
mistake for Europe by sending Turkey a wrong signal (Watt & Traynor, 2006). He reiterated this 
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position at the Riga summit, when he said that it would be a mistake o punish Turkey because it 
could lead to the country turning its back on Europe (Boland & Parker, 2006). 
Ahead of the foreign ministers’ meeting, the United Kingdom argued for freezing three 
chapters rather than eight. British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett authored an op-ed in Sabah, a 
Turkish daily newspaper, on December 10, in which she described Turkey as “the strategic choice of 
Europe” and warned her EU colleagues that pushing it away would make the EU “much poorer, 
weaker and less secure” (“EU braces,” 2006). After the meeting, Beckett said to the press, “I’m sorry 
to disappoint you. There will be no train crash. […] The train is in fact still firmly on the track,” to 
which she again added that Turkey’s entry into the Union was of strategic importance to both the 
EU and Turkey (Bennhold, 2006b).  
When the heads of state and government had also endorsed the partial suspension of 
Turkey’s entry negotiations, Tony Blair set off for Turkey on a diplomatic mission aimed at 
reassuring the Turks about their continued prospects for joining the European Union, or as aides 
explained it, Blair was eager to reassure a wounded Turkey that Europe was not turning its back on a 
predominantly Muslim country (“Blair heads,” 2006). 
Among the other articles that name Britain as one of Turkey’s drivers are: Bilefsky, 2006, 
Boland & Dombey, 2006, Bottolier-Depois, 2006a, Bouilhet, 2006b; Bresson et al., 2006; 
“Cancilleres europeos,” 2006, Docquiert, 2006a; 2006b; Dombey, 2006b, “EU-Außenminister,” 
2006a; “EU-landen,” 2006, “EU must make,” 2006; Fechtner, 2006; Gottschlich, 2006; Ingenrieth & 
Seibert, 2006;  “l’Europe divisée,” 2006; “Londres toujours,” 2006; Ludlow, 2006b, p. 15, 17; Missé, 
2006a, 2006b; Nougayrède, 2006; van Oostrum, 2006b; Proissl, Schmid & Ehrlich, 2006; Purcell, 
2006, “Stoiber fordert,” 2006b; Strittmatter, 2006; “Turchia diplomazia,” 2006; “Turkey and EU,” 
2006; “UE/Chypre,” 2006, “La UE, dividida,” 2006.  
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10.0  TESTING RATIONALIST HYPOTHESES 
This chapter first summarizes the dependent variable as drawn from the previous five chapters. 
Following that brief summary, it tests each of the rationalist hypotheses proposed in the second 
chapter. 
Table 10.1: Member State Policies 
  1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 
Austria Passenger Passenger Brakeman Brakeman Brakeman 
Belgium Passenger Driver Driver Driver Driver 
Denmark Brakeman Passenger Brakeman Brakeman Brakeman 
Finland Passenger Driver Brakeman Driver Driver 
France Driver Driver Passenger Brakeman Brakeman 
Germany Brakeman Driver Driver Driver Brakeman 
Greece Brakeman Driver Driver Driver Brakeman 
Ireland Passenger Passenger Driver Driver Passenger 
Italy Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver 
Luxembourg Brakeman Brakeman Brakeman Driver Brakeman 
Netherlands Driver Driver Brakeman Driver Brakeman 
Portugal Passenger Passenger Driver Driver Driver 
Spain Passenger Driver Driver Driver Driver 
Sweden Brakeman Brakeman Brakeman Driver Driver 
UK Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver 
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10.1 I. DEPENDENT VARIABLE DESCRIPTION. 
The findings of the preceding chapters are summarized in Table 10.1, above. This table shows the 
position of each government at each of the five episodes, according to the driver-passenger-
brakeman typology.  While being a good summary, it is preferable to frame the data in certain ways 
in order to note some patterns. Because many of the analyses below consider the long-term 
tendencies, it is useful to note two things about the data above. The first pattern that is useful to 
note is that some countries adopt a certain policy more often than other policies, and the second 
thing is to note the variation in their policies over time.  
Table 10.2: the average policy over the five episodes 
Member State Average Policy Standard Deviation 
Austria 0.2 0.3 
Belgium 0.9 0.2 
Denmark 0.1 0.2 
Finland 0.7 0.4 
France 0.5 0.5 
Germany 0.6 0.5 
Greece 0.6 0.5 
Ireland 0.7 0.3 
Italy 1 0.0 
Luxembourg 0.2 0.4 
Netherlands 0.6 0.5 
Portugal 0.8 0.3 
Spain 0.9 0.2 
Sweden 0.4 0.5 
UK 1 0.0 
Average 0.61 0.34 
 
The first pattern will be the dependent variable for the long-run analyses. As described in the third 
chapter, the dependent variable is derived by taking the average policy over the five episodes by 
counting each time a brakeman policy is adopted as 0, a passenger policy as 0.5, and a driver policy 
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as 1. This implies that the policies are treated as cardinal, rather than ordinal. The outcome of this 
calculation is presented in Table 10.2, above. Despite a skew toward the driver-side of the spectrum, 
and a fat tail toward brakeman end, this distribution is considered sufficiently normal to not reject 
the utility of ANOVA analyses. 
Though tangential to the purpose of the study, it is interesting to note that the average policy 
among the member states is 0.61. In other words, the member states are generally more supportive 
of EU membership for Turkey than they are opposed. This contrasts a popular notion that ‘the 
Europeans’ are opposed to Turkey becoming a member, at least insofar as their governments are 
concerned. The second pattern is in terms of the variation in the policies; to what degree does each 
member state tend to deviate from its average policy? This is measured by the standard deviation 
from the mean.  
Descriptively, these to figures show that there are some countries that have fairly consistent 
policies on Turkey, either in favor of membership or opposed. (These are the countries that have a 
standard deviation from their average policy that is 0.34 or less.) There is also a set of members that 
have changed their positions significantly over the decade in question. (These are the countries that 
have a standard deviation from their average policy that is more than 0.34.) 
Table 10.3: Member-state tendencies regarding their support or opposition to Turkey 















 United Kingdom 
 
Among this second set are France and Germany, the two most influential members of the EU 
member states. These are supplemented by Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, and Sweden. In terms 
of standard deviation, Luxembourg might also be counted among the ‘swing votes’, though it is 
worthwhile to note that Luxembourg’s single deviation from its strong tendency of being a 
brakeman (0.2) was in 2004, when it unexpectedly changed its position from brakeman to driver. 
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Despite this uncharacteristic change-of-heart, it will be numbered among the brakemen. Consistent 
drivers are Italy and the United Kingdom, and they are usually joined by Belgium, Portugal and 
Spain, and occasionally by Ireland. The fairly consistent brakemen are Austria, Denmark. These 
tendencies are further depicted above (in Table 10.3). 
The highlight of this description is that a large group of countries, including the most 
influential ones, does not show a consistent policy pattern. They are ‘swing votes’, in that their 
average position is no lower than 0.4 and no higher than 0.7, but neither do they tend to express a 
passenger policy. In fact, they rarely take up the passenger position (exceptions are Finland in 1997 
and France in 2002). Instead, the passenger position was more often taken up by the countries that 
tended to usually be either among the brakemen (Austria in 1997 and 1999, and Denmark in 1999) 
or drivers (Belgium in 1997, Ireland in 1997, 1999, and 2006, Portugal in 1997 and 1999, and Spain 
in 1997).  
That means that while there are doubtlessly still underlying structures, Turkey’s membership 
fate is not predetermined by an overwhelming political structure either for or against its 
membership. It also means that the time-fixed variables can only modestly explain what has 
transpired and that the bulk of the explanation must come from the time-sensitive variables. The 
sections below will demonstrate how the bulk of the hypotheses identified in Chapter 2 can be 
rejected (or, more accurately, that the null can fail to be rejected).  
10.2 THE RATIONALIST HYPOTHESES 
The remainder and bulk of this chapter shall consider the rationalist hypotheses posed in Chapter 2 
according to the methodologies described in Chapter 3. They are divided into three sections. The 
first describes the hypotheses relating to the rational demand for security. Do NATO members tend 
to argue a different position than non-NATO members do? What might be the relative benefits 
member states might see from having Turkey as a stalwart ally in terms of its contributions to 
multilateral military missions? Can the different levels of threat from terrorists or from the heroin 
trade explain the members’ different stances on Turkey? 
Following the assessment of the hypotheses relating to Security, the following section 
considers the hypotheses relating to power. The concepts of power are, in turn, also divided into 
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three sub-sections, each dealing with a different level of analysis. The first is the global level and 
what relative benefits Turkey’s membership might offer from the perspective the EU looking out at 
the world. The second is the regional/organizational level. For which members would Turkey be an 
ally and for which would its membership strengthen the opposite side in the intra-European 
disputes over such things as the alignment of the EU’s foreign policy or its external trade policy? 
The third sub-section looks at the domestic level. What are the differing levels of public opinion? 
Do countries with many immigrants, Muslims or domestic Turks behave differently than those 
without, in terms of their policies and their changes of policies? Are political parties a better lens for 
analyzing the policies? 
Finally, the third section looks at hypotheses related to wealth. What are the purely economic 
rationales in a comparative context? What countries stand to gain or lose in terms of the EU 
opening its agricultural markets more to Turkish produce and Turkish consumers? What are the 
different levels of trade and investment? Perhaps the threat or promise of migrant Turkish labor 
helps explain member-state policies regarding Turkey. 
10.3 SECURITY 
The following sections measure the degree to which the security-related hypotheses help explain 
member-state policies regarding Turkey. The first section considers membership in the transatlantic 
security regime of NATO. The second looks at participation in multilateral military missions. The 
second and third sections consider the transnational threats of terrorism and crime.  
10.3.1.1 NATO Membership  
Hs1: NATO members are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than 
non-NATO members are. 
The NATO-dimension is one that measures a time-fixed variable against the long-run policies of the 
member states. Of the fifteen member states being analyzed, ten are full members of NATO, four 
are non-members, and France is a member without being integrated into the NATO command 
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structure. The following table, depicts the member states and their corresponding levels of support, 
with the members higher up in the table being more supportive than those lower down. 
Table 10.4: NATO-membership and long-run levels of support for Turkey  
Level of Support NATO Members Intermediate Non-NATO Members 
1.0 Italy, UK   
0.9 Belgium, Spain   
0.8 Portugal   
0.7   Finland, Ireland 
0.6 Germany, Greece, Neth.   
0.5  France  
0.4   Sweden 
0.3   Austria 
0.2 Luxembourg   
0.1 Denmark   
 
While there is certainly a cadre of NATO-members that is highly supportive of Turkey, Turkey’s 
most stalwart opponents, Denmark and Luxembourg, are also members of that organization. 
Among the non-members, for that matter, they show more modest approaches toward Turkey, with 
Austria and Sweden at the less-supportive end and Finland and Ireland at the more supportive end. 
In numbers, the average level of support from the NATO members is 0.67, while that of the 
non-members is an even 0.5. Because the member states that are most antagonistic toward the idea 
of Turkish membership (Denmark and Luxembourg) are, however, NATO members, this difference 
in averages is not significant, as the F-score in the ANOVA test only comes to 1.072 – well below a 
degree that would imply a causal relationship. The null-hypothesis that there is no relationship 
between NATO membership and enlargement policy on Turkey cannot be rejected. Therefore, 
hypothesis Hs1 will not be accepted. 
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10.3.1.2 Multilateral Military Missions  
Hs2: Those member states who contribute more to the missions that Turkey also 
contributes to are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those 
who contribute less. 
The EU-15 participated in three multilateral military missions together with Turkey. These were 
acronymmed SFOR/Althea, KFOR, and OEF/ISAF. SFOR was the NATO-led mission to secure 
and stabilize Croatia and Bosnia-Herzogovina after the wars of the early and mid-1990s in those 
countries. In 2004, SFOR was handed over to the EU under EUFOR’s Operation Althea. KFOR 
was the NATO-led mission to stabilize Kosovo after its breakaway war with Serbia. OEF and ISAF 
were the US/NATO-led missions to defeat the Taliban and create security in Afghanistan.  
All of the EU-15 member states participated in at least one these missions during at least 
four of the episodes being analyzed. The only countries that were not deployed together with Turkey 
in all five episodes were Sweden and Ireland, who were not yet deployed in the Balkans in 1998. 
Other multilateral missions were associated with these NATO-led missions. UN missions such as 
UNMIBH, which involved mostly Civilian Police officers. The numbers for these associated 
missions are included if they were non-observers in the same country as the mission was taking place 
in.  
Table 10.5: Cross-tab Levels of Deployment by Episode-by-episode Policies 





Brakemen 5 4 8 17 
Passengers 7 3 2 12 
Drivers 10 14 12 16 
Totals 22 21 22 γ = 0.013 
 
Table 10.5, above, cross-tabulates the levels of co-participation with the policies on Turkish 
membership, in each episode. It shows a distribution without much direction (γ = 0.013), in that the 
nine cells are generally populated as one would expect from any random distribution based on the 
totals. Based on a proportional reduction of error, one only improves one’s guess of what a member 
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state’s policy was over the blanket assumption that any given country was a driver (as, at any given 
moment, 53% of member states were) by 1.3%. 
Speaking more descriptively, from a cross-tabulation that lists the countries with the years in 
the different cells, it shows that the picture is indeed muddled. Countries that have served in the 
field with Turkey the most – Italy, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the Netherlands – have 
strikingly different orientations with regard to membership. Italy and the United Kingdom have 
been Turkey’s stalwart defenders, while Denmark has been Turkey’s most steady opponent. The 
Netherlands, whose troops, proportionally, have been co-deployed with the Turks the most, have 
been either Turkey’s strong allies (1997, 1999, 2004) or very much opposed to Turkey’s progress 
through the enlargement regime (2002, 2006).   
Table 10.6: Cross-tab of Levels of Co-deployment and Member states’ Episodic Policies 
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Figure 10.1: Co-deployment of Troops and Policies Regarding Turkish Membership 
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Contrariwise, those countries that have been deployed the least – Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and 
Austria, also have a mixed record. Austria, of course, has tended to oppose Turkey frequently, while 
the Iberians have tended to be supportive. Ireland has been supportive on two occasions, but has 
mostly been silent on the question of Turkish membership when it has come to the public debate. 
France and Sweden have varied considerably in both co-deployment and support for membership, 
but without any discernable pattern between the two measures. Germany, which (1997 aside) has 
mostly done its part in terms of troops has been either opposed or supportive of Turkey, depending 
on what year is being assessed, again, without a clear pattern.  
The time-series graphs (Figure 10.1) do not demonstrate support for the hypothesis. In these 
figures, the blue lines represent the proportional troop-deployment rates in % of troops deployed on 
multilateral missions in proportion to each contributing nation’s army size. The red lines represent 
the policies on Turkey. Denmark, Luxembourg, and Sweden have graphs that seem to show a 
similar pattern between the proportional troop deployment rate and their policies on Turkey. Austria 
and Finland, on the other hand, shows the reverse, that when co-deployment increased, their 
appetite for Turkish membership were at their lowest. For the rest, there does not look to be a 
relationship between troop deployment and enlargement policy for Turkey. 
The removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and the subsequent occupation of that 
country by the United States and its ‘coalition of the willing’ has not yet been mentioned. This very 
high-profile event is clearly another significant military-security development during the same decade 
that is being investigated by this research. What sets it apart from the SFOR, KFOR and 
OEF/ISAF missions is that France, Germany, Belgium, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Luxembourg, 
Greece, and Austria did not participate in that effort. Denmark, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
and Spain, on the other hand, did participate in the Multinational Force that occupied Iraq (MNF-
Iraq) after the invasion.  
Given that the 2002 decision took place in the context of the contentious politics of the run-
up to that event, it is worth looking at this conflict, despite its significantly different character than 
the other missions because of the heated divisions among the member states over the justification 
for and wisdom of the Iraq war. It is also significantly different because Turkey did not participate, 
nor did the Turks allow the invasion force to use its territory to open a northern front, save for the 
use of its airspace to deploy paratroopers. By the time of the Copenhagen European Council in 
2002, however, Turkey had not yet decided on its policy vis-à-vis the Iraq war, or if Ankara would 
permit the United States to use its territory. This included the Turks themselves, as there was an 
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intense struggle within the recently elected government with the AKP-leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
pushing for an opening of the front, and interim Prime Minister Abdullah Gül, seeking to send a 
signal of support to the EU-members that opposed the military effort on Iraq (Kapsis, 2006). 
From an objective-rationalist point of view, then, those countries that had an interest in 
assisting the United States, either out of a security interest in Iraq or from the perspective of 
maintaining strong relations with the United States, also had an interest in Turkey’s assistance, either 
in supplying troops, or by permitting a northern front. Certainly, the United States put a great 
amount of diplomatic effort into convincing the Turks to do so, and pressuring the EU-15, and 
especially the Danes who held the rotating presidency, to accept Turkey’s demand for accession 
negotiations to begin. 
From the perspective of how the MNF-Iraq participants among the EU-15 stood on 
allowing Turkey to move forward with accession negotiations, as opposed to the non-participants, 
the lineup does not offer a valuable predictor variable. While the larger participants of the MNF-Iraq 
(Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, as well as Portugal) were strong supporters of Turkey’s 
ambitions, Denmark and the Netherlands – who were no less eager contributors to the mission in 
Iraq – were clearly against opening accession negotiations with Turkey. The same is true on the non-
participant side. While Belgium, Germany and Ireland were supportive of Turkey, Luxembourg, 
Sweden and Finland were not. France was in the middle ground, acting as the broker on Turkey, 
while taking a clear stand against the war in Iraq. 
Table 10.7: Participation in the Occupation of Iraq and Policies Regarding Turkish Membership 
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The several test to discern a relationship between military missions and member states’ policy 
regarding Turkey have failed to demonstrate any link between the two variables. A cross-tabulation 
calculating a gamma measure offers a negligible reduction in error as compared to a random 
distribution. So too, the time-series analyses fail to find any pattern over changes in policy that 
would reflect changes in troop deployments in multilateral missions. Looking at the Iraq war 
likewise failed to help discern the drivers from the brakemen. Given the hypothesis’ failure in these 
tests to garner any support, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
10.3.1.3 Terrorism 
Hs3: Those member states that have suffered from terrorism in the past more are 
more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have suffered 
less. 
The analytical method described in Chapter 3 yields 32 different ways of looking at the level of 
threat from terrorism in the fifteen EU member states. Some counted strikes, others fatal and 
injurious incidents, deaths and a weighted composite of deaths and injuries. Each of these can be 
put in absolute and relative terms and in four time-lag scenarios. Below are the γ-rates that have 
been calculated for each of these scenarios. The findings of these tests are listed in Table 10.8 for 
the absolute numbers and Table 10.9 for the relative numbers. 
Of these different γ-rates, the model counting terrorist incidents with a cumulative time-lag 
of one year and counting deaths with a cumulative time-lag of three years both produce a γ-rate of γ 
= 0.48. This indicates that guessing at a member state’s policy based on each of those two 
calculations improves one’s chance of guessing correctly by 48%. These are not inconsiderable.  
Table 10.8: γ-rates for levels of severity and degrees of time-lag, absolute numbers 
Absolute numbers Time lag 0 Time lag 1 Time lag 2 Time lag 3 
Incidents 0.36 0.48 0.40 0.43 
Fatal and Injurious Incidents  0.27 0.43 0.38 0.44 
Deaths 0.16 0.37 0.37 0.48 
Casualty composite 0.26 0.39 0.37 0.46 
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Table 10.9: γ-rates for levels of severity and degrees of time-lag, relative numbers 
Relative to population Time lag 0 Time lag 1 Time lag 2 Time lag 3 
Incidents 0.01 0.41 0.22 0.19 
Fatal and Injurious Incidents  0.18 0.32 0.23 0.15 
Deaths 0.14 0.32 0.24 0.33 
Casualty composite 0.23 0.42 0.29 0.44 
 
By comparison, using those same numbers in proportion to population yielded less impressive 
reductions in error. The figures looking at the incidents in a one-year time lag and the casualty 
composite in one-year and three-year time lag model, yielded result in the 0.40s. As such, the relative 
numbers models tend to be less adequate for predicting policies vis-à-vis Turkey than the absolute 
numbers. What is, at least, certain is that higher incidence of terrorism does not dissuade a member 
state from supporting Turkey for EU membership, as all of the γ-rates in all of the scenarios are 
positive.  
Because the γ-rates in the absolute numbers scenario provided higher reductions in error, the 
relative numbers will be dismissed from further analysis. Among the γ-rates in the absolute numbers 
table, the 1-year time lag incidents and the 3-year time lag deaths proved to have the higher values. 
Because the 3-year time lag represents more autocorrelation, and, therefore, less variation over time, 
the 1-year time lag will be used to conduct a graphic/ocular time-series analysis in the same fashion 
as was done for the multilateral military missions variable. These graphs are depicted below.  
In the graphs, note that for countries with many incidents of terrorism (France, Germany, Greece 
and Spain) the scale has been multiplied by ten, and Italy and the United Kingdom have been scaled 
by two, as compared to the other member states. The graphs, which depict the change of policy 
together with the annually changing number of terrorist incidents (regardless of severity), have a 
fairly high degree of compatibility with one another for a number of member states. When 
considered with a one-year time lag - where the year of the decision and the year prior are 
considered - changes in the amount of terrorist incidents seem to explain changes in policy for 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands.  






























Figure 10.2: Terrorist Incidents (right y-axis, blue) and Policy (left y-axis, red) 
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More generally, as in not being precise about the exact number of years prior to decisions, 
understanding that policy solutions to social problems have a variable response rates, a few graphs 
can be seen as having terrorism explain policy regarding Turkey. France, generally, sees support for 
Turkey diminish after the threat of terrorism has diminished. France had more terrorist incidents in 
the late 1990s than it did in the 2000s, when the policy on Turkey membership began to turn toward 
one of antagonism. Germany, on the other hand, experienced a significant reduction in the annual 
amount of terrorist strikes in the 1990s. In the years prior to the policy change, Germany had 
significantly more terrorist incidents (1994: 79, 1995: 148, 1996: 49), many of which were incidents 
directly related to Turkey due to the Kurdish separatist movement. The annual number of incidents 
had already diminished markedly, as shown in the graph, by the time the policy had changed.  
In the context of long-term policy, taking the average amount incidents of terrorism per year 
and correlating that with the average policy, the correlation coefficient is r = 0.31. Compared with 
the proportional reduction of error by 48%, this means that taking the developments of terrorist 
incidents over time produces greater predictive ability than simply measuring the average. However, 
there are some clear limitations. Finland, Luxembourg and Portugal did not have any incidents of 
terrorism as defined by the three criteria of terrorism referred to in the third chapter. As such, 
terrorism cannot explain their policy changes. In the cases of Italy and the United Kingdom, the 
policies did not change, despite marked changes in the amount of terrorist strikes. As such, changes 
in the threat of terrorism cannot explain member-state policies on Turkey for these countries.  
Changing levels of terrorist threat, however, can help to somewhat explain countries like 
Austria, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands. For these countries, higher levels of terrorist 
incidents do coincide with higher levels of support. Over the broad range, however, this hypothesis 
is far from explaining the behavior of all member states at all episodes. It would need to be coupled 
with other variables in order to get a more complete understanding of the factors that could explain 
member-state policies regarding Turkey’s membership ambitions. 
10.3.1.4 Security from Transnational Crime  
Hs4: Those member states that suffer more from the heroin trade are more likely to 
be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have suffered less from the 
heroin trade. 
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The threat of transnational crime emanating out of, or through, Turkey, as measured by the threats 
arising from the trade and use of heroin, demonstrate a tendency at direct odds with the 
expectations of the hypothesis. In terms of comparing the average tendency of member states to 
support Turkey against the average number of drug-induced deaths per million in the years 1995-
2006, there is a correlation coefficient of r = –0.48. Graph 10.1 shows the scatter plot and regression 
line associated with this measurement. 
To the degree, then, that drug related deaths predicts member-state positions regarding 
Turkey, it is a negative relationship. More deaths tends to strongly coincide with lower levels of 
support for Turkish membership. From the perspective of solutions to the policy problem of 
Turkish transnational crime syndicates bringing heroin to the member states, it is clearly not the case 
that the promise of greater capacity to cooperate on solutions to the policy problem encourages 
member states to be more supportive. The contrary is true. Gürer (2008) suggests that fear of crime 
is a contributing factor to negative public perceptions about Turkish membership in countries that 
have many Turkish immigrants. This may begin to explain why the coefficient found in the test 
above is negative.  
 
Figure 10.3: Drug-related Deaths. 
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Regarding the test of this hypothesis in a time-sensitive format, by calculating the proportional 
reduction of error it shows that the relationship is less significant. Table 10.10, below, shows 
proportional reduction of error rates that the number of deaths from heroin, relative to population, 
has a gamma-ratio of γ = 0.34. As with the correlation coefficient above, the proportional reduction 
of error is negative, in that those countries with more heroin-induced deaths are slightly less likely to 
support Turkey than those countries with fewer victims of that drug.  
Table 10.10: γ-rates for the opiate-induced deaths variable 
Relative to population Time lag 0 Time lag 1 Time lag 2 
Opiate-related drug-
induced deaths -0.34 -0.16 -0.03 
 
While there is a medium strength correlation, the direction of the correlation and the reduction of 
error is one that is contrary to the expectations of the hypothesis. Certainly, then, the hypothesis 
must be rejected.  
10.4 POWER 
The following sections measure the degree to which the power-related hypotheses help explain 
member-state policies regarding Turkey. The first two look at power at the international level, the 
following three consider the EU-level of analysis, and the final four analyze the domestic level of 
analysis. 
10.4.1 Power at the international level 
This sub-section considers two power-related concepts at the international level. The first 
hypothesis tests to see of countries with an Atlanticist foreign policy persuasion have a different 
appreciation of the prospect of Turkish membership than the members with a continentalist foreign 
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policy persuasion do. Afterwards, the second hypothesis considers member-state positions on trade 
with third countries. 
10.4.1.1 Atlanticism vs. continentalism 
Hp1: Those member states that exhibit a more Atlanticist foreign policy are more 
likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have a more 
continental or neutral foreign policy. 
Much like the assessment of NATO, this is an ordinal-level independent variable measured against 
the long-run tendency of member-state supportiveness. As mentioned in the chapter on 
methodology, the Atlanticism vs. continentalism variable is treated as a three-way ordinal variable, 
with the Atlanticists on the high end of the variable, the continentals at the low end, and a category 
for intermediate states between them. Pursuant to the literature (e.g. Coolsaet, 2009; Ferreira-Pereira, 
2007; Foradori & Rosa, 2008; Frain, 1997; Hampson, 2000; Howorth, 2002; 2003; Keohane, 2001; 
Lee-Ohlsson, 2009; Mouritzen, 2006; Rynning, 2003; Rieker, 2004), the following table represents 
the member states according to their place in the categories, in a similar manner as Table 10.4 above. 
A few amendments have however been made to what the literature survey would suggest. 
While most of the sources referenced for Spain (Frain, 1997; Howorth, 2002), treat Spain as 
orienting toward the continent rather than toward the United States, the reverse categorization was 
made due to Spain’s close alliance with the United States during the Aznar period. Knowing of 
Spain’s strong support for Turkey, this determination has been made to offer the benefit of the 
doubt to the hypothesis. The same was done for Italy, which the literature suggests has been fairly 
schizophrenic between the Foreign and Defense Ministries. Again, the Berlusconi regime’s support 
of the United States during the decade, and Italy’s similar stance on Turkey are the reasons for this.  
In the table, rather than showing a strong positive relationship between the independent and 
the dependent variable, the pattern resembles an H-pattern, with strong supporters and opponents 
of Turkey’s membership in both the Atlanticist and continental camps. Nevertheless, the 
intermediates/neutrals tend toward the middle-range, aside from Austria. While the Atlanticists are, 
on average 17% more supportive than the continentals, that difference in averages does not take 
into account the greater spread in policy preferences among the Atlanticists with Denmark on the 
one end and the UK and Italy on the other.  
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Table 10.11: Atlanticism vs. Continentalism and Long-run Level of Support. 
Level of Support Continentals Intermediates/Neutrals Atlanticists 
1.0   Italy, UK 
0.9 Belgium  Spain 
0.8   Portugal 
0.7  Finland, Ireland  
0.6 Germany, Greece  Netherlands 
0.5 France   
0.4  Sweden  
0.3  Austria  
0.2 Luxembourg   
0.1   Denmark 
 
Furthermore, that advantage completely dissipates when Spain and Italy are categorized as the 
literature suggests that they ought to be. Furthermore, the F-value in the ANOVA test only comes 
out to 1.0636. As such, the null-hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
10.4.1.2 External Trade  
Hp2: Those member states that exhibit a trade policy similar to Turkey’s expected 
trade policy are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those 
who have a trade policy at odds with Turkey’s expected trade policy. 
Similarly as before, the external trade preferences are a three-way categorical variable measured 
against the long-run policy preferences on Turkish membership. The data is taken from Woolcock’s 
(2005) assessment of member states’ positions on deciding how open the EU will be in its trade 
policy with the world outside its borders and economic area. Those who advocate for freer trade are 
liberals; those who argue against are protectionist. Five of the member states take an in-between 
position, swinging their vote depending on their particular interest at each juncture. The table below 
depicts where the member states are on both the category as well as their long-run level of support 
for Turkey. 
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The results from this table show that many of the protectionists are in favor of Turkish 
membership, with only France at the medium long-run level of support. Both the swing-voting 
states and the liberals exhibit broad ranges from brakemen to drivers, with the liberals at both 
extremes of the policy spectrum. Though the average level of support from the protectionists (0.8) is 
markedly higher than that for the liberals (0.57), the average support of the liberals remains in the 
more positive half of the spectrum; only slightly lower than the average level of support from all the 
member states (0.61). The F-value in the ANOVA test comes out to 1.3169, which does not rise to a 
level of significance. 
If it were true that seeking allies on the EU’s external trade policy was a major consideration 
for a member state’s enlargement preferences, then in this distribution one could see that Italy, 
Spain and Portugal might desire Turkey as an ally in helping them maintain Europe’s protectionist 
policies. It would not explain why Liberals like the United Kingdom, Finland, Germany and the 
Netherlands would support Turkey more often than they did not. Given these facts, it is not 
possible to reject the null hypothesis that trade preferences and the member states preferences on 
Turkish membership are not related. 
Table 10.12: External Trade Preferences and the Long-run Level of Support for Turkey 
Level of Support Protectionists Swing-votes Liberals 
1.0 Italy  UK 
0.9 Spain Belgium  
0.8 Portugal   
0.7  Ireland Finland 
0.6  Greece Germany, Netherlands 
0.5 France   
0.4   Sweden 
0.3  Austria  
0.2  Luxembourg  
0.1   Denmark 
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In contradiction to the external trade policy preferences as Woolcock typifies them, when measuring 
against the actual degrees of external trade the relationship between the degree of external trade and 
the levels of support for Turkey return a significant and positive relationship. Countries with greater 
degrees of external trade – the share of trade done with countries outside of the European 
Economic Area over overall trade – are more likely to be supportive of Turkey than those whose 
trade is more within the European Economic Area (EEA). 
Graph 10.2 shows the scatterplot and regression line of the relationship. The correlation 
coefficient between the two variables is at an impressive r = 0.59, one of the highest correlation 
coefficients found in the course of this research. It should, however, be noted that the range of the 
variation in the independent variable ranges from 10% (Luxembourg) and 24% (Greece) of trade 
being trade outside of the EEA. The stalwart drivers of Turkey’s membership ambitions, Italy and 
the United Kingdom both have external trade as 22% of the total (putting them on the same place in 
the plot), with Belgium close by also at 22%. The habitual brakemen, Austria, Denmark, 
Luxembourg and Sweden are in the lower-left hand corner with external trade shares of 10%-16%. 
The odd-members-out are Portugal and Ireland, which have tended to be positive toward Turkey 
despite having relatively small shares of their trade being with countries outside of the EEA. 
 
Figure 10.4: External Trade 
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Another thing that becomes clear in an examination of the data is that there is very little variation in 
the independent variable over time. Countries that tend to have larger shares of external trade tend 
to stay that way, and those that have less also tend to stay that way throughout the twelve years for 
which measures were taken (1994-2006). As such, this variable cannot explain why states might 
change their position over time. In fact, tracking the independent variable over time and calculating 
the proportional reduction of error reduces the statistical relationship from r = 0.59 to γ = 0.44. In 
comparison to other measures in this chapter and the next, γ = 0.44 is still noteworthy, but it shows 
that considering external trade over time reduces its power of prediction over a simple correlation 
between the case-averages of both the independent and  dependent variables. 
This relationship is only theoretically significant, however, if it means that the external 
traders could hope to gain an ally in the EU’s councils and parliament with Turkey’s accession. 
Turkey’s own ratio of external trade to internal trade is exactly the same as the European average of 
17%. This does not suggest that Turkey would go either one way or another in its external trade 
preferences. Much of its external trade is (also not unlike Europe) with neighboring countries that 
supply energy resources. So, while there is certainly an interesting relationship between the two 
variables, it is difficult to make sense of in light of the indeterminate nature of Turkey’s future 
preferences. The hypothesis cannot be rejected, because it is clear that countries that trade more 
with partners outside of the EEA clearly show a preference for Turkish membership, while those 
who trade less with such partners have a disinclination toward Turkey. However, it does leave 
question marks that will have to be dealt with.  
10.4.2 Power at the regional or organizational level 
Having considered the international level of analysis, the following four sections regard the EU-level 
of analysis, measuring to what degree previous enlargement policies explain enlargement preferences 
regarding Turkey, whether Eurosceptic countries are more likely to want to widen the EU in order 
to prevent deepening the EU, to what degree population sizes may influence the policy, and if there 
is a difference between net-donors and net-recipients from the EU budget. 
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10.4.2.1 Enlargement Policy  
Hp3: Those member states that have exhibited preferences for swift enlargement to 
Eastern Europe are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those 
who have opposed swift enlargement. 
If all enlargements were equal, it should be expected that enlargement policy would be set depending 
on member states’ preferences for a larger Union, or, conversely, for a European Union without 
more members. That same weighing of preferences ought to match the preferences expressed in 
member states’ preferences on the enlargement round that brought ten and two new members into 
the EU.  
As the first ten new member states of Central and Eastern Europe (and the Mediterranean) 
were in the process of joining as Turkey was also starting the process, there is not an excessive time-
lag effect that might indicate that member states changed their minds on enlargement. Any 
difference between the member states’ policies regarding the new member states and those regarding 
Turkey should reflect member states’ opinions particularly regarding Turkey as different from the 
other candidates.  
Table 10.13: Previous Enlargement Preferences and Long-run Level of Support for Turkey 
Level of Support Brakemen Drivers 
1.0 Italy UK 
0.9 Spain, Belgium  
0.8 Portugal  
0.7 Ireland Finland 
0.6 Greece Germany, Netherlands 
0.5 France  
0.4  Sweden 
0.3  Austria 
0.2 Luxembourg  
0.1  Denmark 
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Table 10.13 shows how the brakemen and drivers in the ‘Big Bang’ enlargement in regard to their 
policies on Turkey. It shows a curious pattern. Aside from the United Kingdom and Luxembourg as 
outliers, the brakemen in the enlargement process toward Central and Eastern Europe were 
markedly more supportive of Turkey than the drivers of that enlargement process. In fact, the 
average level of support for Turkish enlargement by the countries that had previously been 
brakemen was 0.18 more than for the drivers of that round. Though the ANOVA test results in an 
F-score of 1.5919, which is higher than the previous tests have been (though still not to the level of 
being significant), the results point in an opposite direction than the hypothesis would predict. The 
hypothesis must, therefore, be rejected. It cannot be said that general preferences on enlargement 
determined member states’ support for Turkey. 
10.4.2.2 Euroscepticism 
Hp4: More Eurosceptic member states are more likely to be supportive of Turkish 
membership than less Eurosceptic member states. 
Below is the table that compares tendencies in government policy toward deeper European 
integration. Soetendorp’s (1999) typology is used as the independent variable. 
Table 10.14: Integration Preferences and Long-run Level of Support for Turkey 
Level of Support Deepeners Swing-votes Non-Deepeners 
1.0 Italy  UK 
0.9 Belgium, Spain   
0.8   Portugal 
0.7 Finland, Ireland   
0.6 Germany, Netherlands  Greece 
0.5 France   
0.4   Sweden 
0.3    
0.2 Luxembourg Austria  
0.1   Denmark 
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This table demonstrates no support for the theory that the member states that are reluctant or 
hostile toward deeper integration are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership. Certainly 
the United Kingdom and Portugal fit the mold of being advocates for Turkey and hesitant on 
deeper integration, but the opposition is held only by Luxembourg. Contrariwise, the quadrant that 
hold the enthusiasts for deeper integration and Turkish membership is well-populated: Italy, 
Belgium, Spain, Finland and Ireland. This is something that the hypothesis would predict against. 
With an F-score in the ANOVA test of 0.4941, the hypothesis is rejected. 
10.4.2.3 Large vs. Small 
Hp5: Larger member states are more likely to be supportive of Turkish 
membership than smaller member states. 
In international politics, as in EU politics, size tends to matter. Population size against the long-run 
Turkey policy produces a noteworthy result. In terms of policy regarding Turkey’s membership 
ambitions, it is noteworthy that the large countries (Germany, France, The United Kingdom, Italy 
and Spain) have an average likelihood to support Turkey that is 0.54 more than the average smaller 
country is likely to be supportive. However, that assessment needs to be tempered by the realization 
that Germany and France, the two most populous member states, are, on their own, only 6% more 
likely to be supportive than the smaller countries are. The high big-country average support level is 
due to Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, which have been highly supportive of Turkish 
membership. Among the smaller countries, there is a broad range between the small brakemen, like 
Luxembourg, Denmark and Austria against the drivers, like Belgium, Portugal, and Finland.  
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Figure 10.5: Population Size 
Graph 10.3 (Figure 10.5), above, depicts the scatterplot of the policies by population size with a 
regression line. What is clearly evident is that the regression line has very large residuals remaining 
and that it poorly predicts how a member state will argue for or against Turkey purely based on a 
member state’s population size. The correlation coefficient is r = 0.42, which is not inconsiderable, 
relative to other correlation coefficients found in this research. The clear limitation of this 
hypothesis, however, is its static nature over time. It will be worthwhile to test this variable in 
conjunction with independent variables that provide variation over time in multivariate models. 
10.4.2.4 The EU Budget 
Hp6: net-recipient states are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership 
than net-donor states are. 
This hypothesis is grounded in the idea that net-recipients want to remain net-recipients, and if they 
have another net-recipient among their ranks – especially a large one that can make itself heard – 
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they will have an easier time doing so. This logic is contrary to the one that believes that net-
recipients ought to be worried about having to share the limited funds available. To the degree that 
there is a motive that is tied to such a redistribution of resources, it is certainly the case that the net-
recipients are, on average, more likely to be supportive of Turkey than the net-donors. The average 
long-run level of support from the net-recipients (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) is 0.75 as 
opposed to 0.56 for the net-donors. In terms of correlation, the relationship has a correlation 
coefficient of r = 0.21, which is a weak correlation.  
Graph 10.4 (Figure 10.6), on the next page, depicts a scatterplot of the policies by 
distribution on the budget. The data was taken from the reports of the European Court of Auditors 
(1995-2006). The graph shows that a foursome of net-donors inhabits the brakeman area in the 
lower-left quadrant of the plot, while the net-recipients all inhabit the upper-right quadrant. These 
two sets fit the hypothesis. However, there are six member states that are both generally supportive 
of Turkey and net-donors. In particular the United Kingdom, Italy and Belgium inhabit a space close 
to the upper-left corner. The Netherlands and Germany, both major net-donors, also have the 
tendency to be supportive more than they are antagonistic toward Turkey. France, a net-donor - but 
only barely – inhabits the 0.5 mark on the long-run policy measure.  
The regression line that depicts the sum of least squares has a modest inclining slope, but 
has very large residuals, suggesting that there is not a significant relationship between the two 
variables. Given this, the null hypothesis – that there is no relationship between the EU budget and 
Turkey policy – cannot be rejected. However, this finding does not mean that no lessons can be 
drawn. The main void on the plot is in the lower-right quadrant, where the net-recipient brakemen 
ought to be if there were any. What this demonstrates, at least, is that net-recipients do not fear 
having to share the EU’s wealth with a larger poorer country more than they have other reasons for 
deciding their policy.  
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Figure 10.6: The EU Budget 
 
10.4.3 Power at the domestic level 
Having rejected most of the previous hypotheses aside from the one that looks at member-state size, 
the following sections consider political variables at the domestic level of analysis, namely: public 
opinion, political ideology of the government in power, political change and political change couple 
with immigration politics. These hypotheses, contrary to the central assumptions of international 
relations theory, prove to be much more powerful in predicting member states’ policies.    
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10.4.3.1 Public Opinion 
Hp7: Member states with public opinion more predominantly against Turkish 
membership are less likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member 
states with public opinion less predominantly against Turkish membership. 
While there have been numerous public opinion polls about Turkey, there are many complications 
in the data. Only Eurobarometer has systematically assessed public opinion among all the EU 
member states. They have also done so for several years, but not all that correspond with the 
episodes analyzed in this research. Table 10.15 shows in what years, and months, the question: “For 
each of the following countries, are you in favour or not of it becoming part of the European Union in the future?” was 
asked. Given that 2002 and 2004 are not featured, it is necessary to allow the nearest preceding date 
to measure the level of public support for Turkish membership for any moment of decision in each 
of the five episodes. The exception must be the 2004 decision, as the nearest preceding survey 
question on Turkey was asked in November 2001, three years earlier. For 2004, then, it is necessary 
to use the June 2005 survey as the proxy for public opinion in late 2004. 
Table 10.15: Months of Eurobarometer Surveys Featuring the Same Question on Turkey 
Public opinion on Turkey was asked in 
several Eurobarometer surveys 
1996 January  
1997 April November 
1998 May November 
1999 April November 
2000 June  
2001 January November 
2005 June October 
2006  September 
2008 April  
 
Measuring the proportional reduction in error, when also taking the independent variable as an 
ordinal-level variable (using the lowest-third, middle-third, and top-third as the categories, as done 
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before), produces a gamma ratio of γ = 0.39. That means that public opinion produces slightly less 
than 40% of the variation in member-state policies. 
However, a correlation between the long-run policy and the average public opinion measure 
produces a Pearson correlation coefficient of r  = 0.54, which indicates a medium to strong level of 
correlation. That means that countries that generally have low public opinion support for Turkish 
membership also tend to have brakeman policies. There are few clear outliers (though Sweden 
seems a bit out of the norm, given a generally positive public disposition toward Turkey coupled 
with a generally brakemanlike policy), suggesting that the trend holds, but there is still room to 
investigate other variables.  
However, the relationship between policy and public opinion this begs the question of which 
variable is actually the independent variable and which is the dependent variable? Do the policy-
makers follow public opinion, or do they shape public opinion with their political rhetoric? Because 
public opinion is very frequently cited as the reason for the reluctance of the member states to 
support Turkey, it is worthwhile to explore this variable a bit closer by way of comparison graphs. 
In the graphs below (Figure 10.7), it should be noted that the scale of the left y-axis for 
public opinion runs between +0.3 (meaning that 30% more respondents were in favor than they 
were against) and –0.9 (meaning that 90% more respondents were against Turkish membership than 
were in favor of it). The thin horizontal line marks where the break-even point of public opinion, 
where Turkey has equal numbers of supporters as opponents among the respondents.  
The average level of public support, over the range of observation, both across time and 
across case, is –0.2, meaning that, generally, opponents outnumber supporters by 20% of the 
population. This means that the prospect of Turkish membership in the EU is deeply unpopular in 
most EU countries. This is contrasted by the fact that most countries at most times have been 
supportive of Turkey, counter to what public opinion would suggest they should be. 
Gauging the fit between public opinion and policy depends on the supposed coefficient – 
how much should public opinion have to change in order to expect a change in policy? This can 
easily be different for different cases depending on how sensitive a state’s politics are to its public 
opinion. However, the hypothesis predicts a positive relationship quite separate from the size of the 
coefficient.  Given this, it is still possible to make some observations of the independent variable 
compared to the dependent variable. The two variables need to move in tandem, or, at least, changes 
in policy should follow changes in public opinion. The following paragraphs detail the cases that 
support the hypothesis, that do not contradict the hypothesis, and those that do contradict the
































Figure 10.7: Public Opinion (right y-axis, blue) and Policy on Turkey (left y-axis, red). 
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Table 10.16: Cases that Support, Contradict and are Neutral Toward Hypothesis Hp7. 
Support Neutral Contradiction 
 France,  
 Ireland,  
 Portugal,  
 Spain,  












hypothesis. Table 10.16, above, offers an overview. The cases that lend support to the hypothesis 
are: France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. France’s public opinion gradually 
soured toward Turkey, as did its policy. Ireland’s public opinion has been very supportive, and in 
2002, when public opinion spiked, Ireland’s policy also changed from a passenger policy to a driver 
policy. The downturn of public opinion anticipated the return to a passenger policy by a couple of 
years. Portugal has had relatively high levels of public support for Turkish membership in the EU, 
and its policy came to reflect that starting in 2002.  
Spain has had the highest level of public support out of all of the member states, and its 
policy (1997 excepted) has reflected this. The oddity, however, is that Spain’s policy shift from 
passenger to driver occurred concurrent with a slight downturn in public opinion. Overall, Spain’s 
public opinion has also declined since the late 1990s, but this does appear to be sufficient to have 
caused a change in policy. That is also not surprising in comparison to other member-states’ public 
opinions regarding Turkey, given that Spain’s public support for Turkish membership remained well 
above the average. With the marginal exception of September 2006, this public opinion has even 
remained positive in that more people were supportive of Turkish membership than were opposed. 
The United Kingdom’s public opinion has been relatively upbeat about Turkey, as has its policy. 
This policy was maintained in 2006, despite a marked decline in public support in that year, possibly 
in response to the London underground attacks.  
Several of the member states show a pattern that does not contradict or lend support to the 
hypothesis. These are Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden. Belgium’s public opinion has remained 
largely flat on the issue, while the policy moved from one of being a passenger in 1997 and a driver 
thereafter. It does not contradict the hypothesis, but neither does it lend support. For Denmark, 
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there is also not much change in public opinion. While there is a lapse in Denmark’s strong 
opposition to Turkey in 1999, that is not accompanied by an upswing in public opinion. In fact, 
there is a very slight downturn just before the 1999 episode, which is followed by a slight increase in 
public favor. When Denmark’s policy turns back against Turkey, this is concurrent with a slight 
downturn again, but not markedly below the level of 1999. Comparing Denmark to Belgium, it is 
further noteworthy that Denmark’s public opinion on Turkey is, on average, only one percentage 
point different than Belgium’s, while their policies are in opposition to one another.  
Luxembourgers have a low opinion of Turkey joining the EU, and this is reflected in their 
government’s policy. However, in 2004 the government shifted its policy in favor, despite a 
significant concurrent downturn (from -0.29 to –0.50 between November 2002 and June 2005). 
Something else must explain Luxembourg’s momentary change of heart regarding Turkey. The 
Netherlands’s policy regarding Turkey only very generally follows public opinion in that public 
opinion is more supportive (or less antagonistic) in the early years, 1997 and 1999, and then soured 
(somewhat) later on in 2002, 2004 and 2006. In 2004, however, when the Netherlands’ policy 
changed from antagonism to support, in their role of the rotating EU presidency, public opinion had 
not changed. If anything, it declined 2% between November 2002 and June 2005. 
In the case of Sweden, based on the graph, a case can be made that policy followed the 
change in public opinion, in that the brakeman policy occurred when public opinion toward Turkey 
was declining, and it moved toward a driver policy when public opinion markedly improved. 
However, this does not explain the case in comparison to other cases. Why should Sweden, with 
relatively high levels of public support in the brakeman years (1997, 1999, and 2002) should have 
embraced a brakeman policy, while others, with drastically lower levels of public support (e.g. 
Belgium, Finland, Germany, and Greece). 
The cases that outright contradict expectations are Austria, Finland, Germany, Greece, and 
Italy. Austria’s dramatic rise in public antagonism toward Turkish membership follows Austria’s 
policy change by at least a year. This means that it is not the case that Austria’s political elite 
followed their public toward a brakeman position. If anything, it suggests that the reverse, that the 
political leadership moving public opinion against Turkey, is possible. It is, however, the only case 
where this is clearly plausible. 
Finland, bizarrely, seems to only improve its policy toward Turkey when public opinion is 
moving in the opposite direction, if modestly so. Furthermore, the public opinion downturn in 2006 
did not dissuade Finland from remaining supportive during its presidency of the EU. Germany’s 
  442 
case is also odd in light of the hypothesis. Germany’s public opinion soured toward Turkey at the 
same time that the Schröder/Fischer government dramatically shifted Germany’s orientation. Public 
opposition to Turkey only diminished (somewhat) a couple of years later. The continuation of the 
earlier downward trend of public opinion did, however, anticipate Germany’s policy shift in 2006, 
but it did not affect Germany’s policy in 2004, which had remained strongly supportive. 
In the case of Greece, there is a concurrent spike in public support for Turkey and a positive 
shift in policy in 1999. This is doubtlessly due to the İzmit and Athens earthquakes and the 
subsequent mutual relief efforts. In April 1999 public opinion was still icy –0.63, this rose to –0.43 
that Fall, and –0.14 the following June. The policy, however, had already shifted before the 
earthquake with the capture of Abdullah Öcalan and the replacement of Theodoros Pangalos with 
George Papandreou as Foreign Minister. In this case, then, the shift in policy preceded the shift in 
public opinion, and public opinion cannot, therefore, explain the shift in policy. Italy maintained a 
positive policy toward Turkey throughout, despite growing unease in the body politic, with the 
public opinion nadir occurring in 2005 (-0.3) and 2006 (-0.35), with no effect on policy.  
Given this seemingly random allocation of cases that support, do not support or contradict, 
and those that outright contradict, there is no basis for rejecting the null hypothesis. If public 
opinion has any impact on member-state policies, it does not do so directly. Likewise, the reverse – 
that policy drives public opinion is also not demonstrated. It appears to be plausible in the case of 
Austria, but not in any other case. In the Greek case, the 1999 change in public opinion may have 
been the result of the policy shift, but the policy shift was announced after the earthquakes. It seems 
much more plausible that the earthquakes’ aftermaths had more to do with public opinion than 
policy-makers convincing the Greek populace to reconsider their views. In any case, public opinion 
soured again long before the 2006 policy shift back toward a brakeman policy.  
In summary, the story here is not that public opinion does not matter. It is doubtlessly the 
case that if public opinion were not so opposed to Turkish membership, it would be easier for the 
member-state governments to support Turkey. In light of the average level of public support for 
driver policies, it is quite surprising that so many countries are as supportive as they are. The next 
sections will explore the domestic political dimensions of this problem further. 
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10.4.3.2 Political party ideology 
Hp8: Left-wing governments are more likely to be supportive of Turkish 
membership than right-wing governments are. 
Testing the proportional reduction of error of the ideologies of governing parties against their 
policies regarding Turkey demonstrates a poor fit for the CMP data (despite the hedges in favor of 
the hypothesis), but a fair ratio for the ParlGov data (see Table 10.17, below).  
If the independent variable is going to be explanatory of the dependent variable, and, thus, 
the general political ideology of governments driving their policies on Turkey, then, the ParlGov 
data is going to be the best reflector of that general political ideology. Further exploration of the 
political dimension, below, will, therefore, be based on this data, rather than the CMP dataset. That 
exploration is done by graph comparisons, similar to what is done above.  





The set of graphs, Figure 10.8 below, displays the calculated ideologies of government parties 
against the member-state policies on Turkey. It should be noted that because the ParlGov data 
assigns higher values the more a political party has a right-wing ideology, and the hypothesis predicts 
a negative relationship between right-wingedness and support for Turkey, the independent variable 
graph will be upside-down, with lower values at the top and higher values at the bottom. 
Table 10.18, lists the hypothesis-supporting cases as well as the hypothesis-neutral and 
contradicting cases. Again, the neutral cases demonstrate a policy pattern that is simply not 
explained by the independent variable, whereas the contradictory cases show the opposite of 
expectations. Six of the member-states’ policies are explained by the political party outlooks of their 
governments. Seven are neutral and two are outright contradictory. That is a poor showing for the 
hypothesis, but it is a closer cut than simply looking at public opinion. Below are some observations 
on the interesting cases. 
 
































Figure 10.8: Coalition Ideology (right y-axis, blue) and Policy (left y-axis, red) 
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Table 10.18: Cases that support, contradict and are neutral toward hypothesis Hp8 


















The open-and-shut cases are Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and France – countries that have 
been crucial in swinging the Council decision one way or another. Denmark also seems to largely be 
explained by this variable. Belgium is contradictory, but this can be understood as a social liberalism-
conservatism dimension to its politics that is not quite captured by the traditional socio-economic 
left-right scale. Certainly, the policy changed when the social liberal VLD took the leadership role 
from the Christian Democrats. 
Finland experienced very limited fluctuation in the political outlook of its government. The 
successive governments of Social Democrat Paavo Lipponen until 2003 were solidly centrist, and 
the first coalition of Matti Vanhanen also included the Social Democrats, keeping on Lipponen’s 
foreign minister. Against this limited political fluctuation, however, Finland’s policy varied 
significantly, moving from passenger to driver under the Finnish Presidency in 1999, to a brakeman 
policy in 2002. In 2004 and under second Finnish Presidency of 2006, Finland again embraced a 
driver policy, without significant shift in political outlook.  
Though supportive of the hypothesis, the French case is peculiar. While the Jospin 
government, with Chirac as president, was very strongly in favor of moving Turkey’s candidacy 
forward, Chirac’s association with the RPR, and the weight parity between the presidency and the 
legislature that this method of calculation imposes, pulls the right-left graph downward. A reading of 
the history of Jacques Chirac’s personal support for Turkey’s membership bid (albeit on a long time-
horizon) suggests that political ideology would be more likely to explain policy had the President not 
have been a peculiar actor in the system. But for his idiosyncratic influence, the counterfactual may 
well have been that with any other right-wing President (such as his predecessor, Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing, or his successor, Nicolas Sarkozy, both of whom made their views on Turkey abundantly 
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clear), France’s policy toward Turkey would probably not have been equally supportive as it was 
under Chirac. 
Luxembourg is a curious case. The first cabinet of the Christian-Democratic Jean-Claude 
Juncker, which was joined by Labor, felt no hesitation using the pulpit of the EU presidency to 
antagonize the Turks in 1997. Yet, later on, in 2004, when a Christian-democrat & labor coalition 
returns, Luxembourg becomes supportive. Yet that same government turned away from Turkey 
again in 2006. 
The Netherlands’ changes in policy and politics mostly support the theory. The purple 
governments of Wim Kok fully supported the prospect of Turkish membership in 1997 and 1999. 
Balkenende’s first and third governments changed course and articulated strong brakeman positions. 
The curious case of 2004, during his second government, seems to belie the hypothesis, however. 
The only political change was the shrunken D66 party (representing only six members of parliament) 
having joined that coalition. Yet, knowing the internal politics of the cabinet makes it clear that D66 
minister Jan Laurens Brinkhorst was a particularly strategic and persuasive actor within the cabinet. 
Though a clear counterfactual, it is not conceivable that without Brinkhorst’s presence in the 
cabinet, The Hague would have been supportive of Turkish membership at that critical juncture. 
Portugal mostly contradicts the hypothesis. The Socialist government of António Guterres 
was indifferent toward Turkey, twice adopting a passenger policy. Representing a rightward turn in 
the government, José Manuel Barroso’s PSD, however, twice embraced the prospect of Turkish 
membership in the EU. José Socrates’ Socialist government maintained the driver policy. Sweden, 
likewise, is contradictory. Sporting a solidly left-wing government throughout the decade until the 
eleventh hour, Sweden was mostly antagonistic toward offering Turkey a clear membership 
perspective. Göran Persson’s SAP government surprisingly took a different turn in 2004, adopting 
an energetic driver policy; one that was maintained by Fredrik Reinfeld’s thoroughly right-wing 
government.  
As the political ideologies of ruling political parties explain less than half of the cases in 
question, the hypothesis cannot stand on its own in being explanatory of the variation in member-
state policies on Turkey. However, together with other variables in multivariate models it helps 
explain the member state policies. 
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10.4.3.3 Political opportunism  
Hp9: When existing government policy is at odds with public opinion, significant 
changes in government pursuant to elections are more likely to result in policy 
changes than when existing policy is not at odds with public opinion.  
This test is conducted by looking at those cases where government policy was at odds with the 
balance of public opinion. These balances were also used in the test that compared public opinion 
directly to policy. This analysis, then, looks at the cases that were not explained by that hypothesis. 
What was made clear in that previous analysis was that public opinion tended much more to 
the negative, while many member states embraced a driver policy. These are then the cases that need 
explaining. These cases are assessed by what happened in by the time of the pursuant episode. These 
outcomes consist of 5 categories: 1) change of government and change of policy, 2) change of policy 
by the sitting government, 3) change of public opinion toward greater alignment with the policy, 4) 
the sitting government maintaining the unpopular policy, and 5) a new government maintaining the 
unpopular policy. The hypothesis expects that scenarios 4 and 5 will rarely occur. 
Identifying the cases that contrast with the expectations of Hp7 requires looking at those 
cases where Turkey’s prospect of membership was met with deep unpopularity. The proportional 
reduction of error test that tested public opinion against policy already divided the balance of public 
opinion into three categories of equal populations. These were, essentially, 1) support or 
ambivalence (where the percentage of respondents against Turkish membership in the EU 
subtracted from the percentage of respondents in favor resulted in a figure of equal to or more than 
–0.12), 2) very unpopular (between –0.12 and –0.33), and 3) deeply unpopular (equal to or less than 
–0.33). 
There are eight cases where governments supported Turkey despite that policy being ‘deeply 
unpopular’, and there were 11 cases where governments did the same despite that policy being ‘very 
unpopular’. These nineteen cases provide the population for this test. The cases and their aftermaths 
are displayed in Table 10.19, below. The first eight are the cases where the prospect of Turkish 
membership was deeply unpopular, and the next 11 are where that prospect was very unpopular. 
Because there is only one case in which a government held a brakeman position despite public 
opinion that had a positive balance toward Turkish membership, this type of scenario will not be 
analyzed.  
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Table 10.19: Cases & Outcomes of Driver Policies Despite Adverse Public Opinions 
 





Finland, 2004-2006 No No No 
France, 1999-2002 Yes Yes No 
Germany, 1999-2002 No No Yes 
Germany, 2004-2006 Yes Yes No 
Greece, 1999-2002 No No No 
Greece, 2002-2004 No Yes No 
Greece, 2004-2006 Yes No No 
Luxembourg 2004-2006 Yes No No 
Belgium, 1999-2002 No No No 
Belgium, 2002-2004 No No No 
Belgium, 2004-2006 No No No 
Finland, 1999-2002 Yes No No 
France, 1997-1999 No No No 
Germany, 2002-2004 No No No 
Italy, 1999-2002 No No No 
Italy, 2002-2004 No Yes No 
Italy, 2004-2006 No Yes No 
Netherlands, 1999-2002 Yes Yes (Marginal) 
Netherlands, 2004-2006 Yes No No 
 
The identification of cases and outcomes in the table above is used to divide the outcomes into 
Table 10.20 below. This table categorizes the outcomes into the five different scenarios of change of 
government and change of policy, change of policy by sitting government, improvement of public 
opinion, maintaining policy by sitting government and maintaining policy by new government. The 
distribution of outcomes in the table above does not show that the political fallout from a policy 
with adverse public opinion was markedly greater in scenarios 1, 2, and 3 than 4 and 5. What is 
striking is the large number of cases where the sitting government maintained its policy.  
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Table 10.20: Five Scenarios of Driver Policies Under Adverse Conditions of Public Opinion 
Scenario Very Unpopular Deeply Unpopular 
1) Change of policy by a 
     new government 
Netherlands, 1999-2002 France, 1999-2002 
Germany, 2004-2006 
2) Change of policy by a 





3) Improvement of 
    public opinion 
 Germany 1999-2002 
4) Maintenance of policy by a 









5) Maintenance of policy by a 





One explanation that remains in keeping with the hypothesis is if many of these governments did 
not face imminent elections. That is the case for all of the cases in scenario 4, save Belgium 2002 
(which faced elections in May 2003), and Greece 1999 (which faced elections in April 2000). So, in 
these cases the governments may have counted on the political amnesia of their constituents to help 
them survive the subsequent election.  
What this does not explain, however, is why these governments ran the risk of being 
replaced in the first place, if political dominance was their political goal. Six governments were 
replaced within the interval after the episode in which they embraced the unpopular policy. That is 
not significantly worse than the six governments out of the 20 cases where the governments 
embraced popular discontent with brakeman policies, which also were replaced within the space of 
an episode. Given this, it is not clear that governments that had unpopular policies on Turkey fared 
any better than governments that appealed to that same sort of opinion by enacting brakeman 
policies. 
This test is regrettably inconclusive. There is little evidence that unpopular policies regarding 
Turkey made it more likely for a government to be defeated by the time of the next episode than 
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policies that embraced appealed to the public opposition to Turkish membership. A significant 
number of governments defied public opinion, though only a few of them faced elections in their 
immediate future. There are also a number of aberrant cases where a new government did not 
change the policy, even where it would have been very popular to do so. As such, it cannot be said 
that public opinions drive policies through the democratic process of replacing governments that 
enact unpopular policies, but it can also not be said that there is absolutely no effect. For the time 
being, it is necessary to leave question marks behind the hypothesis and return to it when other 
hypotheses have been tested in order to see if there is room for government change in a multivariate 
analysis. 
10.4.3.4 Immigration politics  
Analyzing the effects of immigration politics on policies regarding Turkish membership assesses 
three related hypotheses, looking at three proportions of the member-state populations. The idea is 
that the more immigrants, Muslims and/or Turks a country has, the more the native citizens will be 
motivated to oppose Turkish membership for fear of more immigrants from that country should it 
become a member. EU membership, after all, implies free movement of persons. The first 
hypothesis tests the proportions of immigrants, Muslims and Turks in the populations directly 
against the long-run policy on Turkish membership, expecting a negative correlations. The idea, 
after all, is that the larger the minority communities in question, the lower the support for Turkish 
membership. 
Hp10: Member states with larger immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations, relative 
to total population, are more likely to oppose Turkish membership than member 
states with smaller immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations relative to total 
population, are. 
The first aspect of this first hypothesis, measuring the percentage of immigrants in the population 
against the long-run policy finds the expected negative correlation, but not one that is particularly 
strong, namely r = -0.34. Graph 10.5 (Figure 10.9), on the following page, shows a scatterplot and a 
regression line that demonstrates how far apart the member states are with regard to these two 
variables. Because of its outlier status, Luxembourg (has been omitted from the graph and the 
correlation. 
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Figure 10.9: Immigrants 
There is particular divergence in the policies of the high-immigrant countries – those countries that 
have immigrant populations of more than 8%. Belgium has been highly supportive of Turkey, 
Germany has either strongly supported or strongly opposed Turkish membership, and Austria has 
strongly opposed Turkey. Luxembourg would be in the category with Austria, but was omitted 
owing to the fact that with an immigrant population of 34%, it would skew the graph and the 
regression out of proportion. On the other hand, among the low-immigrant countries, those 
countries with less than 3% immigrant populations, there is relatively high support for Turkey. 
These are Italy, Finland and Portugal. Between the extremes of the high-immigrant and low-
immigrant countries, there is anything from Denmark on the most brakeman side of the policy 
spectrum to the United Kingdom on the most driver end. Both have very comparable levels of 
immigration (4.9% and 4.6%, respectively). As such, there is very little empirical support for the 
hypothesis that countries with larger immigrant communities are much more likely to oppose 
Turkey. The hypothesis with respect to immigrants must therefore be viewed with much skepticism. 
The second aspect of the first hypothesis – counting Muslims – fares worse. Correlating the 
estimated Muslim population with the long-run policy offers a correlation of r = -0.20, showing very 
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weak, albeit negative correlation. Graph 10.6 (Figure 10.10), below, shows the scatterplot and 
regression line between the percentage of Muslims in the population and the long-run policy. 
 
 
Figure 10.10: Muslims 
About half of the member states fit neatly on the regression line. Portugal, Finland and Ireland, all 
with few Muslims in their populations tend to have critical but generally supportive policies. Greece 
and Germany, with nearly identical shares of Muslims, have demonstrated identical policies: 
supportive in 1999, 2002 and 2004, but strongly opposing in 1997 and 2006. The Netherlands had 
the same policy average in the long run but with a larger Muslim population (particularly 
Moroccans). France with the largest Muslim population, estimated at 9.77% has been somewhat 
more critical than the others.  
These are, however, offset by the strong drivers: Italy Spain, the United Kingdom and 
Belgium. These have anywhere from 1.75% Muslims to 6.11%, but all have been very supportive. 
They are even more offset by the brakemen, Luxembourg, Austria and Denmark, whose Muslim 
populations are comparatively modest in size, though not negligible. Given this spread, it cannot be 
said that knowing the amount of Muslims in the population is an accurate predictor for what sort of 
policy a member state is likely to have. The Muslim aspect of the Hp10 must, therefore, be rejected. 
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To the degree that the policy concerns the presence of people unlike the general native populations, 
it is less about Muslims than it is about immigrants or Turks (see below). 
The third aspect of the first hypothesis demonstrates the same correlation as the first, 
namely r = -0.34. Graph 10.7 (Figure 10.11) depicts the scatterplot of the relationship between the 
long-run policy and the proportional sizes of the member states’ Turkish communities. Because of 
the missing data, the graph omits Greece. 
 
Figure 10.11: Turks 
 
While the countries with the larger communities do tend to have brakeman policies more often than 
those with fewer Turks, the deviations the regression line are striking. Particularly, Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Sweden and France have policies on the brakeman side of the equation, despite not 
having very large populations of Turks the way that Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium 
have. Austria fits the hypothesis well, but Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium do not.  
In the upper left-hand corner are those supportive countries that are fairly or always 
supportive and have very few Turks, as the hypothesis would predict. While this has a stronger 
relationship than measuring the share of Muslims, like the correlation with the proportion of 
immigrants, this relationship is not particularly strong. There are a large number of cases that are left 
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unexplained. The null hypothesis, therefore, cannot be rejected. As a whole, then, hypothesis Hp10 
cannot be accepted. While the correlations all show the expected direction, the spread in the 
variation does not indicate a strong relationship between the proportion of immigrants, Muslims or 
Turks to predict even the average level of support for Turkish membership. There is, however, food 
for further thought. Might certain the countries with many Turks or immigrants have more volatile 
politics, or might certain political parties appeal to the immigrant or Turkish populations? 
Hp11: Member states with larger immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations, relative 
to total population, are more likely to change their policies on Turkish membership 
more frequently than member states with smaller Muslim/Turkish populations 
relative to total population, are. 
The next hypothesis, Hp11, tests to see if the proportional sizes of the same minority groupings, 
immigrants, Muslims and Turks, can help predict the degree to which the policies will be volatile. 
The idea is that the larger the number if immigrants, Muslims or Turks, the more the policy will be 
subject to domestic politics, with those politics swinging the policies back and forth depending on 
election outcomes. 
In simply calculating the correlations, the tests for immigrants and Muslims come to 
nothing. The correlation between the former and policy volatility is r = -0.05, and the latter and 
policy volatility is r = 0.003. Nothing further need be said about either. With respect to the number 
of Turks in the population, however, the correlation (r = 0.33) comes back stronger than for 
immigrants and Muslims, but still not at an impressive level. This warrants at least a look at the 
scatterplot to look at the variation. This scatterplot is depicted in Graph 10.7 to the right. Again, 
because of the missing data, the graph omits Greece. Spain and Portugal have neither many Turks 
nor much volatility, which is why they overlap in the graph. 
  455 
 
Figure 10.12: Turks & Policy Change 
The unexpected outliers in this model are Finland and Luxembourg on the high end, with a great 
deal of policy volatility and Belgium and Austria at the low end. Given the relative low numbers of 
Turks, the hypothesis would not expect Finland and Luxembourg to have changed their policies as 
much, or Belgium and Austria so little, if the immigration politics related to Turks led to volatile 
policies. In the case of Finland and Luxembourg that points to another factor at work in explaining 
their changes of policy, whereas with Austria and Belgium it may mean that changes government did 
not occur much or lead to large changes in policy. Thankfully, the test following hypothesis, Hp12, 
sheds more light on these cases. 
Hp12: Member states with larger immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations, relative 
to total population, are more likely to see a relationship between changes of 
government and policies on Turkish membership. 
The third hypothesis testing the possible influence of immigration politics shows an interesting set 
of correlations. The idea behind this is that when there are many immigrants, Muslims or Turks in 
the population, immigration politics are more likely to play a role. That role is manifested in the 
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policy being more likely to change when the government changes, rather than governments 
changing their policy for other reasons. 
The hypothesis is tested by calculating a correlation between the changes of government and 
the changes of policy for each member state, and seeing if there is a difference in those correlations 
based on the proportion of immigrants, Muslims and Turks in the population. Because neither Italy 
or the United Kingdom varied their policies during the episodes analyzed, and the United Kingdom 
did not have any political change, the correlation calculations of their policies and politics both 
return with errors. In Italy’s case, this can simply be set at 0 without complication. In the case of the 
United Kingdom, the result is also set to 0, because it was observed that the Conservative 
opposition agreed with the Government regarding its Turkey policy. Therefore, had any 
governmental change occurred, no change of policy is expected to have taken place. 
A factor that can usefully be included in the measurement is to include the direction of 
government and policy changes in the difference. At that point, not only is change of government 
measured, but also the direction of change in government of policy. As hypothesis Hp8, which 
measured government ideology against the short-run policy returned a fairly high proportional 
reduction of error, suggesting that knowing the type of government improves the prediction of the 
policy it will embrace by 48%, it is interesting to note if knowing the amount of immigrants, 
Muslims or Turks in their populations in addition to the government ideology helps predict the 
policies even more.  
Table 10.21 below lists the strength of the correlations between the proportion of 
immigrants, Muslims and Turks in the population of each country and the strength of the 
correlation between changes of government and changes of policy. When the changes are measured 
only for degree, and not with the direction of change inculcated into the correlation, only the 
correlation between the proportion of Turks in the populations and the correlation between 
governments and policy has a strong showing. When the direction of change in both policy and 
politics is accounted for, the correlations strengthen across the board, but, again, knowing the 
proportion of Turks in the population demonstrates the strongest relationship. 
Table 10.21: Immigrants, Muslims and Turks and the Correlations with Policy 
Correlation (r) % Immigrants % Muslims % Turks 
Without direction 0.25 0.01 0.55 
With direction -0.38 -0.47 -0.68 
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This indicates that knowing the proportion of Turks in the population significantly helps predict if 
policy changes will co-occur with political changes. Given that the correlation is negative indicates 
this indicates that in countries with proportionally large Turkish communities (such as Germany, 
Austria and the Netherlands), rightward shifts in government are very likely to produce shifts in 
policy toward opposition to Turkish membership. In other words, right-wing governments 
succeeding left wing governments are very likely to shift the policy against Turkey’s membership, 
when there are large Turkish communities. Vice versa, left-wing governments succeeding right-wing 
governments are very likely to shift the policy in favor of Turkey’s membership, when there are large 
Turkish communities. This relationship is much less likely to exist in member states where there are 
not large Turkish communities (such as Finland, Portugal, Spain and Italy).  
 
Figure 10.13: Turks & Politics 
 
The relationship is depicted in Graph 10.9 (Figure 10.13). It shows a scatterplot where the points are 
more clustered around the regression line than many of the preceding scatterplot graphs. Typical of 
the relationship between the proportion of Turks and the correlation between changes in 
government and policy are those cases that are closest to the regression line. These are, at the one 
end, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. These are the countries with the largest Turkish 
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communities. In these, the shifts of policy have closely aligned with the changes of government. 
Further, the changes of government to the right produced changes to brakeman policies, and when 
the governments changed toward the left, the changes in policy went in a driver direction.  
At the other end of the regression line are Finland and Italy. Both of these have few Turks. 
Italy has not had any shifts of policy despite significant changes in government. Finland has had very 
significant changes in policy, but these did not co-occur with the changes of government. If 
anything, they changed in directions counter to the expectation. Sweden has a modest size Turkish 
community, and its single driver-direction policy shift did not occur at the same time as its right-
wing direction change in government.  
Significantly above the regression line are Ireland, Portugal and Belgium. Belgium, which has 
a significantly large Turkish community, experienced a political shift alongside a shift in policy. 
However, it was counter to the expectation of the hypothesis, because the more (secular) center-
right-wing VLD-led coalition embraced a driver policy, whereas the Christian Democrat-led 
(conservative) center-slightly-less-right-wing government had not expressed a strong policy for or 
against Turkey’s membership ambitions in 1997. This is easily understood from a liberal-
conservative point of view, where this is distinct from the broader left-right spectrum which takes 
socio-economic issues into account.  
Ireland and Portugal, neither of whom have large Turkish communities, had only modest 
shifts in policy. When the policy shifts occurred in tandem with shifts in government, they 
sometimes happened under right-wing governments. Significantly below the regression line are 
France, Spain, Luxembourg and Denmark. In the French, Luxembourger and Danish cases, the 
correlations between policies and governments largely occurred as one would expect, but with fewer 
Turks in the population. In Spain, with no Turks to speak of, the policy shift from passenger to 
driver occurred while under a right-wing government, and the left-wing government maintained the 
driver policy.  
Given that a Pearson correlation coefficient of r = -0.68 is nothing to laugh at in the social 
sciences, this particular hypothesis deserves a closer look. It seems to strongly explain the policies of 
countries of countries with large Turkish communities. It, however, begs the question: what causes 
policy shifts in countries without a significant number of Turks? That question will be taken up in 
Chapter 11. 
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10.5 WEALTH 
Having concluded the section on the rational calculation of power costs and benefits, the following 
sections consider those aspects of the question that look at greater or less wealth for the member 
states, resulting from the expectation of Turkish membership. The first aspect that is considered is 
the trade in agricultural commodities, given that since the implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Customs Union, agriculture remains the main economic sector that has not been liberalized between 
the EU and Turkey. Thus, membership and inclusion into the European agricultural regime, 
whatever that might be in the future, is likely to have the greatest impact in this sector of the 
economy.  
The second aspect that is explored is that of trade and investment. Given the lowering of 
non-tariff barriers with Turkey and Turkey’s adoption of European standards and regulations, 
opportunities for trade and for investment should increase. Those countries that already have 
significant bilateral trade with Turkey should benefit more than those with less trade, and those 
countries with greater investment relationships should also benefit more than those without. 
10.5.1.1 Agriculture 
Hw1: Member states with a complementary agricultural sector with Turkey are 
more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with a 
competitive agricultural sector with Turkey. 
This hypothesis is tested by looking at the agricultural import and export profiles of Turkey 
compared with those of the EU-15 member states. The test considers the top 20 agricultural 
commodities by value in US$(2000). It adds the imports and exports positively where these are in 
complement to one another (Turkey imports a top-20 commodity that the given EU country 
imports and vice versa) and negatively where both Turkey are exporting or importing those 
commodities. The sum of all of these values, divided by GDP (in US$ 2000), provides a figure that 
rates the degree to which the agricultural trade profiles are complementary (when positive) or 
competitive (when negative). 
These values, representing the degree to which member states will benefit from or be 
harmed by open trade in agricultural commodities with Turkey, have only very modest predictive 
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power. The γ-rates are offered in the following table. The best-case scenario, where the year of the 
episode in question and the preceding year are taken into account, offers a γ-rate of 0.18, meaning 
that taking agriculture into account improves one’s predictive capacity over the policies by 18% over 
a random distribution based on a nameless distribution. In comparison to the other hypotheses 
tested in this chapter, this is too modest to warrant further investigation. 
Table 10.22: γ-rates for Trade of Agricultural Commodities 
Cumulative time lags Time lag 0 Time lag 1 Time lag 2 Time lag 3 
Compatibility in the trade of 
agricultural commodities. 0.15 0.18 -0.04 -0.15 
 
It is nevertheless interesting to look at the implications of the distribution. On average, Turkey is 
more competitive than complementary with the agricultural trade profiles of the EU-15 member 
states. The average balance in the computed measure is over the member states over all the years 
(1994 – 2006) is – 0.3% of GDP.  
The few member states that would tend to benefit from opening agricultural trade with 
Turkey were France, Finland and Sweden, with France prospectively benefiting the most by 
considerable degrees. France could benefit from importing prepared foods and exporting cattle, 
soybean cake, and prepared chocolates. Among those whose agricultural sectors would suffer the 
most are Portugal, the Netherlands, and Ireland, with the Portugal facing the stiffest competition 
from Turkey in terms of exporting the products that Turkey also exports and importing the same 
products that Turkey imports. In particular Portuguese soybeans, maize and beef would find 
competition with Turkish soybeans, maize and beef.  
In terms of policy, France has not been more supportive of Turkey than Portugal has, nor 
has Sweden been more supportive than Ireland.  Finland and the Netherlands have both exhibited 
many changes of policy over time, despite being in opposite line-ups on the agricultural 
import/export profiles. For this reason, as supported by the quantitative test, agricultural economics 
do little to explain member-state policies, and the null-hypothesis cannot, therefore, be rejected. 
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10.5.1.2 Trade and investment 
Hw2: Member states with greater volumes of trade with Turkey are more likely to 
be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with smaller volumes of 
trade with Turkey. 
Hw3: Member states with greater volumes of investment between that member 
state and Turkey are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than 
member states with smaller volumes of investment in Turkey. 
Hw4: Member states with a trade surplus with Turkey are more likely to be 
supportive of Turkish membership than member states with a trade deficit with 
Turkey. 
The first trade hypothesis is tested by taking the volume of trade with Turkey relative to GDP of 
each member state and comparing these with one another and with their respective policies on 
Turkey. The idea is that those countries with the greatest volume of trade with Turkey have the 
greatest interest in Turkish membership because to the degree that these proportional volumes of 
trade are a benefit to the member states, Turkish membership would increase that value by making 
that trade easier and therefore more valuable.  
From the more hard-nosed perspective of relative gains and balances reflected in the second 
trade hypothesis, the greater the trade balance in a member state’s favor, the more that member state 
stands to gain. The idea is that membership would induce Turkey has to adjust itself to the Single 
Market, to which the member states are, themselves, already adjusted. The member states would, 
therefore, benefit because of Turkey having to make the terms of trade more favorable to the 
member states, and the greater the surplus of trade, the greater the benefit for the member state. 
The third hypothesis in this line-up, which looks at investments, argues that the greater the 
flow of investments between Turkey and each member state, the more that member state has a stake 
in Turkey, and the more it will be willing to support Turkey’s membership. Becoming a member of 
the EU would subject Turkey’s economy to the same rules and regulations as govern European 
economies. While some of those rules and regulations might reduce returns on investment, many of 
them strengthen the security of those investments in terms of strengthening the investors’ rights 
over their investments and the returns on their investments. They also clarify the regulatory 
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environments and make them subject to more predictable changes, thus reducing transaction costs 
of having radically different regulatory environments. The results of the proportional reduction of 
error tests, for each of the hypotheses under three different time-lag scenarios are given in Table 
10.23, below.  
Table 10.23: γ-rates for Trade and Investment Volumes and Balance 
Cumulative time lags Time lag 0 Time lag 1 Time lag 2 
Trade volume 0.14 0.16 0.08 
Investment volume 0.11 0.06 0.09 
Trade balance 0.0 0.0 0.08 
  
What is immediately striking is the lack of explanatory value the trade volumes and balances and the 
investment balance have. None of these hypotheses have much explanatory power in comparison to 
many of the hypotheses tested above. As such, there is no case to be made that European countries 
support or oppose Turkey based upon how much trade is done with Turkey or invested in Turkey. 
All three hypotheses are, therefore, rejected. 
10.5.1.3 Migration and employment 
Hw5: Member states with low levels of unemployment are more likely to be 
supportive of Turkish membership than member states with high levels of 
unemployment. 
The results from the proportional reduction of error test of policy by unemployment offers a very 
striking result. The test-results are given in Table 10.24 Below. 
Table 10.24: γ-rates for Unemployment and Policy 














Rate (Ur) 0.23 0.20 0.30 0.27 0.28 0.32 0.37 
NAIRU – Ur 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.20 0.11 0.11 -0.05 
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In terms of the relationship between the simple unemployment rates against the policies on Turkey, 
the proportional reductions of error are modest, with the exception of the cumulative 6-year time 
lag, which attempts to predict the policy by positing the average unemployment rate the episode year 
and the previous six years. In this regard, the variation over time is extremely modest. Testing with 
the control for the ‘natural’ rate of unemployment (NAIRU) provides proportional reductions of 
error that are negligible, in that these do nothing to help predict policies. 
However, what is very telling against the hypothesis is that the γ-rates are all positive, while 
the test is against unemployment. If the hypothesis were correct, low levels of unemployment would 
make member states more likely to support Turkey. This would be because they would then possibly 
have more workers, whereas high-unemployment countries would prefer the migrants stay home for 
fear that they would compete against their domestic unemployed for the few jobs available. 
However, because the γ-rates are positive against unemployment, it is clear that to the degree that 
there is a relationship, it is one that moves in the opposite direction of expectations. In fact, if 
anything, the countries with higher unemployment rates – of which Spain, Greece and Finland are 
the best examples – were generally more positive toward Turkey than those countries with 
comparatively low levels of unemployment – of which Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark and 
Austria are the exemplars.  
In order to further illustrate the relationship between the average unemployment level and 
the long-run policy, Graph 10.10 shows the scatterplot and regression line. The correlation 
coefficient for the long-run policy and the average rate of unemployment over the period assessed 
showed a surprisingly strong result of r = 0.54. Considering the unexpected direction of the 
relationship, it can certainly be said that the hypothesis that higher levels of unemployment lead 
member-states to oppose Turkey needs to be rejected. However, because it is so contrary to the 
theoretical relationship, it begs the question of why the reverse appears to be more explanatory than 
the hypothesis is. What seems the most likely case is that the high unemployment countries have not 
historically been the destination of Turkish immigration. Therefore, it is not generally feared that 
more Turks will migrate to those countries in search of jobs. 
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Figure 10.14: Unemployment 
10.6 SUMMARY OF THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL HYPOTHESES 
The rational actor model hypotheses have, in univariate tests performed poorly in explaining 
member-state policies on EU enlargement to Turkey. Variables relating to security in military or 
crime-fighting terms did not demonstrate any correlation with member-states’ policies regarding 
Turkish membership in the EU. Military cooperation, ‘drugs and thugs’, and NATO-membership, 
had no predictive value in helping one predict which countries might be supportive of, or in 
opposition to, Turkey. In terms of counter-terror interests, however, it was found that countries 
suffering from greater threats from terrorism were somewhat more willing to support Turkey. This 
might, at least partially, explain member-state policies. As such, there is a case for using the threat of 
terrorism as a variable to test for in multivariate models, which will be introduced in pursuant 
chapters.  
With regard to interest in enhancing member-state influence at the international level or 
within the EU, there was no basis for believing that any of the related variables had any influence. 
Countries more frequently aligned with the United States (Atlanticism), more inclined toward 
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protectionist external trade policies, more in favor of enlargement generally, or interested in 
gumming up the works of deeper integration demonstrated very little more inclination toward 
supporting Turkey than their opposites on those issues did. While large countries were significantly 
more likely to support Turkey than the smaller countries were, just as net-recipients of the EU 
budget were, these variables do little to explain the variation in policies over time. In terms of the 
economic interests of the member states, these were very poor predictors of member-state policies. 
Measures of agricultural compatibility, trade, and investment had negligible levels of correlation with 
the policies. The exception on the economic indicators was unemployment at 5- to 6-year time lags. 
In this case, however, the statistical relationship was precisely contrary to the expectations of the 
related hypothesis.  
In terms of domestic politics, however, there is a more worthwhile tale to tell. While blanket 
public opinion was a decent predictor of the tendencies in member-state policies, it can be shown 
that it was not necessarily a cause of policies. In the striking case of Austria, for example, the policy 
was a better predictor of public opinion than vice-versa, suggesting the Austrian policy-makers 
helped turn their constituents against Turkey, rather than the policy-makers following the will of 
their people. Finland, curiously, tended to set policies in Turkey’s favor when the polls were down 
and against Turkey when the polls were up. 
Testing against the political ideology of governments provided a better predictor of member-
state policies. Right-wing governments tended to be less supportive of Turkey than left-wing 
governments. It was much clearer, however, that countries where there are many Turks in the 
population, were much easier to predict in terms of government ideology and policy outcomes than 
countries where there were fewer Turks in the population. There is tenuous support for the idea that 
governments and oppositions might have used the Turkey to maintain or take power. 
The most significant finding, then, was the one that predicts policy changes pursuant to 
changes in government in countries with large Turkish communities. This, essentially, multivariate 
approach proportionally reduced errors over random predictions by 68%. That is significant, but still 
an incomplete story. It is incomplete, because it does nothing to predict the behavior of the 
countries without large numbers of Turks. The United Kingdom and Luxembourg both have 
relatively few Turks, but their policies could barely be more different from one another. The same is 
true of, say, Italy versus Finland. Where the one is constant, the other is highly varied over time. 
The purpose of the following chapter is to see if the Constructivist variables identified in the 
second chapter have greater predictive powers than the rationalist hypotheses do. At the end of that 
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chapter, the ANOVA F-scores, correlation coefficients, and proportional reduction of error rates 
will be compared in a table to see which variables are worthwhile pursuing in multivariate models. 
Seeking and testing those multivariate models of explanation is the purpose of the twelfth chapter. 
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11.0  TESTING CONSTRUCTIVIST HYPOTHESES 
Where the previous chapter summarized the dependent variable and assessed the rationalist 
hypotheses, this chapter considers the constructivist hypotheses, likewise testing each in turn. The 
sections are divided into those dealing with identities, norms and values. The hypotheses dealing 
with identity look at religion, nationalism and cultural differences. Hypotheses looking at norms 
consider the Copenhagen enlargement regime and different degrees of socialization of the member 
states. The hypotheses concerning values look at the different degrees to which the member states 
embrace the values embraced by the political Copenhagen criteria. 
In the chapter’s conclusion, the results of all the hypothesis tests from this and the previous 
chapter are summarized. The hypotheses that were not rejected are carried over into the next 
chapter, Chapter 12, which looks at multivariate models that use multiple variables to create a 
broader picture.  
11.1 IDENTITY 
The following sections consider different types of identity. The first section looks at religion and the 
degree to which the content and degree of religious identities of the member states help explain their 
policies on Turkish membership. By contrast, the third hypothesis looks at religious out-grouping of 
Muslims, to see if countries where the people have greater fear or distaste for Muslims have a greater 
tendency toward opposing Turkish membership in the EU. The following section concerns 
nationalism, which is, in essence a measure of self-identification. The last section on identity looks at 
cultural differences, which, in essence, is a measure of other-identification. 
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11.1.1.1 Religion 
Hi1: Member states that are predominantly Catholic are more likely to be 
supportive of Turkish membership than member states that are predominantly 
Protestant. 
Hi2: Member states with a high level of religiosity are more likely to be supportive 
of Turkish membership than member states with a low level of religiosity are. 
Hi3: member states with lower levels of anti-Muslim sentiment are more likely to be 
supportive of Turkish membership than member states with high levels of anti-
Muslim sentiment. 
Religious denomination, Catholic vs. Protestant is a poor predictor of a member state’s likely 
position on Turkey. Given that there is a strong cadre of Catholic member-state supporters of 
Turkey, which include Italy, Spain, Belgium and Portugal, the regression line is slightly positive (see 
Graph 11.1, on the next page). However, at the same time, there are some very stalwart opponents 
in the Catholic camp as well, namely Austria and Luxembourg. On the Protestant side, the United 
Kingdom is clearly the most supportive of Turkey, while Denmark is the least supportive of 
Turkey’s membership ambitions. Overall, the correlation coefficient for the relationship between the 
two variables is r = 0.22, suggesting a weak relationship where Catholic member states are only 
slightly more likely to support Turkey than protestant member states are. 
It is further interesting to note that Germany and the Netherlands, countries that have very 
large minority denominations (in Germany the Catholics are in the minority, whereas in the 
Netherlands the Protestant and Catholic populations are close to parity, with a slight numerical 
advantage to Catholics), the average policies are not particularly in the driver or brakeman camp. 
Instead, they are drivers 60% of the time, and brakemen 40% of the time. 
Given the relatively consistent positions of the bulk of Catholic member states regarding 
Turkey’s membership, any role the varying and opaque pronouncements of the Vatican may have 
had on the matter can also be read as being relatively inconsequential for Turkey’s membership 
ambitions.  
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Figures 11.1 & 11.2: Religion and Religiosity 
Religiosity is the other religious measure, and the hypothesis posits that countries with higher 
degrees of religiosity will be more inclined to support Turkey for EU membership, because Turkey 
is also a very religious country. As Graph 11.2 makes clear, however, there is no relationship 
between a member-state population’s level of self-identified religiosity and a member-state’s policy 
regarding Turkey. This also means that the reverse of the hypothesis is also not true – that a more 
religious nation is more likely to identify the Turks as being religiously different, and therefore 
incompatible with the European ‘Christian Club’. 
In terms of religiosity as a function of church attendance, however, the relationship is not as 
non-existent. Graph 11.3 shows the scatter plot and regression line. Generally speaking, countries 
where people attend church more do show greater support for Turkish membership, as the 
regression line is an upward-sloping one. The correlation coefficient, for that matter, is r = 0.30, 
suggesting that the relationship has a medium strength to it, but that it is far from being a solid 
indicator. 
  













































































Figures  11.3 & 11.4: Church Attendance and Anti-Muslim sentiment 
The third hypothesis related to religious identity considers the out-group religious identity of 
Muslims. This posits that countries where fewer people would like to have Muslims as neighbors are 
less likely to be supportive of Turkey as a member state. Graph 11.4 shows the strength of the 
relationship. The regression line is virtually flat (and even slightly inclining), with very little tendency 
of the data points to scatter close to the line.  
Given the failure of all three of these variables to produce results that strongly support the 
hypotheses – in the case of denominations to have results that coalesce closely around the regression 
line, and in the cases of religiosity and anti-Muslim sentiment to have such coalescing or a 
relationship that strongly indicates a direction – it is fitting to conclude that there is not an apparent 
relationship between religion and member-state policies. As such, there is little evidence that the 
identity sharing between people of faith, or the Catholic-Protestant divide in Europe is explanatory 
of member-state policies. Further, there is no evidence that protection of the ‘Christian club’ is the 
reason for excluding predominantly Muslim Turkey. 
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11.1.1.2 Nationalism 
Hi4: Countries with low levels of nationalism are more likely to be supportive of 
Turkish membership than member states with high levels of nationalism are. 
This hypothesis is tested with two indicators. The first is the percentage of respondents in a member 
state who declare themselves to be ‘very proud’ to be of their nationality. This measure of national 
pride performs very poorly in predicting member-state policies regarding Turkey. Graph 11.5 shows 
the scatter plot and regression line of this independent variable against the long-run policies. 
With a correlation coefficient of r = -0.02 and a nearly flat the regression line, national pride 
has no predictive capacity in determining what countries may be more or less supportive of Turkey’s 
membership in the EU. The three stalwart opponents, Luxembourg, Austria and Denmark are in the 
middle of the pack when it comes to national pride, as are, roughly, Turkey’s most consistent 
supporters, Italy and the United Kingdom. As such, it cannot be said that nationalism in terms of 
‘pride in country’ has any influence on the desire to see Turkey excluded from the EU. 
 
Figures 11.5 &  11.6: Pride in and Fear for Loss of Nationality 
The idea that fear of the loss of national identity may fuel opposition to Turkey is also empirically 
groundless. The correlation coefficient is for these two variables is r = -0.08, enjoying very little 
more support than the precious measure of national identity does.  The scatter plot and regression 
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line of these two variables is given in Graph 11.6. Again, the citizens of the stalwart brakemen are 
not exceptionally more fearful of losing their identity than the average member state. The British are 
the most fearful of losing their national identity to the EU, while the Italians are the least fearful of 
losing themselves in the EU. As such, it does not appear that nationalism, measured according to 
these indicators, has any predictive capacity for member-state policies, and the hypothesis must be 
rejected. 
11.1.1.3 Cultural differences 
Hi5: Countries whose populations identify cultural differences as being the reason 
Turkey should not be allowed to join by greater degrees are more likely to oppose 
Turkey for EU membership than those who do so to lesser degrees are.  
Hi6: Countries whose populations consistently differentiate Turkey from other 
candidate countries less are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership 
than countries whose populations differentiate Turkey from other candidate 
countries more. 
The hypotheses regarding cultural differences pose the idea that the Turkey’s out-group status, due 
to the cultural differences between its people and that of the member states inclines member-state 
leaders to oppose Turkey’s candidacy. The first of these shows statistical support. Member states in 
which respondents strongly identify Turkey as being too culturally different to be allowed to join the 
EU are more likely to oppose Turkey in the European Council. The correlation coefficient is r = -
0.52, indicating that there is a medium-to-strong predictive capacity between the answers to the 
survey results and member-state policies regarding Turkey.  
Not strangely, this measure co-varies (r = -0.96) nearly perfectly with public support for 
Turkey’s membership as measured earlier. That suggests that there is certainly some cultural-identity 
effect at work in public opinion. However, the correlation coefficient between straight public 
opinion on being for or against Turkish membership (as has already been measured) correlates 
slightly better with member-state policies (r = 0.54) than the answers to the survey question on 
cultural differences do. This indicates that regarding the perceptions of cultural differences is not 
quite as good a predictor as the generic public opinion is about Turkey’s membership prospects is. 
As such, the idea that Turkey and the EU are not culturally compatible is likely no more than an 
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antecedent variable to raw public opinion (which has shown itself to be very variable over time), 
rather than a clearer lens into the policy maker’s cultural soul. 
Assessing the second hypothesis, which looks at public opinion over time, comparing 
Turkey to Bulgaria and Romania, produces interesting results. Using the comparison with Bulgaria 
and Romania essentially removes popular ‘enlargement fatigue’ from the omitted variables when 
assessing public opposition for Turkey’s membership. If the respondent’s opposition is due to 
enlargement fatigue, then the respondent ought not to be any more in favor of Romanian or 
Bulgarian membership than he or she is toward Turkish membership. It does not, however, control 
for the fact that while Romania and Bulgaria are smaller countries than Turkey, though Romania is a 
medium-large size country by European standards. Nevertheless, those factors would be constant 
factors and not variable over time; in the same way that the cultural differences are. 
The picture that emerges from a time-series comparison between public opposition to 
Romanian and Bulgarian memberships as opposed to public opposition to Turkish membership is 
that there is not a constant difference over time. In fact, for many countries, opposition to Turkish 
membership is roughly on par with that of Bulgaria and Romania in the earlier years (1996-2001), 
but then opinion significantly turns against Turkey in the later years (2005-2006). This is not due to 
improvements in opinion regarding Bulgaria and Romania. If anything, public opinion toward the 
candidacies of these countries, even in the years immediately prior to their accessions, worsened in 
comparison to the earlier years. The difference is the significant drop in public support for Turkish 
membership. 
This pattern is not, however, the same across all member states. The graphs below 
demonstrate the changes of different levels of public opposition to the candidacies of Turkey as 
opposed to Bulgaria and Romania. The differences in public opposition axis is turned upside-down, 
so as to graph the comparison to the policies in a positive fashion. The higher on the axis, the more 
favorable public opinion is toward Turkey as compared to Romania and Bulgaria. The 0-line marks 
where public opinion against Turkey would be on par with the other candidates. 
What the graphs make clear is that the lines for the differences with Bulgaria and Romania 
differ minimally compared to one another. In that sense, it demonstrates that the measures do not 
reflect particular dynamics concerning either of the other two candidate countries. The changes in 
opposition are overwhelmingly due to changes in regard to public opinion against Turkey’s 
candidacy. 
 
































Figure 11.7: Public Opinion (right y-axis, blue) and Policy (left y-axis, red). 
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The analytically important finding is that some countries show very striking changes whereas others 
do not. If the cultural differences explained opposition to Turkey, there ought to be fewer cases 
where public opposition was relatively close to opposition to Bulgaria and Romania and fewer cases 
where changes in opposition were as dramatic as they were. Table 11.1, on the next page, makes this 
distinction clearer.  
Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom – countries that 
have generally been favorable toward Turkey in terms of their policies – demonstrate relatively little 
differentiation between Turkey’s bid for membership and that of Bulgaria and Romania, and have 
demonstrated relative consistency in their levels of differentiating Turkey from the other two 
candidates over time. On average, they had a 4.5% greater opposition to Turkey than they did for 
Bulgaria/Romania. Further, on average, the standard distribution of the differences was about 5.3%. 
Among them, the Netherlands was the closest toward having both a high degree of variation and a 
high degree of differentiation between Romania/Bulgaria and Turkey. It is worthwhile to note that 
the Netherlands’ policy was also highly variable. In clearer words: the publics of these countries did 
not particularly favor Bulgaria and Romania over Turkey, nor did this significantly change over time. 
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece and Luxembourg, on the other hand, showed high 
degrees of average differentiation between Bulgaria and Romania, but public opposition to Turkey 
also changed a great deal over time. That Greeks should consider Turkey markedly different from 
Romania and Bulgaria should come as no surprise, given Greece’s history and tensions with Turkey. 
Public opinion toward Turkey shifted considerably after the 1999 earthquakes, and soured 
somewhat afterwards, but not quite to the level that before the calamities. France joins this category 
due to the sharp change between the earlier years (1996-2001) and the degree to which opinion 
soured in the later years (2005-2006). It differentiated between Turkey and Romania/Bulgaria rather 
modestly (5% difference) early on, and then sharply (24% difference) in 2005-2006. Luxembourg, 
Finland and Denmark show similar trends – modest-to-high degrees of differentiation in the early 
years and then very striking degrees in the last two. 
Italy and Sweden are the only ones that show the independent variable that the theory of 
cultural differences would expect – constant and high degrees of differentiation. If the lens of 
Turkey’s other-ness were the prime explanatory factor, then the public should have consistently 
perceived great differences between Turkey on the one hand and Bulgaria and Romania on the 
other. Further contrary to the theory, however, Italy was a consistent supporter of Turkey’s 
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membership and Sweden changed its position drastically from a brakeman in 1997, 1999 and 2004 
to a driver in 2004 and 2006, when the trends in public opinion would have expected the reverse. 
Table 11.1: Changes of Public Opinion and Degrees of Difference with Bulgaria and Romania. 
Degrees of change 
over time 




















Finally, Austria and Germany present the greatest puzzles in light of the theory of cultural 
differences. Both had public opinions in the early years that were generally more favorable toward 
Turkey than they were toward Romania and Bulgaria. That changed significantly in 2005 and 2006 
when Austrians and Germans generally soured on the accession of all three countries, but even more 
so against Turkey than against Bulgaria and Romania. If the hypothesis had been valid, then there 
ought not to have been such changes and they certainly should not have favored Turkey more than 
Bulgaria or Romania in the earlier years. 
Aside from the top-left-hand corner, that holds most of Turkey’s allies in the Council, the 
other three boxes do not show much of a pattern between the habitual drivers or brakemen. While 
Austria and Germany are both countries with a lot of Turks the same is true of the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and – to a lesser degree – Sweden. Italy and Sweden have nothing else in common with 
one another. The lower-right-hand box, holds two of Turkey’s most staunch opponents in the 
Council (Denmark and Luxembourg), but also France, Greece and Finland, all of which have, at 
times, been strong drivers of Turkey’s cause, even if they have also taken the brakeman side. 
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In all, it is clear that public opinion and (in 2005 anyways) perceptions of cultural differences 
have some impact on member-state policies, the policies and public opinion are too variable over 
time to be able to say that implicit designation of Turkey as an out-group identity is at the root of 
member-states’ policies. Therefore, the second hypothesis cannot be accepted as explanatory of the 
member-state policies.  
There is doubtlessly something at work when it comes to European peoples identifying the 
Turks as an out-group. However, the Europeans’ own in-group identities as religious members of 
their faiths or as nationalists has no bearing on member-state policies. Further, identifying Turks as 
an out-group has not been consistent over time. Public opinion regarding Turkey, and differentiating 
Turkey from Bulgaria and Romania, only became particularly acute after November 2001.  
Incidentally, the Fall 2001 survey (which captures October-November), was conducted after 
the 9/11 terrorist strikes, and did not show an immediate rise in public opposition to Turkey. In 
fact, there was a 3% drop in straight opposition to Turkey and an only 0.7% rise in the 
differentiation between Turkey and Bulgaria and Romania. This does not suggest an immediate 
reaction to the terrorist strikes, but perhaps a broader and slower development of an out-group 
identity to which the Turks were allocated. In any case, it shows that the identities, or, at least, an 
appreciation of out-group identities by the public, is not a fixed phenomenon, and is therefore not 
directly a function of cultural differences, but, at most, the changing saliency of those differences. 
11.2 NORMS 
The analyses below consider other constructivist theories and their derived hypotheses. The first set 
considers the weight given to the EU’s norms. First hypothesis tested in this set is the norm of 
playing by the EU’s own rules – the Copenhagen enlargement regime. The second is to discern if 
different levels of socialization has produced different policy outcomes.  
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11.2.1.1 The political Copenhagen criteria 
Hn1: Member states are more likely to be supportive of Turkey’s membership after 
Turkey has demonstrated more progress toward meeting the political Copenhagen 
criteria than when Turkey has demonstrated less progress. 
In essence, the Copenhagen enlargement regime is a restriction on the member states that is 
supposed to prevents them from disallowing the accession of a candidate that meets the 
Copenhagen criteria. In determining if Turkey’s own progress has been effective in moving its 
case for membership forward in the European Council, it has first been necessary to determine if 
the sum of policies at each episode shows significant variation over time. In other words, has the 
Council, as a whole, demonstrated changing policies in aggregate that might reflect Turkey’s 
different degrees of progress? 
The empirical answer to this question is ‘yes’. In the change from 1997 to 1999, all countries 
that changed their policies changed their policies in a positive direction. In the change from 1999 to 
2002, only two countries modestly changed their positions (Portugal and Ireland from passenger to 
driver), while countries modestly changed their policies and two significantly changed their policies. 
This represents a significant shift toward brakeman policies during that interval. From 2002 to 2004 
there was a reversal in that four countries (Finland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Sweden) reversed 
their positions in Turkey’s favor from brakeman to driver positions. Against this, only one country 
(France) modestly shifted from a passenger to a brakeman position. The tide reversed again from 
2004 to 2006, when four countries (Germany, Greece, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) reversed 
their driver positions to brakeman positions and one country (Ireland) ceased its active support for 
Turkey. 
In that sense, the variation in the cumulative dependent variable per episode intervals is this: 
1997, 2002 and 2006 the countries were nearly evenly split between the drivers and the brakemen. In 
1999 and 2004, on the other hand, the drivers vastly outnumbered the brakemen. In 2004, the 
drivers outnumbered the brakemen 4.5-to-1, and in 2006 4-to-1. This means that if Turkey’s 
behavior influenced the member states across the board by making impressive strides toward the 
Copenhagen criteria, they would have done so in the 1997-1999 interval and the 2002-2004 interval. 
By contrast, they would have disappointed the member states in the 1999-2002 interval and the 
2004-2006 interval. If Turkey’s degree of progress toward the Copenhagen criteria is a significant 
factor in how the Council votes on its membership prospects, variables that capture that progress 
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need to align with that down-up-down-up-down/wave-like pattern over the episodes. This is done 
in a graph for easy visual comparison. The graphs, below, are scaled in order to comfortably 
encompass the range of actual values, rather than the range of potential values. 
According to both of the graphs on the next page, a curious picture emerges. According to 
the Freedom House indices of political rights and civil liberties, the first two episode intervals saw a 
marked improvement in the balance of member-state policies while Turkey’s progress toward the 
criteria was stagnant, and a downturn in the balance of member-state policies concurrent with 
Turkey’s most significant improvement in its progress toward the criteria. This is precisely contrary 
to the liberal community hypothesis. However, from 2002 to 2004, there is a strong upsurge in the 
balance of member-state support for Turkey concurrent with an improvement of Turkey’s civil 
liberties and political rights, and a marked downturn in the balance of member-state policies when 
Turkey’s progress toward the criteria is stagnant. These last two intervals are in line with the 
hypothesis. 
According to the CIRI measures, the relationship is even more muddled, and actually 
contradictory at every stage. From 1997 to 1999 there is a decline in Turkey’s measures of its liberal 
democracy, while the balance of member state policies improve. The reverse is true in the following 
interval where Turkey is making strides to return to its previous levels with the return of democracy, 
the abolition of the death penalty, and other positive developments, but the member states reject 
Turkey’s bid to begin accession negotiations. When that bid fails, Turkey’s scores according to CIRI 
plummet, when an overwhelming majority of member-states vote in favor of opening accession 
negotiations. After another drastic downturn in 2005, but a very strong recovery in 2006, the 
member states freeze several of the negotiating chapters. This particular data is wholly contrary to 
the hypothesis, but is probably best explained by inadequacies in the data, especially as it contrasts 
with the Freedom House data and, qualitatively, with the European Commission’s annual reports.  
In the Freedom House data, measuring the Political Rights index (dark blue line) and the 
Civil Liberties index (light blue line), against the balance of member-state policies, there is no 
improvement of either score that explains the significant improvement in the balance of member-
state policies from 1997 to 1999. In 2002, while conditions improved for both measures, the Civil 
Rights index still lagged under the minimal standards, explaining why the balance of member-state 
policies was too modestly in Turkey’s favor to open accession negotiations.  
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Freedom House Cingranelli-Richards 
  
Figure 11.8: Freedom House and Cingranelli-Richards, Encouragement Model. 
Freedom House Cingranelli-Richards 
  
Figure 11.9: Freedom House and Cingranelli-Richards, Minimal Standards Model.  
By 2004, however, civil rights had improved to the minimal degree and accession negotiations were 
opened. Given that they did not improve afterward helps explain member-state disappointment and 
a significant decline in the balance of policies. However, strictly analytically, if the minimal standards 
are adequate, it does not explain such a souring of policies. The 1997-1999 interval is unexplained, 
except that the minimal standards did not necessarily have to be met in 1999 in order to warrant 
candidacy.  
By contrast, again, the picture is more complicated using the CIRI data. The Physical 
Integrity index (dark blue line) generally improves over the course of the episodes, which is generally 
consistent with the Freedom House data and the European Commission’s findings. However, it 
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never meets the minimal criteria previously imposed on other candidates. Quite the contrary picture 
emerges from the Empowerment Rights index, which is generally declining in trend, with more than 
minimal scores until 1999, and only twice meeting the minimal level in 2002 and again in 2006. It is 
curious, then, that the balance of member-state policies moves is stark contrast to the 
Empowerment Rights index. 
With the Freedom House data, measured according to the minimal standards approach 
being the best fit out of the four tests, this is the best model for disaggregating the balance of 
policies, and comparing with the policy developments of the individual member states, to see how 
well this model predicts member-state behavior. Testing this means combining both the Political 
Rights and the Civil Liberties score back into one quantitative variable. Rather than summing the 
scores, the two scores are combined by summing the deviations from the minimal standard. When 
tested against the individual policies of the member states, the changes in Turkey’s liberal democracy 
score, however, produces very poor results for predictive power. On the whole, it returns a 
proportional reduction of error score of γ = 0.11, meaning that it improves the prediction by only 
11%. 
Analytically, the real puzzle is why member states in 1999 drastically changed their positions 
from negative to positive without which Turkey’s democracy and human rights situation 
dramatically improved. The particular countries that significantly changed their policies in Turkey’s 
favor were Greece and Germany, while Finland and Spain became vocal on Turkey’s behalf and 
Denmark ceased to be particularly outspoken against Turkey’s membership ambitions. Otherwise, 
no countries were more negative in 1999 than they were in 1997.  
From the point of view of encouragement, the following interval is also puzzling. Turkey 
made great strides in improving its domestic political and human rights environment, but were not 
rewarded for their efforts by the member states. Finland and the Netherlands changed from being 
outspoken supporters to outspoken opponents. Austria and Denmark also became outspoken 
opponents, while on the other side Ireland and Portugal joined the driver camp. Critically, France’s 
enthusiasm for Turkey’s membership waned.  
This change is understandable from a ‘minimal standards’ point-of-view, as Turkey had 
made great strides but did not yet sufficiently satisfy the criteria. The rule had been made that to 
warrant accession negotiations, the minimal standards needed to be met, while these minimal 
standards were not required for candidacy. That, however, makes the 1997 decision all the more 
puzzling in contrast to 1999. If candidacy did not require minimal standards, why, then, were so 
  482 
many member states opposed to putting Turkey in the same category as other candidate countries in 
1997? Furthermore, if Turkey was deemed to have met the minimal standards in 2004, and had not 
retrograded by 2006, why did the member states turn against Turkey to the degree that they did?  
Given these puzzles and the low proportional reduction of error rate, it is difficult not to 
conclude that Turkey’s progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria is not determinative of 
Turkey’s progress toward membership. This finding is also contrary to the rhetoric of member states 
that adopt brakemen positions in name of Turkey’s lack of progress as well as that of member states 
encouraging Turkey to push forward their domestic reforms. In the case of Turkey, then, the liberal 
community hypothesis cannot be supported.  
These results also question the idea that rhetorical entrapment silences brakemen when the 
candidate performs well and drivers when the candidate performs poorly. In the empirical record, 
both made their views known loudly, and, other than in 1997, passengers policies – the expected 
behavior of a rhetorically entrapped actor – were quite rare. Because 1997 was, essentially, the outset 
of the process, it does not count. Afterward, there were only six out of sixty cases of passenger 
policies. While rhetorical entrapment may explain why a member state did not veto, it cannot explain 
why brakemen would become full-throated drivers and vice versa, which seven of the fifteen 
member states did at least once, including both France and Germany. 
11.2.1.2  Socialization 
Hn2: Member states that have been members of the EU for similar amounts of time 
will exhibit behavior that is more similar to one another than to member states that 
have been members for significantly different lengths of time.  
Hn3: Member states that have been member of the EU longer are more likely to 
have their support or opposition governed by Turkey’s level of progress toward 
meeting the Copenhagen criteria than member states that have been members for 
shorter periods of time. 
The concept of socialization captures the idea that actors that have been participants in a regime will 
internalize the norms of the regime. Given that socialization is a gradual process, the explanatory 
variable is, essentially, the length of time that a member state has been a member. Because the 
EEC/EU grew gradually with several waves of enlargements, it is simple to see if members of the 
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same waves behaved more or less more similar to one another than to members of other 
enlargement waves. 
The four groups are: the founding members, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands, the first wave of accession countries: Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, the second wave Greece, Portugal and Spain, and the third wave, Austria, Finland, and 
Sweden. It is also possible to differentiate Portugal and Spain from Greece, given that Greece joined 
five years before the Iberian members did. The Graph set below shows the policies of the member 
states in their different groups by enlargement order. 
The graphs on the next page (Figure 11.10) quickly dispel the idea that members of the 
different waves of joining the EEC/EU have similar behavior. The first graph, showing the 
founding member states, shows a confused zig-zag of policies among precisely the members that 
ought to have been socialized the longest. Their average level of support, using the (–1,0,1) scale 
across each episode) was 0.27, suggesting that on average the founding members were only a touch 
more favorable towards Turkey than they were opposed, and had a standard deviation in their 
policies of 0.9. 
The second group includes the United Kingdom, one of Turkey’s stalwart supporters and 
Denmark, Turkey’s most consistent antagonist. Ireland, on the other hand, is the member whose 
policies have most closely aligned with the Turkey’s developments toward the Copenhagen criteria. 
Their average level of support was 0.2, suggesting that they were also just slightly more in favor of 
Turkey than they were against, but, with a standard deviation of 0.8 it is also clear that their support 
was quite varied.  
The third group, including Greece, Portugal and Spain, show the greatest commonality of all 
the groups, especially between Portugal and Spain. Their average level of support was 0.53 with a 
standard deviation of 0.74. This means that they were, on average, twice as favorable as the founding 
members and the members of the first enlargement wave, but only slightly less varied in their 
policies – mostly owing to Greece opposition in 1997 and 2006. 
Finally, the post-Cold War enlargement group, including Austria, Finland and Sweden also 
shows a little commonality between Sweden and Finland in 2002, 2004 and 2006, and all three 
commonly opposed Turkey in 2002. However, given their short-term membership in the EU, there 
ought to have been the least amount of socialization among them. Their average level of support 
was –0.13, meaning that they were slightly more opposed than supportive, but with a standard 
  484 




Belgium, France, Germany, Italy  
Luxembourg, & Netherlands 
 
Denmark, Ireland & 
United Kingdom 
 
Greece, Portugal & Spain 
 
Austria, Finland & Sweden 
Figure 11.10: Policies regarding Turkey by Order of Enlargement. 
Given that there is nothing to suppose that longer socialization brings similar policies, and the fact 
that Turkey’s advance toward the Copenhagen criteria is a poor predictor across the board, there is 
no evidence to support the second hypothesis that predicts that the founding members ought to be 
the most aligned with the norm of supporting Turkey in line with its advancements toward meeting 
the Copenhagen criteria. Both hypotheses are rejected. 
These two analyses conclude the measurements of the effects of norms on the process. 
Adherence to the norm of not disallowing a member that meets, or progresses toward, the 
Copenhagen criteria to progress through the enlargement regime does not help predict member-
state behavior. That is not to suggest that Turkey need not worry about meeting the criteria in order 
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to become a member of the EU. It will doubtlessly have to meet them in order to become a 
member. 
The findings, here, however, do question Schimmelfennig’s theory that the brakemen were 
entrapped by their own rhetoric and thus permitted Turkey to become a candidate in 1999 and start 
accession negotiations in 2005. The brakemen were not entrapped; they were outvoted. At best, 
rhetorical entrapment suggests that they ought not exercise a veto over the process. Yet, the norm 
against the unilateral veto is not a part of the Copenhagen enlargement regime; it is a part of the 
overarching norm embedded in the Luxembourg Compromise that pressures member states to only 
veto proposals that would harm interests of a ‘particular importance’ to them.  
Further, if norms strengthen as a result of socialization, it is not clear that socialization has 
affected more regularized behavior among the member states that have been in the regime the 
longest. The founding members do not demonstrate any more common behavior than any of the 
other member states do. The greatest similarity of policy was found among the different groups was 
found among the Mediterranean members of the third wave, but that is largely led by similarities 
between Portugal and Spain, which may be explained by many different reasons, given the many 
commonality of characteristics between them. 
The next section considers values. This is treated differently from norms, even the analyses 
will look at similar concepts and measures. The distinction is about the degree to which values are 
shared between Turkey and the different member states, or the degree by which the values matter 
for public opinion.  
11.3 VALUES 
The third Constructivist angle is values. Values are shared beliefs, and in the European Union, the 
belief in liberal democracy and the rule of law is, ostensibly, the shared belief that is supposed to hold 
the community together. As has already been mentioned in the assessment of norms, it is the 
adherence to the values of liberal democracy and the rule of law that makes a country suitable to be 
a member. However, the member states exhibit adherence to those values to varying degrees. Some 
countries are more strict with themselves on, or have fewer temptations to diverge from, these 
values. The following hypotheses test the notion that those countries who are stricter will be less 
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likely to admit a Turkey that is lagging in their embrace of the community values, while countries 
that have a more problematic record will be more lenient with Turkey. 
11.3.1.1 Shared political values 
Hv1: Member states with lower levels of adherence to the values of liberal 
democracy are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member 
states with higher levels of adherence to the values of liberal democracy are. 
Hv2: Member states with lower levels of corruption are less likely to be supportive 
of Turkish membership than member states with higher levels of corruption are. 
The tests of shared political values return partially significant results. The Freedom House civil 
liberties score has some explanatory power (r = 0.46) when using the values of 2001 and earlier 
against the long-run policy average. After 2001, all member states (save Greece) enjoyed scores of 1 
for civil liberties. Given that Freedom House political rights score for all member states was a 1 
during all the years in question, there is no variation to test, and that score cannot have any 
explanatory value. 
The CIRI data also produces some results. While the empowerment index score measured 
either as member-state values (r = -0.01) or as difference-with-Turkey values (r = -0.02) does not 
show any explanatory power, the physical integrity index does. When measured as a difference-with-
Turkey value – taking the member state score and subtracting the score for Turkey, and drawing an 
12-year (1994-2006) average – there is a correlation of r = -0.44. That is slightly improved (r = -0.45) 
when just measuring only against the member-state score without measuring the difference with 
Turkey’s score. 
This suggests that there is at least some correlation between the physical integrity indices of 
the member states and their policies regarding Turkey. The correlation is negative in the sense that 
the higher the physical integrity index score, the less likely that member state is to be supportive of 
Turkey, the way in which the hypothesis expects. However, it is not clearly so that it is the similarity 
of values with Turkey that is the operative part. If that had been the case, the correlation of the 
‘differences with’ score would have been stronger than the absolute score. Instead, it seems like it 
has more to do with member-states’ own compulsion to consider the Copenhagen criteria as the 
important factors. 
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Figures 11.11 & 11.12: Measures of Human Rights and Rule of Law 
In this context it is noteworthy to observe that there is a relatively strong correlation between the 
answers to the Eurobarometer survey question about the importance of human rights and principles 
of democracy as criteria of EU membership. While overwhelming majorities (90%+) in all member 
states answer that upholding human rights and the principles of democracy are important criteria for 
membership, there is interesting variation in the number of people who answer this question 
positively (Most who do not declare it important answer that they are unsure; only 1%-2% answer 
that these things are not important). The answers to these question correlate (r = -0.40) with the 
physical integrity indices, suggesting that there may be some greater strength in the support for 
human rights as membership criteria in member states that, themselves, have stronger human rights 
practices. (Incidentally, the correlation between these survey answers and the long-run policy on 
Turkey is also r = -0.40.) 
Graph 11.7 (Figure 11.11) above, shows the scatter plot and regression line of the physical 
integrity against long-run policy relationship. It is clear that there are significant outstanding 
residuals. Clearly Austria’s level of support is much lower than its physical integrity index would 
suggest (According to CIRI, torture and extrajudicial killings are not unheard of in Austria), and 
Belgium seems to have be supportive of Turkey despite clear differences between Turkey’s human 
rights record and its own. 
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When analyzed with accounting for episode-by-episode changes in both physical integrity 
scores and the short-run policies of the member states, the resulting proportional reduction in error 
returns a γ = -0.54. A limitation to this model is that the independent variable has insufficient 
variation to offer a medium value between the lower category and higher category. Of the seventy-
five cases, here are three cases of scores of 5, ten cases of 6, 31 cases of 7 and another 31 perfect 
scores of 8. re-categorizing the 5s and 6s into the lower category, taking 7s as the medium category 
and 8s as the upper category reduces the measure of fit to γ = -0.39, which is not inconsiderable in 
comparison to many of the measures seen in this research. 
What these figures suggest is that when it comes to the types of human rights identified by 
the physical integrity index (disappearances, extrajudicial killings, political prisoners and cases of 
torture), those member states that have better human records are less likely to be supportive of 
Turkey than countries with somewhat tarnished human rights records. Specifically in terms of the 
hypothesis, however, it is not so much Turkey’s own performance that seems to play into it, as 
measuring the differences with Turkey does not seem to improve the measures over simply the 
member-states’ own performance. Essentially, this is due to the fact that the member states did not 
generally become much more positive toward Turkey as it improved its own record, as was already 
demonstrated above. Taking only Turkey’s Physical Integrity index scores against the member states’ 
short run policies reduces the error over random guessing by only 16% (γ = 0.16).  
The second hypothesis, regarding corruption, also produces a relevant result. The correlation 
coefficient is r = -0.49, showing that, in general terms, countries with higher scores (lower levels of 
corruption) are less likely to support Turkey for membership.  Graph 11.8, (Figure 11.12), above 
shows this relationship in the form of a scatter plot and regression line. In comparison to many of 
these scatter plots, the residuals are much fewer. The main outlier is the United Kingdom, whose 
corruption index is higher (lower corruption) than the average driver.  
In regard to helping predict the member states’ short-run policies, the test also produces 
medium-to-strong results. Measuring against the prediction of the hypothesis, taking differences 
between the CPIs of each of the member states and those of Turkey produces a proportional 
reduction of error of γ = -0.39. Taking the differences out of the equation, and simply assessing 
against the CPIs of the member states improves the predictive value to γ = -0.46. This, again, 
suggests that to the degree that perceptions of corruption are indicative of policies, it is not the case 
that it is revulsion over Turkish corruption that is leading, but perceptions of corruption in the 
home country. 
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This finding, along with the finding of the statistical relationship with the Physical Integrity 
index, shows that it there may be a case for a values effect. It is also the case that the Physical 
Integrity Index and the CPI between them show a high correlation of r = 0.71. Freedom House’s 
Civil Liberties index of 2001 also correlates highly with the Physical Integrity Index (r = -0.65) and 
the CPI (r = -0.73)45.  
11.4 SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES 
With all the hypotheses tested in turn, the following Table 11.2 shows the results of each in the 
different metrics of assessment, and whether or not the hypothesis is accepted for further analysis or 
rejected. Of these, a few reflected results that warrant a further look. 
Among the security-related hypotheses, terrorism is worth considering further, but NATO 
membership and participation in multilateral military missions proved not to have any explanatory 
value. The threat from transnational crime, as measured in heroin deaths seems significant but in a 
contrary direction to the to the expectations of the hypothesis. In the assessments of power, external 
trade policy returned a surprisingly high level of correlation. This was surprising as it is not 
altogether clear that those countries that trade more in the broader world would necessarily benefit 
from Turkey’s membership, given that Turkey trades just as much in the external economy as the 
average European does. While still not insignificant, it is clear that assessing the predictive power of 
external trade over time does not improve the predictive capacity of the variable, as the short-term 
assessment is not as strong as the long-term assessment. 
Among the other non-domestic power-related variables, only population size returned at an 
interesting level of correlation. It is clear that larger countries do tend to be more supportive than 
smaller countries do. This cannot, however, have any explanatory value in terms of why member 
states change their policies over time. Theoretically, it is also problematic at the organizational level 
of analysis, because it is questionable if the large states really gain from having another large partner 
with whom they must share power.     
 
                                                
45 The coefficients are negative because lower values on the Civil Liberties index indicate greater protection of civil 
liberties. 
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Table 11.2: Summary of Rationalist Hypothesis-testing. 
Hypothesis (Construct) ANOVA Pearson’s R 
Gamma 
(γ) Reject? 
Hs1 NATO membership 1.07 N/A N/A Rejected 
Hs2 Military missions N/A N/A 0.01 Rejected 
Hs3 Terrorism N/A 0.31 0.48 Not Rejected 
Hs4 Transnational crime N/A -0.48 -0.34 Rejected 
Hp1 Atlanticism vs. continentalism 1.06 N/A N/A Rejected 
Hp2 External trade policy 1.32 0.59 0.44 Not Rejected 
Hp3 Enlargement policy 1.59 N/A N/A Rejected 
Hp4 Euroscepticism 0.49 N/A N/A Rejected 
Hp5 Large vs. small N/A 0.42 N/A Not Rejected 
Hp6 The EU budget N/A 0.21 N/A Rejected 
Hp7 Public opinion N/A 0.54 0.39 Not Rejected 
Hp8 Political party ideology N/A N/A 0.48 Not Rejected 
Hp9 Political opportunism N/A N/A N/A Not Rejected 
Hp10 Immigration politics – oppose N/A -0.34 N/A Not Rejected 
Hp11 Immigration politics –     frequency of change N/A 0.33 N/A Not Rejected 
Hp12 
Immigration politics – 
relationship between changes 
of government and policy 
N/A -0.68 N/A Not Rejected 
Hw1 Agricultural trade N/A N/A 0.18 Rejected 
Hw2 Volume of trade N/A N/A 0.16 Rejected 
Hw3 Volume of investment N/A N/A 0.11 Rejected 
Hw4 Trade surplus N/A N/A 0.08 Rejected 
Hw5 Migration and unemployment N/A 0.54 0.37 Rejected 
 
The tests of the significance of domestic power relations were all fairly strong, suggesting that the 
domestic arena has great explanatory potential. In particular, countries with many domestic Turks 
seemed to have much greater correlation between changes in government and changes in policy, 
whereas countries with fewer domestic Turks either had more steady policies or their policies did 
not correlate with the changes in government as strongly. The domestic angle is clearly the strongest 
contestant for further investigation. The one caveat is that it does little to explain why the countries 
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with few domestic Turks decided their policies. After all, some had very steady and supportive 
politics, such as Italy and the United Kingdom, while others, such as Luxembourg and Sweden were 
much more likely to oppose. Finland is an example where there was much change in policy without 
which this is explained by the changes in government. Nor does Finland have many domestic Turks. 
The hypotheses relating to wealth faired particularly poorly. It is not at all evident that 
concerns over the agricultural sector or the possibility of strengthening trading and investment 
relations help explain why member states may be supportive or antagonistic to Turkey’s membership 
ambitions. The only hypothesis that approached significance was that concerning unemployment. 
However, that relationship showed that member states with tendencies toward high unemployment 
rates tended to be more supportive of Turkey than countries with low average unemployment rates. 
From the perspective of a need for workers in the economy, this is contrary to the expectation of 
the hypothesis. 
The constructivist hypotheses also had mixed results. These are listed in Table 11.3 on the 
next page. Among the identity-related hypotheses only the identification of cultural differences with 
Turkey returned a significant result. The others, relating to religion, religious intolerance, and 
nationalism, fared poorly. The factor recognizing cultural differences should quickly be tempered by 
the knowledge that it correlates near perfectly with general public opinion about Turkey. Where that 
correlation is imperfect, the general question about respondents’ enlargement preferences performed 
better in explaining member-state policies, suggesting that cultural differences may be more 
rationalization than rationale. 
A very significant finding (significant because of its statistical insignificance) was that 
Turkey’s progress toward the political Copenhagen criteria (or lack thereof) did not explain member-
state policies. This is significant, because the enlargement regime prescribes – and policy-makers 
take many pains to assert it as such – that Turkey’s progress toward meeting these criteria are the 
only factor that really matters. However, while the sum of member-state policies varied widely over 
time, the variation did not align at all with Turkey’s actual progress toward becoming a more liberal 
democratic country.  
Far more significant than Turkey’s progress toward being a liberal democratic country were 
the member states own records along the same measures. Countries with imperfect records on 
torture, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, political prisoners and – measured separately – 
corruption, were far more likely to be supportive of Turkey. In that sense, similarities of political 
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culture (or deviations from the liberal democratic norms and values) were fairly explanatory of 
member-state policies. 
Table 11.3: Summary of Constructivist Hypothesis-testing. 
Hypothesis (Construct) ANOVA Pearson’s R 
Gamma 
(γ) Reject? 
Hi1 Catholics vs. Protestants N/A 0.22 N/A Rejected 
Hi2 Religiosity  (church attendance) N/A 0.30 N/A Not Rejected 
Hi3 Anti-Muslim sentiment N/A 0.04 N/A Rejected 
Hi4 Nationalism N/A -0.02 N/A Rejected 
Hi5 Cultural differences  N/A -0.52 N/A Not Rejected 





Hn1 Political Copenhagen criteria N/A N/A 0.11 Rejected 
Hn2 Socialization: similar time N/A N/A N/A Rejected 
Hn3 Socialization: norm-governed policies. N/A N/A N/A Rejected 
Hv1 Liberal democratic values N/A -0.45 -0.54 Not Rejected 
Hv2 Corruption N/A -0.49 -0.46 Not Rejected 
 
The immediate overall conclusion that can be drawn from the lists in the preceding tables is that 
very few of the theoretically suggested independent variables produce predictions that perform 
better than improving proportionally predictions more than 50% over random guessing. Those that 
come closest are related to terrorism, public opinion, domestic politics and the politics of 
immigration on the rationalist side and political values on the constructivist side. 
The following chapter pulls these results together in testing if multivariate approaches can 
help put together a comprehensive picture. With that done, Chapter 12 also reviews country-by-
country what the implications of this research are, and what it may mean for Turkey’s winding path 
toward membership, should it choose to persist. 
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12.0  TAKING TALLY 
The previous chapters have taken the empirical record of member-state positions on Turkey’s 
progress toward membership and tested the variation of these positions against 32 different 
theoretical reasons – drawn from two metatheoretical paradigms – for which they might make their 
policies. Very few of these hypotheses explained more than a third of the variation in the policies, 
and fewer still could explain more than half of that variation. The first purpose of this chapter is to 
bring the variables from the best-performing hypotheses and puzzle together a multivariate 
understanding of what drives member-state governments. 
Doing so involves testing well-performing hypotheses against the population not explained 
by the best-performing theory from the previous chapters. This theory is that the domestic politics 
of, essentially, past-tense Turkish immigration, has governed member state policy making on Turkey. 
This theory explains why some countries are almost perfectly explained by their domestic political 
changes and others are not. Countries that have relatively large Turkish communities show high 
degrees of correlation between domestic political change and policy change, while countries that do 
not have many Turks do not tend to have their policies on Turkey change with their political winds. 
While this worthwhile finding explains most of the key countries (including France and Germany) it 
leaves most of the countries unexplained. The challenge is, then, to identify that hypothesis that best 
explains the remaining countries.  
The first portion of this chapter further explains the differentiation between the ‘politically 
motivated’ members, and those whose policies need to be explained by other factors. It describes 
which member states are in this category and why.  
The second portion describes the variation found in the remaining group of states and how 
this variation is analyzed. It proceeds to test those hypotheses that were found to have at least some 
explanatory power in the previous chapters against the remaining population. Those that show a 
marked increase in the two measures of association that have already been used will be held to be 
explanatory of the remaining cases.  
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The third section details what these findings mean in both theoretical and particular terms. 
What are the implications of these findings for the metatheories discussed in the first chapter? What 
do the different categories of state mean for understanding the enlargement process for Turkey? 
From there, it considers each member state in turn, exploring what the findings mean for 
understanding each member state’s approach to Turkish membership. 
The fourth and final section summarizes the above and, based in the findings of this 
research, suggests approaches Turkey may use in navigating the politics of the European member 
states going forward. Membership in the EU is far from guaranteed, but, even with all the 
difficulties, it is not an impossible prospect. The barriers to Turkish membership in the EU are very 
high, but they are not fixed insurmountable structures. It is suggested that with the domestic politics 
of immigration determining the policy decisions in the key countries, it is imperative for Turkey to 
alter those domestic debates if it is to prevent these countries mounting sufficient opposition to the 
process to derail the process altogether. 
12.1 THE POLITICS OF PAST-TENSE TURKISH IMMIGRATION 
Among the sets of hypotheses analyzed in the previous chapters, those relating to domestic politics 
demonstrated the strongest relationships between the suggested independent variables and the 
dependent variable. The explanatory power of the domestic-politics lens improved the more it was 
seen through the lens of Turkish immigration and changes in government by the ideological 
direction of the coalition parties. Analytically, then, this is already a multivariate analysis that couples 
the relative number of Turks in the population with governing party ideology to explain the 
member-state policies in question. 
Essentially, this is about the politics of Turkish immigration in the past tense. In the 
countries where this factor is salient, a large part of the Turkish community is of the first generation 
that came in the 1960s and 1970s, and the second generation of immigrants – their children. These 
communities are already established and many have acquired, or were born with, citizenship of the 
member states in which they reside. The further in-flow of Turkish citizens is fairly small compared 
to the stock of Turks of both generations already in these member states. Most of the growth rate of 
these Turkish communities is not determined by immigration, but by the natural growth rate.    
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Table 12.1, below, lists the countries in declining order of the percentage of Turks in the 
population. It also shows the Pearson correlation between changes in political party or coalition 
ideology and changes in the policy adopted. Austria, France and Germany are near-perfect examples. 
The Netherlands and Denmark also show very strong correlation coefficients in the expected 
direction.  
Table 12.1: Percentage of Turks in the population. 
Country % Turks Correlation 
Germany 3.02% -0.93 
Austria 2.49% -0.98 
Netherlands 2.05% -0.71 
Belgium 1.40% 0.67 
Denmark 0.95% -0.67 
Sweden 0.70% 0.61 
France 0.58% -0.91 
UK 0.17% N/A 
Finland 0.11% -0.15 
Luxembourg 0.11% -0.33 
Italy 0.02% N/A 
Ireland 0.01% 0.67 
Portugal 0.00% 0.67 
Spain 0.00% -0.41 
Greece ? -0.17 
 
Belgium and Sweden’s reverse direction, on the other hand are surprising. For Belgium this can be 
understood in light of what the ParlGov ideology measure reflects and what parties the measures 
stand for (see below). For the remainder, the score is either low or in a contrary direction. Given this 
finding, it is helpful to differentiate among the member states between those where politics are 
highly explanatory of policy and those where politics are not. Though each member state is detailed 
more extensively later in the chapter, it is worthwhile to recount the changes in the politics, to 
understand the political ideology numbers in less abstract terms. 
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In Germany, when the CDU and FDP were in power under the Kohl government, Germany 
was opposed to Turkish membership. Under the SPD-Grünen coalition of Gerhard Schröder, 
Germany strongly supported Turkey’s ambitions. This again changed under Angela Merkel’s 
Chancellorship, even while in coalition with the SPD. In Austria, the SPÖ-ÖVP government was 
relatively silent and ambivalent on Turkey, but the ÖVP-FPÖ government was vehemently opposed. 
In this respect, the countries with the largest share of Turks in the population are the best examples 
of the relationship between politics and policy. 
In the Netherlands, the PvdA-VVD-D66 coalition of Wim Kok explicitly favored Turkey. 
The rump of the Balkenende I (CDA-VVD) government in late 2002 that was left after the LPF 
party had been ousted opposed Turkey. Balkenende II (CDA-VVD-D66) supported Turkey but 
opposed Turkey again when D66 quit the coalition in 2006. While D66 was a very small party, there 
can be no doubt that under the counterfactual case of D66 not having been in the government in 
2004, there would not have been support for Turkey in The Hague. The D66 ministers – especially 
Jan Laurens Brinkhorst – were instrumental in pushing the Cabinet into the driver camp.  
In Belgium, too, the policy changed from passenger to driver when the Verhofstad’s liberal 
VLD took over as the largest party in the coalition, having defeated DeHaene’s Christian-democratic 
CVP. While the ParlGov measure of ideology gives VLD a slightly more right-wing score, it is quite 
clear that on this issue, VLD had a different policy agenda than CVP did. This is why the correlation 
coefficient for the Belgian case is relatively low and in the opposite direction of what is expected by 
the hypothesis. 
For Denmark, the case is not as clear. The Social-Democratic-led coalition of Poul Nyrup 
Rasmussen was opposed to Turkey in 1997, but took a passenger position in 1999. The right-wing 
coalition of his successor, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, was a consistent brakeman. For France, there is 
certainly evidence of domestic politics being explanatory, with the caveat that Jacques Chirac was 
personally supportive of Turkey, while his party was vehemently opposed. This made for strong 
French support when Chirac and the Socialist Party were in cohabitation, but the driver policy could 
not hold when the Socialists lost the government. 
In Sweden, by contrast, there is no relationship between domestic political change and policy 
change, as the policy change took place under the government of Göran Persson. Also, in the 
United Kingdom there has not been a hint that the Conservatives would have set a different policy 
from what the Labour party did. For the rest of the member states the only other government 
change leading to policy change was in Luxembourg when in 2004 the social-democratic SDAP 
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joined Jean-Claude Juncker’s Christian-democratic CSV in coalition. However, that same 
government changed the policy back to a brakeman position two years later. 
In order to pursue further inquiry into what variable or variables may explain those countries 
where the politics of Turkish immigration do not play such a clear role, it is necessary to divide the 
population into two groups – those where these domestic politics play a role and those where they 
do not. The former group consists of Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and 
France. While the pure numbers raise question marks behind the choice to include Belgium, and 
why to include France and not Sweden, these choices are for the following reasons: 
Belgium is included because of its relative large number of Turks and because the change of 
government, if not the ParlGov score, shows that Belgium’s policy changed when Verhofstad’s 
VLD came to power and removed the Christian Democrats. France is included for the same 
reasons, though more so on the side of the relationship between politics and policy than that of the 
relative number of Turks. Furthermore, while the percentage of Turks in France (0.58%) is fewer 
than in Sweden (0.7%), that percentage still represents nearly a half-million people. The Turkish 
community is further part of a very large Muslim immigrant population, which tends to be 
associated with the Turks in the minds of the native French populace. Sweden is excluded because 
there does not seem to be a domestic political motivation behind the policy aimed at stifling Turkish 
immigration. Sweden’s change in policy did not change when the government changed, despite 
having relatively more Turks than France.  
Something also needs to be said about the figures for Ireland and Portugal, which both score 
0.8 in the correlation between changes in government and changes in policy. For Ireland, this 
statistic arises because of a minute change in the representative seats in parliament at the same time 
as a policy shift from passenger to driver. In this case, after the 2002 elections, the share of coalition 
between Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats seats shifted slightly in favor of the latter (77-
to-4 to 81-to-8). The coalition did not, however, change between 2004 and 2006, when Ireland 
returned to a passenger policy on Turkey. As such, the coefficient belies the actual relationship. 
Regarding Portugal, a policy shift toward Turkey (also from passenger to driver) did take place after 
the Social Democratic Party of José Manual Barroso took power in 2002. That policy, however, 
remained in place in 2006 when the Socialist Party returned to power. This does not, realistically, 
constitute a relationship between political and policy change in the same way as it does in Germany 
and Austria. Further, Portugal and Ireland have analytically negligible Turkish populations.  
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As such, the politically explained countries – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
and the Netherlands – are differentiated from the rest of the countries. The politics of Turkish are 
highly explanatory of the changes in policy that took place in this group. In the others, other 
motivations or impulses need to be found in order to explain them. This is the purpose of the next 
section of this chapter. 
12.2 DETERMINING COMPLEMENTARY FACTORS 
If domestic politics are taken as explanatory of Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Denmark and France, what remains is to explain the variation in the remaining nine members. 
However, when looking at that remaining variation of policies, the picture is far more skewed than 
the distribution among the fifteen member states is. The only strong brakeman left is Luxembourg, 
whereas the drivers dominate the population. Table 12.2 characterizes the remaining members.  
Table 12.2: Distribution of the policy tendencies in the ‘other’ member states. 













The member-state specific sections later in the chapter will assess Luxembourg as the remaining 
brakeman. The middle category is not typified by a lack of positions – only Finland, once, took a 
passenger stance – but by the observation that their policies shift from brakeman to driver (or vice 
versa) without domestic politics being an explanation. In this particular line-up, the two 
Scandinavian countries might be considered to have more similar policies to one another while 
Greece is much more likely to have an explanation peculiar to Greece. However, it is not necessarily 
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the case that Finland and Sweden had similar policies. While their policies in 2002, 2004, and 2006 
were the same, Finland took a passenger stance in 1997 and a driver stance in 1999, while Sweden 
was a brakeman in both instances. Finland was second to the Netherlands in having a volatile policy 
(three policy shifts, two from one side to the other), while Sweden changed its policy only once.  
In the driver box there are the UK and Italy, who have consistently supported Turkey. In the 
UK’s case, there was no political change, while in the Italian case there were significant changes in 
government, but a constant policy regarding Turkey. Ireland, Portugal, and Spain have mostly been 
supportive or, at times, taken passenger positions. Broadly speaking, all three started off as 
passengers, either because they did not make their voices heard, or their voices were not listened to 
amid the fray between the more powerful and outspoken members. Spain became a driver in 1999 
and Portugal and Ireland followed suit in 2002. In 2006, Ireland, again, did not express its 
preferences loud enough to be heard, to the degree that it had strong preferences one way or 
another, which was not particularly evident.  
Aside from the hypotheses related to domestic politics, there are six other hypotheses that 
rose to interesting levels of correlation. These are security from terrorism, external trade, population 
size, religious identity, cultural differences, liberal democratic values and corruption. The key to 
finding which of these helps explain the remaining variation lies in seeing if they correlate stronger 
with the remaining member-state policy profiles than they did with the countries with domestic 
political concerns in the mix. 
The simplest means of doing so is to recalculate the correlation coefficients and proportional 
reductions in error with the six politically-motivated member states removed from the population. 
Taking note of the changes in measurements helps determine if there is added value from these 
hypotheses in explaining the remaining members. If the measures markedly increase, it indicates that 
these hypotheses help explain member state behavior in the absence of the overriding concern for a 
country’s domestic politics. The paragraphs below detail the findings of each recalculation, the 
numbers for which are summarized in Table 12.3. 
12.2.1 Terrorism 
In terms of terrorism, it is true that Ireland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom have suffered 
more under terrorism than Sweden, Finland and Luxembourg have. However, Portugal has been 
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relatively free of terrorism, but has still been supportive. Also, regarding Spain and Ireland, their 
threat from terrorism was greater in years when they held passenger positions. Further, without any 
terrorist incidents, Finland’s policy volatility and Luxembourg’s single episode (2004) of embracing a 
driver policy cannot be explained at all. 
In terms of measurement, when taking the politically motivated countries out of the 
population, the correlation between incidents of terrorism (with a 1-year time lag) and policies 
improves from r = 0.31 to r = 0.36. In terms of predicting across episodes, however, the 
proportional reduction of error measure, gamma, decreases from γ = 0.48 to γ = 0.37. As such, it is 
a difficult case to make for the threat of terrorism being a prime motivator for the remaining 
countries. The variable does not yield added value when removing the politically motivated 
countries, and should, therefore, be discarded from further consideration. 
12.2.2 External Trade 
The mysterious factor of external trade remains measurably significant, but the removal of the 
politically-motivated countries does not shift the measures much. The correlation coefficient 
improves from r = 0.59 to r = 0.60, while gamma reduces from γ = 0.44 to γ = 0.42. While it is 
clearly the case that free-trader members do seem to support Turkey more than protectionist 
members do, this is not particularly a characteristic that improves with time, or, at least, taking 
episodes into account. Furthermore, it continues to suffer theoretically from the idea that the free 
traders cannot predict that Turkey will have similar external-trade policy interests once it becomes a 
member, given that its degree of trade outside of the European Economic Area is on par with the 
average European country. 
12.2.3 Large vs. Small 
The other puzzling factor, population size, does show a marked increase. With Germany and France 
out of the picture, Italy the United Kingdom and Spain are at the big-country end of the size 
spectrum, with Luxembourg at the other. The Pearson coefficient rises from r = 0.42 to r = 0.79. 
Because relative population size did not differ much over the course of the episodes, there is no 
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cause for measuring the proportional reduction of error. Relative population size cannot explain 
change over time. 
In absence of the countries with a domestic political rationale, then, large countries were 
much more eager to have Turkey join their ranks than the smaller ones were. This was so, despite 
the fact that they would have to share power within the organization. Given that it is France and 
Germany that are excluded, this is not surprising. With France and Germany already as the leading 
two countries in European integration, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom can easily have an 
interest in diluting the primary influence of the Franco-German alliance by adding another large 
partner. France and Germany’s own policy patterns, however, suggests that they were not necessarily 
opposed to Turkey on these grounds. 
This is good news for Turkey’s membership ambitions, considering the relative (though not 
proportional) greater influence of the larger member states. The smaller member states may have a 
greater tendency to oppose Turkey, for fear of being drowned out by yet another large member 
state, but they will be at greater pains to stop the accession, should that become imminent. However, 
since population size is not a factor that can be affected, it is not something that ought to be treated 
as particularly meaningful.  
12.2.4 Religious Identity 
With the politically motivated countries removed from the population, it is not conceptually 
impossible that the religious identities of the member states would help explain member-state 
behavior more. However, that is not demonstrably the case. The correlation coefficient between 
church attendance and policy reduces slightly from r = 0.30 to r = 0.28, leaving the question 
essentially closed. While more religious countries (in terms of churchgoing) still tend to be more 
supportive of Turkey, this is not something that is more relevant outside of the domestic political 
angle.  
It is, however, once again meaningful to point out that opposition to Turkey is not because 
Europe is Christian. Nor, as it has already been observed, is it because Turks are Muslims and many 
European countries have bigoted populations. People’s unwillingness to have Muslim neighbors is 
no more significant among the remaining nine countries than it was among all fifteen. Therefore, the 
factor of religious identity can be removed from further consideration. If anything, greater religiosity 
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slightly predicts greater support for Turkey, but this is not improved with the removal of the 
politically-motivated countries and has no added value for understanding the remaining member 
states.  
12.2.5 Cultural Differences 
The same is true of cultural differences as a rationale for rejecting Turkey. While the correlation is 
still relatively strong, it reduces from r = -0.52 to r = -0.42 in terms of the relationship between 
popular opinion rejecting Turkey on cultural grounds and the policies of the governments 
representing those publics. The negative figures indicate the more that the cultural differences 
rationale is supported, the less likely a country is going to be a driver, as the hypothesis expects. 
Without any added value, however, there is no case for cultural differences being particularly 
explanatory of the remaining countries. 
12.2.6 Liberal Democratic Values 
By contrast, liberal democratic values, as measured by the CIRI physical integrity index, improve the 
degree to which member-state policies are predictable when the politically-motivated countries are 
removed from the population. The correlation coefficient improves from r = -0.45 to r = -0.68. This 
improvement also holds for the assessment across the episodes, with the proportional reduction of 
error rate increasing from γ = -0.54 to γ = -0.68. Again, the negatives are expected by the hypothesis 
– the higher the index score, the more the liberal democratic values are enacted into member states’ 
own policies regarding human rights the less likely they are to embrace a Turkey where the human 
rights situation is not perfect. 
This suggests that among the remaining countries, the countries with records of strict 
adherence to human rights – Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden – were much more likely to oppose 
Turkey’s progress through the enlargement process, while those with more faults in that field – 
Greece, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom – were not as sanctimonious in regard to Turkey’s 
record. The improved explanatory power over time is the result of last-episode declines in Finland 
and Sweden’s human rights records, when their policies were more positive toward Turkey than they 
had been earlier on.  
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12.2.7 Corruption 
The degree to which member states maintain a stricter rule of law remains fairly high. The 
measurement of the corruption perception index, which has higher values for countries with less 
corruption, slips a little in terms of the correlation coefficient, reducing from r = -0.49 to r = -0.38. 
However, the predictions across the episodes hold steady at γ = –0.46. As such, there’s no additional 
explanation from the degree to which the remaining member states adhere to the rule of law than 
there was before the politically-motivated member states were removed. It does, however, show that 
even in the absence of domestic politics, countries with strong rule-of-law institutions have a distaste 
for adding a country with rule-of-law problems such as Turkey to the EU’s membership.  
12.2.8 Summary of added findings 
The recomputed measures of association and prediction, r and γ, between these independent 
variables and the dependent variable are listed in Table 12.3, below. Among all the independent 
variables, only population size and the physical integrity index are shown to have added explanatory 
value over the dependent variable. Factors or motives related to terrorism, external trade, religiosity, 
cultural differences, and corruption do not seem to weigh in any more for the remaining member 
states than they did for the whole EU-15 range of member states. 
Table 12.3: Summary of hypothesis-test 
Hypothesis (Construct) 
Pearson’s R Gamma (γ) 
EU-15 9 members EU-15 9 members 
Terrorism 0.31 0.36 0.48 0.37 
External trade 0.59 0.60 0.44 0.42 
Population size 0.42 0.79 N/A N/A 
Religiosity 0.30 0.28 N/A N/A 
Cultural differences -0.52 -0.42 N/A N/A 
Physical integrity -0.45 -0.68 -0.54 -0.68 
Corruption -0.49 -0.38 -0.46 -0.46 
 
  504 
In regard to population size, this is not a factor that conceivably has a direct relationship. Only by 
imputing different interests of large countries compared to small countries can one really posit why 
this relationship appears to be significant. It is, however, worth noting because, to the degree that 
larger member states have greater influence on the European Council’s decisions, it is good news for 
Turkey going forward. The United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain can protect Turkey’s interests in the 
Council in more ways than Greece, Luxembourg and Sweden can harm them.  
The findings of the values approach are more theoretically interesting, however. The 
measures improved in explanatory power both across averages and when taking episodic change into 
account, improving the correlation coefficient from r = -0.45 to an impressive r = -0.68, and the 
proportional reduction in error to γ = -0.68. This suggests that human rights are not an unimportant 
factor in this story, but the way in which the factor is expressed is different from what is commonly 
understood. It is clear that it is not so much Turkey’s progress on the human-rights front that 
matters as it is member-states’ own performance in protecting human rights.  
 
 
Figure 12.1: Physical Integrity 
































Graph 12.1: Physical Integrity
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What this tautologically implies is that the political Copenhagen criteria matter to those countries for 
whom the political Copenhagen criteria matter. Among the remaining nine member states, the 
countries that scored better-than-average are Luxembourg, Finland, Sweden and Ireland. Ireland, 
while a driver in 2002 and 2004, took passenger positions in 1997, 1999 and 2006, making it, overall, 
a lackluster driver. 
In contrast to these are Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, all of whom 
had somewhat tarnished records. Among these, Greece was the least supportive of Turkey. Portugal, 
the best performing of this group was also the least enthusiastic of its support for Turkey, not 
joining the ranks of the drivers until 2002. This relationship against the average is depicted in Graph 
12.1 to the right. As per the stronger relationship, the regression line shows a steeper decline that the 
corresponding graph (Graph 11.7) in the previous chapter did. 
However, it is a step too far to say that Turkey’s progress toward the Copenhagen criteria 
explains the members in the lower-right-hand corner of the graph. Finland’s policy toward Turkey 
had changed from passenger to that of a driver in 1999 when improvements in Turkey had taken 
place, but it soured in 2002 without the human rights situation in Turkey having markedly 
deteriorated. Sweden and Luxembourg, on the other hand, did not change their positions to drivers 
in 1999 or 2002 after those improvements in Turkey happened, and Luxembourg soured on Turkey 
in 2006 without which Turkey’s situation deteriorated. This can perhaps be understood from the 
perspective of the minimal standards model, whereby Turkey had to progress to a certain level 
before all of them decided to be supportive. This happened in 2004, after which Turkey had 
progressed to a higher degree, though not as strongly as it did between 1997 and 1999. 
It is, however, the case that taking the difference between each member state’s physical 
integrity score and that of Turkey improves the proportional reduction of error from γ = -0.68 to γ 
= -0.73. Taking Turkey’s progress alone against the policies of the remaining member states yields a 
gamma of γ = 0.5146. This suggests that the member-states’ own levels reveal more about their 
policies than Turkey’s progress does, but that there is some added value to taking Turkey’s progress 
into account. In more descriptive terms, Turkey’s stalwart allies – who tend to have lower Physical 
Integrity scores – support Turkey regardless of Turkey’s human rights record. When Turkey 
progresses toward meeting the political criteria, by improving its human rights record, those 
                                                
46 This is a positive number because as Turkey’s score improves, so does its general approval by the member states. The 
other gamma rates are negative because, as the numbers in the independent variable increase, the less likely a member 
state is to be supportive.  
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countries with higher human rights standards (Finland, Luxembourg, and Sweden) also tend to 
come around and decide to be more supportive. These countries are, however, much fewer in 
number. 
What this means is that the three variables, domestic political change, the number of Turks, 
and the physical integrity index – together – explain most of the variation in the overall population. 
Essentially, what is explained by these variables is why countries oppose Turkey, not so much why 
they are supportive. While the laundry list of rationalist hypotheses proposed many reasons for 
supporting Turkey – burden sharing in military missions, cooperation in counter terrorism and crime 
fighting, economic benefits in terms of trade and finance – none of these proved to be predictive of 
why member states might be supportive of Turkey. Nevertheless, most countries were supportive of 
Turkey, with the brakemen usually in the minority. That suggests that, to the degree that member 
states are utility-driven rational actors, they are supportive for a broader set of reasons than the 
reasons that some of them are opposed. Occam’s razor points toward the reasons for opposing 
Turkey, rather than the reasons for supporting Turkey.  
12.2.9 Typology 
The headline finding is that there are, essentially, three categories of countries and one outlier. The 
three categories are the politically-motivated countries, the habitual drivers, and the sticklers. The 
outlier is Greece. The following table, 12.4, shows the distribution over the typology. 
Table 12.4: The typology of member-states in their approaches toward Turkish membership 
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The first of these categories – the politically-motivated countries – is the most significant in terms of 
Turkey’s membership prospects in the future. It consists of the six countries where the question of 
Turkish membership is linked to the politics of (Turkish) immigration. In these countries, the 
outcomes of elections help understand how a country will align itself in the debate over Turkey. This 
group consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France and the Netherlands. With 
Germany and France included in this group, it is essentially the main group which Turkey has to win 
over in order to progress through the enlargement process. 
The second group – the habitual drivers – is made up of countries that have generally 
positive attitudes toward Turkey joining the EU. It consists of Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the 
United Kingdom. These countries support Turkey in the European Council and prevent the 
brakemen from shutting the process down. They are characterized by their lack of immigration 
politics related to Turkish immigrants. This is because Turks did not move to those countries en 
masse in the 1960s and 1970s, the way they did to the countries in the first group of states. These 
countries, with, perhaps, the exception of Ireland, are not as concerned with Turkey’s human-rights 
record, because their own human-rights records are also not spotless.  
In terms of public opinion, it is also noteworthy that many more respondents from these 
countries reply with ‘don’t know’ in the Eurobarometer surveys about Turkey’s future membership. 
In the 2006 Standard Eurobarometer question about the desirability of future membership for 
Turkey, on average, 22% of respondents (from 15% of Italians to 30% of Portuguese respondents) 
reply with ‘don’t know’, whereas among the respondents from the other two categories, 7% of 
respondents do so (from 4% of Belgians to 11% of Swedes). When asked if respondents would 
support or oppose Turkey provided Turkey met all the membership requirements (asked in a Special 
Eurobarometer also in 2006), the number of ‘don’t know’ replies declined by 2% among politically-
motivated and stickler countries, whereas among the habitual drivers, that rate increased by 3%. This 
suggests that in the habitual driver countries, as opposed to the other countries, the populace has 
not been groomed by the political class on what to think, yea or nay, or, conversely, that it is not an 
issue that the voting publics care about, and so politicians are not going to use the matter as part of 
their political campaigns against one another. Whatever the reason, the difference is marked. 
The third group of countries – the sticklers – consists of three small member states with 
high human rights standards. They are Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden. These are countries that 
are generally sheltered from the sort of security risks that lure many states into transgressing human 
rights standards. As such, they have little tolerance for Turkey’s faults and realities, while countries 
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like the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy are more accustomed these, and, therefore, probably more 
understanding of Turkey’s challenges. That, or these other countries do not believe in the human 
rights values to the same degree that Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden do and are, therefore, not as 
worried about Turkey not having a stellar human rights record.  
This typology leaves out Greece. Greece does not fit comfortably into any of the categories. 
Its policies regarding Turkey have not been determined by its domestic politics, nor does Greece 
have a human rights record on par with Finland, Luxembourg or Sweden. Greece also does not have 
a policy as permissive of Turkey as the second group of countries. Greece’s more specific record on 
Turkey is discussed in further detail below. Suffice to say here is that it does not fit neatly into the 
preceding categories, due to the peculiar bilateral relationships between Greece and Turkey. 
In a typology of this type, it is very tempting to draw a table that puts political motivations 
on one axis and human rights on the other, allowing some members to be motivated by both or 
neither. While Greece can easily be put into the ‘neither’ field, it would share that field with the 
members of the second group – the five habitual drivers – despite Greece still being very different 
from them. The five habitual drivers never opposed Turkey’s advancement, whereas Greece has 
twice been a very vocal brakeman, willing to go to more extraordinary lengths to seek its 
preferences. 
The opposite side of this table would be trickier still. Denmark and the Netherlands are both 
countries that have been put into the politically-motivated category. They also share the attribute of 
having very good human rights records. Their policy patterns are, however, very different. The 
Netherlands, despite its exceptional human rights record, has been much more supportive of Turkey 
than Denmark has. Dutch policy can be almost perfectly explained by domestic politics, and 
therefore, for the Netherlands, it is not necessary to introduce a second variable. In terms of 
Denmark, a case can be made that human rights do matter, which may be why Denmark has been so 
reluctant to embrace Turkey’s progress through the system. Furthermore, it may explain why the left 
in Denmark was hesitant of embracing the Turks in 1997, and non-committal in 1999. However, 
immigration is seen as a more important issue in Denmark than many other countries, and Turks are 
a dominant immigrant group in Denmark. Therefore, Turkish membership may be too hot an issue 
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in Denmark for the left to be willing to touch, and they beg off doing so by naming human rights 
concerns.47 
12.3 GENERAL & SPECIFIC IMPLICATIONS 
This section details the findings of this research that help explain the tendencies of each member 
state and what this may mean for Turkey’s enlargement process going forward. First, however, it 
draws general implications for understanding the politics of Turkish accession. This involves 
revisiting the metatheories presented in the first chapter. After wrestling with those approaches, and 
what the findings above and in the previous chapters means for those approaches, it lists what this 
research implies for each member state in turn. While the typology, above, does give a very broad 
understanding of the member states, each, nevertheless, has its own story to tell, and there are 
unique nuances to all of them. 
12.3.1 Metatheoretical Implications 
The immediate implication of the findings, and the typology above, is that different countries require 
different approaches in terms of understanding their policy behavior as well as how to affect their 
future behavior. This first implication is dealt with more extensively in the remainder of this section, 
where each country is analyzed in turn. Another implication is of a theoretical, or, rather, 
metatheoretical nature. In assessing the series of hypotheses and how well they explained (or did not 
explain) member state behavior, both metatheories – rationalism and constructivism – are bloodied 
by their brawl with the empirical evidence.  
In terms of rationalism, what is found is that states are not unitary rational actors. With the 
predictive power of the domestic political angle, it is difficult to usefully maintain the analytical 
fiction that states are unitary actors. The defensive position that domestic politics is the process by 
                                                
47 According to successive Eurobarometer surveys, an average of 25% of Danish respondents names immigration as the 
most important issue facing their country. Aside from Spain and the United Kingdom, this percentage is much higher 
than for other member states. Because Turkey is not an origin of immigrants for Spain and the United Kingdom, the 
immigration issue does not touch Turkish membership politics in those countries the same way it does for Denmark. 
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which states determine their rational interests – that politics is simply the internal calculus of the 
actor’s rationale – is unsustainable. It hinges on the supposition that the countries’ purpose is to 
enhance their interests. This would imply that for the countries whose policies have changed 
frequently – of which the Netherlands, Finland, and Luxembourg are the exemplars – would be 
subject to changing external stimuli. These are, however, not in evidence. 
Given the absence of explanatory external rationales, the domestic pursuit of power is the 
remaining rationalist lens. From this angle, rationalism holds up in that politicians, in their pursuit of 
power within the domestic political market, have selected a political product for which there is 
demand. In countries with proportionally large Turkish communities, some politicians can win votes 
by agitating against Turkish membership in the EU, while others can win by accusing their 
opponents of bigotry. In countries without large Turkish communities, this is not as much of a 
winning issue, because their electorates do not think of Turkey as an origin of immigrants. 
This calls into question the material rationalism of these electorates. Do voters think of the 
material interests of their countries when they vote for politicians promising to keep Turkey out of 
the EU? EU Membership implies the free movement of persons. It is certainly plausible that those 
countries that already have large Turkish communities will draw more Turkish immigrants than 
those without large Turkish communities will. Migrants are more likely to move to countries where 
there is already community of similar people who can help the newcomers integrate. What remains 
unknown is if those added immigrants will be a cost or a benefit to the country, and what, exactly, 
the free movement of persons of EU membership will do to migration rates. 
It is rational for those electorates to support politicians who agitate against Turkish 
membership, as opposed to any other issue they care about, if the new immigrants will be a 
detriment to the country or the voters personally, and if Turkey, as an EU member enjoying open 
borders with the EU, will push more migrants into these countries. These two conditions contain 
many unknowable prospective elements, but the future economic and social conditions in Turkey 
and in the member state in question are the main factors. 
Given that many of the countries with large Turkish populations tend to have relatively low 
unemployment rates and aging populations, and that Turkey is a rapidly growing economy (meaning 
that it will quite possibly be an increasing tug on migrants to return), it is not at all certain that these 
countries have more to lose than to gain from Turkish membership – especially if membership will 
help Turkey develop socially and economically. Improved social and economic conditions in Turkey 
would mean a draw on poorer and less educated former migrants to return to a country where more 
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people speak their language and do not discriminate against their culture. It would also mean that 
new immigrants from Turkey might be more educated, if the reforms Turkey must undergo to meet 
the standards of the acquis communautaire help develop Turkey’s education system. By the same 
token, if those reforms help Turkey address its corruption problem, Turkey joining the EU will be 
an asset in many other ways (Lejour & de Mooij, 2005, p. 114). 
These considerations are, however, not a part of the domestic political debates between 
politicians and the public. That Turkey, as an EU member, would bring a flood of migrants and that 
these would a detriment to the voters’ countries is an assumption loudly voiced by antagonists and 
scarcely objected to by the proponents of Turkish membership. Given that the bulk of antagonists’ 
rhetoric is founded on religious and cultural differences, and the bulk of proponents’ argumentation 
is based on the premise that the antagonists are bigoted, the debate is far removed from being a 
rational discussion about material interests. The rationalism is only explanatory insofar as politicians 
are pursuing their own interests (political power) with effective means (inciting fear of Muslim 
immigrants, or the fear of having bigots in power). It is not explanatory at the state-level, because 
the material interests of the member states do not align with the policies they express. If national 
and material interests were explanatory, Denmark would be the poster-child of the drivers, rather 
than the most stalwart brakeman48.  
Constructivism does not fare much better. Schimmelfennig’s liberal community hypothesis 
only really works in terms of the member states who best embody the liberal democratic values are 
opposed to Turkish membership, only if the domestic politics do not get in the way first. It has little 
to do with Turkey’s own progress toward these values. This is in contradiction to many member 
states’ statements on the conditionality of the political Copenhagen criteria. Corruption statistics, in 
terms of countries with more corruption being less antagonistic to Turkey than countries with 
stronger rule-of-law institutions, returned a fairly strong correlation, but this did not hold up quite as 
strongly over time. It also did not become more powerful an explanation when controlling for 
domestic politics. 
Religious identities suggest that more religious countries have a slight preference for Turkey 
to become a member. As such, it is not a clash of Christians vs. Muslims, nor is anti-Islamic fervor 
                                                
48 Denmark has the greatest proportional participation rate in multilateral military missions, the worst drug problem, and 
a strongly Atlanticist foreign policy. Further, it has a pro-enlargement and Eurosceptic EU policy, low unemployment 
rates, and its industrialists lobby (ineffectively) on Turkey’s behalf, suggesting that Denmark does not stand to suffer 
economically from Turkish membership (Jung, 2010, p. 4).  
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explanatory. Belgians are the least likely to want Muslim neighbors and Swedes the least likely to 
voice objections to Muslim neighbors. Nevertheless, Belgium has been much more supportive of 
Turkish membership than Sweden has. While there is more support for Turkey from Catholic-
dominant countries than Protestant-dominant countries, this relationship is weak and has some very 
clear outliers (the United Kingdom on the Protestant side and Austria and Luxembourg on the 
Catholic side). 
National pride nor the fear of losing one’s national identity have predictive power, and 
cultural differences seem more like an after-the-fact rationalization of wanting to keep Turkey out, 
rather than the leading reason for doing so. Leastways, the differences between wanting to keep 
Turkey out, as opposed to Romania and Bulgaria are inconstant, whereas culture is not something 
that changes year-by-year. Finally, countries with the longest socialization in the European 
Community/Union have the greatest variation in their policies, demonstrating that they are not 
more norm-driven than the more-recent members are. If anything, perhaps Finland helped Turkey 
in its progress toward membership during Finland’s tenure in the 1999 EU presidency precisely 
because it was in its first time at the helm. In that role, it may not have felt it would have been 
proper to thwart the will of the majority the way that Denmark attempted to do three years later. As 
such, the Constructivist hypotheses did not perform any more strongly than the rationalist 
hypotheses did. 
Essentially, what these findings mean is that the politics of the EU being joined by Turkey 
have very little to do with Turkey itself. The three dominant factors relating to the policy-making – 
the number of domestic Turks, domestic political change, and member state’s own embrace of 
human rights – are all domestic characteristics of the member states. These findings point in a 
direction that Kenneth Waltz would call ‘reductionism’. Others might call it ‘navel-gazing’. What this 
broadly means is that some of the Turkish critiques of the process – those who say that the EU will 
find obstructions to Turkey’s entry no matter what Turkey does – are not wholly without merit. 
That does not mean that it is hopeless for Turkey to affect its own membership fate. It does, 
however, suggest that becoming a member of the EU is going to be a stiff task and will require an 
unconventional approach. The direction of opinion polls do not look good for Turkey, and with 
flagging public support for the difficult process within Turkey’s own population, it may very well be 
that it is not an effort worth making. Nevertheless, the final section in this research will outline what 
Turkey might do to navigate the maze of the member-state politics and policies. That 
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recommendation will be based, in large part, on the paragraphs, below, which assess the situation in 
each member state. 
Incorporated into to these analyses are the differences between the answers to the 
September 2006 standard Eurobarometer survey question on the desirability of future Turkish 
membership and the answers to a conditional question in the July 2006 Special Eurobarometer on 
enlargement. This conditional question was: “Once Turkey complies with all the conditions set by 
the European Union, would you be… to the accession of Turkey to the European Union?” The 
difference in the ‘against’ figures implies that a certain amount of people would prefer not to see 
Turkey join the EU in the future, but if Turkey would be able to comply with the Copenhagen 
criteria, they would not oppose accession. 
It is worthwhile to mention that the two Eurobarometer polls surveyed different people, as 
they were two separate surveys. Results where the percentage answering in favor of Turkey in the 
standard question and against Turkey in the conditional question are held to be sampling errors. It 
does not seem conceivable that 3% of Portuguese respondents would only support Turkish 
membership if Turkey does not meet the criteria. The differences may also reflect changing opinions 
over the six months between the surveys. The standard question on possible future Turkish 
membership was not asked in the spring Standard Eurobarometer of 2006. 
12.3.2 Austria 
Table 12.5: Austria’s Policy on Turkey and its Coalition Parties Over the Episodes. 
1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 
Passenger Passenger Brakeman Brakeman Brakeman 
SPÖ-ÖVP SPÖ-ÖVP ÖVP-FPÖ ÖVP-FPÖ ÖVP-BZÖ 
 
Austrian opposition to Turkish membership is often dismissed as resulting from the historical 
memory of the 16th and 17th Century defenses against Ottoman onslaughts. Because of this, Austria 
is frequently cited as the member state most opposed to Turkish membership in the EU, explaining 
its status as having the most hostile public opinion. Indeed, in the Eurobarometer polls of January 
1996 and April 1996, Austria’s public opinion was more negative than the average European 
country, but it was not the most negative. As of November 2001, public opposition to Turkish 
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membership stood at 55%. By June 2005, this had grown to 80%. While opposition to Romanian 
and Bulgarian membership also grew markedly (from 65% and 59% to 73% and 68%, respectively), 
these single-digit changes do not equal the 25% growth of public opposition to Turkey. 
In this respect, it is worth mentioning that Austria’s range of public opinion data on the 
prospect of Turkish membership in the EU is also the most volatile with a standard deviation far 
higher than any other of the EU-15 member states, and three times as high as the average member 
state.  What the time-series graphs (see in particular Graph Set 10.3) also showed was how Austria’s 
public opposition to Turkish membership grew manifestly after the 1999 parliamentary election that 
brought Jörg Haidar’s FPÖ to the governing coalition, after which is also when the policy changed. 
What this demonstrates is that Austrian public opinion has been very variable. If it were 
simply the result of deep-seated historical memories from Siege of Vienna, it would not be that 
volatile. Instead, it seems more plausible that the changes in public opinion covary with policy, 
because both are the result of the politics of immigration. Austria has the second-largest 
proportional Turkish population among the member states, and many Austrians feel immigration is 
the one of the most important issues facing their country. 
The critical lower-house elections of 1999, which brought the FPÖ to power by the next 
episode, was not so much decided by the FPÖ’s choice to highlight its well-known stance on 
immigration in the campaign. That stance did not need highlighting. According to post-election polls 
a large plurality of FPÖ voters named opposition to the status quo and immigration concerns as the 
reasons for their vote (Müller, 2000; Plasser, Ulram & Sommer, 1999).  
Once the FPÖ had joined the government in 2000, they lost their opposition to the status 
quo as a campaign issue for the 2002 elections. In government, they turned toward tightening 
immigration and asylum policies and making citizenship classes obligatory for new immigrants. 
However, it was the ÖVP, whose Interior Minister Ernst Strasser had been the initiative-taker in the 
tougher migration policies, that managed to capitalize on anti-immigration sentiment in 2002 
(Luther, 2003). What this means is that with opposition to the status quo off the table as a campaign 
issue, the FPÖ had immigration left, and opposition to Turkey was caught up in that rhetoric. The 
ÖVP, was also earning its anti-immigration credentials, which allowed it to trounce their coalition 
partners in 2002. 
Going forward, it seems unlikely that Austria will turn toward a driver policy, if and when 
Turkey resurfaces on the European Council’s agenda, despite an SPÖ-led government. As long as 
public opinion remains opposed to Turkey at the level of the most recent (2008) Eurobarometer 
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poll of 85% opposed, the political left will not commit political suicide by embracing Turkey. 
Likewise, as of 2006, when Eurobarometer polled on both the desire to see new members in the 
future and support for Turkish membership if Turkey fulfilled all the membership criteria, there was 
marginal difference (6%) between those who preferred never to see Turkey become a member and 
those who opposed Turkish membership even if they were to fulfill all the membership 
requirements.  
While Austria is unlikely to provide the unilateral veto of Turkey’s membership within the 
context of the European Council or in accession negotiations, a future government essentially would 
have to renege on Wolfgang Schüssel’s 2004 promise to hold a referendum before signing an 
accession treaty with Turkey. While Austria’s public opinion has proven to be relatively volatile on 
the issue, it is essentially unfathomable that such a referendum would ever return a result in Turkey’s 
favor. 
12.3.3 Belgium 
Table 12.6: Belgium’s Policy on Turkey and its Coalition Parties Over the Episodes. 
1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 












Belgium is another country with a large Turkish community. While its record of support for Turkey 
is nearly continuous, with the exception of the first episode, it is nevertheless easily fathomable that 
Belgium could move into the brakeman column should the issue of Turkey come up on the 
European Council’s agenda when a Christian-democrat-led government is in power. Like many 
countries, a majority of Belgians oppose Turkish membership, and that majority has grown since 
1999.  
Like Austria, there is only a marginal difference between those answering the standard 
Eurobarometer question and the Special Eurobarometer question. Opposers reduce with 6% (61% 
to 55%) and proponents increase with 9% (34%-43%), with 2% fewer don’t-knows (4% to 2%). As 
such, there is fuel for political entrepreneurs to make an issue of Turkey, provided that the 
population will consider Turkey to be a salient issue in their politics. As immigration is the runner up 
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as one of the two major problems facing Belgium, according to Belgian respondents to the 2011 
Standard Eurobarometer, and has been growing since 2008, it will not be difficult for Belgian 
politicians to point at Turkish membership as a threat for future immigration into Belgium in order 
to win votes. 
12.3.4 Denmark 
Table 12.7: Denmark’s Policy on Turkey and its Coalition Parties Over the Episodes. 
1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 







(Danish People’s Party) 
Venstre 
Conservatives 
(Danish People’s Party) 
Venstre 
Conservatives 
(Danish People’s Party) 
 
Possibly because of Denmark’s reputation as a loyal American ally with a forward-leaning Atlanticist 
foreign policy, and a strongly pro-enlargement policy regarding the Eastern European countries, 
Denmark has frequently been misunderstood as being on the driver side of the Turkey debate, 
though the actual record clearly bears out the reverse. During its presidency in 2002, several sources 
assumed Denmark to be ‘on board’ with the drivers because of its outspoken support for the 
candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. On Turkey, this was, however, not the case. 
Denmark was opposed and attempted to use its presidency to skew the debate in favor of the 
brakemen. 
In Denmark, both factors underlying member-state positions may be at work. Denmark has 
a fairly sizeable Turkish community, and the politics of immigration is clearly a very strong issue on 
the Danish right. Furthermore, Denmark has a strong human rights record, like Luxembourg and 
the other Scandinavian member states. As such, Turkey is unlikely to find a left-wing government, 
such as the new Social-Democrat-led government of Helle Thorning-Schmidt, supportive of 
Turkey’s progress toward membership until Turkey further addresses its human rights standards. 
During the 2006 episode, Thorning-Schmidt supported the then-Prime Minister’s brakeman position 
on a hard 18-month ultimatum for Turkey to open its ports to Cypriot shipping (Jung, 2010, p. 4). 
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In the vein of human rights standards, Denmark is exceptional in the degree to which 
respondents answered differently in the two Eurobarometer surveys of 2006. When asked if they 
would like to see Turkey join the EU in the future 66% opposed Turkey joining. However, when 
asked if they would support Turkey joining, if it complied with the membership criteria, only 44% 
declared themselves opposed. Support grew from 26% to 50%. This suggests that Turkey can 
promote its case in Denmark if it works to comply more with the political Copenhagen criteria. This 
is, however, unlikely to matter for any government being supported by the Danish People’s Party or 
based on a strong mandate to stifle immigration. 
12.3.5 Finland 
Table 12.8: Finland’s Policy on Turkey and the Physical Integrity scores. 
 1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 
Policy Passenger Driver Brakeman Driver Driver 
Phys. Int. Finland 8 8 8 8 7 
Phys. Int. Turkey 0 1 2 3 3 
Phys. Int. Difference 8 7 6 5 4 
 
Finland is the first country in this alphabetical lineup to have a relatively small Turkish community. 
As such, it is not expected to have a domestic-political rationale for deciding its policy. Finland does, 
however, have high human rights standards and it is, therefore, expected to be a member of the 
‘sticklers’ club. Compared to the other two members of this group, Luxembourg and Sweden, 
however, it has had a more positive policy regarding Turkey than would have been expected. 
Probably the first factor that suggests itself in explaining Finland’s policies is the fact that in 
the 1999 and 2006 episodes Finland held the rotating presidency. That said, the presidency is not an 
easy lens to use. There is debate about whether or not the rotating presidency induces a member 
state to set aside its narrow interests in favor of the collective good, or if the presidency is simply an 
avenue through which a member state can more effectively pursue its interests. It is not clearly the 
case that the presidency induces member states to support Turkey. Luxembourg and Denmark used 
their positions in the presidency to sway events toward the brakeman position. In the Netherlands, 
by contrast, the drivers within the Dutch government used the presidency to facilitate the internal 
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Dutch decision as well as pressure Austria and Cyprus to not scuttle the opening of accession 
negotiations.  
However, in light of the fact that Finland held the presidency for first time in 1999 and 
Sweden and Luxembourg were the only outspoken brakemen on the Council, it seems unlikely that 
Finland would have used the presidency to sway the European Council’s common position toward 
that of this small minority of states. In 2006 (and 2004), Turkey had improved its human rights 
record (and Finland’s had slipped in its own score in 2003, 2005 and 200649). Given that Sweden and 
Luxembourg also supported Turkey in 2004, Finland is not was outlier from this category in 2004. 
In 2006, when it, again, held the presidency, the bone of contention was clearly the dispute 
over Cyprus and Turkey opening its airports and harbors to Cypriot shipping. The Finns attempted 
everything within their power to bring the two parties into agreement and solve the problem. In this, 
they received high marks from the Turkish leadership. Had the Finns been opposed to Turkey’s 
membership prospects, it could have easily stood back and allowed the train to derail itself.  
Going forward, Turkey is likely to keep Finnish support provided it improves the recent 
declines in its human rights record, and implicitly suggest that Finland’s own political prisoner 
problem is not without blemish.    
12.3.6 France 
Table 12.9: France’s Policy on Turkey and its Coalition Parties Over the Episodes. 
1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 
Driver Driver Passenger Brakeman Brakeman 
Chirac – PS Chirac – PS Chirac - UMP Chirac – UMP Chirac – UMP 
 
France is a particularly critical case for the Turks, and its vote will be a very difficult one (or two) to 
win over. France’s influence in the EU is undeniable, as is the degree to which its domestic politics 
matter. Turkey had the good fortune that the former President, Jacques Chirac was personally 
supportive of Turkey, even if he only envisioned Turkey’s membership as a possibility in the longue 
                                                
49 The CIRI data show Finland had political prisoners, probably relating to the punitive measures against conscientious 
objectors to military conscription. 
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durée. He was, however, unwilling to spend the necessary political capital to attempt to force his 
party into alignment with him, if this had even been possible given the nationalist challenge on the 
French right. The Parti Socialiste of Lionel Jospin happily collaborated with Chirac on Turkey, but 
her more open stance on Turkey may have been what cost Ségolène Royal the presidency in 2007. 
Having been out of power for a decade, the PS is unlikely to decide to fall on its sword (again) over 
Turkey.  
Opinion polls show that Turkey has a very rough road ahead with France. French public 
opinion has a rigidly negative view on Turkey that has changed little between 1996 and 2008, except 
in a downward trend. The slight silver lining in the French case is that there is a 15 percentage-point 
spread between those who oppose Turkey joining in the future and those who still oppose Turkey if 
Turkey meets all the membership conditions. Despite that relatively large difference, a majority of 
54% is still opposed to Turkey even if it meets all the conditions. 
Given these numbers, it is imperative that Chirac’s promise of a referendum on Turkish 
accession be avoided. Thankfully, this promise, which had been codified into the French 
constitution, has already been partially rescinded. The Constitution, as it currently stands, allows the 
legislature to override the referendum requirement for accession treaties, provided that three-fifths 
of both houses agree to not hold that referendum. 
The preferred policy of the French president will clearly be key for France’s position on 
Turkey. For his presidency, Nicolas Sarkozy made opposition to Turkey a firm plank of his election 
campaign. With French public opinion clearly opposed to Turkey’s membership, it is unlikely that 
the nominee of the Parti Socialiste is going to express explicit support for Turkey. François Hollande 
– the current presidential nominee of the PS – has in the past expressed the necessity for Turkey to 
recognize the Armenian Genocide. However, he has written that the negotiations should continue 
fairly (Hollande, 2011). 
One option that Turkey does hold with respect to France is that, in addition to a large 
Turkish community, France also has a large Armenian community with inroads into the PS. If 
Turkey were to put some form of a negotiated recognition of the Armenian Genocide on the table, 
and the Socialists were able to put that feather in their cap, it may prove to be a way in which the 
Socialists can move the policy toward, at least, acquiescing to Turkish membership. 
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12.3.7 Germany 
Table 12.10: Germany’s Policy on Turkey and its Coalition Parties Over the Episodes. 
1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 
Brakeman Driver Driver Driver Brakeman 
CDU/CSU-FDP SPD-Grünen SPD-Grünen SPD-Grünen CDU/CSU-SPD 
 
Like France, Germany’s position on Turkey will be key for any future prospects of membership. 
With the largest Turkish minority, Germany’s policy regarding those prospects is highly political and 
has been perfectly correlated with the changes of government. Public opinion regarding Turkish 
membership is even more opposed than France’s public opinion, and it is less ‘soft’, regarding the 
membership criteria. There is a 9% spread between those regularly opposed (78%), and those 
opposed even under the proposition that Turkey has fulfilled all the membership requirements 
(69%). As with Belgium, further, the immigration issue has been increasing in its saliency as a policy 
problem. 
In Germany, the silver lining is that the larger number of Turks means that they represent a 
larger constituency for Germany’s left-wing parties. Unlike the French socialist nominee, the 
German social democrats have not abandoned their support for Turkey or embraced Angela 
Merkel’s proposal for a ‘privileged partnership’. Also, unlike in France, Germany’s public opinion 
has been more volatile, in that it has, in the past, been much less opposed to Turkish membership 
than in the most recent surveys. Conceivably, then, that public opinion can change again in the 
future. Of course, it has a long way to go, given the level of 77% opposed in the Eurobarometer of 
April 2008. 
With these margins, it is not a winning proposition for the SPD to put up a full-throated 
defense of Turkey, if the Christian Democrats continue to make the issue a core plank in their 
election platforms. With 21% of German respondents naming immigration as one of the two most 
important issues facing Germany (this makes it runner up to ‘the economic situation’ with 36%), the 
Christian Democrats have an interest in keeping this issue alive as long as the SPD is unwilling to 
change its own preferred policy. The SPD’s only rational response is to change the subject and not 
confront the CDU on the premises of their preferred policy. 
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12.3.8 Greece 
Table 12.11: Greece’s Policy on Turkey and the Dominant Contested Topics. 
1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 
Brakeman Driver Driver Driver Brakeman 
Conference “Candidate” Negotiations Negotiations Cypriot shipping 
 
Without domestic politics or a high regard for its own human rights situation, Greece is the only 
country that seems to change its position based on its troubled relationship with Turkey and the 
problem of Cyprus. Unlike the habitual drivers, Greece has vociferously opposed Turkey during two 
episodes, while full-throatedly supporting Turkey in 1999, 2002, and 2004. Unlike the countries with 
large Turkish immigrant minorities, Greece’s policies have not changed with the changing domestic 
politics.  
In 1997, Turkey and Greece were still very much at odds with one another, having nearly 
clashed militarily a year before over two uninhabited islets in the Eastern Aegean Sea. After the 
embarrassment of having been found harboring Turkey’s most-wanted terrorist, and the change in 
public opinion, subsequent to two devastating earthquakes, Greece changed its position to facilitate 
Turkey’s progress through the enlargement regime. The one sticking point, however, has been 
Cyprus. Even during those episodes where Greece was supportive of Turkey’s right to, in principle, 
join the European Union, Greece has consistently held that Turkey must make concessions 
regarding Cyprus. With the issue of Cypriot access to Turkish harbors and airports center stage in 
2006, Greece switched again to the brakeman side of the debate.   
In this regard, unless matters change, Turkey’s best prospect for winning Greek (and Greek-
Cypriot) acquiescence is to hold onto the Cyprus card. While Cyprus, with Greek support, will seek 
to maintain the chill on the frozen negotiating chapters until Turkey opens its airports and harbors 
to Cypriot shipping, the actual process of adopting the measures of the acquis communautaire is fully 
within Turkey’s control. Given that, it is probably the best strategy to maintain the denial of entry on 
Cypriot vessels until the moment at which Turkey has fulfilled all the requirements of membership. 
This would prevent Greece and Cyprus from drawing out the process while demanding decreasingly 
reasonable concessions on Ankara’s part.  
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12.3.9 Ireland 
Table 12.12: Ireland’s Policy on Turkey and the Physical Integrity scores. 
 1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 
Policy Passenger Passenger Driver Driver Passenger 
Phys. Int. Ireland 8 7 8 7 7 
Phys. Int. Turkey 0 1 2 3 3 
Phys. Int. Difference 8 6 6 4 4 
 
Of the habitual drivers, Ireland is the least habitual in that it supported Turkey in 2002 and in 2004, 
but mostly kept its position out of the headlines in the other three episodes. Ireland does not have 
very many Turks, nor was there significant political change during the episodes in question. Of the 
‘’habitual drivers’, however, it has the best human rights score according to the CIRI Physical 
Integrity Index. On average it has scored about the same as Sweden, without Sweden’s opposition to 
Turkey. In this regard, it is categorized according to the dependent variable.  
Despite being a habitual driver, then, human rights may matter. However, the changing 
levels of its own Physical Integrity Index, or the difference between its own and Turkey’s actually 
poorly predict its changing level of support. In neither of the intervals where Irelands policy grew 
toward Turkey or drifted away, neither frame of the independent variable predicts the change. 
In terms of the future, Ireland is unlikely to become a brakeman, even though public opinion 
has been souring toward Turkey (from 23% against in 1999 and 2001 to 42% against in the 2008 
Standard Eurobarometer). The public opinion swing in Turkey’s favor, if Turkey meets all the 
criteria, is a significant one from 46% against to 32% against in the 2006 Standard and Special 
Eurobarometer surveys. Furthermore, Irish public opinion is not particularly polarized on this issue, 
with 29% responding ‘don’t know’ to the Standard Eurobarometer question in 2008. In 2006, this 
uncertainty was not decreased in the Special Eurobarometer question (28%) as compared to the 
Standard Eurobarometer question (25%).  
Notwithstanding the opinions of one deputy, the Fine Gael party’s official position in is 
favor of Turkish membership, provided it meets the requisite criteria. As such, Turkey’s membership 
prospects have not become a controversial issue in Irish politics. 
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12.3.10 Italy 
Table 12.13: Italy’s Policy on Turkey and the Physical Integrity scores. 
 1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 
Policy Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver 
Phys. Int. Italy 7 5 7 6 6 
Phys. Int. Turkey 0 1 2 3 3 
Phys. Int. Difference 7 4 5 3 3 
 
Italy is a much more clear-cut member of the habitual drivers club, having supported Turkey at 
every instance, regardless of its politics. As a country with very few Turks and a lower-than-average 
human-rights record in terms of the CIRI Physical Integrity Index, the model consisting of the three 
independent variables outlined above predicts that Italy would be supportive of Turkey, as there is 
not a domestic nervousness of a flood of Turkish immigrants, nor are the Italians sticklers in terms 
of human rights. 
All that said, Italy does have a growing Turkish population, and concern over immigration 
has also been growing in Italy. Possibly as a result, public opinion on Turkey has also grown more 
negative, with opposition to Turkish membership having grown from 45% in 1999 and 2001 to 58% 
in 2008. The spread between the Standard Eurobarometer question and the Special Eurobarometer 
question is 11%, suggesting that opposition would diminish somewhat with the adoption of the 
membership criteria. 
Politically, the Northern League has expressed its opposition to Turkish membership, 
though Silvio Berlusconi managed to overrule them in the coalition. With the future of Italian 
politics uncertain, it is unknown to what degree the Northern League or any other political parties 
will be willing to capitalize on the majority opposition to Turkish membership as a plank in an 
election campaign. Concern over immigration has risen sharply in recent years, with 27% of Italian 
respondents naming immigration as one of two top political concerns for Italy, after the economic 
situation and unemployment.  
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12.3.11 Luxembourg 
Table 12.14: Luxembourg’s Policy on Turkey and the Physical Integrity scores. 
 1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 
Policy Brakeman Brakeman Brakeman Driver Brakeman 
Phys. Int. Luxembourg 8 8 8 8 8 
Phys. Int. Turkey 0 1 2 3 3 
Phys. Int. Difference 8 7 6 5 5 
 
In the way that Italy is the poster-child for the habitual drivers, Luxembourg is the model ‘stickler’. 
With a perfect human rights record, as measured by the CIRI Physical Integrity Index, and with few 
Turks in the large immigrant population, Luxembourg is easily categorized. Along with Denmark 
and Austria, Luxembourg has also been in the brakemen crowd. 
The one exception is in 2004, when it surprisingly took a driver position in regard to the 
opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. One explanation is that this followed elections with 
more permissive social democrats having formed the government with Jean-Claude Juncker’s 
Christian democrats. That does not, however, explain the return to brakemanship in the following 
episode, as the coalition endured. Another possible explanation is that had the negotiations started 
according to Juncker’s plans in 2004, they would have done so under Grand Duchy’s auspices in the 
rotating presidency in Spring 2005. That plan was however delayed, and the British presided over the 
start of accession negotiations. 
The most plausible explanation is that Turkey had, in fact, improved its human rights record 
in the years leading up to 2004, but had failed to improve on this record in the years since 2004.  In 
2005 Turkey faltered in terms of extrajudicial killings – going from ‘occasional’ to ‘frequent’ killings 
– and regained its ‘occasional’ status in 2006, but no improvement on other fronts. 
As long as Turkey does not improve its record, Luxembourg will doubtlessly remain a 
brakeman. Though even with the adoption of all the membership criteria, Luxembourgers are only a 
little less inclined to oppose Turkey. Opposition reduced only 8% (from 77% opposed to 69%) in 
the condition Special Eurobarometer survey question as opposed to the Standard Eurobarometer 
question. Further, as long as Luxembourg maintains its own adherence to the values of human 
rights, it will not be open to the charge of hypocrisy in the same way as other countries might be. 
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Nevertheless, as one of the smallest countries in the EU, Luxembourg is very unlikely to exert a 
unilateral veto on Turkish accession. 
12.3.12 Netherlands 
Table 12.15: the Netherlands’ Policy on Turkey and its Coalition Parties Over the Episodes. 
1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 
Driver Driver Brakeman Driver Brakeman 
PvdA-VVD-D66 PvdA-VVD-D66 CDA-VVD CDA-VVD-D66 CDA-VVD 
 
While the Netherlands has a human rights score equal to that of Luxembourg, its policy is clearly set 
by its domestic politics. With a large Turkish minority, this is unsurprising. That said, the main 
political parties on the right (CDA and VVD) are far from firm in their opposition to Turkey, and 
leading figures from both have been very supportive of Turkey on different occasions. As such, the 
critical political struggles for Dutch policy are within these two parties. 
Within the CDA the struggle on either side of the factional divide has been on human rights 
grounds. One side, which previously was headed by the Prime Minister, Jan Peter Balkenende, and 
his Foreign Minister, Ben Bot, advocated for a carrot-side approach to Turkey. If Turkey were to be 
encouraged with progress toward membership, it would doubtlessly embrace the western values of 
liberal democracy. The other side coalesced around Maxime Verhagen, formerly the Parliamentary 
leader of the CDA, then Foreign Minister after Ben Bot and currently the Deputy Prime Minister in 
the Rutte cabinet. This side embraces the stick-side approach, denying Turkey progress through the 
regime until it addresses the Cyprus situation as well as human rights and corruption.  
The VVD has struggled more with the issue, but, instead, its dichotomy has coalesced 
around an Atlanticist foreign policy oriented toward the United States on the driver side and an anti-
immigration stance on the brakeman side. Devastated by an anti-Muslim immigration argument 
from Pim Fortuyn’s party in 2002 and Geert Wilders’ party in the 2006 elections, it has been at pains 
to chart its own course between its liberal and its own anti-immigration faction. Mark Rutte, the 
political leader of the VVD, and current Prime Minister, implicitly took the liberal side of the debate 
as he defeated the virulent anti-immigration wing of his party, but during the 2006 election 
campaign, he clearly took the brakeman side as the stand-off over Cypriot shipping unfolded. Since 
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then, the position has emerged been that Turkey might be a suitable member if Turkey could ever 
meet the criteria – something VVD candidates say they doubt will ever happen. 
Like in other countries, immigration is a top political issue for The Hague. With as many 
Turks as the Netherlands has, Turkey’s membership is likely to continue to be associated with the 
threat of more (Muslim) immigration. Public opinion toward Turkey has soured with 41% opposing 
membership in November 2001 and 55% doing so in April 2008. As with Denmark, however, there 
is a significant swing of 15% (from 57% opposed down to 42%, and reducing uncertainty by 5%) 
between the Standard Eurobarometer question and the conditional question in the Special 
Eurobarometer question of 2006. This suggests that the adoption of the criteria is of more 
importance to the Dutch than for many other members. 
12.3.13 Portugal 
Table 12.16: Portugal’s Policy on Turkey and the Physical Integrity scores. 
 1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 
Policy Passenger Passenger Driver Driver Driver 
Phys. Int. Portugal 7 7 7 7 7 
Phys. Int. Turkey 0 1 2 3 3 
Phys. Int. Difference 7 6 5 4 4 
 
Without a Turkish immigrant community of significant numbers, and an ‘occasional’ mistreatment 
of prisoners problem, Portugal is expected to be a habitual driver. It was, however, slow to make 
itself heard as it adopted passenger positions in 1997 and 1999. Afterward, it embraced the driver 
position. 
While any such theory of translating the CIRI Physical Integrity Index to policies regarding 
Turkey runs into the problem of nebulously connecting cause and effect through a chain of events, 
it works out rather well in the case of both Portugal and Ireland. Among the habitual drivers, Ireland 
has the highest average Physical Integrity Index rating over the years from 1994 to 2006. Ireland was 
also less supportive of Turkey than the others – supporting Turkey two out of three times. Portugal, 
with the second-highest rating was also less supportive of Turkey than the remaining habitual drivers 
were, actively supporting only three out of five times. 
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Going forward, Portugal is not a country that Turkey shall have to target in order to shore 
up its chances of accession. Opposition in Portuguese public opinion, while higher in 2008 than in 
previous years, remains relatively low at 41%. Like in many of the habitual drivers, there are many 
(22%) undecided respondents (those who checked ‘don’t know’). By and large, the Turkey issue is 
not a hot potato in Portugal. 
12.3.14 Spain 
Table 12.17: Spain’s Policy on Turkey and the Physical Integrity scores. 
 1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 
Policy Passenger Driver Driver Driver Driver 
Phys. Int. Spain 6 7 7 7 5 
Phys. Int. Turkey 0 1 2 3 3 
Phys. Int. Difference 6 6 5 4 2 
 
Like Portugal, Spain is a habitual driver, though it began supporting Turkey several years before 
Portugal and Ireland did. Like Portugal and Ireland, Spain does not have a significant Turkish 
immigrant population, nor does it have a spotless human rights record. As such, Spain adds to the 
overall trends found in this research. Instead, Spain has allowed its policy to be driven by broader 
concerns, probably related to geopolitics. Spain’s past Prime Minister, José Luis Zapatero, has also 
made it an explicit point of cooperation with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to advocate for an ‘Alliance of 
Civilizations’ in direct contradiction to Samuel Huntington’s thesis that Islamic countries and 
Christian countries cannot easily coexist. 
Like in most countries, public opinion in Spain has gradually moved away from Turkey, but 
in Spain’s case the level of opposition is very low, with only 32% of respondents in April 2008 
voicing opposition to Turkey. Also, like in Portugal, 22% of respondents did not state an opinion. 
As such, the prospect of Turkish membership is not a controversial one in Spain, and Turkey should 
put its efforts elsewhere, if it wants to navigate a path towards membership. 
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12.3.15 Sweden 
Table 12.18: Sweden’s Policy on Turkey and the Physical Integrity scores. 
 1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 
Policy Brakeman Brakeman Brakeman Driver Driver 
Phys. Int. Sweden 6 8 8 8 7 
Phys. Int. Turkey 0 1 2 3 3 
Phys. Int. Difference 6 7 6 5 4 
 
While Sweden has a proportionally larger Turkish community than France does, and though it has 
not been void of human rights problems50, Sweden is, nevertheless, considered one of the ‘sticklers’. 
While Sweden does have a large immigrant population, many being Kurds who fled the 
turmoil and persecution in the 1980s and 1990s, this does not appear to have created a political 
dynamic that made changes in politics determinative of changes in policy. While not an absent issue, 
immigration does not top the list of significant political problems in Sweden. Many more Swedes 
identify the health care system, crime and unemployment as top priorities, and immigration tends to 
fall in with issues such as education and the environment. 
The single change of policy occurred under the government of Göran Persson. This may 
have been because of a difference of political vision between the former Foreign Minister, Anna 
Lindh, and that of her successor, Laila Freivalds, who took the post after Lindh’s assassination. In 
2002, Lindh mentioned that human rights would have to be much improved in Turkey, and the 
Prime Minister highlighted the plight of the Kurds. In 2004, Persson and Freivalds expressed their 
appreciation for the improvement of human rights in Turkey, which they said was very important to 
Sweden. 
Swedish public opinion, on the whole, has been relatively positive toward Turkish 
membership, with a very different pattern than many of the other member states. In 2008 46% of 
Swedish respondent supported Turkish membership, while 45% opposed it. If Turkey meets all the 
criteria, public opinion opposition declines by 9%, but support increases by 14%, with the difference 
coming out of the ‘don’t know’ column. 
                                                
50 According to CIRI, there have been occasional reports of torture and in 1997 the score on extrajudicial killings was 
lowered to ‘occasional’.  
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With Swedish public opinion relatively supportive, and the question not being politically 
controversial (the right-wing government of Fredrik Reinfeldt did not change the policy), Sweden 
seems likely to remain supportive of Turkey. That is, unless Turkey’s own human rights situation 
does not improve or deteriorates.  
12.3.16 United Kingdom 
Table 12.19:  the United Kingdom’s Policy on Turkey and the Physical Integrity scores 
 1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 
Policy Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver 
Phys. Int. UK 6 7 7 7 7 
Phys. Int. Turkey 0 1 2 3 3 
Phys. Int. Difference 6 7 6 5 4 
 
The United Kingdom’s policy on enlargement in general is frequently considered to be a function of 
its purported desire to gum up the works in Brussels and transform the EU into little more than a 
large free trade area. In the comparative analyses, however, Euroscepticism and general support for 
enlargement have been poor predictors of member states’ support for Turkey. If it were generally 
true that Eurosceptic countries who favored enlargement generally also favored enlargement to 
Turkey, then Sweden and Denmark would also have been drivers of Turkey’s membership. Sweden, 
however, is only a late comer to the drivers club and Denmark has been Turkey’s most stalwart 
antagonist.  
While it is without doubt the case that the United Kingdom is generally opposed to 
‘deepening’ Europe, this, alone, is not a sufficient condition for support of Turkey. More than likely, 
the United Kingdom’s primary motives are geopolitical. However, to a large extent, the findings of 
this research have become an exercise in finding the reasons why countries do not support Turkey, 
the absence of which factors indicate that countries tend to be supportive, for any broad assortment 
of reasons. 
Like Italy (a country not set against the deepening of Europe), the United Kingdom has 
consistently spoken on Turkey’s behalf in the European Council. With a numerically insignificant 
Turkish immigrant community and a spotty human rights record, the UK easily fits into the habitual 
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drivers category. As such, it does not have overriding domestic-political concerns for the ‘threat’ of 
Turkish immigration, nor does it have an overriding distaste for allowing a country with low human 
rights standards into the club. 
While it has not, yet, been tested, political change in the United Kingdom is unlikely to 
change the supportive policy. The Conservatives did not make it a campaign issue to oppose the 
Labour government of Tony Blair on its support for Turkey. That having been said, Britons have 
become more opposed to Turkish membership, with opposition in the first three episodes having 
been in the low 30%s and more recently 52% in 2006 and 49% in 2008. Popular support for Turkey 
has also been fairly weak, with a relatively large share (16% in 2008) of respondents not expressing 
an opinion on the matter, something characteristic of the habitual drivers. There is 13% spread 
between the opposing respondents in the Standard Eurobarometer and the Special Eurobarometer, 
suggesting a medium level of change if Turkey meets all the membership criteria. 
For the future, it is very unlikely that the United Kingdom will grow to be a problem for 
Turkey in its pursuit of its membership ambitions.  
12.4 NAVIGATING THE FUTURE 
The previous paragraphs, outlining each of the member states, offered limited perspectives on where 
the member states seem to be going with their policies on Turkey. This section offers a political 
strategy for Turkey to navigate the difficult streets of European politics toward the destination of 
membership. This strategy is offered making use of the typology, above, and the other findings of 
this research. 
Because the EU is now a union of 27 member states, and likely to grow with the imminent 
accession of Croatia, and the probable accessions of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro, Albania, 
Serbia and Kosovo by the time Turkey’s process is at a critical stage, it is necessary to also offer 
some perspective on how these countries will likely argue on Turkey’s case. Most of these countries, 
are likely to be a part of the habitual drivers group. They, mostly, do not have large Turkish 
minorities couple with domestic concerns over immigration. They also, mostly, do not have human 
rights standards at the level of Finland, Luxembourg, or Sweden. The exception, here, is likely to be 
Iceland. That is not to say that some of them will not have nationalist backlashes against Turkey. In 
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particular, in the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovakia, there are strong public opinions against 
Turkish membership. However, these are not likely to be as troublesome as the member states with 
strong domestic political concerns, especially Austria, France and Germany. 
Cyprus is, of course, a very special case. Turkey occupies a very large portion of the island 
with some 30,000 troops, supporting a separatist government. As such, Cyprus is best considered in 
a similar light as Greece – a country with a very difficult bilateral relationship with Turkey, whose 
enlargement policies will be oriented on the specific problems of that relationship.  
For many of the habitual drivers the outlook is such that these will not likely be the 
‘battleground’ member states. While public opinion is generally growing more negative toward 
Turkey, their politics are such that, while supportive policies may be unpopular, they are not of the 
highest order of importance to voters, and bucking popular preference will not mean political 
suicide for the political parties in power.  
This is also somewhat the case for the sticklers. Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden are not 
driven to set their policies on Turkey by their domestic politics. Finland, in particular, seems to have 
changed its policies against the directions of changing public opinion. What is noteworthy about this 
group of countries is that they are small and, when the moment was decisive (in 2004), they were all 
supportive of Turkey’s progress. This suggests that when the decisions come to sign or not sign an 
accession treaty, it is unlikely that these countries will provide the prohibitive roadblocks. 
Greece, being in a category of its own due to its difficult bilateral relationship with Turkey, is 
most likely to be driven by developments related to its security and its specific interests in the 
Aegean and concerning Cyprus. As mentioned above, Cyprus also fits this category. As such, while 
the negotiating positions of the domestically-driven countries will concern their overall tone toward 
Turkey (for a domestic audience) and the specifics of the future safeguards on the free movement of 
persons and/or an alternative to full membership, Cyprus and Greece will be using the enlargement 
process as a carrot and stick to negotiate more favorable resolutions to the Cyprus problem and 
maritime territorial disputes. 
This means that there are four particular issues on which Turkey should focus its efforts: 
The domestic politics of the six domestically-driven member states, the particular disputes with 
Greece and Cyprus, completing administrative and legal reforms in adopting the acquis communautaire, 
and developing higher standards of human rights developments. These shall be dealt with, below, in 
increasing orders of importance for accession. 
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12.4.1 Human Rights 
The findings of this research have shown that Turkey’s human rights concerns are not of the first 
order of importance in determining member-state policies, despite the contrary assertions of many 
of the member-state leaders. Turkey’s strongest efforts toward meeting the political Copenhagen 
criteria, ahead of the European Council of Copenhagen in 2002, were not met with enthusiastic 
support from the member states. Instead, support had declined from the previous episode. In 
particular, support declined in Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, while support 
improved only in Ireland and Portugal. 
That said, the question at hand in 2002 was different than it was in 1999. In 1999 the 
question was one of making Turkey’s candidacy explicit. To a large degree, this was simply a 
symbolic gesture, whereas in 2002 the question was one about the actual start of accession 
negotiations. Nevertheless, the changing policies in the member states were mostly due to domestic 
politics within those countries, and not the result of changes in Turkey or the changing question 
before the European Council. 
That is not to say that human-rights improvements, and developments toward the political 
Copenhagen criteria in general will not help Turkey in its accession process. Most importantly, these 
improvements are benefits in themselves and do not need an instrumentalist rationale to support 
them. However, from the instrumentalist perspective, they are likely to help most in a handful of 
smaller countries, but also in France. In France as well as Denmark, Finland, Ireland and the 
Netherlands, there are significant decreases in public opposition to Turkish membership if Turkey is 
seen to have fulfilled the criteria of membership, which are largely seen in terms of the political 
criteria. Aside from France, these are also countries that have good human rights records of their 
own.  
The odd member states out, here, are Luxembourg and Sweden, that are, after all, supposed 
to be members of the sticklers club, for whom human rights matter. In Luxembourg, this is 
strangely curious, as there is only a 7%-8% spread between the percentages of support/opposition 
in the Standard and the Special Eurobarometer surveys. In Sweden, there is a significant positive 
shift in the support-for percentage (14%), but a smaller decrease (9%) in public opposition. The 
difference comes from the undecided respondents. However, Luxembourg is small and Swedish 
public opinion is generally more positive. 
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Human rights improvements will, therefore, be important for France, Denmark and the 
Netherlands. All three of these countries are members of the domestic politics group, and marked 
improvements in the human rights situation in Turkey will deprive the political forces arrayed 
against Turkish membership of a talking point that seems to matter in those countries. 
Another aspect, here, is that the political Copenhagen criteria concern the minority rights of 
the Kurds. An improvement in the plight of the Kurds, which is related to Turkey’s security 
problems in Southeastern Turkey, also touches the real sore spot with many of the brakemen. While 
statistics are very elusive, it is the general understanding that many of the Turkish immigrants are, in 
fact, from this particular community. Improving the protection of minority rights of the Kurds and 
improving the economic and security situation in Southeast Turkey will relieve migration pressures 
toward Western Europe. Further, it is generally understood that these migrants are also the least 
educated and provide the least human capital in terms of the economic benefits to the countries to 
which they migrate.  
12.4.2 Greece and Cyprus 
Turkey’s differences with Greece on maritime borders and, more importantly, the division of 
Cyprus, are a particular roadblock to Turkey’s accession. At this stage, several negotiating chapters 
have been frozen until Turkey opens its harbors and airports to Cypriot ships and airplanes. A 
solution to this problem must come ahead of accession, as both Greece and Cyprus are not shy of 
threatening or using a veto, regardless of the diplomatic pressure from the other member states. 
Despite the common position of the European Council that these problems – in particular 
that of the shipping issue – must be solved before accession negotiations can be unfrozen, there is 
some danger in prematurely offering concessions on this front. This stems from two facts: the first 
being the manifestly negative public opinions in both Cyprus and Greece, and, secondly, the largely 
symbolic nature of the frozen chapters. Together, they suggest that Turkey ought to not make 
premature unilateral concessions on the particular problem of Cypriot shipping or on the bilateral 
problems in general. 
The negative public opinions, in themselves, pressure Athens and (Greek) Nicosia to bargain 
hard with Turkey and exact as many concessions from the Turks as possible. Because the reforms 
within Turkey (see below) require political capital, it would be counterproductive for the 
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government in Ankara to ‘sell out’ the Turkish Cypriots by offering unilateral concessions to the 
Greek Cypriots. As such, it is in Turkey’s interest to not prematurely offer the necessary concessions 
for the opening of the frozen negotiating chapters. 
The frozen negotiating chapters are, largely, symbolic in that accession negotiations concern 
the member states agreeing that Turkey’s reforms sufficiently meet the legal and administrative 
requirements of the acquis communautaire – the entirety of common EU laws. However, the actual 
process of reforming those institutions lies entirely within Turkey’s power. These are largely 
technical in nature and only political to the degree that the member states are willing to raise 
inauthentic objections to the technicalities. As such, the process of sitting at the table with the 
member states and engaging in ‘negotiations’ is not where the real action is. The real action is in 
Ankara and its ability to make the necessary reforms. So long as Ankara is actually making the 
reforms, the negotiations are simply a political decision that can be subject to a final deal. 
The key, then, is in making sure that as many chapters are opened/unfrozen and closed in as 
few instances as possible. That way, Greece and Cyprus cannot force Turkey into incrementally 
making concession after concession for the opening and closing of each of the remaining chapters. 
Doing so would (further) sap domestic support within Turkey for making the necessary reforms. 
With respect to the other member states, it is a problem that the public narrative about 
Turkey’s 1974 invasion of Cyprus is frequently one-sided. To the degree that most people in the 
member states know anything about the Cyprus situation it is that Turkey occupies a large part of 
the island. Turkey could increase pressure on Greek Cyprus by more effectively providing balance to 
this one-sided story. This would, essentially, be an added part of the public diplomacy strategy 
discussed below. 
12.4.3 Accession Negotiations 
As mentioned in the previous section, the accession negotiations, themselves, are largely symbolic in 
nature though they provide avenues for the brakemen to slow down the accession process. 
However, the actual reforms are entirely within Ankara’s ability to implement. In that regard, Ankara 
sets its pace within the confines of its own domestic political and administrative realm. 
As such, it is up to Ankara to make the necessary legal and administrative reforms ahead of 
the time at which maneuvering the political hurdles with the member states will be at hand. In doing 
  535 
this, the European Commission, which writes the annual reports, can be a useful ally in being able to 
offer the technical testimony to the degree that Turkey has adopted the acquis communautaire. With 
that testimony, the brakemen shall be at greater pains to contradict the technical facts in order to 
prevent the closing of the negotiations chapters. 
Implementing the necessary reforms in order to adopt the acquis requires substantial political 
capital in order to overcome the bureaucratic, political, and societal resistance that such reforms 
inevitably raise. In order to husband that political capital, Turkey ought to avoid offering premature 
concessions at the European or bilateral level, such as those relating to Cyprus. If the government is 
seen as ‘selling out’ the Turkish Cypriots, or its other interest ahead of time, it will likely have more 
troubles reforming, say, its intellectual property laws. In a similar vein, with Turkish public opinion 
far from uniform on joining the EU, the reforms ought to primarily be packaged as measures that 
benefit Turkey, or the domestic stakeholders of the policy areas within which the reforms must take 
place.  
12.4.4 Member-state Domestic Politics  
Ultimately, however, it will come down to each of the member states having to, individually, ratify 
accession treaties with Turkey, if Turkey is to become a member. Some member-state governments 
will force those accession treaties through their legislatures, despite their unpopularity. Others will 
be less willing to swim against the tide of public opinion. As the previous chapters attest, Turkey has 
nearly always enjoyed support from a majority of the member states. There are only a handful of 
countries that may pose particular problems in signing these accession treaties or agreeing to close 
the negotiations process. Greece and Cyprus are among this number, but most of them will be the 
countries that have substantial Turkish immigrant communities. In these countries, there is 
significant, if not prohibitive, domestic opposition to Turkey ever becoming a member, regardless of 
its adoption of the criteria of membership. Furthermore, the trends of public opinion in these 
countries do not, presently, favor Turkey – opinion is bad and getting worse. 
Domestic political problems call for solutions based in the domestic political realm. Thus 
far, Turkey appears to have done more work at trying to appeal to governments at the geostrategic 
level. For many years, Turkey has been a loyal NATO ally. In recent years, they have diversified their 
foreign-policy portfolio. This has manifested itself in a more cooperative foreign policy with Iran 
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and a more antagonistic relationship with Israel. In some sense, this can be seen as showing Europe 
the carrot and stick of Turkey’s geostrategic value. This has seemingly convinced the habitual drivers 
and the United States. However, Turkey’s geostrategic value is of les importance to politicians whose 
greatest threat is from domestic political upsets. That greater threat comes from populist right-wing 
politicians who are able to put the mainstream right- and left-wing parties on the defensive on an 
issue with little start-off popularity. If these countries – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands – are to also be won over, and persuaded to close accession 
negotiations and ratify accession treaties, that domestic political threat will have to be minimized. 
While many will object to a foreign country meddling in their own country’s politics, this is 
not any more objectionable than one country unilaterally determining another country’s fate by way 
of referendum or parliamentary resolution. That having been said, it is worthwhile to be mindful of 
potential blowback from ham-fisted attempts to manipulate. Also, this is general advice and country-
specific political strategies by those knowledgeable about political campaign laws and norms in those 
countries naturally supersede the advice given here. 
With this in mind, it will not be possible for Turkey to join the EU without which the 
domestic politics of the critical member states change, and, with current trends, that will not happen 
unless some agent induces those domestic politics to change. Without injecting itself into the 
domestic politics of these countries, Turkey will fail to become a member of the EU. If Turkey 
attempts to make its own case for membership directly to the voting publics, it risks diplomatic 
tensions with leaders who are elected in spite of Turkey’s efforts. Given Turkey’s strength at the 
geostrategic level, any displeasure from governments annoyed at Turkey’s campaign practices are 
likely to be of a fleeting nature. In short, Turkey has little to lose from making an attempt to 
influence public opinion in the member states where such opinion is a particular political problem. 
Such a political campaign for a realigning of Turkey’s image in these countries should consist 
of three parts: providing information, message control, and offering painful concessions. The first 
two of these are aspects of public diplomacy – directly influencing public opinion. The last part is 
also aimed at the public, but ought to happen at the very last stage of the process in order to 
maintain support on Turkey’s domestic front until such time as the last hurdles – closing accession 
negotiations and ratifying accession treaties - need to be cleared.  
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12.4.5 Providing Information 
Broadly speaking, the debate over Turkey within these countries is mostly fuelled by anti-
immigration sentiment. Actors on the political right have equated the Turkish membership with an 
inevitable flood of immigration. Connected to this are the suppositions of Turkey’s 
cultural/religious incompatibility with the EU. Given the inconstant nature of public opinion, this 
looks to be more a function of political rhetoric, rather than a structural factor in determining 
peoples’ willingness to accept Turkey. Nevertheless, perceptions of culture need to be addressed, if 
only to deflate the efficacy of the political antagonists’ rhetoric. Many (though certainly not all) of 
those who hold negative opinions about Turkey also have profound misconceptions about this 
country. Turkey is not, for example, a country where adulterers are legally stoned, thieves 
dismembered or Christians beheaded under some brutal conception of Shari’a law. Perceptions that 
most Turkish men have multiple wives, whom they regularly beat, are commonplace in Europe 
(Traynor & Henley, 2004).51  
As Reiner Hülsse (2006), a constructivist scholar of European identity, suggests, Turkey is in 
need of a policy that starts to alter Turkey’s image in the minds of the countries where Turkey is 
politically opposed. Rather than a country that reacts emotionally to setbacks, engages in vociferous 
defense against such issues as the Armenian Genocide, and a ‘managed’ civil society, Turkey ought 
to reshape its image into a country that is not very different from the mainstream European country. 
In light of the set of countries where opposition to Turkey is the most politically viable, Turkey 
ought to create an image that is more like them. In light of the sovereign debt crises, it is not, 
presently, a winning strategy to pose Turkey to be more like the Southern European countries, even 
if those are, in fact, the most similar to Turkey. Instead, Turkey should profile itself as a country 
with a strong growing economy, a vibrant modern society, with a government that is eager to adopt 
Western political values.  
In this context it is worthwhile to be mindful that for every example of Europe-like 
conditions in Turkey drawn from Western Turkey, there are corresponding examples of not-
Europe-like conditions in Eastern Turkey. It would be useful for Turkey to ‘play up’ the West, but 
                                                
51 That is not to suggest that Turkey does not have a very real violence-against-women problem. However, there should 
be an honest discussion about what rejection of EU membership will mean. Is public opinion in member states honestly 
concerned about improving women’s rights, or are they using it as a talking point to support their opinions about 
keeping Turkey out of the EU? 
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also to acknowledge the East when pressed to do so. Correspondingly, pointing out regional 
variations of conditions in many European countries, such as in Italy (North and South), Germany 
(East and West), and in Europe as a whole (Northwest vs. South and East), understanding that the 
divergence in Turkey is of far greater scale than is the case in the counterexamples.  
The point, however, is to acknowledge that problems exist in the Southeast and other 
spheres of development, but that the requirements of membership and the developments resulting 
from those requirements are the surest means by which to ameliorate those problems. It will be 
useful to point out the benefits that the perspective of membership has had on Turkey, and that by 
rejecting Turkey, member states are essentially complicit in the reasons for which public opinion 
(supposedly) holds Turkey in such low esteem.  
The purpose of building this positive narrative is to change the narrative from that of 
Turkey’s antagonists – where Turkey is the source of the Muslim barbarians seeking to plunder 
European welfare states. This narrative appeals to the public’s desire to defend itself. The narrative 
that suits Turkey better is one where the publics of the member states are made to feel good about 
themselves as guides and examples for Turkey. Such a narrative would highlight Turkey’s recent past 
as having long been attracted to European society and values, as having made difficult but earnest 
strides toward adopting those esteemed values, and having benefited from European example.  
The point, here, is not to suggest specifics on how to change the narrative, but to suggest 
that Turkey needs to be actively engaged in public diplomacy in order to do so. It should be ready 
and willing to actively contradict the narratives of Turkey’s political antagonists in the six critical 
member states with informational campaigns that change the inaccurate stereotypes that many 
people in Europe still have about Turkey. In so doing, it should also acknowledge that Turkey still 
has faults – as so many countries (including the six member states in question) do – but that they are 
working hard to correct those faults. The narrative should be of that of the honest prodigal son, 
rather than the wastrel outsider seeking enrichment from Europe’s plenty.  
12.4.6 Message Control 
Of course, as a proud country, many in Turkey will balk at the narrative of the prodigal son – not to 
mention the painful concessions that will likely have to be made. The prodigal-son narrative is 
demeaning and the concessions that will be required are unfair. The narrative is also not necessarily a 
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true one. To suggest that Turkey would not have made political, economic and societal reforms 
without the Copenhagen criteria’s ‘enlightened’ guidance is absurd. However, if Turkey wishes to 
appeal to European public opinion, those bitter pills will likely have to be swallowed. It will be up to 
the Turkish leaders to decide if EU membership is worth having to swallow their pride, knowing 
that there are no guarantees that they will be sufficient to win membership. 
Part of this swallowing will also entail curtailing the negative messages that tend to 
accompany the process from the side of Turkey and its allies. Turkey can also help itself by altering 
the way in which its own political community and that of its allies communicates Turkey’s image. 
The dominant change in its own approach that would work in its favor is to take Hülsse’s advice to 
‘play it cool’, in terms of how it responds to criticism. The best change its allies can make is to drop 
the charges of racism and discuss the issues openly and factually. 
Hülsse’s advice for being “Cool Turkey” is to cease the angry responses when the European 
Council delivers less than was hoped for, or when European leaders make negative statements. To a 
large extent, Turkey’s leaders have already adopted this. While the AKP leaders responded 
vociferously to the setbacks in 1997 and 2002, they have since taken setbacks in stride – politely 
disagreeing with the public statements of leaders like Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel. Failing to 
do so feeds into the perception of Turkey as a traditionalistic and nationalistic culture that cannot 
abide even reasonable criticism, and, in short, of ‘being pushy’. In many cases, it is entirely warranted 
for Turks to feel slighted. Many of the charges laid at their feet – such as its ‘non-European’ 
geography, the Armenian Genocide, or its occupation of Northern Cyprus – have nothing to do 
with the criteria of membership. Expressing indignation at these things is, not, however, productive 
in the pursuit of membership. 
Also, it does not do well to highlight the European-ness of the Ottoman history. The debate 
should not be about history. The historic narrative is already too polluted with imagery of the Siege 
of Vienna and misunderstandings about the Ottoman past. Instead, the frame should be about 
Turkey as a rapidly modernizing country with a bright future. The improvement of human and civic 
rights should be highlighted. Also, it should be about how it is (presently and in the foreseeable 
future) governed by a political party that in many ways is similar to Christian Democrats – 
sometimes a little sanctimonious but in practice quite pragmatic. The rapidly growing economy 
should, especially, be highlighted in terms of the prospect of being a draw for return migration.  
One particular image that needs to be discarded from Turkey’s allies’ political rhetoric is the 
metaphor of Turkey as a ‘bridge’ to the Middle East. The ‘bridge’ is a metaphor that appeals to 
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foreign policy idealists – who see Ankara as a desirable intermediary between the Western World 
and the countries of the Middle East. However, for those people who are led to oppose Turkey 
because they fear the prospect of immigration from the Middle East, a bridge, over which people 
cross to get from one side to the other, is precisely the wrong image. To them it is not a bridge ‘to’ 
the Middle East, but a bridge ‘from’ the Middle East, carrying hordes of poor and needy immigrants.  
Obviously, this is not what the metaphor is attempting to communicate, but it is a metaphor 
that appeals to the wrong crowd in the right way, but to the necessary crowd in the wrong way. 
Foreign policy idealists are not those who need to be convinced. It is the people who have fears of 
more immigration who need to be persuaded that Turkey is not a threat. The metaphors of political 
discourse need to be shaped around those who need to be persuaded, not around those who are 
already on board.   
Controlling the message is also valid advice for Turkey’s allies. The political left’s accusations 
of the political right being racist do nothing to diminish the fears of immigration that those who 
vote for the right have. Accusations of racism only perpetuate the marriage between the debate over 
Turkey and the debate over immigration. Instead, those two debates must be divorced from one 
another. Turkey should cease to be framed as a ‘Muslim country’ altogether, because that frame only 
highlights one particular cultural facet about a very multifaceted country. If an identity card must be 
played, it should be how Turkey is not an Arab country and how it is very different from the Arab 
world.  
Turkey can also work with the business communities in the member states, who, by-and-
large, are more positive toward the prospect of Turkish membership. The business community can 
help shape the debate about Turkey away from the debate about immigration. In many cases, such 
as in Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands, the business community has control over the old 
liberal right, but this bastion has given way to the populist right. The business community can, 
perhaps, help craft an agreement between the old liberal right and the mainstream left to sideline the 
populist right by staging the political debate around other issues during political campaigns. The left 
could compensate for what the liberal right may lose in the campaign (by not agitating against 
Turkey) in the coalition agreements after elections. Furthermore, the business community can more 
actively campaign on Turkey’s behalf by highlighting the economic benefits Turkey’s membership 
promises.  
In addition to Turkey’s allies in the political left and in the business communities, a third ally 
that needs to be curtailed is the United States. Especially during the 2002, 2004, and 2006 episodes, 
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America’s ‘soft power’ political capital was in the red. Nevertheless, it loudly advocated its position 
on Turkey’s behalf, which only strengthened Turkey’s antagonists. In 2002, they misread Denmark 
(as did many), and in 2004 they preached at the Dutch government, which surreptitiously had 
already joined the choir. The same was true of Jacques Chirac, who – despite his personal support 
for Turkey – felt called to rebuke the Americans for their intrusion. If it does nothing else, the 
United States could best pursue its interest to see Turkey further ensconced in the Western 
community of countries by keeping quiet on the matter in public, and shoring up support for Turkey 
in the Eastern European countries where it enjoys more influence.  
12.4.7 Concessions 
Beyond public diplomacy and message control, it is also very likely that Turkey shall have to make 
three particular concessions. The first, which has already been discussed, regards Cyprus. Turkey 
shall have to come to a modus vivendi with Greek Cyprus and allow its ships and airplanes to dock in 
and land on Turkish harbors and airports. Hopefully, it can do this at the same time that it helps 
facilitate a solution to the continuing division on the island and is able to withdraw its troops. As 
mentioned already, it is not strategic to do this too soon, so as to prevent the Greeks and the Greek 
Cypriots from demanding more concessions than are necessary. 
The other two that will likely be necessary concern the Armenian Genocide and permanent 
limitations on the free movement of persons. Both of these will be odious to Turks: 
acknowledgement of genocide, because it has nothing to do with the requisites of membership and 
curtailing the free movement of persons because it is quite unfair that Turkish citizens will be 
second-class citizens of the EU.  
The case of the Armenian Genocide will probably be necessary for France. France has the 
largest Armenian community in the EU, which has leverage in the Parti Socialiste. However, the 
precise language of any recognition should be discretely negotiated directly with Armenian leaders in 
the Parti Socialiste, rather with Yerevan or any other representatives or the Armenian community. 
The immediate aim of the concession concerns gaining support for Turkish membership from the 
left in France, presuming that the left will be in power at a time when Turkey will make its final bid 
for ratification of the accession treaty in France. If the left is not in power and the right is expected 
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to either block ratification or put it to referendum, then there is little point in making a push for 
membership. 
More important, however, will be a concession on the free movement of persons. In the 
final analysis, the greatest part of what unnerves domestic public opinion about Turkey joining the 
EU is the prospect of a flood of new immigrants from Turkey. While past impacts of membership 
on immigration was always much less than had been feared – in the case of Greece, Spain, Portugal 
and the Eastern European Countries, where actual migration flows were much less than had been 
prognosticated – it may be that Turkey shall have to put permanent safeguards on the free 
movement of persons on the table. 
As immigration is the primary concern, offering a limitation on the number of Turkish 
citizens able to migrate into Europe should take the migration issue off the table. Once Turkey is a 
member, it should be able to renegotiate the terms at a time when the migration issue may be less of 
a concern, when Turkey is demonstrated to be an EU member in good standing, and when Turkey 
has the leverage in the Council to log-roll the free movement of Turkish persons with other issues to 
be decided. Again, because this will have to be a concession in order to win support, it should only 
be offered if doing so will win the support of the requisite member states to close the negotiations 
and ratify the accession treaties. It should also not be offered prematurely so that the member states 
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13.0  CONCLUSION 
The introduction to this dissertation began with a quote from a Dutch European Commissioner 
referencing a 17th century battle between the Holy Roman Empire and the Ottoman Empire. He 
indicated that if Muslim immigration were not diminished, the victory of the Christian forces at 
Vienna would have been for naught, essentially comparing the immigration of Muslim people with 
violent invasion and brutal conquest. He made these remarks in the context of a pending decision of 
the European Council, under the Dutch Presidency, of the EU beginning accession negotiations 
with Turkey. They push the narrative of a clash of civilizations between Muslims and Christians. It 
suggests that this clash goes back many centuries, and that the question of Turkish membership, tied 
to the problems of immigration, are a part of this supposed perennial struggle between the 
Christian/civilized West and the Muslim (read: uncivilized) Turks.  
The astute reader will note that this research did not test for narratives. It drew hypotheses 
from two broad metatheoretical paradigms of international relations and tested these against the 
empirical record of member-state positions on Turkey joining the EU. In other words, it sought to 
broadly locate where the most parsimonious explanation, derived from theory, could be found. The 
clash of competing narratives, however, helped cement the findings together into a fuller 
understanding of the case.  
13.1 FINDINGS  
The first thing that is immediately apparent from the variation in the policies on Turkey is that many 
states changed their policies significantly over time. France began as a strong supporter, and 
gradually turned into an opponent of Turkish membership in the EU. Greece and Germany, on the 
other hand, started out as strong opponents, became strong supporters, and then eventually returned 
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to policies attempting to slow down or derail Turkey’s progress through the enlargement regime. 
Other countries, such as the Netherlands, Finland and Luxembourg changed their policies radically 
over time.  
Because so many of these countries have changed their policies so drastically, the changes 
can only be explained by at least one variable that introduces significant change over time. This is 
not the case for the common notions of why Turkey has been kept at arm’s length, like religion or 
historical memories of the Battle of Vienna. The same is true for why some embrace Turkey, such as 
political loyalty to the United States or a desire to hollow out the EU by enlarging it beyond its 
supposed absorption capacity. As such, variables that differ per member state, but not significantly 
over time, cannot – alone – explain the policies. 
In testing the hypotheses derived from the overarching metatheories of international 
relations, what was found is that, out of the 32 tested hypotheses, the most parsimonious 
multivariate explanation for member-state behavior comes down to two assertions, based off three 
variables. The two assertions are as follows: 
 Member states with large numbers of Turks are much more likely to have their policies 
change at the same time that their domestic politics change. 
 Member states without large numbers of Turks are more likely to support Turkey if their 
own human rights standards are relatively lower, and are more likely to oppose Turkey if 
their human rights standards are relatively higher. 
This second of these two is strengthened slightly when taking the difference between the member 
state’s human rights standards and Turkey’s human rights standards into account. However, the 
added value is marginal and is not particularly illustrative in cross-country comparisons. 
The interpretation of these empirical findings is that where Turks are a dominant immigrant 
group, Turkey is considered a source for immigration, and the prospect of Turkish membership is 
cast in the light of more immigration from Turkey in the future. It is observed that the political right 
tends to propose policies that strongly limit immigration and compel the integration of culturally 
different people. By contrast, the political left tends to oppose such policies and is more likely to 
stand for immigrants’ cultural rights. Therefore, it is theoretically assumed that, given the 
presupposed relationship between Turkish membership and the prospect of more immigration from 
Turkey, the political right will oppose Turkish membership and the political left will be more 
supportive. This assumption is borne out by the analyses of the empirical record. Governments of 
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the (center)right have tended to oppose Turkish membership and governments of the (center)left 
have tended to support Turkish membership – but only in these six countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
 In their political message-making, right-wing politicians have used the language of cultural 
and religious differences to explain their opposition to Turkey. They have also raised the prospect 
that membership would imply a massive increase in immigration from Turkey to their countries. In 
reaction to this, left-wing politicians have used accusations of bigotry to denounce their political 
opponents on the right. To the degree that this has affected public opinion, the left has been losing 
the battle for public opinion and the right has been winning. Public opinion has become increasingly 
negative toward the prospect of Turkish membership, and, in 2005, respondents with negative 
opinions attributed their opinions to cultural differences between Europe and Turkey. 
This strongly suggests that right-wing politicians, at some point, saw an opportunity to 
capitalize on an unpopular issue – Turkish membership – and make it even more unpopular. This 
shift in public opinion suggests that left-wing politicians have been ineffective in making Turkey’s 
case. They have used ad hominem attacks and metaphorical language (‘a bridge to the Middle East’) 
that has communicated the wrong message to the electorate. Bridges, after all, are what people use 
to go from one side of something to the other side. If immigration was the dominant frame, then 
that bridge is more likely to have been interpreted as the avenue by which more immigrants come to 
Europe’s neighborhoods, rather than the means by which Europe can influence events in the Middle 
East.  
What is also important to note is that the question of Turkey is not determined by religious 
factors, on which the Clash of Civilizations theory hinges. Countries with higher levels of religiosity 
by self-identification are no more likely to oppose Turkey than countries that are less religious. In 
terms of church attendance, countries where people go to church more often are, in fact, somewhat 
more likely to be supportive of Turkey than countries where church attendance is less frequent. 
Also, the changing policies and public opinions suggest that none of this is as permanent a feature as 
countries’ religious identities are. As such, it is not the case that opposition to Turkey is based on 
some structural clash of civilizations.  
The clash of civilizations is a public narrative that became salient in the 2000s, possibly as an 
indirect result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The effect is assumed to have been 
indirect, because the decline in public support for Turkey was not immediately measurable in 
opinion surveys in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. The prospect of Turkish membership 
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polled roughly as well (or as badly) as the prospect of Bulgarian and Romanian membership did in 
October-November 2001. The clash of civilizations frame became a public narrative only after 
opinion-makers decided to make it a stronger public narrative.  
By contrast, support for Turkey is directly a function of the material interests of states. 
Variables related to security – either in the form of a power block (NATO), in the form of regional 
or global stability, or security from terrorism or transnational crime (drugs) – do not explain 
different levels of member-state support very well. Global and regional power interests or economic 
interests also poorly explain the policies regarding Turkey, with the strange exceptions of population 
size and external trade policy.  
In terms of relative power, it appears that the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain, the large 
and medium-size countries that are slightly smaller than Germany and France, were much more 
likely to support Turkey than either Germany and France or the smaller countries were. That said, 
size did not determine the policies of Germany and France, given that their policies changed over 
time, but their relative weight in population size did not, nor does it explain the erratic policies of 
some smaller countries, like the Netherlands, Finland and Luxembourg.  
A similar observation is made in regard to external trade policy preferences. Those countries 
that generally support a more liberal external trade policy between the EU and third countries, also 
tend to support Turkish membership more. However, that is not a time-sensitive variable, nor does 
it necessarily make sense in a rationalist understanding. It is unknown what sort of external trade 
preferences Turkey would have, should it become an EU member. 
Domestic politics did not, however, explain variation over time in the remaining nine 
countries. The remaining countries were broadly supportive of Turkey, unless they had very high 
human rights standards (such as Sweden, Finland and Luxembourg), in which case they supported 
Turkey only when it seemed evident that Turkey was on the road toward improving its own human 
rights record. Turkey’s bid for membership did not awaken tough political struggles between the 
mainstream political parties, and, for many of them, did not really entice public opinion to think 
particularly hard on the matter, insofar as the high amount of ‘don’t know’ responses on surveys 
suggests apathy.  
Given that the countries with relatively large Turkish communities form the main roadblock 
to Turkey’s membership, it is useful to expand on the social workings that underlie the domestic 
political struggles between left and right. This is where the competing narratives enter into the 
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picture. However, it is useful to first highlight the problems this research poses for the competition 
between the grand metatheoretical paradigms that underlie international relations theories. 
13.2 (META)THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 
This research poses a theoretical problem for the international relations literature, which strongly 
tends to look for explanations of foreign-policy behavior in the international realm of politics, and 
not in the domestic realm of politics. However, in testing many of the supposed reasons for foreign 
policy behavior, few of these returned anything but minimal explanatory power for the observed 
policies. For rationalism, the pursuit of security, wealth, and power at the global and regional levels 
did not explain member-state behavior. Most of the constructivist hypotheses related to identities, 
norms, and values, likewise failed to produce strong results. The strongest of the constructivist 
hypotheses was one where the human rights record of the member states in question was 
measured52. This trend was further strengthened when Turkey’s own human rights record was taken 
into account, though this added factor offered only marginal explanatory added-value. Mostly, it is 
about member states’ own respect for human rights and only secondarily about Turkey’s human 
rights. This suggests that advances in human rights matter to those countries for whom human 
rights are important, in the absence of domestic political imperatives.  
Countries without those domestic political imperatives and with relatively mediocre respect 
for human rights were generally supportive of Turkey. It is assumed that, for them, the broad 
foreign policy benefits of bringing Turkey into the fold were determinative of their policies toward 
integrating Turkey as a member. Yet, this suggests that the international-level interests are secondary 
to the domestic political interests. States only support Turkey when there are not domestic political 
imperatives to prevent them from doing so.  
International relations theory could accommodate the import of domestic politics if the 
question of Turkey were a low-stakes issue at the international level. This is, however, not the case. 
Turkey is a strong and very strategically located country. It has a large and mostly modern military. It 
has diplomatic relations with third countries that Europe could benefit from. It is becoming the 
                                                
52 Actually, it was the level of corruption that was the most explanatory over the whole range of member states, but this 
weakened in the multivariate model, whereas the human-rights variable strengthened in the multivariate model. 
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thoroughfare for Caspian, Iranian and Iraqi energy resources, which would diminish Europe’s 
dependence on Russian pipelines. Further integration of intelligence and law enforcement 
institutions can help with Europe’s terrorism and organized crime problems. Turkey is also a rapidly 
growing economy and membership can open Turkey’s agricultural market and further reduce non-
tariff barriers to goods covered by the existing Customs Union. 
Likewise, from the constructivist angle, it would be a harder case for anti-Western opinion 
leaders in the Middle East to make a case for innate European anti-Islamic prejudices if the EU were 
to admit Turkey as a member. The Clash of Civilizations theory would be ‘defeated’ by a European 
‘Alliance of Civilizations.’ This would undermine the central narrative of Islamist terrorism regarding 
Europe and the West. With the Arab Spring still unfolding at the time of writing, the model of a 
democratic Turkey, where modern Islamist politics are not feared for enacting a theocracy, has 
potential benefits to spread western democratic values to the countries on the southern and eastern 
shores of the Mediterranean and beyond.  
From both metatheoretical approaches, the question of Turkey is a high-stakes issue, and if 
domestic politics more adequately explains member-states’ policies toward Turkey, then 
international relations theory has a very serious ‘missing variable bias.’ If domestic politics trump 
foreign policy interests in deciding policy regarding Turkey, it is a very problematic case for 
international relations theory, which generally assumes that one need not look inside states for 
explanations of behavior between states.  
It is also problematic for those who want rationalism to trump constructivism or vice versa, 
because variables from both realms are, together, explanatory of the case. It is rational for politicians 
to seek power, and to use the most effective means available for them to do so. However, it strains 
that paradigm when those means rely on narratives of cultural and religious differences. By the same 
token, constructivism cannot stand on its own either. The cultural variables, aside from corruption 
and human rights, explain very little without which they have power-seeking politicians interpreting 
the relationships between culture and religion on the one hand and immigrants and Turkish 
membership on the other. 
  549 
13.3 NARRATIVES 
Because of the above limitations of international relations theory, it is necessary for there to be 
metatheoretical cement between rationalism and constructivism that operates at the domestic level. 
This is not the place, nor does this author have the wisdom, to produce a full paradigmatic 
understanding or deductive empirical test of such cement here. Yet it is useful to provide an 
interpretation of the analyses of the preceding chapters coupled with a sense of the underlying logic 
that is the result of having been immersed in this material for the past couple of years. The adoption, 
or creation, of such metatheory and an empirical test can usefully be done in future research.  
That sense of the underlying logic is that – coming out of the politics of immigration, where 
politicians of the right broadly oppose both Turkish membership and more immigration, and 
politicians of the left, broadly, support Turkish membership and immigrant rights – politicians have 
engaged in political story-telling. The stories they have told, which are narratives that make selective 
use of history and frames of identity, culture, and religion – have intended to create intellectually 
parsimonious dramas that paint the politicians as defenders of the norms and values of their 
societies.  
From the right, the narrative has been that the right-wing politicians are the defenders of 
Western/Christian civilization from a non-Western/Muslim threat. Hearkening back to the sieges 
and battles of Vienna, where the Ottoman Turkish menace was militarily defeated, they suggest, as 
Frits Bolkestein does, that the Islamization of Europe means the undermining of European 
civilization. It draws on the theory of the clash of civilizations wherein different cultures inexorably 
come into conflict with one another because these cultures (supposedly) have inherently different 
values and desires. They paint their left-wing political rivals as having embraced the non-Western 
barbarians with naïve ideas that a multicultural society can be a harmonious society, when the 
narrative suggests that this is impossible.  
From the left, the narrative has been that the left-wing politicians are the defenders of the 
liberal/Enlightenment tradition that assumes that all people want to live free from oppression in 
harmonious social-democratic societies. The narrative projects the view of the EU and its 
Copenhagen criteria as means of spreading this liberal/Enlightenment tradition to the farthest 
reaches of the globe with Eastern Europe and the opposite shores of the Dardanelles as the next 
logical place where Western values will be adopted. The politicians of the right, who are 
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(supposedly) racists and religious bigots, are stifling this grand ideological plan and need to be 
exposed as such. 
In using this narrative, Turkey’s left-wing allies have done Turkey few favors, because, like 
the right-wing narrative, the left-wing narrative is predicated on Turkey’s differences with European 
countries, rather than its similarities with European countries or its differences from other Middle 
Eastern and Northern African countries. The left-wing narrative, essentially also, lumps all Muslims 
together and portrays them as a people who can benefit from Western tutelage. So, instead of 
disputing the narrative, Turkey’s proponents have fed into the overall narrative of Turkey as the 
‘Muslim other’ against which Europe’s Southeastern borders are culturally and religiously defined. 
Further, by projecting the idea that embracing Turkey as a member state could diminish Islamist 
terrorism by providing for a ‘good Muslim’ example, this narrative reiterates the relationship 
between Muslims and terrorism, while, Islamist terrorism has not emanated from Turkey at all.  
By embracing this narrative, Turkey’s allies have attempted to score political points by 
accusing their domestic political opponents as being prejudiced against Muslims. In doing so, they 
have undermined Turkey’s case for membership by making religion Turkey’s defining characteristic, 
and reiterating the relationship between that religion and terrorism. As such, they have essentially 
worked against Turkey’s interests, by reproducing parts of the right wing’s narrative in order to score 
political points at home: something that, thus far, does not seem to have worked much in their 
favor. 
Both these narratives make selective use of fact and fiction to create dramatic stories that 
their audiences, the electorates, will embrace. They are designed to win votes, not to provide honest 
intellectual foundations for thoughtful policy. As such, they highlight compelling drama over 
accurate complexity. That is not to say that these politicians do not believe the stories they tell; it is 
quite easy for them to make themselves believe what they are saying. There is, most likely, a 
spectrum between true believers and cynical manipulators along which politicians of both stripes can 
be arrayed. However, it remains that the complexity of reality is glossed over in order to facilitate 
political advancement at the ballot box.  
In terms of the political effectiveness of these narratives, it seems that the narrative of the 
political right has been more effective than that of the left in the countries with large Turkish 
communities. This is evident in the right’s more aggressive use of rejection of Turkish membership 
in the EU in their election campaigns, compared to the left’s tepid defensiveness about their 
preferred policy. With public opinion more against Turkey than in favor of its membership, the right 
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has been able to capitalize and move public opinion further into the ‘oppose’ column. The left, on 
the other hand, has preferred to highlight other policy issues in their campaign platforms. At most, 
they will accuse their domestic political opponents of inciting nationalism and mumble something 
about Turkey’s human rights; preferring to change the subject. 
13.4 POLICY PROPOSALS 
With these findings and derived suppositions about political narratives in hand, it is worthwhile to 
close out the research with policy implications and ideas for future research. The previous chapter 
listed recommendations to Turkey for navigating the precarious future of its bid for membership, 
should it choose to continue on that path. It suggested providing information, message control and 
painful concessions. Below are added public diplomacy suggestions based on the ideas of narratives 
presented above. 
Because the countries with relatively large Turkish communities are the primary opponents 
of Turkish membership when their right wings are in power, it is the structure of political incentives 
within these countries that need to be addressed. As long as the political right can win votes by 
agitating against Turkish membership in enough of these countries, they have a great incentive to 
block Turkish accession. In order to overcome that, Turkey will have to wade into the domestic 
politics of these countries in order to change the incentive structures of the right-wing politicians. 
This can probably not be done without Turkey having to offer the concession of permanent 
safeguards on the free movement of persons from Turkey, in addition to other concessions 
involving Cyprus and the Armenian Genocide. It is not suggested that these concessions are fair, but 
they are most likely going to be necessary. 
Most of these concessions are recommended for the endgame of the accession process. In 
order to both maintain domestic control in Turkey and prevent more concessions than are strictly 
necessary, Turkey should not make these concessions prematurely. In the meanwhile, however, it is 
necessary to change the direction of public opinion and doing so means adjusting the poorly 
performing narratives of Turkey’s allies in the six member states where the domestic politics matter. 
Because the left-wing political class, by-and-large, would prefer to talk about other issues, it 
is incumbent upon Turkey – operating through its Foreign Ministry and Ministry of European 
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Union Affairs – to help its allies craft a winning political message. In doing so, they need to properly 
identify those who need to be convinced. Broadly speaking, the liberal political message of the EU, 
bringing enlightenment to foreign shores through the Copenhagen criteria, is a narrative that only 
works on those who are already convinced. Also, the ad hominem accusations of bigotry offend those 
who have honest concerns over immigration while doing nothing to expand the base of people who 
support Turkey for membership.  Turkey and its allies need to use arguments that expand its base of 
supporters, not narratives that preach to the choir. 
In the same vein as the existing left- and right-wing narratives are dramatic simplifications of 
reality that use partial facts and emotions (such as hope and fear) instrumentally, Turkey and its allies 
should consider crafting a narrative that also makes use of both selective factual and emotional 
content. Yet, unlike the existing left-wing narrative, which does not provide a useful counter-
narrative to the right-wing narrative, the new narrative should also include a powerful narrative that 
contradicts the existing right-wing narrative. This counter-narrative should highlight both Turkey’s 
secularism and modernity. In so doing, it ought to highlight those aspects of Turkey that are most 
similar to Europe. It should convey facts about Turkey that are contrary to stereotypical 
understandings of Arab culture and countries, so as to draw distinctions between Turkey and the 
broader Middle East. These may seem very basic, but it would be worthwhile to highlight facts such 
as the fact that Turkey uses the Latin alphabet, just as Europeans do; that it operates according to 
Western-derived law and not Shari’a law; that women are forbidden to wear the headscarf in public 
buildings. Regardless of how basic these facts are these are often unknown to people in Europe. 
In addition to a counter-narrative that contradicts the core elements of the existing narrative, 
it is useful to craft a positive message that plays on the primary concerns that people in the member 
states have. According to Gürer (2008), the four main factors of negative public opinion toward 
Turkey were: ‘concerns about identity’, ‘future enlargement’, ‘economic expectations’, and ‘crime.’  
Though this research did not find a significant effect of ‘fear of loss of identity’ at the 
member state level of analysis, this does not mean that it is insignificant at the individual level of 
analysis. Turkey cannot address the loss of distinct national identity in European member-states. 
However, the identification of Turkey as part of a nearly indistinguishable larger group of 
immigrants can be addressed. This also plays into the counter-narrative by which Turkey has 
defining features other than the religion of most of its citizens.  
A useful means of addressing identity concerns is by differentiating Turks from other Middle 
Easterners and other Muslims. In many of the countries in which there are significant Turkish 
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communities, Turks are not the only immigrant communities who practice Islam. In many cases, 
these are North African Arab immigrants from the Maghreb, such as Algeria and Morocco. Not 
only should the message communicate distinctions between Turkey and these other countries from 
where Muslim immigrants come, but also the differing types of behavior of the immigrant 
communities. For example, in the Netherlands, the message could indicate the significantly lower 
crime rate of Turkish youth compared to Moroccan youth. This is not an innocent message, 
however, as it will essentially alienate these other immigrant communities. 
This recommendation regarding crime plays into one of the factors Gürer identifies as being 
an explanatory variable for opposition to Turkish membership in public opinion. The more a person 
fears crime, the more they reject the prospect of Turkey joining the EU. If Turks can be 
disconnected from crime in the message, then public opinion may cease to regard the prospect of 
Turkish membership with an increase of crime in their environs. In addition to differentiating 
between Turkish immigrants and other immigrant communities in their contribution toward the 
overall crime rate, it can be highlighted that integration of Turkey into EU law-enforcement 
institutions can help minimize crime related to Turkish immigrants. 
The other factors identified by Gürer were ‘future enlargement’ and ‘economic expectations.’ 
Enlargement to Turkey certainly cannot address concerns over future enlargement, however, it can 
address economic expectations – especially in light of its recent rapid growth as compared to that of 
many of the member states. By profiling Turkey as a growing economy, with which European 
countries have mutually beneficial trade relations, it provides the message of Turkey as an economic 
gain to Europe, rather than an economic cost as many people presume. 
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13.5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
These are little more than off-the-cuff ideas for approaches toward influencing public opinion in 
Europe toward more open policies toward Turkey’s membership ambitions. There is more research 
that can be done to more fully understand public opinion and political dynamics in the member 
states that this research does not have the space to address. Public diplomacy policies should be well 
researched and tailored for each member state and the peculiarities of their individual political 
discourse cultures.  
What this research does show is that domestic political dynamics are critical for deciding 
Turkey’s enlargement prospects. Given the level of public opposition that currently exists, it will be 
impossible for Turkey to ‘earn’ membership on its own merits, either by fully meeting the 
Copenhagen criteria or by making itself strategically invaluable. That is an unfortunate reality, but a 
reality nonetheless. 
For the study of international relations, it remains a very interesting case. Future research can 
investigate the power of domestic politics and political narrative to shape foreign policy decisions. 
This case demonstrates that domestic political imperatives can trump even high-stakes foreign policy 
imperatives. While politicians have, at many times, done unpopular things for what they consider to 
be the greater good, this case is not an example of that. It defies the rational unitary-actor model of 
the state. Instead, the politician or political party is the more useful level of analysis for 
understanding policy.  
Such research can also attempt to further investigate the relationship between rational cost 
and benefit structures of domestic political actors and their ability to weave political narratives. This 
cuts at a metatheoretical problem that many have sought to solve. Jupille, Caporaso & Checkel 
(2003) argue that the two metatheories may be “ontologically irreconcilable.” They contrast the 
paradigmatic positions as arguing that for rationalists the political world consists of “self-interested 
agents engaged in strategic choices,” whereas the constructivist political world consists of “other-
regarding agents engaged in deliberative dynamics” (p. 16).  
They do not suggest a full synthesis of the two metatheories, arguing that the foundational 
differences between them are too great. Therefore, they suggest four models by which rationalism 
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and constructivism can be brought into dialogue with one another. The first model is ‘competitive 
testing’, which is not so much a model of combination, but one that attempts to determine which 
approach explains more of the variation in the dependent variable. This is the conventional model 
used by adherents of one theory/approach to demonstrate the power of their theory/approach 
compared to that of other theories/approaches. This research found both metatheories to be 
inadequate to the task of explanation, whereas a combination of variables, drawn from both 
metatheories, produced better results. 
The second approach they offer is one of a separation by ‘domain of application,’ which 
suggests that rationalism and constructivism have different spheres of influence (e.g. that rationalism 
may explain more high-stakes interactions whereas constructivism and institutional routines explain 
low-stakes interactions). This research also contradicted this particular division. The politics of 
Turkish membership are high-stakes games, yet they appear to be subject to many constructivist 
elements.  
 The third model is ‘sequencing’, which suggests a temporal domain of application, where 
one theory explains a first step in a process and the other theory explains a second step53. The fourth 
model is ‘incorporation’ (subsumption) wherein one theoretical approach is simply a subset of, or 
derived from, the other. This latter approach seems to be the most adequate in this case, one that 
combines rational calculation within an imperfectly intersubjective understanding of the social 
environment, which is a constructivist ontology.  
In this case, political narratives erect competing understandings of the world and voters 
choose which is the most compelling. They do not choose based on which interpretation yields 
them the biggest pay-off, but which narrative they find speaks both to their imperfect understanding 
of the world as well as their desire for a dramatic story in which they are the ‘good guy’ and not 
infrequently the victim. Politicians craft or spin their narratives based on their rational calculations of 
power. They see a marketplace for their dramatic narratives in which they can win voter approval by 
offering voters what the voters seem to want, not by what a rational calculus says they should need. 
These politicians may believe their own messages, but their messages do not tend to do themselves a 
disservice.  
 
                                                
53 Jupille et al. offer the example of constructivism explaining preference formation and rationalism explaining the pursuit 
of preferences, which is nothing more than Thin-Theory Rationalism 
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13.6 SUMMARY 
This research has collected the recent history of the diplomatic back-and-forth of Turkey’s progress 
towards EU membership. This history has been analyzed with respect to common understandings 
of what motivations drive government policy on Turkey’s membership prospects. The findings of 
this research point out that a re-think is necessary at the theoretical level and at the policy level. On 
the theoretical side, it is necessary to take domestic politics seriously, and to understand what 
motivates changes of government, because changes of government help explain changes of policy in 
the most influential member states. Where the winning political arguments are not based in 
materialist costs or benefits, but in ideational narratives, it is counterproductive to continue to 
believe that domestic politics are the means by which states arrive at their rationalist optimal 
interests from a material cost-benefit analysis. In a political market where narratives win voters, 
politicians will seek their political fortunes offering public what electorates want to hear.  
This resounds on the policy side. From Turkey’s perspective, where the Turkish foreign 
ministry has been at pains to explain Turkey’s value to member states’ theoretical material interests – 
that Turkey is a geostrategically valuable partner, that it has a growing economy of consumers, that 
its cooperation in the field of counter-terror and law enforcement can diminish these non-state 
threats, and so forth, has paid off only with the countries that do not have overriding concerns 
elsewhere in their spectrum of interests. In a large number of countries – including Germany and 
France – domestic political advantages provide a strong rationale for domestic political operatives to 
prefer the advantages of domestic political support to strengthening bilateral and multilateral 
relationships with Turkey. Until the narratives change, or the subject ceases to be salient, policies 
should not be expected to change. 
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APPENDIX A: DRUG DEATHS 
The available data from the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
(EMCDDA) on drug-induced deaths in the EU-15 member states is an incomplete set among the 
episodes. To correct for this, the available data, in both Selections B and D, is used to arrive at 
estimate numbers that are less subject to outliers in the existing Selection B data. The differences 
between Selections B and D come from the origins of the data. Selection B data come from general 
mortality registries, whereas Selection D data come from special registries, usually forensic or police. 
Table A.1 shows the available data from Selection B. The missing data points have been shaded.  
Table A.1: Number of Drug-Induced Deaths from Opiates, ‘Selection B’. 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Austria    119 135 167 153 84 192 185 196 202 
Belgium 132 137 123  113     74   
Denmark 214 242 256 243 217 240 221 224 222 220 207 227 
Finland  107 98 84 119 134 110 97 101 135 126 138 
France 465 393 228 143 118 247 272 242 231 267 301 305 
Germany 1227 1305 1088 1280 1337 1487 1239 1139 1161 1104 1223 1169 
Greece             
Ireland 36 44 78 82 122 113 93 90 96 112 124 131 
Italy 1231 1369 1097 1068 950 851 698 530     
Luxembourg    22 14 21 16 12 10 5 12 11 
Netherlands 70 108 108 110 115 131 144 103 104 127 122 112 
Portugal        34 23 20 9 12 
Spain     609 604  536 579 480 316 204 
Sweden 70 122 133 138 157 194 204 203 188 170 186 172 
UK  1152 1258 1455 1644 1707 1995 1863 1596 1691 1812 1800 
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Of those with missing values above, a complete set of Selection D data exists for Austria, Greece, 
Italy, and Spain, but not for Belgium or Portugal. For the latter two, then, it is necessary to estimate 
the missing values solely based on the existing values. The missing value for Finland is estimated by 
drawing a trend from the later 11 data points. In the case of Belgium this is done by way of 
interpolating the values for 1998, and 2000 through 2003, and extrapolating for 2005 and beyond. In 
the case of Portugal, this is done by extrapolating backwards from 2002-2009 to 1995-2001. Also, 
because there are only three missing values in the first three years, and the Selection D data is greatly 
at odds with the Selection B data, there is little harm is simply extrapolating. Doing all of the above 
provides the following data with the estimates in table A.2. 
For Greece, Italy and Spain there is Selection D data available, making sole reliance on 
interpolated and extrapolated numbers unnecessary. Because it is assumed that the trends visible in 
the Selection D data are going to be the same as they would be in the Selection B, were that data 
available, the trends in Selection D are transferred to the data used in this analysis, adjusting the 
numbers according to the average factoral difference between Selections B and D. Below are the 
numbers, Selection B, D. and the estimated numbers used for this analysis for each of these 
countries.  
For Italy, there are missing numbers for 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. As Table B.3, below, 
shows, there are differences between the Selection B and the Selection D data. The Selection B data 
tends to be higher in 1995 and 2003, but is usually lower than the Selection D counts. An estimating 
trend has been calculated to the multiplier of the D to the B data, and the results of the estimated 
trend have been used as multipliers for the Selection D numbers with respect to the missing values. 
The estimated numbers are listed below. 
 Table A.2: Estimated Number of Drug-Induced Deaths for Belgium and Portugal. 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Austria 94ε 103ε 112ε 119 135 167 153 84 192 185 196 202 
Belgium 132 137 123 117ε 113 103ε 96ε 89ε 83ε 74 69ε 62ε 
Portugal 30ε 29ε 28ε 27ε 26ε 25ε 24ε 34 23 20 9 12 
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Table A.3: Estimated Number of Drug-Induced Deaths for Italy 
Italy 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Selection B 1231 1369 1097 1068 950 851 698 530     
Selection D 1195 1566 1160 1080 1002 1016 825 520 517 653 653 551 
Estimates 1231 1369 1097 1068 950 851 698 530 468ε 586ε 582ε 487ε 
 
Spain’s missing data is from the earlier years, rather than the later years. Also, the difference between 
the Selection B and selection D data has decreased over time, with the earlier numbers (for years 
1999, 2000, 2002, and 2004) differing significantly more than the more recent years, 2005 and since 
(including 2007, 2008, and 2009). The means of estimating is the same as for Italy, computing a 
trend for the difference multiplier for the missing years and multiplying that number by the Selection 
D data. The table below offers the resulting numbers.  
Table A.4: Estimated Number of Drug-Induced Deaths for Spain 
Spain 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Selection B     609 604  536 579 480 316 204 
Selection D 371 381 321 271 258 254 240 204 274 212 237 218 
Estimates 1262ε 1227ε 976ε 775ε 609 604 598ε 536 579 480 316 204 
 
Greece, on the other hand, does not have any Selection B data to draw from, but there is a complete 
set of Selection D data. In order to keep numbers that can be compared across cases, it is necessary 
to multiply the Selection D data by a multiplier that will put it into a similar range as that of the 
other member states. This multiplier is calculated by taking the average multiplier of all the known 
cases of Selection B and D data for all 30 countries in the EMCDDA dataset. These averages are 
also calculated for each year to test for heteroscedasticity. It is noted that there does not seem to be 
a trend that makes that average multiplier grow or diminish over time, so the average multiplier 
(1.144) will be applied to the Greek Selection D data to compute an estimate for the missing 
Selection B data. The estimates are shown in the table below. 
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 Table A.5: Estimated Number of Drug-Induced Deaths for Greece 
Greece 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Selection B             
Selection D 176 222 232 245 265 304 321 259 217 255 325 253 
Estimates 201ε 254ε 265ε 280ε 303ε 348ε 367ε 296ε 248ε 292ε 372ε 289ε 
 
With these estimates made, the known data is supplemented with the estimated data into Table A.6, 
which shall be used in the analysis of the effects of drug-related deaths from heroin on the 
likelihood that a member state shall be supportive of, or antagonistic to, Turkish membership in the 
EU.  
Table A.6: Estimated Number of Drug-Induced Deaths Recorded in the EU-15 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Austria 94ε 103ε 112ε 119 135 167 153 84 192 185 196 202 
Belgium 132 137 123 117ε 113 103ε 96ε 89ε 83ε 74 69ε 62ε 
Denmark 214 242 256 243 217 240 221 224 222 220 207 227 
Finland 85ε 107 98 84 119 134 110 97 101 135 126 138 
France 465 393 228 143 118 247 272 242 231 267 301 305 
Germany 1227 1305 1088 1280 1337 1487 1239 1139 1161 1104 1223 1169 
Greece 201ε 254ε 265ε 280ε 303ε 348ε 367ε 296ε 248ε 292ε 372ε 289ε 
Ireland 36 44 78 82 122 113 93 90 96 112 124 131 
Italy 1231 1369 1097 1068 950 851 698 530 468ε 586ε 582ε 487ε 
Luxembourg 22ε 21ε 20ε 22 14 21 16 12 10 5 12 11 
Netherlands 70 108 108 110 115 131 144 103 104 127 122 112 
Portugal 30ε 29ε 28ε 27ε 26ε 25ε 24ε 34 23 20 9 12 
Spain 1262ε 1227ε 976ε 775ε 609 604 598ε 536 579 480 316 204 
Sweden 70 122 133 138 157 194 204 203 188 170 186 172 
UK 1272ε 1152 1258 1455 1644 1707 1995 1863 1596 1691 1812 1800 
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APPENDIX B:  POLITICAL PARTIES, LEFT VS. RIGHT 
This appendix details the use of the data in Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) database in order 
to craft a variable to use in the analysis of Hypothesis Hp8, concerning the politics of ruling parties.  
The idea is that left-wing parties are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than right-
wing parties are. The CMP database has ratio-level values measuring the left-vs-rightness of party 
manifestos. Like many datasets, the CMP database has missing values. The exercise in this appendix 
is threefold: 1) to explain how the scores of coalition governments are measured, 2) how the scores 
are affected by the time delay between the most recent election and the moment of decision, and 3) 
estimating the values of the missing data.  
In terms of measurement, the CMP database offers a score of right/left political agenda, into 
which a host of policy proposals from party manifestos are measured. The measure is a ratio-level 
variable that runs a spectrum from –100 (extreme left) to +100 (extreme right). The decisions on 
Turkey, however, rarely occur just after an election that brings (or returns) parties to power. The 
general rule of identifying a right-left value to assign to a government making a decision regarding 
the Turkish accession process will be to take the scores from the parties of the most recent election. 
As most European governments are coalition governments, it is necessary to create a means 
by which to calculate a government’s right- left score based on the right-left scores of the 
constituent parties of that coalition government. Because it is rarely the case that two parties have 
equal weight in the government, the scores of the constituent parties will be weighed by their share 
of seats in the directly-elected, or lower, house of their parliament. This may create a complication 
for those governments that have peculiar relationships with their upper houses, but in this research 
it is assumed that the lower houses more accurately reflect the weight of power in the coalition. In 
regard to minority governments, when these are formally supported by a party outside of the 
coalition - like that of Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s second cabinet – that supporting party will be 
included in the calculation of the governments’ right-left score. If there is no such formal support, 
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and the legislative alliances shift depending on the legislation in question, then only the coalition 
parties will be counted and weighed.  
In terms of timing, manifestos are generally written ahead of elections in order to give the 
members of the political parties a platform on which to campaign. As such, there is variation over 
time for each political party as they re-formulate their policy proposals to meet the strategic 
campaign and policy needs at each election, rather than those positions (and their measures) being 
fixed across time. In a few of these cases, the decisions have to be made concurrent with an election. 
These are the tricky cases where a campaign occurs while a government that has been incumbent for 
its term of office makes a decision while its replacement government is being formed. The sitting 
government will have been formed on a mandate of the manifestos on which it ran before its term 
of office, which will generally have been several years prior to the decision. In these cases, the 
method of measurement will be to still take the scored from the most recent (or concurrent) election 
and assign them to the parties, weighed by the results of the election that brought the sitting 
government to power.  
Regrettably, the CMP database does not have a score for all parties in every election. There 
are missing values for Austrian parties for the 2006 elections, the French RPR (the party of Jacques 
Chirac before he created the UMP), Greek parties after 2000. Luxembourg parties for the 2004 
elections, and Dutch parties for the elections of 2006. The general estimate for those missing values 
is the most recent prior score for that party. The necessary exceptions to that rule are determined as 
follows: 
In addition to the Austrian missing values after 2002, there is a missing value for the BZÖ 
party that assumed the coalition role of the FPÖ after that party split up into two factions. Because 
the BZÖ was not formed until 2005 when the Jörg Haider faction of the FPÖ split from the main 
party to create the BZÖ, it had never produced a manifesto separate from that of the FPÖ. In this 
case, the left-right estimator for the BZÖ will be that of the FPÖ in 1999. This is done because the 
governing members of the FPÖ were seen to have betrayed the spirit of the FPÖ of 1999, and the 
BZÖ attempted to return to the message that had brought them success in that earlier election. The 
‘straying’ of the FPÖ is also evident in the numbers. In 1999 it scored 25, but in 2002 it scored a 6. 
The BZÖ part of the coalition that governed in 2006 will therefore be counted as 25. In 
terms of the hypothesis, this runs a greater danger of a type I error (a false positive), because the 
higher left-right score pulls the overall coalition rightward. Given that in 2006 (as in 2002 and 2004) 
  563 
Austria was a brakeman, it supports the hypothesis. It, therefore, makes it more difficult to reject the 
hypothesis.    
France also has missing data in terms of not having Jacques Chirac’s RPR party represented 
in the CMP data. The values for the RPR will be extrapolated from the later values of Jacques 
Chirac’s UMP party. Further, the 29 left-wing deputies from diverse political parties that supported 
the Jospin government in 1997 will be not be counted for weighing, given that they do not have a 
right-left score. Given that they represent 5% of the National Assembly (which is counted as 0.5 of 
the cohabited government) this is considered a marginal loss of accuracy. 
France is also an exceptional case because it is a presidential system wherein the President 
has sweeping foreign policy powers. Sometimes, as was the case in 1997 and 1999, the party in 
power of the government and the party in the power of the Presidency are not the same and a 
situation called ‘cohabitation’ exists. In this case, the weight accorded to the President (using the 
values for his political party) will be 0.5 and the parties in the cabinet will, collectively, be accorded 
the other half. That second half will, however, be further weighed according to each party’s share of 
the seats controlled in the National Assembly. 
What is surprising in the French data is that Chirac’s UMP (and, thus, the RPR as well) is 
considered a left-of-center party. The data assigns a right-left value of –8.5 in 2002 and –12 in 2007, 
indicating that the scoring of the manifestos of that party considers Jacques Chirac and the UMP to 
be somewhat left-wing when compared to international political parties’ standards. This is odd 
considering that Jacques Chirac and his parties have long been the standard bearers of the moderate 
French right. 
For Ireland, a scoring for the Progressive Democrats’ (PD) manifestos are missing from the 
CMP data. As they were a small portion of the coalition with the Fianna Fáil governments of Bertie 
Ahern (numbering 4 out of 81 coalition deputies in 1997 and 1999, and 8 out of 89 in 2002, 2004 
and 2006), they will not be accounted for.  
With Italy, the missing data problem is greater, as the political party system shifts among 
groups of small, and frequently personal, parties. The four government parties in 1997 have not all 
been scored by the CMP data nor the ParlGov data. Thankfully, the ParlGov data scores the entire 
coalition at 2.6. The CMP data, on the other hand, only scores the senior part – the PDS 
(Democratic Party of the Left), and the FdV (Greens), leaving out the personal parties of Romano 
Prodi and Lamberto Dini. Regrettably, the weighed scores for the PDS and the FdV will have to 
suffice for drawing the coalition’s average score. For the government that held power in 2006 (the 
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second Prodi cabinet), there is similarly a large grouping if different political parties for which each 
have not been scored by the CMP data. Thankfully, many of the constituent parties of this coalition 
have been assigned the score of 17.1, which will be assigned to those coalition parties for which 
there is no separate score. 
For the Netherlands in 2002, the LPF has not been scored by the CMP data. Because by the 
time the decision regarding Turkey was made the cabinet had fallen, and the LPF ministers were no 
longer in position, the LPF will not be taken into account when calculating the coalition 
government’s score.  
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APPENDIX C: DEMOGRAPHY 
Because the Turkish populations in the EU-15 countries are very much seen as a factor in the 
decisions of member states with respect to Turkish membership in the EU, it has been necessary to 
estimate the Turkish populations in these countries. However, the legal integration (naturalization of 
citizenship) of the first generation and the coming of age of the second and third generations has 
made reporting on the numbers of people in the Turkish community very problematic. Different 
EU-members also have different means of conducting surveys, censuses, and registering their 
population with respect to identifying national or cultural identities. Eurostat, the Directorate-
General of the European Commission for statistical information, does not report on the cultural or 
citizenship identities of second-generation immigrant populations. Other databases, such as that of 
the OECD, offer data on citizenship numbers (while omitting some countries and some years for 
other countries), but also no numbers on the second-generation or third-generation Turks.  
Because it is of great interest to this research to have a decent estimate of Turkish 
populations, it is necessary to go to some lengths to generate numbers for the Turkish communities 
in each of the member-states. As arriving at the second-generation of Turks is difficult enough, only 
the number of first- and second-generation Turks will be counted as the Turkish community for 
each member state. This will, regrettably, underestimate the numbers in the Turkish communities in 
those countries with immigration going back the guest-worker programs in the 1960s and 1970s, 
such as Germany, Belgium, France, Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands.  
The operational definition for first-generation Turkish immigrants, when compiling the data 
is ‘persons born in Turkey’, rather than Turkish citizens, because the latter number would exclude 
naturalized citizens of the member states. For the second-generation, the databases frequently refer 
to that number as the ‘second generation’, or to ‘ancestry’ or ‘children of parents born in Turkey’. 
Full year-on-year numbers of first and second-generation Turkish immigrants are available from 
statistical databases for Belgium (available from NPData), Denmark (StatBank), and the Netherlands 
(Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek). From Statistik Austria, the first-generation numbers are 
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available from between and including 2002-2011. The preceding (1995-2001) first-generation 
numbers are estimated by linear extrapolation. Official estimates for the second-generation Turks 
are available for 2001 and 2011. The remaining second generation numbers are estimated using 
interpolation and extrapolation of the ratio of second-generation over second and first generation 
numbers from those years (0.33 and 0.38, respectively) and then multiplied by the first-generation 
numbers. 
The paragraphs below explain the estimation methods used to arrive at numbers for Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. It 
also explains why the available numbers for Greece are inadequate for the analyses. Because each 
uses a different method to arrive at estimate numbers for the first- and, where applicable, second-
generation Turkish immigrants it is worthwhile to take these numbers with some caution in terms of 
the comparative analyses in this research. They are nevertheless used because inaccuracies are 
unlikely to shift the numbers to the degree that they will be so dramatically off in the scale of 
national populations that they will significantly skew the results. 
The aggregate estimates of Turkish populations, both in absolute and relative to member-
state population, living in all the fifteen member states are gathered in Tables C.11 and C.12 at the 
end of this appendix. 
Finland 
The number of Turkish immigrants for Finland are estimated by an annual cumulative calculation of 
the net-migration from Turkey. This is an estimate, because it is assumed that the people 
immigrating from and emigrating to Turkey are, in fact, Turks. These numbers, from Tilastokeskus 
(Statistics Finland), start in 1987 when the net-migration is that of 20 people from Turkey into 
Finland (25 in, 5 out). In order to arrive at the second generation, these first-generation numbers are 
multiplied by the birth rate of children born to fathers (the amount of children born each year to 
male Turks/the amount of Turks in the population) derived from the French data )see below). 
These numbers are then cumulatively calculated per year. This makes the (hopefully not too heroic) 
assumption that Turkish males in Finland have the same birth rate as Turkish males in France (see 
below). This birth rate (average = 3.8%) is not too distant from the birth rate found for ‘Live-born 
children with foreign citizenship’ in Germany between 2007 and 2009 (3.3%), or that of ‘children 
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born to women born in Turkey’ over 1st generation population in Denmark in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 
2010 (3.4%). This suggests that the male 3.8% birth rate assumption is not outlandish. 
 
France 
For France, numbers of Turkish-born persons living in France are available from the Institut 
National de la Statistique et des Etudes Économiques (INSEE) for 1999 and 2005-2007. This leaves 
the necessity for arriving at numbers for the second generation of Turks. Fortunately, year-on-year 
numbers on children born to people (men or women) who were born in Turkey are available. 
Therefore, the second generation is calculated by summing the year-on-year numbers of births to 
Turkish fathers. Because the first wave of immigration involved more men than women, and these 
men did have children during that period, the figure of children born to men born in Turkey is 
considered a preferable estimator than children born to women born in Turkey. These numbers are 
available starting in 1966, with the first figure being 88 births (as opposed to 63 born to women 
born in Turkey). 
The sum of all the births to Turkish fathers in the year in question and all preceding years is 
considered the second generation of Turkish immigrants in any given year. The numbers generated 
by this method offer a ratio of second generation over first and second generation (1995: 0.40 – 
2008: 0.45) that is very similar to that of Denmark (1995: 0.37 – 2008: 0.45) and the Netherlands 
(1995: 0.38 – 2008: 0.48), though higher than that of Belgium (1995: 0.1 – 2008: 0.26), possibly 
owing to Belgium’s moratorium on immigration for economic reasons in the 1980s. Using the 
method described, the numbers for the second generation of Turks in France are estimated as 
follows: 
Table C.1: Estimated Number of Second-generation Turkish Immigrants Living in France. 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
99,588ε 105,775ε 112,138ε 118,863ε 125,553ε 133,231ε 
      
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
141,138ε 149,272ε 157,634ε 166,223ε 175,040ε 184,085ε 
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Germany 
For Germany, the Statistischen Bundesamt offers micro-census (survey) data estimates for the first 
and second generation for 2005-2009, from which the numbers for the preceding years have been 
extrapolated, offering the numbers in the Table C.2: 
Table C.2: Estimated Number of First and Second-generation Turkish Immigrants in Germany. 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
2,419,656ε 2,480,761ε 2,572,659ε 2,596,050ε 2,542,941ε 2,497,730ε 
      
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
2,453,041ε 2,421,765ε 2,396,459ε 2,279,674ε 2,493,000 2,495,000 
Greece 
The Turks living in Greece are of an entirely different sort than elsewhere in the EU-15 in that they 
are not immigrants. As a part of the former Ottoman Empire, Greece has many persons of Turkish 
identity living within its territory, despite a history of forced population movements in the early 20th 
century. Many of these are concentrated in Western Thrace, near the Turkish border, and on the 
Dodecanese islands. Due to fears of irredentism, the Greek government does not officially recognize 
Turks as a distinct identity, nor does it count ethnicities in its census. Further, the historical and 
present natures of the communities defy simple categorization, owing to the complication of 
definitions (Madianou, 2005).  
Thus, estimates of the size of the Turkish minority vary significantly. As it is the largest 
concentration, many attempts at counting have focused on Western Thrace, where in 1990 between 
120,000 and 130,000 were estimated in that region alone (Whitman, 1990). Estimates published in 
1999 range from 80,000 to 120,000, with experts considering the lower range to be more accurate, 
and the Greek authorities and the Turkish community claiming more than 120,000 (Human Rights 
Watch, 1999). The decline may be due to official encouragement for ethnic Turks to relocate 
elsewhere in Greece, meaning that the decline in Western Thrace would be offset by growing 
numbers elsewhere.  
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The safest methodological policy is to omit Greece from analyses dealing with demographic 
data on their domestic Turkish population. This is especially the case with regard to migration 
politics, as the Greek Turks are not immigrants; they are the ‘leftovers’, as it were, of the Ottoman 
Empire. 
Ireland 
The Central Statistics Office Ireland does not record nationalities other than EU-members or 
Americans. Turks are not required to register themselves with the embassy upon arrival, and 
Embassy staff estimates to interviewed members of the Turkish community vary widely (between 
650 according to the Embassy in 2006 to 2000-3000 according to the community (Lacey, 2007). 
According to Eurostat there were 645 Turks in Ireland as of 2009 and 710 in 2010. Presuming that 
these people probably did not all arrive in 2009 (according the immigration numbers, 72 arrived and 
40 departed in 2008), these numbers will be extrapolated over the preceding years. Doing so has, in 
mathematical theory, the first Turks arriving in 2000. Because of the assumed late start-date of 
immigration of Turks to Ireland, no second-generation Turks are assumed. 
Italy 
Italy is another country with minimal records on its amount of Turkish immigrants. Eurostat and 
ISTAT, the Italian national statistics institute, report on Turkish citizens living in Italy for the years 
1999-2009, but not the amount of people of Turkish birth or parentage. Because of this omission, it 
is necessary to make some estimate of the amount of Italian citizens of Turkish birth and their 
children. In order to estimate the number of Turks of non-Turkish citizenship living in Italy, to 
supplement the Turkish citizens living in Italy, several calculations must be made.  
First, it is necessary to extrapolate the amount of Turkish citizens living in Italy from the 
years for which this information is available to the preceding years. According to the numbers 
available, there was a relatively steadily rate of growth of Turkish citizens living in Italy from 1999 to 
2002. In 2003 that rate of growth accelerated dramatically, decreasing in the late 2000s, but still 
much higher than the prior years. Table C.3 offers the numbers and growth rates of Turks in Italy. 
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Table C.3: Turkish Citizens Living in Italy; Rate of Growth from the Preceding Year. 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
6,277 6,402 6,784 7,183 9,130 11,077 12,359 13,532 14,562 16,225 17,651 
6.2%ε 2.0% 5.6% 5.6% 21.3% 17.6% 10.4% 8.7% 7.1% 10.2% 8.1% 
 
It is assumed that the years 1999-2002 represent a more likely picture of the migration flow of the 
preceding years. Therefore, these numbers will be used to extrapolate the numbers of Turkish 
citizens living in Italy in the preceding years. Doing this extrapolation figures that Turks began their 
migration to Italy in 1980.  
Table C.4: Estimated number of Turkish citizens living in Italy in years prior to 1999. 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
0 ε 307 ε 617 ε 927 ε 1237 ε 1547 ε 1857 ε 2167 ε 2477 ε 2787 ε 
          
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
3097 ε 3407 ε 3717 ε 4027 ε 4337 ε 4647 ε 4957 ε 5267 ε 5577 ε 5887 ε 
 
Second, it is necessary to estimate the amount of Turks acquiring Italian citizenship. For 2008 and 
2009, Eurostat reports 299 and 273 Turkish citizens acquiring Italian citizenship, respectively. 
Because 2008 and 2009 are too close together to establish a valid trend line, the assumption is made 
that the average between them is a constant for what they measure, rather than a point along a 
decreasing trend. Given that the number of Turkish citizens living in Italy increased significantly (by 
8%), it is certainly not the case that there is an exodus of Turks from Italy.  
Italian law specifies that a foreigner must live in Italy for ten years prior to an application for 
citizenship. Therefore, number of citizenship acquisitions (299+273) is divided by the amount of 
Turkish citizens living in Italy ten years prior (5,887+6,277). This offers a rate of 4.7%. This rate is 
applied to the Turkish citizens in all the years between 1980 and 2009. These numbers are added 
together to estimate the number of 1st generation Turkish immigrants receiving Italian citizenship 
ten years after arrival. E.g. 4.7% multiplied by the 307 estimated Turkish citizens who arrived in 
1980, estimates that 14 Turks received for citizenship in 1990. Understandably, not all of the 307 
Turks estimated to have arrived in 1980 would have been there the whole ten years, as there is also 
an outflow of Turkish citizens from Italy, but the ten-year residency period is also not the only road 
to citizenship. 
  571 
The number of first-generation Italian citizens of Turkish birth for the years between 1995 
and 2006 are, therefore, estimated as follows: 
Table C.5: Estimated number of Italian citizens of Turkish birth living in Italy. 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
305ε 407ε 523ε 655ε 800ε 960ε 1,135ε 1,324ε 1,528ε 1,747ε 1,980ε 2,228ε 
 
Because many of the second-generation of Turkish immigrants are presumed to remain Turkish 
citizens, and applying a birth rate to the estimated number of Italian citizens of Turkish birth yields 
negligible results, an estimate for the second generation will be omitted. Using the above 
estimations, the estimated population of persons with a Turkish identity, living in Italy, is in the 
table, below, together with the percentage of the overall Italian population. Checking this number 
with the single figure from the 2001 census shows the estimate for the 1st generation (persons born 
in Turkey) as underestimating the figure by 230 persons (a 3% error). Given that this discrepancy, 
over a total Italian population in 2001 of 57 million, is negligible, the single figure for 2001 will be 
corrected, but the numbers otherwise will remain as estimated. 
Table C.6: Estimated number of people with a Turkish identity living in Italy 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
5,262ε 5,674ε 6,100ε 6,541ε 7,077ε 7,362ε 
0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 
      
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
8,149 (7,919ε) 8,507ε 10,658ε 12,824ε 14,339ε 15,760ε 
0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 
 
Despite inflating the citizenship numbers with the estimated numbers of Turks with Italian 
citizenship, by the above-explained method, the estimated number of Turks is still a very low 
percentage in comparison to those countries that are known to have attracted more Turkish 
immigration, such as Germany and Austria, (3% in 2006), the Netherlands and Belgium (2%, in 
2006), or Denmark (1%). It should be mentioned, however, that the Turkish population in Italy is 
growing very rapidly. Note that these numbers do not take into consideration any rate of deaths. 
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Because of the recent arrival of the immigrants, and the strong tendency for immigrants to be 
young, few are assumed to have died. 
Luxembourg 
Yet another country with limited statistics on the Turkish community is Luxembourg. According to 
the Luxembourg decennial census of 2001, there were 290 people of Turkish birth living in 
Luxembourg, 207of whom were Turkish citizens. According to the 1991 census there were 190 
persons of Turkish citizenship living in Luxembourg. That census did not count people by country 
of birth. The results of the 2011 Census have not been published at the time of writing.  
It is worthwhile to take some caution in extrapolating the change in numbers of Turkish 
citizens onto the numbers of 1st generation Turkish immigrants. The change in Turkish citizens from 
1991 to 2001(190-207) is minimal for a ten-year period. The numbers in other countries show that 
the numbers of Turkish citizens can remain roughly the same or even decline, while the 1st 
generation of Turkish immigrants grows, so long as naturalization of previously Turkish citizens 
exceeds the net-migration of Turkish citizens. This is, indeed, what happens during the period in 
question in the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium. Therefore, while there may be a minimal 
difference between the numbers of Turkish citizens in Luxembourg, this does not necessarily mean 
that the amount of citizens of Luxembourg born in Turkey is not increasing at a considerably greater 
rate. It is, therefore, deemed preferable to disregard the annualized rate of increase of the number of 
Turkish citizens between 1991 and 2001 (0.9%), for estimating the number of 1st generation Turkish 
immigrants.       
Fortunately, Eurostat provides naturalization data and numbers on the inflow and outflow 
of Turkish citizens for 2002-2009 and 1999-1009 respectively. The naturalization numbers are 
supplemented for the years 1999-2001 with OECD data. These figures allow the number of Turkish 
citizens and Luxembourgers of Turkish birth to be calculated, understanding that there will be some 
discrepancy owing to complications of citizenship laws between Turkey and Luxembourg54. For 
those years that net-migration and naturalization numbers are unavailable, a linear extrapolation 
                                                
54 Acquiring citizenship in Luxembourg requires one to renounce one’s former citizenship, but that renunciation may 
not have to be recognized in Turkey. This discrepancy is probably diminished by the assumption that Naturalized 
Turkish Luxembourgers that have not renounced their Turkish citizenship in Turkey will not likely inform the 
Luxembourgois census bureau that they are Turkish citizens.  
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from following four years is used, in order to estimate these figures. This process calculates and 
estimates the following numbers: 
Table C.7: Estimated Number of Persons of Turkish Birth Living in Luxembourg. 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
201ε 210ε 220ε 231ε 246 271 290 300 329 350 375 375 
 
That, however, leaves the second generation of Turkish immigrants to be estimated. Because longer 
trends are unavailable, the ratios of first- to second-generation should not be assumed to be similar 
to that of Luxembourg’s neighbors. In fact, longer-term migration data is available for other 
nationalities, and these figures paint a certain picture. The striking amount of Portuguese immigrants 
arriving in the 1970s (5,783 by 1970; 29, 309 by 1981, as opposed to persons from Asia; 579 by 
1981, and 1,612 by 1991, of which only 190 were Turks), suggests that the Portuguese immigrant 
community, and to a lesser extend the Spanish (2,155 in 1970; 2,073 in 1981) fulfilled Luxembourg’s 
guest-worker needs, in contrast to that of neighboring Germany and the Netherlands, where Turks 
provided much more of the labor. Therefore, assuming few Turks arriving in the 1960s and the 
1970s and only 190 by the end of the 1980s, it is safe to assume that the second generation is not 
very numerous.  
With 190 Turkish citizens in Luxembourg in 1991, out of 1,612 from Asia overall, the 
starting number for calculating a growing second generation will be 70 (190/1,612 = 0.12; 0.12*579 
= 70). Using the same birth rate found in France, that number offers an estimated second 
generation in the table below. A combined first and second generation Turkish population and 
percentage of the overall Luxembourg population also found in Table C.8 below.  
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Table C.8: Estimated number of people with a Turkish identity living in Luxembourg. 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
86ε 94ε 102ε 111ε 121ε 131ε 142ε 153ε 166ε 179ε 193ε 208ε 
287ε 304ε 322ε 342ε 367ε 402ε 432ε 453ε 495ε 529ε 568ε 583ε 
.07%ε .07%ε .08%ε .08%ε .09%ε .09%ε .10%ε .10%ε .11%ε .12%ε .12%ε .12%ε 
 
With the addition of the expected second-generation Turkish immigrants, the number of people 
with a Turkish background in Luxembourg is still very modest, even in comparison to 
Luxembourg’s small population size. Like Italy, the above numbers do not take deaths into account, 
for the same reason. 
Spain 
For Spain, Eurostat reports both persons by country of birth (1999-2010) and by citizenship (1998-
2010) for people from Turkey. Given that Spain has not been a country where significant numbers 
of Turks have migrated to for many decades, it is assumed that there is no need to pursue figures for 
a second generation of Turkish immigrants to Spain. In the numbers, however, there is an odd 
discrepancy, with more Turkish citizens than persons born in Turkey being reported in 2001. 
Barring the possibility that several hundred persons born in Spain, having acquired Turkish 
citizenship, re-emigrated to Spain in 2001 and swiftly departed the following year, it is presumed that 
these numbers were transposed. As such, these numbers will be substituted, and the number of 
persons born in Turkey will be used in the analyses of this research. Numbers for the years prior to 
1999 will be extrapolated from the available data, though the negative number that this method 
provides for 1995 will be discarded. 
Portugal 
Portugal is a country of few Turks. Eurostat reports numbers of Turkish citizens for the years 1998-
2003 and 2007-2010. Turkish-born persons residing in Portugal are counted for 2002 and 2009, with 
those numbers only 5 and 10 greater than the amounts of Turkish citizens for those years, 
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respectively. This indicates that very few of the very few persons born in Turkey living in Portugal 
adopt Portuguese citizenship. The gaps will be filled by interpolation and extrapolation, but given 
how few numbers of these persons there are in Portugal the numbers essentially shrink to all-but- 
nothing in comparison to the Portuguese population. 
Sweden 
The Turkish population of Sweden is another number that will require some estimation to 
approximate. In contrast to Luxembourg, there is more information available. The number of 
persons living in Sweden born in Turkey is available from 1999 from the Statistika centralbyrån and 
the OECD. The numbers for the preceding years can be extrapolated. However, unlike Luxembourg 
and Italy, Sweden is a country that enjoyed many Turkish guest-workers in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Therefore, it also has a substantial population of second-generation Turkish immigrants.  
Westin (2003, p. 990) reports that in 2000, 44% of Turks living in Sweden were born in 
Sweden. That is a ratio very comparable to those of the Netherlands and Denmark, though over the 
course of the late 1990s and 2000s, those ratios of the second-generation to overall Turkish 
population increased steadily by, on average 0.65 percentage points per year. This increase will be 
applied to the Swedish ratio of second generation to overall population in order to estimate the 
second-generation population for the years in question. These numbers – percentage and estimated 
second-generation populations – are given in the table below:  
Table C.9: Estimated number of second-generation Turkish persons in Sweden 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
40.7%ε 41.4%ε 42.0%ε 42.7%ε 43.3%ε 44.0% 
26,499ε 27,495ε 28,491ε 29,487ε 31,409 31,894 
18,219ε 19,420ε 20,670ε 21,971ε 24,033ε 25,060ε 
      
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
44.7%ε 45.3%ε 46.0%ε 46.6%ε 47.3%ε 47.9% 
32,453 33,094 34,083 34,965 35,853 37,107 
26,181ε 27,410ε 28,981ε 30,520ε 32,125ε 34,128ε 
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United Kingdom 
As immigrants from Turkey are only a small subset of total immigration into the United Kingdom, 
reporting on persons born in Turkey (and Turkish citizens) in the UK is sporadic in the data 
available from the Office for National Statistics (ONS), Eurostat and the OECD.  There are, 
however, enough numbers for persons born in Turkey to make reasonable extrapolations and 
interpolations. Though the United Kingdom did not bring Turks into its borders through guest-
worker programs, the UK nevertheless had a 1960s influx of Turks from Cyprus. This influx 
increased in the 1970s and 1980s following the violent events on the island, and the economic 
isolation of Northern Cyprus after the Turkish invasion of 1974. These Turkish Cypriots afterwards 
invited mainland Turks to Britain as guest workers, thus acting in a similar manner as the official 
guest-worker programs of the northwestern European countries. 
As such, the Turkish community is long-standing in a similar manner as the countries with 
Turkish guest workers, and second-generation Turkish immigrants are assumed to be present. Their 
numbers will be estimated in the same manner as was done for the second generation of Turks in 
Sweden, estimating by way of a multiplier derived from a presumed share of the second generation 
out of the whole. Because the mass migration began in the 1960, in the same way as that for 
Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands, a ratio taken from the average of those countries (44.1%) 
will be applied to the persons born in Turkey, with the same rate of increase of that ratio applied 
over the span of years in question, centered on 2002. This produces the following numbers in the 
same format as for Sweden, above:   
Table C.10: Estimated percentage of second-generation Turks in the UK 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
39.5%ε 40.2%ε 40.8%ε 41.5%ε 42.1%ε 42.8%ε 
39,238ε 41,976ε 44,713ε 45,448 50,927 49,254 
25,649ε 28,195ε 30,857ε 32,219ε 37,083ε 36,834ε 
      
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
43.4%ε 44.1%ε 44.7%ε 45.4%ε 46.0%ε 46.7%ε 
55,664ε 58,401ε 69,876 61,343 66,614ε 74,000ε 
42,748ε 46,054ε 56,576ε 50,992ε 56,846ε 64,826ε 
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Following the methods of calculation and estimation above, the populations of Turks among the 
EU-15 member countries, except for Greece, are as follows: 
Table C.11: Estimated number of first and second-generation Turks in the EU-15. 
 1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 
Austria 165,000 179,000 190,000 217,000 235,000 
Belgium 115,000 125,000 146,000 161,000 177,000 
Denmark 43,000 47,000 52,000 54,000 55,000 
Finland 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 
France 270,000 302,000 350,000 381,000 413,000 
Germany 2,573,000 2,543,000 2,422,000 2,280,000 2,495,000 
Greece N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Ireland 0 0 200 300 450 
Italy 6,000 7,000 9,000 13,000 16,000 
Luxembourg 300 400 500 500 600 
Netherlands 280,000 300,000 331,000 352,000 364,000 
Portugal 70 80 110 200 260 
Spain 200 700 1,000 2,000 2,000 
Sweden 49,000 55,000 61,000 65,000 71,000 
UK 76,000 88,000 104,000 112,000 139,000 
Table C.12: Estimated percentage of first and second-generation Turks in the EU-15. 
 1997 1999 2002 2004 2006 
Austria 2.07% 2.24% 2.36% 2.66% 2.85% 
Belgium 1.13% 1.23% 1.42% 1.55% 1.68% 
Denmark 0.82% 0.88% 0.97% 1.01% 1.02% 
Finland 0.06% 0.07% 0.10% 0.12% 0.14% 
France 0.45% 0.50% 0.57% 0.61% 0.65% 
Germany 3.14% 3.10% 2.94% 2.76% 3.03% 
Greece N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Ireland 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 
Italy 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.03% 
Luxembourg 0.08% 0.09% 0.10% 0.12% 0.12% 
Netherlands 1.80% 1.90% 2.05% 2.16% 2.23% 
Portugal 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Spain 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 
Sweden 0.56% 0.63% 0.68% 0.73% 0.79% 
UK 0.13% 0.15% 0.18% 0.19% 0.23% 
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